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PREFACE 
It is estimated that the initial capital cost of equipment leased 
by U. K. organisations in the public and private sectors of the 
economy now aggregate to something like one and a half billion 
pounds sterling. however, opinions differ on several 
fundamental issues relevant to this phenomenon: 
1. How and why has the pace and development been so rapid? 
2. To what extent is and must leasing be a by-product of a 
particular system of corporate taxation? 
3. How should an equipment leasing contract be evaluated? 
4. How should the lease-or-buy alternatives be analysed? 
5, What is the contribution of leasing to financial nanagenent 
strategies, especially in the nanagernent of working capital? 
6. To what extent does the leasing decision, per se, involve 
3 
an integration of corporate investnent and financing decisions? 
7. How should equipment leases be accounted for in the books of 
the Lessor and Lessee? g 
In a doctoral study of equipment leasing and company financing 
decisions, it is inevitable that the researcher must delve into 
a multitude of subject areas if he is to correctly portray the 
richness of the problem being confronted. Unhappily, the 
complexities surrounding the leasing decision are often overlooked 
in the literature in favour of a series of simplifying assumptions. 
Generally this approach is received with equanimity as being 
essential to the progress of knowledge and the understanding of 
complex issues. However, in order to achieve a satisfactory 
4" 
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examination of the leasing decision we require a broader frame 
of reference. Researchers must strive for a more complete 
understanding not only of the immediate problem, but they must 
also undertake a thorough analysis of what may appear to be 
(but on reflection are not) peripheral issues: such as, corporate 
taxation, mathematical programing nodels of the integrated 
investment and financing decisions, debt management and debt 
capacity, the commercial and economic environment in which 
leasing decisions are taken, and the formation of fixed and 
working capital. 
Clearly, these topics are major research areas in their own right 
and this Thesis rust of necessity restrict its enquiry into each 
subject, but because they inter-act with the leasing decision to 
such a significant extent they must be investigated and scrutinised 
J 
in an effort to illustrate the true dimension of the problem. 
Throughout the discipline of financial nanagernent there exists a 
most urgent priority for empirical research, and this is especially 
true of leasing. Prior to this study there has only been a 
limited exploration of industrial and banking practice in this 
regard, with most of the survey data being collected in the U. S. A. 
The issues and questions raised above are of significant concern 
to academic and businessmen alike, but empirical evidence in 
support of the various leasing algorithms proposed and a 
considered exchange of opinions are notably missing. Hopefully 
this Thesis bridges the gap in some measure and provides a route 
for other researchers to follow. 
- 15 - 
One problem that immediately confronts such an approach to . 
research is that of perception. An important illustration of 
this difficulty is found in the debate between the modern- 
traditional and 111111 schools of financial theory, and the behaviour 
of executive in "real life". Like the philosophers stone, the 
concept of an optimal capital structure is illusive and yet is 
vigorously debated in theoretical argument; in practice its 
existence is believed in, but without sound rationale as to its 
precise location. The conceptual framework developed in this 
Thesis differs from prescriptive solutions as to the merits, or 
otherwise, of a pre-determined optimal debt-equity ratio, and 
favours the work of DONALDSON who argued that, companies should 
develop a unique and internal assessment of their debt bearing 
capacity based upon their cash-flow projections and forecasts. 
Despite encouraging developments in industry towards this 
objective a good many executives do behave as if they were 
constrained in the development of their financial structure by a 
limit on their debt-equity ratio. Thus, when the leasing strategy 
termed "Spill-Over" is introduced -- where companies believe they 
have exhausted their normal supplies of debt capital -- it is 
quite clear that they behave as if existing pockets of debt can 
be exhausted and that their capital structure is at its upper 
limit, but. that spare capacity exists in that pocket of debt 
termed leasing finance. This Thesis will explore some of the 
underlying reasons for this aspect of corporate behaviour which 
clearly depends upon a complex matrix of events and perceptions. 
- Z6 - 
The hoped-for outcome of this research is to establish leasing 
as an integral part of corporate financing strategy. Most of 
the equipment leasing in the U. K. is written by one or other of 
the leasing subsidiaries of the banking or financial 
establishments in this country -- leasing is no longer (if it 
ever was) "second class financing", the "last refuge of an 
improvident manager. " 
13 
7 
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SYNOPSIS 
The U. K. capital market has observed a remarkable growth in 
the use of lease financing as a tool of financial management. It 
must be recognised, however, that its profitable use by Industry 
is dependent upon an easily applicable and theoretically 
acceptable method of evaluation within corporate capital budgeting 
procedures. 
Increasingly, analysts have come to acknowledge the need to 
integrate corporate investment and financing decisions insofar as 
concerns the acquisition of industrial plant and equipment. 
However, traditional methods of lease evaluation fail to examine 
its integrative nature, and in consequence,. 
-they 
neglect the 
critical interdependencies which encompass the simultaneous 
decision process. 
Extant lease evaluation models also fail to consider the 
consequences of the earnings generated by the "Residual Capital 
Balances". That is, the working capital freed when leasing is 
strategically used to relax what otherwise would be an 
unacceptable shortage of funds. Such earnings are a 
fundamental part of an integrated lease cash-flow profile under 
certain circumstances: namely, the use of leasing as part of a 
"Planned Financing nix", as opposed to its use as an emergency 
or "spill-over" financing when no residual capital occurs. 
On the basis of extensive empirical study into the circumstances 
under which U. K. financial management had recourse to leasing, 
a hypothesis was developed to explain the role of leasing in 
- 18 - 
corporate financial planning and debt management. The research 
proceeds to establish models for the evaluation of leasing under 
"spill-over" conditions (where all otherwise available sources 
of finance are, or appear to be, exhausted) and "Planned 
Financing" conditions (when the use of leasing in quantitative 
terns is formally envisaged as part of the corporate financing 
policy). In this way it is possible to determine the risks 
implicit in the haphazard use of leasing together with the 
benefits available to its planned use. 
CHAPTER 1 
THE INSTITUTIONALLY ACCEPTED/PERCEIVED ROLE OF 
THE LEASING INDUSTRY -- ITS HISTORY AND GROWTH 
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
-1- 
INTRODUCTION 
In this Chapter a brief history of the development of lease financing 
in the United Kingdom will be traced, and some of the more relevant factors 
which have contributed towards its acceptance, growth and maturity as a fi- 
nancial instrument will be outlined. It is considered necessary to lay this 
foundation so that the reader is then aware of the current state of the 
leasing industry. It will also prove valuable to the discussion in later 
Chapters of an Industrial Survey, carried out as part of this research study, 
into the current attitudes of financial executives towards the use and evalu- 
ation of leasing finance. 
As part of the opening debate the various advantages and disadvantages 
of leasing, as they are frequently seen in academic and professional litera- 
ture on the subject, will be reviewed. Comment on the validity or otherwise 
of the points raised will be delayed until a later Chapter of the Thesis. As 
will be observed from the data presented, the growth of leasing in the U. K. 
(and indeed elsewhere in the world) has been quite remarkable. An effort is 
made to identify the more influential factors in this process by examining `J 
the role of Government and Fiscal intervention in the economy to control and 
regulate industrial investment (a subject which is returned to in Chapter 3). 
In particular, the impact on leasing of the various Capital Allowance systems 
that have been introduced over the years and the different rates of Corpora- 
tion Tax are considered. 
Throughout the discussion attention will be paid to the financial insti- 
tutions which comprise the leasing industry, that is, the Joint Stock and 
Merchant Banks. Their motives for entering the industry are questioned: 
was it simply for taxation reasons, or was it a genuine desire to add to the 
portfolio of services they could offer to clients? This question is couched 
in the light of available data on the profitability of the leasing 
a 
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industry, which for many lessors has been poor. 
In the second Chapter, a review of the current (1975) debate on the 
new Accounting Standard for the recording of the profitability of 
leasing contracts in the books of the lessor is undertaken. The major 
position, outlining a suitable technique to be adopted as an appropri- 
ate standard, is discussed in depth, with some of the implicit assump-, 
tions about the "nature and financing" of a leasing organisation that 
the proposal contains being challenged. 
1.1. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN, AND DEFINITION OF, AN OPERATING AND FINANCIAL 
LEASE 
A lease is a method of financing the use of an asset. The leasing 
company - henceforth known as the lessor - will undertake to provide 
capital goods and equipment of almost any nature to a customer - 
henceforth known as the lessee - in return for a negotiated schedule 
of repayments. 
The instalments will be paid over two distinct periods: 
THE PRIMARY PERIOD Where the-repayments to the lessor will be suficient 
to (i) amortize the initial cost of the equipment, 
net of any grant or allowance that may be available 
from the Government and passed on to the lessee, 
(ii) repay the interest costs incurred by the les- 
sor and, (iii) cover the lessors overheads, admini- 
stration costs and his profit in a predetermined 
series of instalments. 
-3- 
THE SECONDARY PERIOD 
This occurs on termination of the primary period 
and can extend for a specified or indefinite number 
of years. The lessee is entitled to continue using 
the equipment on payment of a much reduced rental, 
(peppercorn rent), which usually takes the form 
of 11 per annum or a fee which represents a mini- 
mal percentage of the original cost of the asset. 
There exist two principal types, or forms, of lease financing which 
were originally distinguished in the literature by R. F. VANCIL 
[135, p8-91 1 
OPERATING LEASES These may be defined as, a contract for the use of 
an asset which involves no significant future com- 
mitment for the lessee. An operating lease may be 
cancelled by the lessee with only a short period 
of notification being required. The asset would 
then be returned to the lessor. The use of an ope- 
rating lease gives the lessee an increased flexi- 
bility in that it enables him to continually review 
and adjust the level of assets he funds in this 
manner. 
The lessor will expect short period contracts for operating leases with 
a variety of lessees sequentially using the same asset over its life- 
time. Thus, the rate at which the rental is set is a reflection of the 
-4- 
amount of compensation required by the lessor in return for the poten- 
tial risk of being unable to re-lease, or sell, the asset. As a general 
rule, the type of assets attracting operating lease facilities are sub- 
ject, by their very nature, to an uncertain and often rapid obsolescence. ' 
Hence, while operating lease rentals may be considered high, part of 
that cost is an insurance policy paid to reduce the consequences of a 
more catastrophic loss that could possibly ensue if the asset was owned 
by the lessee. Two further technical points: it is extremely unlikely 
that the asset will be wholly amortized during a specific operating 
lease contract; and, as may be deduced, there is no secondary period 
in an operating lease although payments may be designed to reduce af- 
ter a given amount of time has expired. 
FINANCIAL LEASES These may be defined as an contract involving pay- 
ment over a specified period of a sum sufficient 
to amortize the initial outlay and associated costs 
of a lessor plus his profit. This obligatory, or 
primary, period is generally less than, or at most 
equal to, the estimated useful life of the asset. 
Once this period is completed the lessee is enti- 
tled to negotiate for a secondary period of usage 
of the asset, generally at a nominal period rental. 
The lease involves a significant and unavoidable 
future commitment of cash-flow as it cannot be can- 
celled. Nor usually can it be made the subject of 
a major revision in the terms (In practice, cancella- 
tions or revisions are not unknown, although they 
., 
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are infrequent: however, given honourable intention 
on the part of the lessee, they are not usually en- 
visaged when the lease is first agreed)1. The les- 
see is invariably responsible for maintenance and 
all other incidental costs associated with the as- 
set, such as repairs and insurance, unless such ser- 
vices form part of the contract. A financial lease 
is sometimes refered to as a fully pay-out lease. 
For purposes of determining the extent of a company's Corporation Tax 
liability, the Inland Revenue must be satisfied that the lessor retains 
at all times the legal ownership (equity) of the asset, while the les- 
see will have physical possesion and use of the asset during the con- 
tracted period. This very strict legal aspect of leasing distinquishes 
it from the other common varients of instalment debt currently available. 
It is relevant to differentiate between the three most frequently obser- 
ved categories, namely: leasing; hire purchase; and conditional sale. 
"Selection of the asset by the lessee normally distinguishes 
leasing from hiring. In hiring (including plant hire and con- 
tract hire) the assets are usually bought by the hiring-out 
firm before the initial user appears on the scene. The hiring- 
out firm is in business to hire-out a particular range of 
goods in which it specialises and for which it charges a regu- 
lar tariff. The intending user chooses from the stock already 
1. The termination of a lease contract may be allowed providing that (a) the lessee recompenses the lessor with a lump sum equal to the remaining value 
of the instalments plus an agreed penalty, or (b) if the lessee intends to 
update (increase) the value of his commitment by trading-in the original 
asset for a more expensive one. 
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held by the hiring-out firm. 
In contrast, the first step in leasing is for the user to 
select a particular asset on which a lease is then negotia- 
ted. Such a negotiated lease is often on tailor-made terms 
and is with a third party (the leasing company) who acquires 
the asset after it has been chosen by the lessee. Leasing 
companies, are financial institutions which are in business 
to lease any item of capital equipment which their customers 
may wish to buy". 
C 42 ]EQUIPMENT LEASING ASSOCIATION 
The Equipment Leasing Association is the London based collection of 
U. K. lessors and representative body of the leasing industry (hereafter 
termed the E. L. A. ). 
A conditional sales contract, on the other hand, is more well known and 
widely used in the United States. Occasionally, some poorly phrased and 
hence bogus leasing contracts may allow the lessee to purchase the 
equipment at the termination of the primary period. The Inland Revenue 
would class such a lease as a conditional sale and withdraw the taxa- 
tion privileges enjoyed by a lease. 
"Under the (conditional) sales contract, the buyer agrees 
to buy a particular piece of equipment and pay for it in in- 
stalments over a one-to-five year period. Until payment is 
completed, the seller of the equipment continues to hold title 
to the equipment. This fact gives rise to the name conditional 
sales contract - the sale is conditional upon a satisfactory 
completion of the payments. While the contract is being paid 
I 
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off, the purchaser has possesion of the equipment and 
uses it'in his business". 
WESTON & BRIGHAM C 144; pp 529/3031 
One further important term in the leasing 'vocabulary' may also be no- 
ted -- "leveraged leasing". When an asset is the subject of a leverag- 
ed lease the following, frequently complex, arrangements have been made: 
A holding company will be formed between three parties, 
(1) the lessee, (2) a genuine leasing company or bank, and (3) a group 
of individuals or companies. The function of the leasing company is to 
act as negotiator, administrator and general intermediary between the 
groups. It is normal practice for the lessor to contribute a modest 
amount of 'equity' to the deal, but the majority of the capital is 
provided by the individuals or companies by way of a 'debt' contract 
between them and the holding company. Thus, the total. capital sum is 
said to be levered, 'being part 'equity' and 'part debt'1. 
In the vast majority of cases it is only worthwhile organising such a 
detailed agreement for very large contracts running into millions of 
pounds2. The financial backers of the lease are invariably seeking to 
profit from the tax shelter afforded by the lease, as such it is com- 
mon for them to be highly liquid and subject to a high rate of taxa- 
tion. It is more common to observe leveraged leases in the U. S. A., where 
they have been practiced for several years. However, there are some no- 
table examples of this form of financing contract in the U. K. (vide, 
1. The terms debt and equity are somewhat of a misnomer, or legal fiction, in 
that both groups provide debt. For all practical purpose the distinction is 
artificial (except that it could be said that the leasing company is invol- 
ving some of its or its parents equity) serving only to differentiate be- 
tween the two sources of funds provided. I 
2. For further details and case-studies see VANDERWICKEN [139]»nd CHILDS& 
GRINDLEY [333 
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the British Rail scheme discussed in more detail in section 1.7 infra). 
The purpose of this Thesis is to explore the profitable use of lease 
financing within corporate capital budgeting procedures. As such it 
will be necessary to judge leasing by some economic indicator in order 
to determine the extent of its use, and the conditions under which it 
is most advantageous to employ it as a financial strategy. The quanti- 
tative analysis of a leasing contract will be considered in later Chap- 
ters, but at this juncture an examination will be made of what have 
come to be regarded as the 'institutionally accepted advantages and 
disadvantages of leasing'. Comment on some of the issues raised will 
be postponed until the matter is considered in depth at a later stage; 
or, given that the issues relate to industrial practice, until the In- 
dustrial Survey of U. K. financial management's perceptions of leasing 
is considered. 
Nonetheless, where it is appropriate some comment and discussion will 
take place. Hopefully this will assist a realistic detachment of myth 
from reality and provide an opportunity to determine whether the 'pros 
and cons' frequently mentioned in the literature and promotional adver- 
tising are indeed accurate. 
Many of the points mentioned in the list below have indefinable origins, 
growing in number as leasing became more widespread and people began 
writing on the subject. It is not intended to be in any way an exhaus- 
tive list; however, it is hoped that the major advantages and disad- 
vantages are covered. A variety of source materials has been used, but 
1. For example: VANCIL [135]; E. L. A. [421 ; McLEAN [96] 1; B. I. M. [23] ; BARNES [11]`; GANT [58]'; OGDEN [108]; JACKSON [781'. Other sources in- 
clude the Financial Times and the Investors Chronicle. 
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it would be tedious to reference every item as this would in some sense 
imply originality where clearly none exists. 
1.2 THE ADVANTAGE OF LEASING - FOR THE LESSEE 
1. Leasing only involves a limited initial charge on capital to secure 
a productive, cash generating, asset. As such, it does not 'tie-up' 
capital in depreciating equipment and has the added advantage that 
future lease instalment can be made from the income produced by the 
equipment itself. Because the commitment can be self-liquidating it 
is commonly thought to be popular among companies which are expand- 
ing fast with limited capital resources. This technique is sometimes 
referred to in the literature as 'boot-strap' financing. 
2. Leasing can ease and help control cash-flow planning in a company. 
If the cash-flow 'profile can be anticipated with some degree of accu- 
racy then it may be possible to circumvent present or forecasted 
illiquidity. by skillfully using leasing to overcome capital restrict- 
ions and obtain what perhaps may be a much needed piece of equipment. 
The leasing companies will be prepared to negotiate schedules of a 
specific shape and size in order to accommodate expected cash-flow 
peaks and troughs. This manipulation of repayments may help to in- 
crease the planned investment in machinery which under normal cir- 
cumstances would have to be foregone through lack of liquid resour- 
ces. Leasing is a highly flexible financial source able to offer ad- 
vantages which conventional forms of finance rarely can. 
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3. Repayments are known and fixed at the outset and are not expected 
to fluctuate from the original contract. This assists forward plan- 
ning, budgeting and management discipline. Cash-flow forecasts are 
strenthened and future problem areas may be anticipated and pre- 
pared for. 
4. Leasing commitments do not appear directly in the lessee's Balance 
Sheet. At the present time the only statutory obligation regarding 
disclosure in the accounts of the lessee (in regard to hire charges 
payable) is contained in paragraph 12(1) (gb) Schedule 2, Companies 
Act. 1967. 
FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF ADVANTAGE 4 
The above Act requires that the amount if material charged to revenue 
in respect of sums payable for the hire of plant and machinery should 
be disclosed as a separate item in the statutory Profit and Loss account 
of a company. This is in many ways a very unsatisfactory piece of com- 
pany law as it does not differentiate between the various forms of 
hiring, nor does it give any clear indication of the capital commitment 
undertaken by an organisation when it leases. The use of the subjective 
term 'material' is often open to wide interpretations. 
At the time of writing the Equipment Leasing Association has submitted 
a detailed proposal2 to the Acc96ting Standard Steering Committee of 
1. It is interesting to speculate whether the hiring of a telephone system, 
for example, ccmes within the spirit of the law. 
2. Entitled, "Report and Recommendations on Accounting Procedures for lessors 
and lessees of industrial and commercial equipment". Submitted to the ASSC 
28th July, 1974. This is discussed extensively in Chapter 2. 
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the Joint Accountancy Bodies which is intended to influence the direc- 
tion of a future exposure draft on this subject. An analysis and cri- 
ticism of part of their proposal is to be found in Chapter 2. 
There is a wealth of literature, mainly American, on this aspect of 
leasing which is generally known under the all embracing title of "Off 
Balance Sheet Financing". The range of views expressed is wide, but 
they seem to warrant classification under three alternative proposi- 
tions relating to the recording of the corporate use of a lease: 
A. It is argued that lease payments are in every respect similar to 
debt repayments and, consequently, the lease repayment schedule 
should be capitalised at some appropriate rate so as to reflect this 
debt equivalence. The resulting liability would appear in the Balan- 
ce Sheet together with the written down value of the assets., 
Needlesstosay, a great deal of debate centres around the selection of 
an appropriate rate of discount and the consequent impropriety of re- 
cording in the accounts an asset which is not owned, nor will never be. 
In an important study commissioned by the American Accounting Institute 
in 1962, MYERS [104] suggests four alternative capitalisation rates: 
1. There is a body of opinion which looks at this problem from the view of 
divisionalised companies and financial ratio analysis. Thus SOLOMONS 
[125, ppl31,134] and KNUTSON [83] suggest that lease repayments have si- 
milar characteristics to a conventional depreciation charge. Suitable 
capitalisation of leases would then ensure comparability with 'ordinary' 
fixed assets when computing divisional or corporate return on capital 
performance ratios. TOMKINS quite rightly notes this potential loophole 
in divisional reporting and warns that, The possibility of leasing 
equipment instead of purchasing it merely to increase the reported di- 
visional return on investment should be forseen by head-office". 
[131, p144]. 
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(i) The lessor's earning rate: "the interest rate to be used in 
discounting the rental is that used in setting the rentals". 
(ii) Adjust the current "prime rate of interest" for the lessee's 
creditworthyness. 
(iii) Add a half of one percent to the cost of the last debt raised 
by the lessee. 
(iv ) Add a half of one percent to a debt instrument of similar size 
as the lease that the lessee could currently raiser. 
VATTER [139, p127] ; dismissed them all and suggested the lessee's cost 
of capital; while ZISES [149, p4O] considers that a decision to capi- 
talise a lease may in the end prove to be detrimental to the industry. 
For if, as it is assumed, the purpose of capitalising a lease is to' 
express its debt equivalent, then ZISES feels that the past "customs 
and mores" of the U. S. Revenue would cause them to reassess the full 
tax deductability of lease rentals and replace this with a tax relief 
system based upon the implicit interest costs of a lease, as per their 
debt counterparts. It is possible that this line of reasoning still 
prevails in the leäsing industry (although no evidence is given), and 
perhaps this acts as a strong disincentive against capitalisation in 
favour of more disclosure - as the E. L. A. suggest - which presumably 
will not disturb the unique tax position of leasing. 
The proposed accounting treatments of leasing in the Balance Sheet of 
the lessee has prompted two counter arguments against capitalisation. 
1. The last two figures typify the extreme arbitrariness of much. thinking 
on leasing at that time. For example it is redolent of GANT's [591, be- lief that funds provided by financial leases typically cost a half a 
percent more than interest costs on direct debt. The way in which the lessor determines the rental to be charged on a lease is reviewed below in section 1.9. 
y 
- 13 - 
B. The Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of C. P. 
A's has prepared two opinion drafts, No. 5 and No. 7, published in 
1964 and 1966 respectively. They were entitled! [31 & [41 "Re- 
porting of l. eases in financial statements of lessee's". In summary 
form they suggested that for financial leasest: 
The Accounts should disclose-sufficient information, 
so that the reader of the accounts will be able to 
assess the present and future financial position and 
operating results of the lessee. Hence, a note must 
be attached to the accounts disclosing the minimum 
annual rental and the period over which it was to 
be paid2. 
ZISES C149, p471; who may be considered as representative of the 
American 'full disclosure' school of accounting, would argue that 
such a proposal is more workable than the capitalisation alterna- 
tives: 
, 
"Capitalising long term rentals and commitments and pla- 
cing them on the balance sheet today would incorrectly 
equate these commitments with debt; would not provide full 
and objective disclosure; but would produce a devastating 
situation because of: 
1. Should the contract be framed so as to suggest the lease is actually a 
purchase then the opinion recommends that the lease be capitalised as 
an asset and the discounted value of the payments shown as a liability. 
2. For a full discussion of the ramifications and practical problems faced 
by a company that has an extensive portfolio of leased assets covering 
many different starting dates, finishing dates and costs, see K. S. AXEL- 
SON [8]. He shows how a genuine attempt at proper disclosure can 
result in an extremely confusing picture for the shareholder. 
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1. Fundamental problems of determining objectively and 
fairly the figure to be placed on the Balance Sheet 
and in adjusting the figures for operational, tax and 
other considerations. 
2. Possible catastrophic effects upon management, stock- 
holders and creditors under outstanding indentures, 
current and changing tax laws, and regulations of 
industry. 
3. The legal liability of accountants in public practice 
if such techniques were adjudicated as "misrepresentation". 
While it is reasonably easy to agree with the first point, the lat- 
ter two lack credibility, in that accountants-would observe the 
rules and guidelines prescribed by, the appropriate professional 
body, at least in the U. K. (although this may not be valid in a 
U. S. context). Legal liability of the company, on the other hand, 
prompts WYATT [146', p37] to write: 
"Noncapitalisation of leases in financial statements 
creates risks of, straying from fairness in financial 
representation ... The key question is whether there 
is in existence at the reporting date an underlying 
contractual type of relationship that creates a claim 
on the resources of the enterprise ... Omission from 
the Balance Sheet of the substansive claim incurred 
when a noncancellable lease agreement is signed creates 
an understatement of liabilities and must be the. result 
of an overemphasis on legal technicalities". 
- 15 - 
C. The above comment by WYATT, emphasising the legal liability enter- 
ed into when undertaking a lease, would appear to be sound. However, 
this fact alone does not turn the argument in favour of capitalisa- 
tion, as a direct and unbiased method of disclosure by note would 
still represent a fair financial presentation. 
Surprisingly, a notable body of opinion in the United States would 
disavow the validity of recording a capitalised lease figure in the 
accounts. It is considered, however, that such legal reasoning ap- 
plies only to operating leases, but the quote below'is intended to 
apply to financial leases: 
"Leasing companies, officials, and lawyers, describe a lease 
as an executory contract, an agreement that services will be 
performed in the future. Since the performance of the services 
and the resulting execution of the contractare based upon con- 
tingencies, it is maintained that the obligation under a lease,. 
unlike that of a conventional debt, is not fixed and the legal 
liability is indeterminate and unpredictable. A related distinct- 
ion is that in the event of bankruptcy a direct debt is recogni- 
9 
sed as a claim against the debtors assets, while the trustee in 
in bankruptcy may disaffirm a lease obligation. For these rea- 
sons, a lease obligation is frequently considered uncertain or 
too conjectural to appear as fixed debt on a balance sheet". 
HAMEL [701 
The recent events at Court Line Ltd., where several aeroplanes 
were leased, would indicate that in the U. K. a lessor will regain 
his asset, but will not receive preferential treatment among the 
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various creditors when claiming any penalty clauses'. 
The recommendation issued by the E. L. A. [431 on "accounting by the 
lessee" rejected the capitalisation of the lease payments and sug- 
gested a more detailed method of disclosure. The audited accounts 
would then show: 
1. The total amount of future lease repayments after the date 
of the current Balance Sheet. 
2. The time period covered by the repayments, and 
ý3. The total amount of repayments to be paid in the twelve months 
following the Balance Sheet data. 
Undoubtedly this method of disclosure is superior to the present 
legislation, but is it totally satisfactory? The problem faced by 
a financial analyst trying to estimate the capital value of leased 
equipment being used by a company with several leasing contracts, 
spanning several years, is still as difficult. The information gi- 
ven only provides a partial, albeit improved, answer. Indeed, the 
problem is very similar to the accounting treatment of depreciation: 
a full schedule of each asset's depreciation to date is not issued: 
for reasons of obvious impractically, the figures are published in 
1. Several U. K. lessors have been questioned on their interpretation of the 
legal status of a lease. In general they suggest that, "we remain legal- 
ly vulnerable, because no suitable test case has been heard on some of 
the more unconventional clauses of a lease contract, like variable inte- 
rest and repayment schedules in particular. What is the allowable vari- 
ation? Given that leasing contracts as presently written are tending to 
move away from their traditional position as a 'conventional method of 
hire', and hence are not fully covered by Hire Purchase Legislation; the 
extent of the lessors liability is a question that is under continuous 
review". For an excellent discussion of the legal standing of a lease 
in the event of bankruptcy see ZISES [1491. Although this is an early 
American text, 1961, it may well contain all, or nearly all, the rele- 
vant legal points that would be used in a British court. 
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aggregate. In doing so, much vital information may be lost to the rea- 
der of the accounts as he may only estimate the age of the company's 
plant and equipment, with no means of testing the accuracy of such an 
estimation. A similar problem arises with leasing, in that the reader 
of the accounts must use judgement and appraisement to obtain a realis- 
tic figure for a company's capital. commitment to leasing. 
In view of the general acceptance of the "off balance sheet" argument 
in the literature', and the general acknowledgement that this characte- 
ristic is capable of enhancing two of the favourite financial ratios- 
debt to equity, and return on capital employed - it would not be too 
uncharitable to suggest that footnote disclosure is to the advantage 
of the Equipment Leasing Industry. However, the E. L. A. 's proposal is 
a positive step in eliminating the distorted corporate image that can 
occur if lease obligations are overlooked when calculating indebted- 
ness and efficiency of capital. It does seem unlikely, though, that 
Institutional investors2 and major creditors would overlook the pos-, 
sible use of leasing in the capital structure when contemplating an 
investment in the organisation -- they are just not deluded by the 
"off balance sheet" argument and will ask questions accordingly, 
being in a strong position to do so. 
1. A pioneer survey by VANCIL AND ANTHONY [132], USA 1959, indicated a 
strong opinion in favour of the "off balance sheet" argument. This 
article is frequently cited as an indication of management perceptions 
on the use of leasing --- despite the date of the paper. 2. Leach in a survey [851 during 1971 estimated that 35% of the equity 
of U. K. registered and mänaged companies are owned by institutions. 
Today the unit trusts, insurance companies and pension funds are esti- 
mated to own in excess of 80% of the equity of U. K. companies: See Financial Report, The Guardian, October 6th, 1975. 
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ADVANTAGES OF LEASING CONTINUED 
5. Leasing is not a loan .... leasing is not an additional form of 
bor- 
rowing it is a revenue item'. 
The above statements would certainly apply to short-term cancellable 
operating leases as quite clearly they offer a service and not a loan. 
However, it appears that in the minds of many writers and financial 
executives the presence of a tangible asset, instead of cash, is prima 
facie proof that a lease is not a loan 
A financial lease is equal in status to any of the more conventional 
forms of debt as there exists a contractual obligation to repay the 
entire amount of the outstanding repayments. The commitment is ine- 
luctable.. 
7 
6. Leasing provides 100% financing: thus making the entire cost of the 
asset available immediately. This may not be the case with other 
debt instruments2. 
1. For example, see OGDEN [108, p747], a typical. early U. K. writer on 
leasing. It is also staggering to see and hear this attitude still persist- 
ing: SPRINGHAM [126, p304] and LEWIS (Financial Times, March 21st 1975, p14, 
in a special feature on leasing) both write, "leasing is not borrowing". 
2. The Government Bill entitled "The Control of Hiring and Hire Purchase 
and Credit Sale Orders" introduced various distinctions between leasing 
and the hire-purchase of vehicles. For example one third of the cost 
must be paid immediately w eýi using H. P., with a maximum repayment period 
of two years; whereas with leasing a 42 weeks prepayment must be made. 
For other assets a 25% downpayment is required when using industrial 
hire-purchase. 
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One of the prime advantages of leasing is that the lessee is on- 
ly required to make the first instalment at the commencement of the 
contract. This enables a rapid build-up of equipment in a particu- 
lar desired area of the business so that a competitive edge may be 
gained in the light of some new opportunity. Or, it facilitates 
virtually-instant replacement of defunct machinery without the de- 
lay necessary to accumulate the total cash-price. 
7. Operating leases permit the hedging of business risk, particularly 
obsolescence, as the contract will normally have a rapid cancella- 
tion clause. Lessees can therefore have the most up-to-date model 
of any machinery ...... which may give benefits of productivity, 
product marketability or simply prestige. Computers and some highly 
sophisticated types of advanced equipment which have a reasonable 
second-hand market are the prime examples. VANCIL [135, p9]. puts 
the issue succinctly. 
"As the name implies, a financial lease is primarily a device 
for permitting the acquisition of a piece of equipment without 
paying cash for it. The chief purpose of an operating lease is 
to permit the lessee to use a piece of equipment without running 
the risks of ownership. Obsolescence, one of the major ownership 
risks, is borne by the lessee under a financial lease; and it is 
shifted to the lessor under an operating lease". 
Financial leases may not protect the lessee from obsolescence depen- 
ding upon how the contract is written: if the agreement is immutable 
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then even if the asset is rendered catastrophically obsolete, and 
hence valueless, the lessee would still be committed to repay the 
fixed instalment schedule; however, and this is increasingly becoming 
the case, it is possible to organise specific leasing agreements 
which contain a clause setting out the various possibilities under 
which the lessee may surrender the asset (on payment of a penalty 
fee) providing that a new, and probably more expensive, asset is 
substituted in its place and a new lease contract drawn up. 
In general, therefore, it follows that the type of asset leased 
in the financial and operating lease categories bears some rela- 
tion to: its present and future marketability; the risk of obso- 
lescence; the industrial category of the lessee; the opportunity 
for economies of scale, with such assets as cars and trucks; the 
asset's place of location; the extent to which the asset is for 
specialised or general use; etc. etc.. 
8. Lease rentals are considered to be operating expenses by the In- 
land Revenue, thus making them chargeable in full against Corpo- 
ration Tax. The Capital Allowances generated through the purchase 
of an asset goes to whoever possesses the equity in the asset, 
which in all cases of financial lease contracts is the lessor. 
The particular legislation is in the Capital Allowances Act, 1968, 
Sections 42 and 43 and there is some case law' associated with 
1. Namely: Macsaga Investment Co. Ltd., v. Lupton (1967) AU. E. R. 930,44 T. C. 688 and; Lupton v Cadogen Gardens Development Ltd., (1971) 1. All 
E. R. 717. 
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these matters concerning the nature of subsequent costs or con- 
tracted maintenance. 
9. The current system of Capital Allowances enables a company to de- 
fer, to future periods, its current tax liability. As the lessor 
is granted the Allowance he can quantify this advantage and pass 
it on to the lessee in the form of reduced rental costs. This sys- 
tem is particularly beneficial to those equipment intensive compa- 
nies whose taxable profits are currently nil or negligible; and 
by extension whose future taxable profits are anticipated to be 
approximating to zero. Hence, such companies will obtain no benefit 
from these Allowances if the asset was bought outright, but would 
obtain an advantage, via a smaller repayment schedule, if they 
leased the asset. However, it follows that the lease tax shield 
would be smaller -- indeed it may possibly not exist in a zero 
taxable profit situation. 
As a financing strategy the use of leasing in these circumstances 
can be particularly advantageous to companies with previously accu- 
mulated Allowances; companies with high cost assets that would 
swamp a poor profitability; and many of the nationalised industries 
who have several years of accrued deficit. 
10. Leasing is a hedge against inflation. The terms of a lease con- 
tract, if fixed, offer a definite advantage in a period of high 
inflation as the real money cost of the repayments will effectively 
fall over the period of the lease. Equally, the interest rate may 
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be fixed at the commencement-of the contract which again offers 
distinct advantages in a period of rapidly rising interest rates. 
It should be noted that fixed repayment schedules have in practice 
become increasingly rare in today's markets, being replaced by 
variable interest, taxation and VAT clauses2., 
11. Leasing simplifies accounting procedures and administrative 
effort through the convenience of only having to make one perio- 
dic payment. In conversations with U. K. lessors who deal with small 
to medium sized companies it is clear that this is a strong in- 
centive to lease. 
12. Leasing provides what may be a "financing-gap" in some companies 
by providing medium to long-term finance with the. added advan- 
tage that it does not dilute ownership or control. As with all 
debt the profitable use of leasing can provide leverage to the 
equity earnings. 
13. The asset to be leased will generate earnings which will help 
pay the lease instalments: this is sometimes termed a "bootstrap" 
operation, where effectively the asset pays for itself. 
1. To the best of my knowledge only one company maintains a strict, no 
variation, lease contract. It might also be added that they are one of 
the major U. K. lessors. 
2. As mentioned in advantage 4, variable rate clauses have not received 
much attention in law so it remains unclear to what extent a lessor 
can pass-on various charges. 
a 
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1.3. THE DISADVANTAGES OF LEASING - FOR THE LESSEE 
1. The implicit interest rate charged on either type of lease 
may well be higher than existing channels of debt open to the 
lessee. Fairly obviously, leasing costsl are subject to consi- 
derable fluctuation in just the same manner as ordinary debt. 
For example: LESTER [86] : in 1972 put the cost of leasing 
at 12% to 13%; HAMEL [71] in January 1972 suggested a price 
of between 121 and £25 per month for every £1,000 of equipment 
leased on a five year term. This implies an effective interest 
charge of between 11% and 16% per annum. 
By contrast, estimated costs at the beginning of 1975 indicate 
a band running between 22% and 25%. The latter price may be com- 
pared with the Hire Purchase charge at the time of either 4% 
above Finance House base, or 18% to 20% effective ratet. 
2. The nature and extent of tax advantages and disadvantages to 
the lessee and lessor are of considerable importance; this will 
be discussed at length later as part of an overall corporate 
1. As will be discussed in a later Chapter, the sources of funds to a 
typical U. K. lessor (termed in the jargon his "moneybook") are heavily 
biased towards short-term finance. Hence, they are exposed to the 
classic banking problem of borrowing short and lending fairly long. 
2. An interesting development (1975) in the leasing of fleets of company 
cars and trucks has arisen following the sharp downturn in the regis- 
tration figures for new vehicles. The emergence of a 'price war' be- 
tween the major manufacturers (Datsun, Chrysler, Vauxhall and Austin 
Morris) has meant a variety of different leasing schemes with average 
flat rates of 9% (... a real rate of 16%). It is recognised by all the 
companies that such a low cost means they will loose money on the finan- 
cing aspect of each deal, but they are so concerned with funding their 
own increased stockpile that they are prepared to take a much reduced 
profit in order to improve cash-flow and liquidity. 
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tax strategy, see Chapter 5, ' 
3. At the termination of the primary period of a financial lease, 
_ 
the equipment in question may still retain some residual value 
(as either scrap or second hand sales value). This sum may 
become a tail-end bonus to the lessor, at the expense of the 
lessee, depending upon the wording or termination-provisions 
of the contract. Many writers consider this to be a distinct 
disadvantage to the lessee as it is a cash-flow he would have 
gained had he bought the asset himself; thus they argue that 
the lessee has suffered an opportunity loss. if he cannot recover 
some portion of this value. However, the issue is spurious 
as any advantage to either party is neutralised if the lessee 
has a right to exercise the clause enabling him to use the 
asset in the secondary period. Many of the contracts signed 
today make the lessee responsible for disposing of the asset 
at the end of the primary period. He may then sell to the highest 
bidder using his specialised knowledge of'the second-hand 
market for such assets, and in general receive a proportion 
of the sales price. 
An operating lease cannot be considered in these terms as 
it is strictly a short-term expedient utilised so as to avoid 
outright purchase. 
4. "Leasing can result in a loss of control over capital expen- 
diture. Unless leasing is controlled at the operating level the 
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result may be that divisional managers will be able to ob- 
tain assets through leasing which they were denied appropria- 
tions for in the budget. Some companies have recognised this 
possible danger by instituting a seperate leasing budget". 
GANT [59] 
5. "Leasing may result in distortions in the evaluation of inter- 
company performance. To the extent that leased assets are used, 
the comparison of a return on invested capital between divisions 
can be distorted. Some companies have overcome this by capitali- 
sing lease rentals in measuring return on capital investment". 
GANT [591; 
SOLOMONS [125, p1321 gives the same advice as GANT and suggests 
that in order to preserve the comparability of divisions the 
"capital value of leased equipment should be brought into the 
investment base of the leasing division". 
(Further discussion about the capitalisation of leases is de- 
layed until Chapter 2). 
6. A financial lease establishes an immutable committment on the 
company's future cash-flow which, if not properly controlled, 
will enchance the possibility of cash inadequacy or even in- 
solvency. 
7. A leased asset is not an owned asset. The extent to which 
pride, prestige, emotion and psychology inhibit a rational 
0 
-26-' 
economic decision to use leasing is extremely relevant in any 
discussion of the use of debt. These factors will be dealt with 
further in Chapter 7. 
1.4. THE ADVANTAGES OF LEASING TO THE SUPPLIERS OF PLANT AND EQUIPMENT 
There are also advantages to be gained by the manufacturer or supplier 
of equipment whose goods may become the subject of lease agreements. 
This may well take the form, sometimes refered to as "captive leasing", 
where a manufacturer will incorporate an associated leasing company 
to distribute its products. 
1. The superior technical knowledge of the manufacturer can be uti- 
lised by the lessee. This can be particularly beneficial in the 
areas of maintenance and servicing. The contract is mutually ad- 
vantageous to both parties: the lessee will receive specialised 
help and advice; the lessor is able to gain contacts and discuss 
new product development with potential customers. 
The computer companies, and office equipment and furnishing com- 
panies, are extremely active in this area. 
2. Market penetration may be increased by the offer of attractive 
"use now-pay later" lease facilities. The use of a third party 
lessor enables the manufacturer to offer a credit function while 
assuming no risk himself. 
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A BRIEF RESUME 
While the above listing of advantages and disadvantages is not exhaustive, 
it is considered to be a reasonable representation of some of the alleged 
qualitative factors which management will commonly use, or come into con- 
tact with, when making the leasing decision for a company. A list of advan- 
tages and disadvantages for the lessor has not been made as, in many cases, 
they merely replicate or mirror, the list for the lessee. 
In a later Chapter the results of an extensive Industrial Survey into the 
use and appraisal of leasing are discussed; this will clarify how current- 
day financial management views leasing and what qualitative factor they 
consider important to the leasing decision. 
1.5. I THE LENGTH OF FINANCIAL LEASING CONTRACTS 
The Equipment Leasing Association [42, p7] has issued some sample 
statistics taken from its members on the length and character of 
leasing terms. As previously mentioned most financial leases provide 
for a primary period and a secondary period. The actual length of 
the primary period depends upon negotiations between the lessee and 
lessor about, for example: the anticipated useful life of the asset, 
the prevailing conditions under which the lessor is able to raise 
the finance, and the expected cash-flow profile generated by the 
asset in use. Given a reasonable estimate of these figures a suitable 
repayment schedule can be devised. 
Generally, this will range from one to ten years, but can be longer 
in the case of specific assets. The E. L. A. data yields the following: 
3 
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PRIMARY PERIOD 
up to 3 years 
DISTRIBUTION 
14 
over 3 to 5 years 72 - 
over 5 to 7 years 7 
over 7 to 10 years 3 
over 10 years 4 
No data is available for the length of the secondary period: 
this is because many of the leasing contracts written by the 
lessors have not yet matured into the secondary period. Pre- 
liminary evidence' suggests this period to be short, perhaps 
no more than two years. 
1.5. II TYPICAL PROVISIONS AND CLAUSES IN A U. K. LEASING CONTRACT 
The following list is synthesized from a number of specimen 
lease contracts obtained from a selection of the larger U. K. 
lessors together with a series of discussions with leasing mana- 
gers. Quite obviously the points mentioned are intended only as 
a brief guide2 -- further detailed information is available from 
the E. L. A. or any lessor. Thus, a typical lease agreement would 
contain some or all of the following provisions: 
1. The lessor shall at all times retain the legal equity of the 
asset. 
1. Obtained in conversation with various U. K. lessors. 
2. Such agreements are frequently of great legal complexity: one lessor. 
whom I contacted said that the typical length of his company's 
contracts excedddd 100 pages -- a commercial necessity in view of 
the equipment he was leasing. 
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2. The lessor shall receive, in the first instance, all Government 
grants, allowances or incentives that are applicable to the asset 
or its location. 
3. The lessee shall not offer for sale, dispose of, or transfer the 
asset, to a third party. 
4. The lessee is responsible for the cost of maintenance, insurance, 
legal costs, incidental expenses and (occasionally) the cost of 
returning the asset to the lessor, or an agreed location, on com- 
pletion of the contract. 
5. The lessee is held fully responsible for any loss or damage to the 
asset. 
6. The lessee must obtain prior permission before undertaking alter- 
ations or modifications to the asset. The lessor retains the right 
to refuse such alterations. 
7. The asset must be firmly situated in one place and marked with 
an identification plate (if possible). 
8. The lessor may inspect the asset at any time. 
9. The lessor shall receive all benefits of the manufacturers guaran- 
tee; all correspondence or litigation on such matters is to be 
conducted between the lessee and the manufacturer. 
10. The lessor may terminate the agreement in the event of a default 
in payment by the lessee; the insolvency of the lessee; 'or the 
failure to comply with any clause of the contract. In all cases the 
lessor may recover the asset, claim all subsequent legal or miscel- 
laneous expenses, plus any penalty payment and all outstanding re- 
payments (to be charged with interest at x% above Bank Rate for the 
period outstanding). 
.: 
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11. The lessor and lessee will necotiate and agree to the length of 
the primary period, the size and frequency of repayment; plus de- 
tails of how to exercise the secondary period and its associated 
rental. In addition provisions may be agreed to pass to the les- 
see (in part or in toto) any increase in the lessor's costs cau- 
sed by changes to the tax-rate, interest-rate or government grant. 
Limits on the range of such change may be set in advance (ie. + 
or -3% in tax or interest rates). 
12. The asset is to be disposed of by the lessee (or lessor) and the 
subsequent sales proceeds divided in a certain proportion between 
the lessee and the lessor. 
1.6. ' THE GROWTH OF LEASING 
Leasing can justifiably claim to be one of the original instruments of 
commerce to be developed by mankind. Its recorded historical pedigree 
stretches back over 5000 years to the ancient civilisations of Egypt, 
Greece and the Roman Empire where it is reputed to have been used to 
finance real estate, shipping, slavery and the trade of certain commo- 
dities between the major ports of the Mediterranean'. 
As an instrument of Financial Management and Treasureship however, 
leasing was to emerge in the United States during the 1940's as a 
radical and most timely alternative to the conventional forms of long- 
term debt then in use. Original writers on the subject2 attribute its 
modern day development to three factors: 
.... ........... ......................................... 
1. See VAN CLAES and LIVIJN [136] 
2. For example see McNEILL, 1944 [97] and perhaps more persuasively COHEN 
1954 [37] 
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1. A substantial change in the financial climate which was influen- 
ced heavily by the depression and later the war. 
This resulted in a substantial impetus to re-equip and expand in- 
vestment thoughout the nation. 
2. The gradual emergence of a body of economic and financial litera- 
ture (led by authors like FISHER, HICKS and DEWING) which resulted 
in more professional and better educated managers and accountants. 
3. And finally, what was without doubt the most crucial factor, 
the ever escalating cost of new equipment that was being produ- 
ced in response to the technological developments of the day. 
The great surge of economic development stimulated the banks and fi- 
nance houses to devise new methods of funding the demand for indus- 
trial capital; one of which was the avoidance of outright payment 
and the substitution of instalments covering several years and re- 
payable either monthly or quarterly. The banks, with their long and 
successful association with the leasing of land and buildings, had 
little difficulty diversifying this aspect of their business to in- 
corporate industrial machinery. 
As was noted above, a theme running directly parallel to that of the 
general requirement to modernise old plant was the ever increasing 
cost of replacing machinery. The cause of such a rapid rise in costs 
was the notable sophistication and complexity of a wide range of new 
industrial technology. It was a generally held opinion of contempo- 
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rary H. riters that the aircraft industry provided the necessary! 
fillips. 
"The advent of the commercial jet airliner has confronted 
the airlines with a great many problems, but none more im- 
posing than the question of how they are to raise the tre- 
mendous amounts of additional capital required to finance 
the change over from piston-type aircraft" 
GANT 1591 
"In recent years airlines have begun to lease rather than 
buy their aeroplanes under equipment trust arrangements. 
This change was necessitated by the hugh financing require- 
ments of the second generation of aircraft. Under the equip- 
ment trust arrangements banks, finance companies-or indivi- 
duals typically supply 25% of the cost of the aeroplane. 
The trustees in the arrangement, who lease the equipment 
to the airlines, borrow the remaining 75% on a straight 
debt basis". 
SHAPIRO & WOLF [122]1 
1. See GANT [59] or VANCIL [135] who concur on this point. 
More recent studies by SHAPIRO & WOLF [122] and GRITTA [67] also 
come to the same conclusion. 
For a review of the tremendous inpact made by leasing on the balan- 
ce sheets of today's U. S. A. aircraft corporations see GRITTA. His 
study shows their extensive reliance on leasing and calculates the 
effect of capitalising leases on some of their financial ratios, no- 
ting the quite remarkable deterioration of return on capital and 
debt to equity ratios. 
I 
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Today the United States leasing industry is flourishing', chiefly 
as a result of significant changes in the banking regulations made 
during 1973 which allowed the very large state and national banks 
to become lessors. Various tax changes have also given an added 
i 
impetus to the industry in recent years and VANDERWICKEN {137T 
notes that leveraged leasing is now becoming more widespread as 
a result of these alterations. 
The following quote gives some impression of the impact of leas- 
ing in the USA capital equipment sector of the economy: 
"Capital Equipment with an original cost of somewhat 
more that $ 60 billion is now on lease in the US to Cor- 
porations, Institutions, and Governments. New equipment 
worth over $ 11 billion was leased last year (1973), and 
it accounted for about 14% of all business investment in 
capital equipment. Overall the volume of leasing is ex- 
panding by around 20% a year. If leasing continues to grow 
at its recent rate, by 1977 about one-fifth of all new ca- 
pital equipment in use by business will be leased". 
VANDERWICKEN [137, p136]1 
1. There are various estimates of the growth of leasing in the USA; 
the following assessments have been made: 
U. S. A. Growth of leasing $ million (106 ) 
1950 1960 1965 1971 *' 1973 ** 1974 ** 
1J 400 1006 2TT00 75,75700 $7,000 
*obtained from the publication DER MIETFINANZE 
** estimates by PARRA and MATHEWS[110, p136J but see alternative 
figures given in quote above. 
For a full discussion of the development of the USA leasing indus- 
try during 1960-1966, including the impact of the various invest- 
ment credit systems and tax changes, see BRIGHAM (2111 
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Within Europe the development of leasing came some 15 years later 
(the first U. K. leasing company being established in 1959/60) and 
the following statistics serve as a comparison betvieen the various 
countries. 
FRANCE --- first leasing company in 1963; see CADE [28]J 
billions of Francs 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
2.3 5.05 8.15 11.63 16.33 21.14 
NEDERLANDS --- first leasing company in 1963; see GOUDSMIT & KEIJSER [6211. 
millions of Gilder 
1969 1970 1971 
34.5 66.6 125 
ry 
The statistics for GERMANY, approximately 3000 million Marks in 
1971, and BELGIUM approximately 400 million Francs in 1970 are 
not well developed; see GOUDSMIT & KEIJSER E62, p13/15J or FEIST 
[50, p21/33] 
The development of leasing in the U. K. has been ascribed to a simi- 
lar set of circumstances as prevailed in the U. S. A.: 
"Under the pressure of competition firms began to find an 
increasing need to replace their existing assets by more 
modern equipment, but found also that the cost of replace- 
ment - particularly in the case of custom built machinery - 
was a growing obstacle due to the increasing sophistication, and 
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consequently the increasing cost, of plant and machinery. 
The attraction of spreading payments for a new machine out 
of earnings began to assume greater importance, particular- 
ly with the increase in the rate of inflation". 
E. L. A. [42, p9] f 
Currently there are three sources of statistics compiled with the 
intention of shedding some light, however dim, on the growth of 
lease finance within the U. K. Firstly, the Department of Trade 
and Industry issuer quarterly figures under the heading: 
"FINANCE HOUSE: Goods owned which are the subject of hiring, 
leasing or rental agreements" 
f MILLION 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
50 55 64 95 127 164 216 256 325 
Prior to 1966 funds employed in leasing equipment were negligible 
in comparison to other capital sources for industry, but between 
that date and 1973 there was a fourfold increase in the size of 
leasing business undertaken by Finance Houses. At the end of 1968 
leasing represented only 9% of the effective investment of these in- 
stitutions. During the next three years 33% of their new investment 
1. Source: Business Monitor, official statistics Ref. Nos. SD6 and 
SD7. They are also to be found in the magazine CREDIT, the Finance House Association's Quarterly Review. 
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went into leasing assets and in 1973 over 25% of their business 
was in the leasing sector. 
However, the compilation of official statistics which attempt 
to indicate the levels of leasing in this country are acknowled- 
ged to be notoriously inaccuratei. There are at least two reasons 
for this: 
1. The statistics are essentially incomplete as they do not 
take account of: business undertaken by independent leasing 
companies who are not members of the Finance House Associa- 
tion; transactions undertaken by the 'secondary banking sec- 
tor' and the 'captive leasing' sector; and individually ar- 
ranged intercompany leasing contracts2. They are also unli- 
kely to record leasing arrangements with customers who will 
use the goods overseas. 
2. As is clear from the statistics above, leasing is never record- 
ed independently but is amalgamated into an overall figure for 
instalment debt and industrial hire purchase. 
1. To quote from a letter to the writer from the director of the Equipment 
Leasing Association: 
"On the matter of statistics, our efforts have been main- 
ly directed to persuading the authorities to improve the 
official collection of leasing statistics rather than col- 
lecting statistics of our own. We carried out a very limit- 
ed exercise as a one-off rather than a continuous study in 
order to demonstrate to the authorities that their existing 
statistics are inadequate". 
2. "Like most of the leasing subsidiaries of banks we were originally set 
up to shelter the profits of our Parent Company, and although this is 
still part of our business, we now specialise in packaging large scale 
leases for clients without necessarily taking them onto our own portfolio". 
Hence, they will not be recorded in the official statistics. 
Private correspondence with the Managing Director of a large U. K. 
Leasing Company. 
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Not surprisingly, there are many independent estimates of the true 
extent of leasing in this country; BUCKLE [26]1 suggests that: 
"The worldwide growth of leasing since the early 1960's 
has been phenominal. In the United Kingdom, from the date 
of the first leasing company in 1959, the industry has 
grown to the stage where there are now thirty five to forty 
active leasing companies in the market. In money terms the 
market has grown from nil to an annual investment of ¬350 
million in fourteen years". 
An independent survey of the leasing industry by GREENE & CO. 
[63] of the stock exchange, considers the previous two sets 
of data to be conservative estimates. They suggest that the 
industry now provides equipment with an initial cost of £600 
million. This agrees with an estimate by the E. L. A. (see foot- 
note on previous page) of approximately £580 million which was 
acquired by its members in the following patterns. 
£ MILLION OF LEASED ASSETS 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
19 35 56 112 121 
The current compound growth rate of the U. K. leasing industry 
is estimated at a substantial 20% per annum2. 
1. An analysis of the 1971 figures, by area, shows: 
(a) Goods leased in development areas 7.7% 
(b) Goods leased in non-development areas 92.3% 
2. See GREENE & CO's report [63]. 
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Clearly, such development will have a significant effect upon 
the U. K. capital markets and may indicate (as shall be discus- 
sed later) a change of influence in corporate financing strate- 
gies .... towards an increasing reliance on short-term instal- 
ment debt. In order to develop a deeper understanding of the 
leasing industry, it is worthwhile attempting to trace the im- 
pact and repercussions of Government and Fiscal intervention 
upon the economy and see how this relates to leasing. Hopeful- 
ly, this will provide a further, perhaps valuable, insight in- 
to the circumstances of its growth and its possible prospects 
for the future. 
1.7. GOVERNMENT AND FISCAL INTERVENTION: ITS EFFECT UPON THE LEASING 
INDUSTRY 
Successive Governments, in an effort to direct and invigorate the 
economy, have made frequent adjustments to a variety of economic 
parameters which, inter alia, have directly affected the lessor's 
ability to obtain a reward for his services. This intervention 
has taken either of two forms: 
1. The alteration of capital incentives given to industry in an 
attempt to raise investment .... for example, investment grants 
and the designation of development and special need geographical 
areas or industries. 
2. The alteration of various forms of tax incentives afforded to 
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industry .... for example, Capital Allowances, tax abate- 
ments, tax write offs and. carry forwards. 
To indicate how these various factors have altered over the years, 
consider first the rate of Corporation Tax: 
CORPORATION TAX RATE % 
APRIL '66 APRIL '68 APRIL '70 APRIL '71 APRIL '73 APRIL '74 
MARCH '68 MARCH '70 MARCH '71 MARCH '73 MARCH '74 
42.5 45 42.5 40 50 52 
The fluctuation of tax rates, which are to all intents and pur- 
poses unpredictable to both lessee and lessor at the outset of 
a leasing contract, undoubtedly creates a great deal of uncer- 
tainty in the industry. It can also have a quite pronounced ef- 
fect on the profitability of a leasing deal. 
,A 
lessor has three 
possible reactions to this: 
(i) be prepared to absorb the loss or gain himself (wil- 
lingly or unwillingly); 
(ii) ensure that the lease payments will vary pro-rata with 
the tax rates over the period; 
(iii) transfer the potential risk of monetary loss directly 
to the lessee through higher charges. 
The latter two modes of action are not a very attractive option 
to the lessor as it will reduce his competitive edge in what is 
a highly competitive market. 
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Perhaps a more significant problem to the lessor is the legis- 
lation covering investment incentives - in particular Capital 
Allowances - which have been subject to a similar, if not more 
dramatic, series of variations. 
The last ten years have seen a wide variety of changes which un- 
doubtedly have altered the relative position of the industry 
within the money market. Chronologically the respective allo- 
wances have been: 
8th April 1959 A 30% investment allowances system was 
reintroduced in addition to the initial 
allowances. 
17th January 1966 The Labour Government decided to abandon 
the investment allowance method of incentive 
and substitute direct cash grants. This 
scheme was, however, resticted to certain 
defined types of new plant (in the manufac- 
turing and extractive industries, ships and 
computers). 
Initial allowances were retained for all 
other new equipment and secondhand equipment. 
The Government varied the rate of cash grant 
twice during its remaining life. 
27th October 1970 The Conservative Government abandoned the in- 
vestment grant approach. and substituted the 
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20th July 1971 
22nd March 1972 
Industry Act 1972 
system of overall accelerated tax deprecia- 
tion as an investment incentive. The rate 
of first year allowance was initially set 
at 60% of original cost. 
First year allowance raised to 80%. 
First year allowance raised to 100%. 
This allowed leasing companies to receive 
government grants for capital equipment which 
was to be used in certain designated areas. 
The amount of the grant was set at 20% of the 
qualifying expenditure, or 22% in very special 
development areas, rising to 30% in Northern 
Ireland. 
The constant manipulation of allowances, while being welcomed because 
it has followed an upward trend, has nevertheless caused consterna- 
tion in the industry because of the ever increasing demands it has 
placed on the predictive qualities of the leasing manager. The effect 
of increased tax rates plus varying allowances has created an insta- 
bility in the lessor's profits and an inability to determine, or in 
any sense control, customer requirements for lease finance. 
A further development in Government legislation, designed to elimi- 
nate a widely publicised and notorious loophole in the law, was in- 
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troduced in the 1973 Finance Act. Prior to this date public 
corporations, and British Rail in particular, had undertaken only a 
marginal amount of leasing. However, during 1972 and 1973 a rather 
ingenious schemeI was devised to utilise the vast', previously 
accrued, tax losses of British Rail. With their vast programe 
of capital expenditure it could be predicted that they would have a 
zero tax liability for several years to cone, and little 
possibility of using the Capital Allowances such expenditure would 
generate. It was decided to undertake several nillion pounds worth 
of leasing business - rolling stock for themselves and a series of 
assets for other companies, ships and computers for example. 
Due to a divergence at the tine between company law and corporation 
tax law the following system was devised. 
GROUP OF COMPANIES BRITISH RAIL 
AND BANKS 
-- high taxable profit no 
taxable profit, 
-- acting as Lessor 
but large unclained 
Capital Allowances 
Newly formed company 
acting as Lessee, with 
the capita'f structure: 
Preference Shares 75% Preference Shares Ordinary Shares 
owned by- 25% Ordinary Shares owned by 
Lessor Group British Rail 
1. Somewhat similar to the U. S. A. 'Leveraged Leasings 
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Prior to the Act, the new subsidiary company was 
(i) a subsidiary of the lessor for corporation tax purposes 
and 
(ii) a subsidiary of British Rail for accounting purposes. 
Because the new company leased goods with no obvious relevance to 
the rail industry, thereby denying to the Revenue tax from other- 
corporate bodies, the Government decided to stop the practice. 
Today, public corporations continue to participate in lease finan- 
cing by the conventional method but (according to a letter sent 
to the writer by the finance director of the Coal Board) they 
must inform the Treasury and obtain permission before commencing 
the negotiationsl. 
A third major problem area for the leasing industry is the influ- 
ence and role played by interest rates and money supply. 
1.8. THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE BANKING SECTOR IN LEASING AND THE IMPACT 
OF CHANGING INTEREST RATE STRUCTURES 
The Merchant and Joint Stock banks were both relatively late en- 
trants into the leasing industry for two reasons: 
(i) In the tradition of conservatism which surrounds the 
1. The nationalised industries and local government participate 
extensively in leasing but the extent of this activity is unknown. 
This topic-is a research area in its own right and is not discussed 
further in this thesis. For an overview of the problems involved 
see BATES & FRASER [12]I 
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City and its institutions, leasing was looked upon as a 
rather incongruous form of banking (this would equally ap- 
ply to industrial hire purchase). 
(ii) Prior to August 1971, the Bank of England had exhibited a 
very strong influence in the banking sector by restricting 
the type of financial activity to that permitted by custom 
" and the traditional canons of. "sound banking" and law. 
However, due to a change of Government economic policy, leasing 
emerged as an attractive financing medium through which the Banks 
could acceptably enlarge the range of their activities. Two dates 
are significant. 1967 produced the following catalyst: 
"The stampede into leasing by the banks really got under- 
way in 1967-68, when the Labour Government imposed a ceiling 
on bank loans to customers. This ceiling, which continued 
until 1971, did not cover leasing and banks thattwould be 
willing to lend money to customers so that they may buy 
new plant were happy to lease the plant to the companies 
instead". 
GEDDES [60, p2291; 
The move into leasing was indeed significant but the real 'take- 
off' point for the industry was 1972; when 100% first year Capi- 
tal Allowances were introduced. 
900 
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It is sometimes denied that the 1972 surge in leasing business 
was purely for taxation reasonsl; and perhaps this is partially 
true. 
However it is argued here that the advantages bestowed on the 
lessor's parent bank through the medium of group relief of taxa- 
tion would make leasing a highly attractive financial proposition 
to the banking group. As such, if the various reasons were to be 
ranked to explain their entry into leasing, it is argued that seve- 
ral million pounds of potential tax shield would be more of an indu- 
cement than any altruistic gesture to their customers2. 
Four principal strategies were employed by the banking sector in 
their highly successful entry into leasing. 
1. Perhaps the most common method was the development of a leasing 
subsidiary which was owned and financed by the parent bank. For 
example: 
1. "Although the influence of the 100% first year capital allowances on 
the recent growth of leasing has been substantial, the entry of the 
banks into leasing should not be regarded as being tax-motivated. The 
clearing banks saw leasing as a growth industry in which, as major fi- 
nancial institutions, they should be involved". T. CLARK, Chief Mana- 
ger, Lloyds Leasing from-INVESTORS CHRONICLE April 11th, 1975 p. vii 
supplement on leasing. See also page 36, supra, footnote 2. 
2. Although it must be recognised that during the early 1960's the Banking 
Sector in the U. K. (and indeed elsewhere, particularly America) was un- 
dergoing far reaching changes; noticably seeking methods of diversifi- 
cation from the traditional, but no longer germane, colonial past: viz, 
the contemporaneous emergence of leasing and factoring in response to 
changing trading conditions and practices -- see WESTLAKE'[142, Ch6] for 
an excellent review of the history of the factoring industry during this 
period. For most of the 1960's, however, both these forms of finance re- 
presented only a very small proportion of the banking turnover -- they 
were very much 'fringe-finance' -- but they epitomized the change to 
more sophisticated and imaginative banking, to higher-risk lending. 
Their development was also partially'influenced by the then pressing 
need to utilise to maximum potential the newly acquired computer hard- 
ware and personnel that so dominated the early stages of the technolo- 
gical era of banking. 
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2. Alternatively, banks began to purchase assets and equipment at the 
request of their customers and lease them direct. In the main this 
was the province of the Merchant Banks, for example: 
William Brandts; Schroders; Hambros; Hill Samuel; Klienwort Benson; 
Rothchilds and Slater Walker. 
3. Thirdly, and the medium through which leasing achieved the "big 
ticket" status, was the formation of several leasing consortiums 
comprising of groups of banks capable of financing extremely large 
projects. For example, Airlease and Orion (discussed again shortly). 
4. And finally, a few banks began 'take-over bids' for existing leasing 
companies. For example Barclays Bank and Mercantile Credits. 
There are, of course, various independent lessors, the most prominent 
of which are: I. C. F. C., United Dominion Trust, Lloyds & Scottish, Bow- 
makers, and First National. 
To emphasise the growth of the leasing industry GREENE & CO. (op. cit) 
prepared an extensive data collection exercise of 20 leasing companies. 
1. Mercantile Credit, as one of the leading lessors in the U. K., collapsed 
in 1975 under severe financial pressure. 
z 
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Two of their illustrations showed the following trends, over the 
period 1968-1972. 
TAn1F77 
A SAP1PLE OF LEADING GROWTH IN ASSETS GROWTH IN PROFITS 
LESSORS %1% 
FIRST NATIONAL 177 120 
FORWARD LEASING 153 91 
BOWMAKER 128 103 
HAMILTON 35 52 
COMPUTER LEASING 31 35 
(continued overleaf) 
I 
. 11 
1. The median growth rate was 30% for the total sample; with the Finance 
House leasing sector averaging 20%. 
2. "The median rate of profit growth is 86.25%. Compound interest and Tax 
Equalisation Accounts do have a miraculous effect on profits". 
GREENE & CO [63, p447) 
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A SAMPLE OF LEADING GROWTH IN ASSETS, GROWTH IN PROFITS, 
LESSORS %% 
HILL SAMUEL 29 123 
LLOYDS & SCOTTISH 27 45 
WILLIAMS BRANDTS 26 87 
MERCANTILE CREDIT 17 85 
U. D. T. 16 227 
The ensuing success and current dominance of the lessor banks is not 
surprising in view of their unquestionable understanding of, and posi- 
tion in, the money market. Their posture as established and trusted 
organisations has to a certain extent managed to raise the industry's 
image from the 'hire purchase' (and 'factoring') sectors, with their 
poor psychological status, into the realm of serious corporate finance. 
Furthermore, their increased access to larger sums of prime rate capital 
would conceivably reduce the cost of leasing below that obtainable by 
its predecessors, thereby making it a more attractive economic proposition. 
In effect, their massive financial backing and willingness to deploy 
substantial resources in the business and its promotion, expanded the 
limits of the industry. 
Funds were now available for extremely expensive equipment whether it 
be Oil Tankers, British Rail rolling stock, or Concorde. 
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Examples of their financial strength and international capability" 
are easily found .... Orion Leasing Holdings is a consortium of six 
shareholders: Chase Manhatten; Credito Italiano; Mitsubiski Bank; 
National Westminster; Royal Bank of Canada; Westdeutsche Landesbank... 
with assets over £35,000 million. In the U. K. single projects such 
as the British Rail scheme demanded the financial co-operation of 
Bankers and individual companies. Morgan Grenfell brought together 
Barclays, William and Glyns, Great Universal Stores, G. E. C., 
Distillers and themselves to act as joint lessors on the project. 
Leasing now forms an integral part of the spectrum of financial 
services offered by a bank, indeed (as will be discussed later in 
the survey of U. K. lessors, Chapter 7) leasing compliments other 
sources of finance. On the basis of the argument thus far it is 
possible to advance the following tentative speculation as to why 
and when leasing is used: 
1. It could be because leasing is in demand, for some as yet unspeci- 
fied reason, when other short to medium term financial services are 
not, or 
2. The banks expect their customers to traverse the range of debt in- 
struments in a specified sequential order. The movement would per- 
1. As PALMER 11093 of the Finance Times hypothesizes: 
"The whole concept of a multi-national leasing deal which, for example, 
could involve a U. K. based company using Swiss raised funds to lease 
U. S. equipment to a German company operating in Italy. This is based 
on the premise that, first, transborder companies prefer to deal cen- 
trally with one finance house and, second, that the cost of a multi- 
national deal will be more expensive if arranged in individual compa- 
nies". 
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haps start at the highest quality debt, such as a long term deben- 
ture, and gradually move through less senior and more expensive 
forms of debt to leasing. 
Continuing this brief incursion into work to be considered in later 
Chapters, it is worth pausing to reflect on the reversal of the im- 
pressive growth rate in leasing during the latter half of 1972. 
This provides an opportunity to make an initial probe into the cir- 
cumstances surrounding leasing as a financing strategy. 
The downturn in equipment leasing differed quite noticeably from the 
general increase in capital expenditure during this period. This was 
attributed to: 
".... the combined factors of low interest rates and high money 
supply". 
SHELDON [124, p645] 
3 
On first reading this would appear to be. a curious comment as, by in- 
ference, one could postulate that the popularity of leasing would there- 
fore be at its peak - or more actively indulged in - when interest 
rates are highest and money is in short supply. This gives rise to a 
series of questions: 
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1. Does the leasing subsidiary of a bank deliberately dampen down 
its monetary supply (through not allowing leasing) to its custo- 
mers under such conditions? 
2. Does the lessee simply fail to use leasing when terms are cheap? 
Or, 
3. Is the lessee forced, through lack of available options in a 
'tight' money period, to lease when terms will by implication be 
expensive? 
The first hypothesis is considered below. However, we must delay a full 
discussion on items 2 and 3 until the results of the Industrial Survey 
are analysed. 
The fluctuating demand for equipment within a company may not be the 
prime motive for seeking lease arrangements as one might at first sus- 
pect. Instead, as the SHELDON quote would imply, the restriction of 
credit alternatives, precipitated either by a given economic climate 
or the financial standing of a company, would appear to be of greater 
influence. 
The lessor, of course, has a sound economic rationale for such action: 
"Leasing companies would not compete for business because they 
would not lock themselves into a five year agreement at last 
summer's (1972) low rates of interest". 
SHELDON [124, p645] 
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Here it can be further postulated that. as the lines of corporate credit 
become depleted, or even exhausted, -- for example the overdraft cei- 
ling is reached -- then the Banks intervene in an indirect manner by 
supplying finance for capital investment through their leasing subsi- 
diary. By implication leasing could be conceived of as one of the more 
risky forms of business entered into by a Bank. Furthermore, the les- 
sor may effectively discourage good credit-rating customers from using 
leasing because the price structure is based upon more risky clients. 
It would follow from this argument that financially weak companies may 
gain this extra credit facility purely because in the last resort the 
lessor's collateral. is the equipment itselfl. A further interesting, 
and indeed penetrating, insight into the modus operandi of the banking 
and leasing environment is that a company may be refused an increase in 
its overdraft ceiling yet, simultaneously, be allowed to undertake a 
lease with the leasing subsidiary of the company's bank. 
While leasing may be viewed as a logical extension of a bank's services, 
1. In the event of the lessee becoming insolvent and. being forced into li- 
quidation, the lessor will have substantial, and generally total, pro- 
tection and equity of his asset --- as this will not legally rank against the insolvent estate of the lessee: there is no question of another cre- 
ditor placing a lien on the leased asset. The lessor will, of course, 
be put to the inconvenience of recovering and re-selling (or re-leasing) 
the asset. He may also be able to recover the costs involved in such an 
operation plus any contractual, 'termination of the lease' fee, which 
may have been negotiated. However, these latter two items have no special 
priority or seniority over other claims by creditors. A priori, there- 
fore, the lessor is uniquely placed in terms of security; and as such, 
it may be argued that leasing could be a highly suitable financial in- 
strument of "last resort".... see Chapter 7 for the Industrial and les- 
sor reaction to this hypothesis. 
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bridging the gap between long and short-term credit (and confirming 
CLARK's comment, see footnote page 45), there is no reason to suppose 
that this was the dominant motive. Indeed, in one respect, leasing 
runs counter to conventional Banking practice in that it subjects the 
Bank to the following risks: 
"With five year leases common and longer ones by no means unusual, 
banks are effectively lending money against a fixed stream of 
repayments for a longer period than they might be willing to 
go on a straight loan. Since it would be unusual' for a bank to 
match a lease by borrowing long-term money at the start, it is 
exposed to all the risks of rising interest rates in the same 
way as anyone who borrows short and lends long". 
GEDDES [60 , p3011 
If we observe the fluctuations of the Bank of England minimum lending 
rate over the ten year period 1965-1975 we note a decline in the rate 
during 1972 followed by an unprecented rise; 'doubling within the 
space of a few months in 1973 due mainly to the Middle East crisis. 
SHELDON [124, p645] and GEDDES [60,, p299] point to the problems of 
borrowing short and lending long during such periods. Without doubt 
this has been a major influence upon the poor profit performance of 
many U. K. lessors, especially when one considers that the common philo- 
sophy of lessor financing is to match a five year lease with 'three 
1. Exactly why it would be unusual is not explained further by. 
GEDDES. We will return to the composition and make-up of the 
lessors "money book" in Chapter 7. 
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year money': a debt raised for a three year period. 
14% 
13% 
12% 
11% 
10% 
9% 
8% 
7% 
6% 
5% 
BANK OF ENGLAND. 
MINIMUM LENDING RATE. 
1.9 THE PROFITABILITY OF LEASING FOR THE LESSOR 
Three exogenous influences which affect the ultimate financial viabi- 
lity of a lease contract to the lessor, have now been discussed: viz, 
the rate of corporate taxationl; the level of interest/rental charges 
and the type of funds used by the lessor; and, finally, the size and 
periodic structure (ie. 100% First Year Allowances) of Capital Allo- 
wances and investment grants. The demonstrable variability of these 
factors has placed a collective pressure on the profitability of the 
leasing industry. 
1. Taxation and tax management will be returned to later: see Chapter 5. 
65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 
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"Margins are not high in the leasing sector ....... 
which makes for a poor return on capital employed. 
Too much leasing has been done for seeking 
taxation advantages, rather than profit, and this 
may prove to be costly with today's high interest" 
v rates". 
GREENE & CO [63 , p35] 
The financial press often refers to the above as "negative leasing", 
which is briefly discussed in the following section. " 
Negative leasing 
It is generally recognised that the U. K. banking system has been a high- 
ly successful and profitable sector of the economy. It is possible to 
conjecture, therefore, that the banks would actively seek appropriate 
methods to diminish their consequent extensive taxation liability. In 
an effort to reduce this burden the banks adopted leasing as a tax 
shelter: using the Capital Allowances'obtained from their ownership, 
via subsidiary companies, of the assets which they leased out, to 
significantly reduce their group tax liability. That the leases them- 
selves should be profitable was in practical terms of less financial 
consequence than the tax savings effected. 
It has been suggested' that because the tax advantages of leasing were 
so obvious and lucrative the lessors were willing to issue contracts 
which, when considered in isolation, appeared to produce a loss...... 
1. See SHELDON [124] or ARTHUR, YOUNG, McCLELLAND and MOORES [5] 
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hence the term "negative leasing". The lessor was prepared to accept 
this loss on the face value of the contract on the implicit understan- 
ding that the group's overall tax liability would be sufficiently di- 
minished, thereby making the amalgamated effect worthwhile. 
It has proved difficultl to gauge with any accuracy whether or not this 
approach is truly indicative of a lessor's commercial strategy (it may 
be surmised, on the basis of personal conversations with lessors, that 
such action is extremely infrequent today).. However, in the early days 
of the industry it does seem plausible that the tremendous inducement 
to tap these substantial resources of tax shelter may have led certain 
'lessors to such action; even if the subsequent 'profitability' for the 
leasing company was poor. The motive to minimise the parent company's 
tax liability perhaps proved too much of an incitement; which in the 
end made leasing, prima facie, a low profit activity. Its true but un- 
recorded profitability lay unattributed within the parent bank's taxa- 
tion accounts. 
For what it is worth in the light of the foregoing, the report of 
GREENE & CO_[63] 
-gives 
us something of a more comprehensive picture 
of the profitability of a selection of U. K. lessors. Extracting some 
of the more relevant data covering the period 1972-1973, we observe: 
1. Both GREENE & CO [63] and ARTHUR, YOUNG etc [5] found that 
such a practice existed, büt lessors were reluctant to reveal the extent 
of this approach in their leasing operations. 
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TART F- 19 
0 
A-SAMPLE OF 
LEADING 
LESSORS 
BOOK VALUE-OF. - 
INVESTMENT IN 
LEASED EQUIPMENT 
LEASE 
INCOME 
LEASING 
RETURN2 
PRE-TAX 
PROFIT 
PROFIT 
MARGIN 
IM im % im % 
MERCANTILE1 69 18.5 26.6 
. 
1.4 2.0 
COMPUTER LEAS- 
ING 65 18.6 28.8 5.5 8.2 
LLOYDS & SCOT- 
TISH 59 11.2 19.0 3.0 5.1 
HAMILTON 24 7.0 29.2 0.7 3.1 
U. D. T. 21 5.5 26.0 0.3 1.6 
WILLIAM BRANDTS 18 3.7 20.2 0.1 0.5 
FORWARD 16 2.8 17.9 0.3 2.0 
BOMAKER 15 3.3 21.8 0.7 4.9 
Table 1.2. clearly indicates the quite precarious profit margins earned 
by the lessors; and no doubt over the intervening period since this ta- 
ble was compiled the margin will have been further eroded due to the in- 
creased burden of interest charges. 
To a large extent the profit figures are distorted by the "Rule, of 78" 
method of accounting for profit by the lessors (see Chapter 2). This 
method is widely adopted in the U. K., but unfortunately it has the side 
effect of reporting losses during the early years of the lease contract. 
1. Now gone into liquidation. 
2. Leasing return = Leasing income divided by gross book value of equipment 
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This problem has been most acutely felt by lessors whose asset base 
has expanded rapidly during the past years as more business has been 
undertaken: their growth seemingly resulting in larger losses -- due 
perhaps as much (or more) to an accounting system as to economic reali- 
ty. When the lessor is a subsidiary of a Bank or Finance House this 
must concern management greatly: their efficiency and acumen is 
brought into doubt, with potential adverse reaction in both personal 
and company terms. Certainly it does seem that at the time of writing, 
the pressure from parent companies upon their leasing subsidiaries to 
make a trading, as well as a fiscal, contribution to the group (which 
is itself a significant indication of a changed economic climate for 
the banks), is resulting in a considerable emphasis being laid upon 
systems of accounting for leases in the books of lessors. This is dis- 
cussed further in the next Chapter. 
If Table 1.2. is reconsidered the following question may be posed: 
to what extent is the poor profit record of the industry a product of 
excessive, perhaps even unnecessarily excessive, rate cutting? 
Such rate cutting would take the form of offering contracts at low ren- 
tals. Besides the taxation motive previously outlined there are two 
further possible reasons to explain the lessor's action: firstly, a 
natural anxiety to establish leasing as a widely used and accepted sys- 
tem of corporate finance; and secondly, to promote their own position 
within the industry. The impact of setting uneconomically lote rentals 
would be two fold: profitability would be depressed and cash-flow 
(liquidity) prejudiced. 
How are lease rentals calculated? According to discussion with several 
lessors and the E. L. A., there are ten principal areas to be considered 
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when determining the size and pattern of a financial lease repayment 
schedule', (the order is in no way indicative of their importance): 
1. The cost of the asset, and the date when the lessor must 
pay the manufacturer of the equipment. 
2. The availability of any Government grant for the special 
location or industrial circumstances of the lessee which 
in the first instance will be paid to the lessor. Concern 
is also given to the exact timing of the grant and whether 
the conditions under which the grant is made require that 
it is to be transfered in a single sum or whether it may 
be spread out over the life of the lease. 
3. The situation prevailing in the money market when the lease 
is being negotiated: that is, whether the lessor 'may use long, 
medium or short-term funds2; the level of the rate of interest; 
and the possible impact of any future changes in the cost of 
money upon the lessor's profitability and cash-flow situation. 
4. Overhead costs: those incurred in the routine credit status in- 
vestigation of the lessee; collection and processing of ren- 
tals; preparing and handling of documents and legal contracts; 
staff and building costs; etc. 
1. The cost of an operating lease will not be considered in this thesis. 
Suffice it to say that it is determined principally by the cost of the 
asset, by consideration of the length of the initial lease, by the. an- 
ticipated second hand value of the asset and by expectations about its 
potential for re-leasing after the first lease is terminated. 
2. During 1974, for example, many lessors remarked that it was almost im- 
possible to obtain funds in excess of a3 year term. As a result of the 
prevailing uncertainty lessors have been forced into much shorter term 
money than they would like ..... with the inevitable consequences in a rising interest rate market. 
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5. Profit. 
6. The profit margin should include a small element to cover the sta- 
tistical probability of one of the lessee's defaulting on a con- 
tract. If the lessee is forced into liquidation it may be sometime 
before recovery of the remaining payments is made. 
7. The current and anticipated level of Corporation Tax and the ti- 
ming, incidence and size of Advanced Corporation Tax. 
8. If there should occur any undue lapse of times between the payment 
for the asset by the lessor and the receipt of the Capital Allowan- 
ce, or if there is a delay in the arrival of any rentals, both of 
which are not incorporated into the appropriate year's tax accounts, 
then the overall benefit of tax deferment by the lessor will be di- 
minished and his profit will suffer correspondingly. 
9. The possibility that, at some future date, a tax liability will, 
occur because an. excess of Capital Allowances has been accumulated 
by the lessor which. is above that which group tax profits can ab- 
sorb. This may has been caused by an unexpected decline in the 
taxable profits of other sectors of the group. 
10. In a period of high inflation the lessor must consciously build in- 
to the level of lease charges a factor which will compensate for the 
decline in the purchasing power of money over the period of the con- 
tract. 
1. Recent information received (Aug. 1975) would suggest that many U. K. lessors are currently undertaking leasing business which, because of 
their fully absorbed tax position, will not receive immediate and full benefit of the 100% first year capital allowance. As such, rentals are being calculated on the assumption that the lessor will only be able to absorb, say, 50% of the maximum amount in the first year of the 
contract. 
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To what extent the lessor has failed to handle this interactive pack- 
age of parameters in an optimal manner, and as a direct consequence 
suffered poor profit levels, is impossible to say. 
The leasing industry is too young and fragmented to permit any strong 
inferences to be drawn from the data that is available -- and it will 
surely be realised that the relevant data which comprise the necessary 
homogeneous population of lease contracts is not available. The sub- 
ject matter is too confidential; and the attribute of leasing that 
it can be tailored to your circumstances" mitigates against homoge- 
neity. 
That so many decision parameters should be recognised by leasing man- 
agement is mildly encouraging: but recognition and application may be 
unrelated given variations in human skills and the pressures of a very 
competitive market. For leasing management the problem is three fold: 
(i) To correctly-'quantify the parameter values in the present 
economic and legal climate; 
(ii) To correctly estimate their future values and the timing 
and scope of their impact upon leasing contracts drawn up 
now; and, 
(iii) To optimally combine these present and future values in 
determining rentals. 
It is not difficult to draw up models to effect a solution to (iii) 
in the context of assumptions about current conditions and values. 
It is, however, much more difficult to quantify actual values, and to 
define actual conditions of law, taxation and the like for any time 
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horizon beyond a short period hence --- the longer the lease contract, 
the more reliance is placed on estimates and the greater the possibili- 
ty of serious error. 
Because of the previously discussed ambiguities currently existing in 
the reporting of lease profitability the true position remains unclear: 
is the industry profitable or not? Has leasing management been success- 
ful or not? Until an accurate and equitable method of accounting is 
defined these questions will remain unanswered. In the meantime the 
situation is unresolved and the true circumstances can only be specu- 
lated. Such evidence as there is, and such conversations as have been 
entered into, lead to a moderately pessimistic conclusion. 
.1 
5 
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1.10 CONCLUSION 
As one of the principal sources of short to medium-term Instalment 
Debt available to the U. K. corporate sector, leasing has gradually 
emerged with a most impressive growth record to firmly establish itself 
as a new and increasingly prominent tool of financial management. Leas- 
ing is no longer (if it ever was) "second class" financing, but is 
actively engaged in by a wide variety of industries as an integral part 
of their corporate financing strategies. 
In an endeavour to chronicle the relevant fiscal changes that have ta- 
ken place since the introduction of leasing into this country, the 
fundamental issues and events which it is felt have contributed to- 
wards its growth and maturity have been considered. For the lessor it 
has been argued that the pace of development owed a great deal to the 
U. K. 's particular system of Corporation Tax ...... with the 
banking 
sector becoming increasingly influential in the field so as to secure 
the tax concessions which leasing brings through the medium of group 
relief. For the lessee, it has been suggested that their use of leas- 
ing may have developed for three (as yet unsubstantiated) reasons: 
1. As part of a defensive strategy when other suppliers of credit 
had been reluctant to increase or renew their financing commitment; 
2. As a taxation strategy, and; 3. As part of the overall financing 
policy of the company. In subsequent Chapters of the Thesis, opportu- 
nity will be taken to explore further the lessee's motives for leasing. 
Although it has been stressed that within the U. K. the leasing industry 
has received a substantial fillip from the tax system, there is con- 
spicuous evidence to suggest that it also has a more general and equal- 
ly strategic röle to play in corporate finance. France, Germany, Benilux, 
0 
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and the U. S. A. have all seen spectacular growth records in the use 
of leasing. Yet it is to be noted with interest that none of these 
countries have investment incentives (such as a 100% First Year Allo- 
wance) as generous as the Ü. K. In these countries the lessor's chief 
fiscal advantage lies in his ability to depreciate the asset over a 
shorter period than would normally be the case. 
Finally, the profitability of the leasing industry was considered. 
The data that was available proved to be somewhat equivocal due to 
the methods of accounting currently being used by U. K. Lessors. 
This important topic is now discussed further in the next Chapter. 
0 
CHAPTER 2 
SOME OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENT ON THE PROPOSED 
'INVESTMENT PERIOD' METHOD OF ACCOUNTING FOR 
EQUIPMENT LEASES BY LESSORS OF INDUSTRIAL AND 
COMMERCIAL EQUIPMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
At the time of writing the Accounting Standards Steering Committee of 
the Joint Accountancy Bodies of the U. K. (henceforth, the ASSC) is consider- 
ing the problem of an appropriate technique for the reporting of profits by 
lessors of industrial plant and equipment. In June 1974, the E. L. A. submit- 
ted a report on this topic [431 ', suggesting that the "Investment Period" 
method of accounting for the profitability of a lease should be adopted as 
the appropriate standard in the accounts of the lessor. 
Arguably' there are certain fundamental problems associated with the 
implementation of this method. As such, the purpose of this Chapter is to 
review the proposals put forward by the E. L. A. 
2.2 CURRENT 'ACCOUNTING FOR PROFIT' PRACTICE --U. K. LESSORS 
In its report the E. L. A. gives details of how its members report profit 
on financial leases and how they record depreciation on the assets so leased. 
The most common method of recording profit in the statutory accounts is by 
taking primary rentals to the P. & L. a/c evenly over the life of the asset. 
The most common practice of providing depreciation is via a form of the 
"sum of digits" basis. Thus, depreciation is provided: "as the sum equal to 
the balance of each primary rental, after deducting earnings (defined as: 
primary rentals less the cost of the asset) calculated on the 'sum of digits' 
1. This Chapter is partially drawn up from two sources: (i) a first paper 
by myself submitted to the E. L. A. and subsequently to the ASSC [129]twhich 
presented the initial thoughts and doubts on the problem of double counting 
(a topic to be discussed later), and (ii) a paper by R. A. FAWTHROP [ 47 3, sub- 
mitted to the ASSC, which was based upon our joint discussions and upon an 
initial draft prepared by myself. Full permission has been given by Prof. 
Fawthrop to include part of this second paper in this Chapter of the Thesis 
as it represents a substantial amount of my own research and thinking. I have followed the main line of thought developed in the Fawthrop paper, 
enlarging arguments where necessary and included the section 2.10, "Port- folio of Leases" which did not appear in either paper. 
3 
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basis. " r43 , p6]. The lessors responded to the E. L. A. survey as follows: 
How taken 
primary rentals to profit 
depreciation policy 4 12+3 
The E. L. A. considers there to be serious deficiencies in both accounting 
methods (almost to the point of considering them as unrepresentative of 
'true' business profitability, see footnote, p67): 
"The 'straight line' method of releasing primary rentals and charging 
depreciation to the profit and loss account produces results which 
bear no relation to the actual profits earned from the lease except, 
in total when the lease has run its full term. The main distortion 
arises because high interest charges are incurred at the beginning 
of the lease and are not spread evenly over the whole period. The 
'sum of digits' method of accounting overcomes this distortion in 
part by releasing a higher level of net income at the beginning of 
the lease to compensate for the higher levels of interest charges 
incurred. It is an unsatisfactory method of equalising income with 
evenly sum'of digits 
16 3 
straight line sum of digits 
interest charges. " [43, p10] 
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2.3 THE INVESTMENT PERIOD METHOD -- INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS 
In view of the problems' outlined in section 2.2 the E. L. A. has 
devised the Investment Period method which adopts as its main principle 
that: 
"Gross earnings, being the excess of total lease rentals over 
the cost of the asset, should be taken to profit in direct relation- 
ship to the reducing capital invested in the equipment during the 
lease period. "[43, p8]. 
To this end, total gross earnings are: 
"Apportioned to the accounting periods in the ratio that the cash 
invested at each rest (each accounting year end) bears to the total 
cash invested at all rests during the accounting period. Total gross 
earnings are thus spread over the investment period only. "[43, p8]. 
Prima facie, the Investment Period method appears to be an unexceptionable 
approach. In what follows it will be argued that this approach is not 
necessarily 'wrong': but that for it to be 'right' implies an acceptance 
of a set of axioms about the nature and financing of a leasing organisation 
which may, or may not, be an accurate representation of what happens in 
practice within an individual organisation ... several shades of grey will 
be seen to exist which could prejudice the accuracy of the method. 
This is not an unusual characteristic of accounting procedures --- 
current controversies over accounting axioms, principles, postulates and 
conventions are, after all, the raison d'etre of the A. S. S. C. 
1. As was noted in Ch. 1,1.9, the leasing companies have found themselves 
in a distressing situation recently: they have grown quickly, issuing pre- 
sumably profitable contracts, yet they have been showing a rapidly deterio- 
rating profit position, which in some cases has been a loss. The profits from previous and current contracts continue to be 'swamped' by the heavy initial interest and set-up cost of new business. Managerial concern to 
(cont. }) 
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The need for flexibility in accounting standards is well'argued, at 
any rate up to the point of permitting presentation of accounting state- 
0 
ments which reflect genuine differences in underlying economic circum- 
stances: yet not to the extent of facilitating the disguising, or the 
evasion of disclosure, of relevant economic circumstances however un- 
pleasant. In order to safely walk the narrow path between, requires the 
detailed specification'and'understanding of a set of axioms -- particularly, 
the ground rules about the nature and financing of the economic entity now 
being accounted for -- which management of the entity can adhere to, can be 
consistent with, in their accounting procedures. Any standardised method 
of accounting for equipment leases must reflect both the same judicious 
tolerance for the genuinely different and that same responsible care for 
the materially truthful -- which must likewise be founded upon a set of 
commonly understood axioms about the nature and financing of the organisa- 
tion now in report. Thus, the following argument is central to our discus- 
Sion in this chapter. 
What does the Investment Period system appear to be telling us about 
the nature and financing of leasing companies: and does that accord 
with the way they really are? 
As will be apparent in the later Chapter containing a discussion of 
asurvey conducted with several U. K. lessors, see Chapter 7, it must 
be admitted at the outset that it is very difficult to determine, "the way 
(cont. ): 
make the accounting system more 'representative' (i. e. show profits earlier) has been all the more keen in recent years with interest rates and overhead burdens rising sharply. - 
- 69 - 
0 
0 they really are" in an industry where its members are acutely aware of 
their competitive position and extremely sensitive to the disclosure of 
confidential information which may prejudice their position. As with any 
other economic organisation a definitive statement on policy (or profitabi- 
lity; which is frequently well hidden within the parents accounts) is largely 
a question of who one is talking to, and the degree of mutual respect as to 
confidentiality. However, an accounting system or method is usually con- 
structed for the purpose of either score-keeping and reporting, for control- 
ling, or for providing information with which to make decisions. Occasional- 
ly, the same system or method is sought to be used for two, or perhaps all 
. 
three, of these purposes -- usually with less than satisfactory results 
and at a cost of much misunderstanding. It appears that something of this 
trauma seems to be pervading discussions of the Investment Period system of 
equipment leasing accounting: during recent discussions on the subject with 
various members of the E. L. A. it has been described with equal positiveness 
as: 
"A technique of management accounting for internal decision-making" 
and also as 
"A method of measuring (and reporting) profits from equipment leasing". 
This divergence of opinion, and its implications, will be returned to 
later; noting for the present that there does appear to be a reasonable 
amount of misunderstanding and perhaps misplaced emphasis and critisism in 
the discussion of the system. 
BROWNING [25, plO] does, however, make a significant contribution to 
clearing up these misunderstandings when he comments: 
-' "It will be appreciated that the underlying philosophies of the Actua- 
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rial P"ethodl and the Investment Period Method are different, as the 
Investment Period method does not make cash (i. e. earnings) available 
to the lessor for alternative uses (e. g. payment of dividends, invest- 
ment in new"projects, etc. ) until the end of the life'of the lease. In 
this case, therefore, the cash is not released but is retained within 
the lease to artificially depress the market borrowings necessary to 
support the lease itself. " (emphasis supplied). 
It is hoped that the ensuing discussion will show that this statement 
contains a considerable amount of truth: acceptance of the Investment Period 
system must depend upon whether or not one accepts as an axiom of the nature 
and financing of leasing companies that "to artificially depress the market 
borrowings necessary to support the lease itself" is IN FACT "the way they 
(the nature and financing) really are". External observers of the industry 
may question this --- these doubts will be further considered and outlined 
in this Chapter and the subsequent Industrial Survey. 
Arguably the problem is rather more complex than even BROWNING's com- 
ment implies. To demonstrate this it will be necessary to construct an il- 
lustration and then to analyse the implications. 
2.4 A PURE DISCOUNTING APPROACH 
An asset costing £ 2000 (outright purchase price) is the subject of 
a leasing contract consisting of a primary period of five annual payments 
of £557, followed by a secondary period of annually renewable negligible 
amounts. "Gross Earnings", as defined previously, are thus (5 x £557)- 
£2000= £785. The asset attracts a full 100% first year allowance which 
1. This is basically a discounting approach, discussed later. 
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the lessor may absorb in total during the first eligible year, and Cor- 
poration Tax is expected to remain at 50% throughout the period, with 
the lessor paying tax at the full amount. 
THE FOLLOWING CONVENTIONS1 ARE USED: 
1. (i) Rentals are annual, and payable in advance. The use of annual 
amounts simplifies computation, compresses tabulation and high- 
lights problems of cash-flow timing. 
(ii) Receipt of the first rental is co-terminous with payment for the 
asset. 
2. Payment of taxation, and receipt of tax relief, takes place on assess- 
ment to tax. Assessment is effected on January 1st next following 
the end of the fiscal year within which the accounting year ends. 
First-year allowances relate to the accounting year within which 
the asset is first brought into service. The accounting year ends on 
31st December. 
This specific assumption must be made regarding the receipt of 
tax allowances and the payment of corporation tax: the following se- 
quence of events causes the two year delay shown in the subsequent 
Tables -- for tax purposes the first lease is commenced by the com- 
pany at t=0 (date 1.1. xl). and will be recorded in the accounts, at t=1 
(1.1. x2), tax will then be paid on this amount at t=2 (1.1. x3). This 
convention is typical of those used in all project appraisals (al- 
though in the subsequent survey of the literature on leasing, this 
1. To identify, quantify and date exactly each variable in the analysis 
(such as a series of tax payments) is lab rious and may introduce a random 
bias. A set of standardised assumptions, or conventions, is therefore made 
which is a reasonable approximation to the facts of the case but which 
avoids these difficulties. 
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very important two year delay! - - as opposed to the standard 
one year delay -- is frequently overlooked, with significant 
effects on the discounting process). In practice the lease may not 
always commence at exactly t=0, or the start of the accounting 
period, it is then accepted accounting procedure to apportion the 
tax burden to the appropriate years. 
,A 
similar argument (i. e. a 
two year delay) may be constructed for Capital Allowances. 
This convention is less pedantic and more practically significant 
than it might seem. The Investment Period requires that interest be 
computed from time to time on the residuals of capital; net of taxation, 
amounts. It is, therefore, extremely important to date precisely the 
receipt or payment of taxation amounts so as to calculate the interest. 
Further: it is of considerable importance in that the period (year-end) 
reporting of data at a particular time will demand a knowledge of what 
taxation items to include or exclude. The full significance of these 
points will be demonstrated later, but it serves at this time to em- 
phasise how an accounting method can "appear to be telling us about 
the nature and financing" of the organisation. 
It should also be noted that this particular tax convention sets 
an accounting year-end at December 31st and taxation cash-flows, re- 
lating to the previous accounting year, on January 1st. 
In the Investment Period method the two dates are separate; but in 
any method which utilises discounting, AS DO THE VARIOUS ACTUARIAL 
METHODS, the two dates are the same for all practical purposes. 
Consider year-end data at 31-12-xl and a tax cash-flow at 
1.1. x2. In the Investment Period analysis the two would appear in 
separate data columns: but as the discount factor at 31.12. x1, is 
for any realistic rate of interest, virtually indistinguishable 
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from that of 1.1. x2 both dates would be regarded as co-terminus for 
actuarial purposes. However, over periods as long as one year, the 
results of this difference in treatment upon calculations of capital 
recovery and income (profit) can be significant. 
3. All cash-flows are assumed to be discrete amounts occurring at year- 
ends or year-beginnings. A different tax convention would nullify 
this. 
4. All interest amounts are discrete year-end computations. Continuous 
compounding might be more realistic, but not greatly so -- and in 
the context of the problem at hand it is much less useful or familiar 
to the ultimate uses of the accounting system. 
The cash-flows of the contract may be depicted as follows: 
TABLE 2.1 
1 FAeF mr\lTRMT DATA If) 
DATE OF CASH FLOW: 1.1. x1 1.1. x2 1.1. x3 1.1. x4 1.1. x5 1.1. x6 1.1. x7 
NAME OF CASH FLOW 
LESSORS PURCHASE 
COST OF THE ASSET. (2000) 
LESSORS RECEIPT 
OF RENTALS., 557 557 557 557 557 
50% CORPORATION 
TAX ON RENTALS., -(278) (278) (278) 
(278) (278) 
FIRST YEAR ALLOW- 
ANCE (100% @ 50T4. ' 1000 
AGGREGATE CASH- 
FLOW (1443) 557 1279 279 279 (278) (278) 
(Bracketed figures are cash-outflows from the lessor) 
To clarify subsequent analysis it will be convenient at this point to 
establish equivalent time periods (thereby clearing up what may have been 
some confusion in Assumption 2 above): 
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TABLE 2.2 
CASH-FLOW DATA 
(TABLE 2.1) 
EQUIVALENT DATE FOR 
DISCOUNTING PURPOSES 
DISCOUNT PERIOD "t" 
1.1. x l 31.12. x0 t=0 
1.1. x2 31.12. x1 t=1 
1.1. x3 31.12. x2 t=2 
1.1. x4 31.12. x3 t-3 
1.1. x5 31.12. x4 t-4 
1.1. x6 31.12. x5 t=5 
1.1. x7 31.12. x6 t=6 
A capital recovery table' may now be computed using an interest rate 
of 20%. 
TABLE 2.3 
CAPITAL RECOVERY IMPLICIT IN THE LEASE (C) 
DISCOUNT CAPITAL INTEREST on CAPITAL + CASH-FLOW CAPITAL- 
] 
CAPITAL 
PERIOD "t" OUTSTAND- OUTSTAND- INTEREST IN PERIOD UNRECOV- RECOVERED 
ING AT ING CAPITAL DUE AT END "t" ER ED AT DURING 
START OF AT 20% OF PERIOD 
END OF 
PERIOD' 
PERIOD "t" 
PERIOD "t" 
0 (2000) (2000) 557 (1443) 557 
1 (1443) (288) (1731) 557 (1174) 269 
2 (1174) (235) (1409) 1279 ( 130) 1044 
3 130 26 156 279 123' 253' 
4 123' 24 147' 279 426* 303* 
5 426' 84 510' (278) 232' (193) 
6 232' 46 278' (278) 0 (232) 
Up to the end of period 3 the project still has capital to be recovered; in 
period 3 there is an over-recovery of f 123 (as indicated by the asterisk). 
Consequently, in period 4 there is a surplus (asterisked) rather than an 
amount due at the period-end, which gives rise to an even larger over-re- 
covery (asterisked). This pattern is repeated in period 5, but the negative 
cash-flow of that period reduces the over-recovery with the negative cash- 
flow of period 6 completing the process to leave a NIL under or over-recovery. 
1. This table, and the following Table 2.4, together with subsequent dis- 
cussion on the "reinvestment assumption" are based upon pages 191-194 of 
FAWTHROP [45] . 
:. 
- 75 - 
Table 2.3 demonstrates that the contract has a yield' of 20%: if the 
.I period cash-flows were discounted at 20% there would be. a zero net present 
value. FAWTHROP'[45 , p1931 has demonstrated that each period cash-flow can 
be split up into a yield (income) element equal*to'20%*of the capital re- 
maining'in the contract'at'each*periöd'rest (thus matching income to in- 
vestment --- one of the desired principles of the Investment Period, see 
Section 2.3), plus a capital recovery or depreciation, viz.: 
TABLE 2.4 
THE INCOME FRACTION AND DEPRECIATION FRACTION OF CASH--FLOW (i) 
I %. 
Discounting period "t" 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Accounting year end 19x1 19x2 19x3 19x4 19x5 19x6 19x7 
31 Dec. 
Period cash flow 557 557 1279 279 279 (278) (278) 
Divisible into: 
1. Capital recovery 557 209 1044 130 
2. Income 288 235 26 
3. Borrowing from contr. 123 303 
4. Interest thereon (loss) (24) (85) (46) 
5. Repayment to contr. (193) (232) 
Capital invested during 
period 1443 1174 130 0 - - - 
Income as afb thereon* 20% 0% 20% 
Capital borrowed 122 425 232 0 
Loss as a% thereon " 20% 20% 20% 
x This is established with reference to the capital base in previous year. 
This is a strict 'pure' discounting approach. It has the special 
characteristic that the income (or loss) is computed at the true yield 
inherent in the terms of the lease contract and its related tax conventions. 
From the income there may be deducted the normal costs of operation such as 
... ... .................. . ... ...... 
1. Technically, the cash-flow profile of this project, with its switch from 
negative to positive to negative again, is a "non-simple, mixed" profile 
from which it may be erroneous to derive a yield in the manner demonstrated. 
This is, however, a somewhat sophisticated aspect of discounting mathematics 
which we may ignore in the present context. 
See Chapter 8 for a full discussion of this problem. 
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overheads, provisions for bad debts and the like. There would also be a 
corresponding addition to the latter period's'loss'. 
Additional points of importance are: 
1. By 31.12. x4 the initial capital outlay of £ 2000 has been fully re- 
covered and a surplus cash throw-off accrues to the contract. This 
increases in the following years but because of the negative cash-flow 
occurring in the final two years the throw-off is reduced to zero. 
The life of the contract can be divided into two reference periods 
which will prove useful in the ensuing discussion. 
THE CAPITAL DEFICIT PERIOD1 which relates to those periods prior 
to the surplus cash throw-off, and 
THE CAPITAL SURPLUS PERIOD which runs from the end of the capital 
deficit period until the termination of 
the lease (i. e. all the subsequent 
periods) 
2. Totally implicit in this approach is that the depreciation fraction 
(capital recovery) is taken out of ("borrowed from") the contract and 
reinvested at a rate not less than the true yield on the contract? 
This is the "Reinvestment Assumption" implicit in all discounting pro- 
cedures (see footnote p. 74). It will be noted that positive capital re- 
covery will only occur in the CAPITAL DEFICIT period. Therefore, a point 
is raised here for the reader to bear in mind subsequently: the rein- 
vestment of the cash-flows occuring in the CAPITAL SURPLUS period will 
be seen to be fundamental to the methodology and workings of the In- 
vestment Period method. The present, 'pure discounting' method implies 
1. This corresponds exactly to the length of the Investment Period (out- lined shortly). 
2. Reinvestment earnings up to that rate are then imputed back to the con- tract ('lost' to the firm) which otherwise would yield 20%. 
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that leasing companies'do reinvest the depreciation fraction impli- 
cit in the lease rentals -- it "says something about the nature and 
financing of leasing organisationso. But note the conflict between 
the, as yet to be discussed, Investment Period method's desire to 
reinvest the cash-flow (in full)' which occurs in the CAPITAL, SURPLUS 
period, and the pure discounting method which only reinvests a fract- 
ion of the cash-flow and then with greatest impact in the CAPITAL 
DEFICIT period. 
3. FAWTHROP [45, p193] shows that capital recovery (depreciation) is a 
""true'economic depreciätiön" -- it is the change in the earning po- 
wer of the contract at each period rest, as measured by the present 
value of the contract at each period end. This approach has consider- 
able affinity to the method proposed by MYERS t1071, differing on- 
ly by the discount rate used2. 
MYERS suggests a modified form of the after-tax cost of debt, which 
may well be different from the internal yield used here. 
The cost of finance would be a further deduction from "income" in 
the present method, and a'reduction of the "loss", in as much as ex- 
ternal market borrowing costs would be avoided by using the "deprecia- 
tion fraction" of the contract for further operations (re-investment 
in other leases). The discounting approach also has the virtue of 
spreading the gross income over the contract life in a logical man- 
ner rather than that "by some rule or other", MYERS (op cit. ) 
1. Subject to certain deduction see Table 2.5. 
2. As will become obvious in the Chapter dealing with the previous literature 
on leasing, the question of the "correct" discount rate is a thorny problem. 
MYERS' contribution to the current debate is based on another article of 
his, namely [106 1. It is considered premature to raise the full issue of 
this paper at this stage of the Thesis, see chapter 6. 
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4. The discounting approach is, as MYERS remarks, an "ideal" approach. 
Computationally it is not especially difficult'and it has the virtue 
of being based upon strict economic logic. It is related to cash-flow 
rather than accounting values -- vide especially the computation of 
depreciation. It is also a type of Actuarial calculation and, as 
such, MYERS' preference for the Actuarial alternative in the E. L. A. 
submission is understandable. 
The discounting approach has proved valuable as a means of exploring the 
economic nature of a leasing contract. From this basis it is now possible to 
fully discuss the implications of the Investment Period. 
2.5 THE INVESTMENT PERIOD APPROACH --- AN EXAMPLE AND COMMENT 
The following tables (2.5 to 2.8) purport to apply the Investment 
Period approach to the exemplar leasing contract (and its associated 
conventions as previously described) utilised in the preceeding section. 
This presentation is somewhat different from that demonstrated in the 
E. L. A. submission -- in particular annual rests are used by way of sim- 
plification -- but it is believed to contain all the principal features 
of the approach. 
(i) It should be noted that in this presentation the cost of bor- 
rowing (raising funds to finance the lease) has been taken as 10% per 
annum pre-tax. 
(ii) The point of translation from CAPITAL DEFICIT to CAPITAL SUR- 
PLUS is in the period market with an asterix; although in fact the 
amounts of CAPITAL SURPLUS and DEFICIT are really an aggregate of capital 
and interest, both adjusted for tax 
(iii) This example shows two periodic rests in CAPITAL DEFICIT, the 
amounts of capital outstanding in these periods are £ 1587 and 1 1133. 
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Four major differences may be observed between Table 2.3 and 2.5 
1. Table 2.3 is computed on an internal yield basis -- it is self- 
consistent. Whereas, Table 2.5 requires the introduction of an 
exogenously-determined "cost of funds" (here 10%) which may or 
may not be consistent with the "yield to funds" (here 20%). 
2. Table 2.5 is also open to the charge that it embodies an element 
of "double counting" -- subject to certain conditions to be out- 
lined shortly. From Table 2.3 it will be noted that the rentals 
received were broken down into their constituent elements of interest 
and capital recovery. Prima facie in Table 2.5 (but not incontro- 
vertibly -- there is an element of doubt as to the true "nature 
and financing" of the organisation) the rental for, say, 19x3 is 
used wholly to reduce the capital investment in the contract. This 
is then followed on line 10 by the imputation of a separate interest 
income of £ 22 to the lease contract ..... and so on in all the 
periods within the CAPITAL SURPLUS section of the lease. But sure- 
ly the rental does include all the income really attributable to the 
contract, and to impute yet a' further income to it is surely 
spurious? 
A measure of this double counting is indicated by the fact that 
the internal discount rate -- that which results in a zero present 
value over the 8 years -- on the data in Table 2.5 is close to 15%; 
yet Table 2.3 clearly indicates that the "true" yield of this con- 
tract is no more than 20%. 
1. An attempt to 'prove' this assertion will be made in a later section 
of this Chapter, see section 2.10. 
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3. Table 2.3, and its derivative Table 2.4, come to a "natural" conclu- 
Sion when capital investment in, and borrowing from, the contract 
are just terminated by the interaction of rentals, taxation and interest 
cash-flows. It will be noted that Table 2.5 has no "natural" end -- 
presumably it could be continued to infinity or any arbitrarily de- 
termined shorter period. Here, the first clear year after completion 
of rentals receivable and associated tax liabilities has been chosen: 
but there is no apparently logical terminal period. It also presents 
us with the problem of 'explaining' the nature of the terminal cash- 
flow. 
4. It is not immediately clear just exactly what has happened to the 
various cash-flows in Table 2.5 (-- perhaps, the nub of the problem). 
For example, in year 19x2, Table 2.5 shows all the rental for that 
year as a reduction in the investment in the contract (that is, 
capital recovery or depreciation is the-full amount of-the rental): 
yet, as will be seen, the linked Table 2.7 shows most of it to be 
income. 
Table 2.5 also embodies a singular form of "reinvestment assumption": 
by comparison to Table 2.3 which deliberately re-invests the depreci- 
ation fraction, Table 2.5 "disinvests" the capital of the project 
back to the original financial source of the contract, and only re- 
invests the CAPITAL SURPLUSES in the later years. Thus, there is no 
guarantee that the project yield will be achieved if the reinvestment 
rate differs from (is lower than) the original project yield. 
These differences will be discussed further below, meanwhile the In- 
vestment Period approach computations must be completed. The data of Table 
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2.5 can be applied as follows in accordance with paragraphs 12.1 and 12.5 
of the E. L. A. submission: 
. 'Table 2.6 
'APPORTIONMENT-OF GROSS EARNINGS 
.................... .... 
Accounting year-end Amount invested at Apportionment of gross 
Dec 31st year. end earnings 
19x1 £1587 = 58% 58% £ 456 
19x2 £1133 = 42% 42% £ 329 
£2720 = 100% 100% _1 _785 
and the results applied to the determination of a "depreciation" series: 
Table 2.7 
GROSS EARNINGS AND RESULTING DEPRECIATION CHARGE 
Accounting year- 
end - Dec. 31st 
Rental received 
in year 
Gross earnings 
in year 
Depreciation 
in year 
19x1 557 456 101 
19x2 557 329 ' 
228 
19x3 557 - 557 
19x4 557 - 557 
19x5 557 - 557 
12785 1785 £2000 
Combining all the previous information the effect of this single lease 
contract on the "profit and loss" account of the lessor can be demonstrated 
over the life of the agreement, and beyond. NOTE that one of the inherent 
principles of the Investment Period method is that interest ("profit") will 
accrue to the lease cash balances once the contract has entered the CAPITAL 
SURPLUS PERIOD. Thus: 
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Table .8 
PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT(S); LESSOR 
Accounting 
year-end 
31st Dec. 
Primary 
rentals 
received 
Deprecia- 
tion charg- 
ed 
Gross' 
earnings 
Interest 
charged/ 
credited 
Profit/ 
(loss) 
prior to 
corn. tax 
19x1 557 101 456 (144) 312 
19x2 557 228 329 (103) 226 
19x3 557 557 0 22 22 
19x4 557 557 0 57 57 
19x5 557 557 0 89 89 
£r85 12000 £785 T =ý 19x6 68 68 
19x7 41 44 
19x8 42 42 
etc. iý etc. I etc. )t 
t-t witnOUL DOuna) 
Table 2.8 especially brings out the arbitrary nature of the appraisal 
period. This is endemic in any investment appraisal study that does not have 
a finite and foreseeable "life". In the present case, th6 five years of the 
contract form such a "life" only if it can be ascertained clearly what hap- 
pens to the cash-flows accruing during the "life" after the 5 years are ter- 
minated -- which is a function of the "nature and financing" of the orga- 
nisati. on: a definite statement about the role or placement of the terminal 
cash-flow goes a considerable way towards determining the "life" of the stu- 
dy period. However, the E. L. A. submission is silent on this point; and there 
would also appear to be disagreement among some U. K. lessors who in 
discussion have stated it to be either a "reinvestment" into new leases or 
a "distribution" to the parent. 
'. 6 DEPRECIATION POLICY 
From the previous Tables 2.6 and 2.7 it is clear that the size and 
timing of depreciation is seen as a residual after gross earnings have been 
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apportioned to their relevant time intervals and deducted from rentals. 
It is proposed here that depreciation would be more correctly es- 
tablished by reference to the actual loss-in-value-through-use of*the 
equipment, which is after all the substance behind the lease. Given this, 
gross earnings would then appear as'a residual. It is also suggested that 
loss-in-value-through-use would best be determined and related to replace- 
ment rather than historic cost; on the grounds of greater realism. But 
perhaps the system with most to recommend it would be a depreciation policy 
based on the change in income earnings capacity (i. e. the "economic de- 
preciation" policy previously outlined in Tables 2.3 and 2.4) of the lease 
by measuring the change in the present value at each successive year end 
-- this is the pure discounting or actuarial approach. The argument for 
computing gross income and thus depreciation in the manner advocated is 
that this system matches earnings to investment. 
The Investment Period method of reporting depreciation is potentially 
a most misleading and possibly hazardous system: 
(1) The E. L. A. submission[43, p10 ]clearly indicates that the reported 
asset in the statutory accounts will be the depreciated value of 
the equipment. An examination of Tables . 2.8 and 2.5 indicates that 
the reported earnings will in no way match the investment base. The 
desire to "front-end-load", the gross earnings from the lease serious- 
ly distorts any return to capital employed measurement. 
(2) The proposed system recommendsa re-allocation of total gross income 
into those accounting periods where the lease remains in cash 
deficit. As such, "Profit and Loss" is shown to be highest when the 
cash commitment is at its peak. If, as is to be commercially expect- 
ed, the gross earnings generated by the lease will contribute towards 
some form of distribution to the parent company, then the Investment 
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Period method will encourage a . distribütion'of'cash at precisely the 
time when all the cash resources are tied-up in the on-going contract. 
This, basically, is, an untenable position if the accounting principle 
of realisation and the accounting convention of prudence are to be 
recognised. It. is vitally important to match distributions with cash- 
flow, but the Investment Period method fails to do this. 
i 
To continue with the previous discussion on the Investment Period. 
As was noted above, a major difference between the discounting approach 
and the Investment Period approach is that in the latter there is no 
immediate indication of'what happens to the cash-flow generated by the 
" contract during its life time. 
Evidently this issue of the destination of cash-flow generated by the 
contract is of major importance in understanding the Investment Period 
approach to accounting for leases. And insofar as this involves the 
question of whether or not such cash-flows are assumed to be reinvested, 
a second important issue must be the interest rate used in the apprai- 
sal -- which also was seen to be a major difference between the two 
approaches. 
2.7'A'"SINGLE VENTURE" OR A'"REINVESTMENT" SYSTEM 
INTRODUCTION 
It is taken as axiomatic that: 
Whatever method of accounting for equipment leases is used, 
it'must be possible to reconcile the aggregate amounts of 
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interest charged and credited in the individual contract 
profit and loss accounts with the actual net payments 
or receipt of interest in the books of account of the - 
organisation. 
In fact, it would be possible to modify this requirement somewhat if 
(a) the individual contract "profit and loss" accounts were to be used 
for internal decision making purposes rather than profit reporting, 
and 
(b) senior management did not then attempt to aggregate these management 
accounts (which is what they would be) into financial position sta- 
tements 1. 
It is assumed that these two conditions are not what is envisaged. 
At the heart of the matter is that the net receipts of, or. payments of, 
interest in the books of account of the lessor will reflect the actual 
movements of funds -- how the organisation actually operates and what 
use it has made of its funds. 
A priori, it seems possible that the following movements of funds could 
take place (against which net receipts and payments of interest could 
1. There does seem to be some confusion between proponents of the Invest- 
ment Period system as to what ultimate use the appraisal method is to 
be put to. Both "management accounting" and "financial accounting" usages 
have been indicated in discussion. The E. L. A. submission itself talks a- 
bout "accounting for leasing" without saying "accounting for leases to 
whom". If, in fact, what'is envisaged is management accounting then much 
of the ensuing critisism is unnecessary (being broadly similar in nature 
to a lease appraisal technique which we shall introduce later in the 
Thesis). However, it may be noted that so far the ASSC has only been con- 
cerned with standards for external financial reporting. The critisism is 
thus couched on the assumption that the system is to be employed as part 
of the statutory accounts. 
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be reconciled): 
MOVEMENT A As each lease contract is entered into, fresh ad hoc funds 
are raised to acquire the asset. As the rentals are recei- 
ved and the various tax and interest adjustments brought in, 
then: 
(i) During the CAPITAL DEFICIT period, net receipts are 
used to retire those ad hoc funds -- the entire resi- 
Y 
dual sum at each year end is set aside to retire the 
initial capital. The retiral is quite explicit (it is 
an actual,, not notional, event). The cost of funds 
which still remain tied-up in the contract must of 
. course 
be paid for, but there is areduction in the 
tie-up. 
(ii) During the CAPITAL SURPLUS period, net receipts are 
put into a 
'separate 
bank account or other non-leasing 
non-capital redemtion investment. There they will be 
able to earn interest in a compound manner. 
MOVEMENT B As movement A but with the following difference: 
during the CAPITAL DEFICIT period net receipts are put into 
a separate non-leasing, non-capital redemption investment 
the interest of which is credited to the contract, reducing 
the net interest charged to it during the deficit period. 
l1OVEMET C During the CAPITAL DEFICIT period, the net inflows are used 
in the same manner as movements A and B. However, during the 
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CAPITAL SURPLUS period, net inflows are used to reduce the 
.... ....... ... ............. ... tie-up of capital'in'öther'existing'(örr'aboüt'to'commence) 
i easing'cbntracts during'their CAPITAL DEFICIT period. 
MOVEMENT D As soon as'äny net inflows are received, i. e. whether our 
lease contract is in CAPITAL DEFICIT or SURPLUS they are 
used to reduce the capital tie-up in other*existing'con- 
'tracts. It will follow, of course, that the contract will 
also be reciprocally relieved, which increases its ability 
to relieve even further, other existing-contracts. 
'MOVEMENT E During the CAPITAL DEFICIT period, net inflows may move 
as in A or B. But during the CAPITAL SURPLUS period, net 
inflows are used to finance 'new, additional contracts. 
MOVEMENT F As soon as'any net inflows are received -- i. e. whether 
the contract-is in CAPITAL SURPLUS or DEFICIT -- net in- 
flows are used to finance new, additional contracts. 
MOVEMENT G Only that part of the net cash-inflows representing the 
capital recovery, or depreciation (as per Table 2.3) is 
reinvested in new, additional contracts 
l. 
Other alternatives will occur to the reader, but these will suffice to 
illustrate different "natures and financing" of leasing organisations. 
...................................................................... 
1. This is the "idealised" discounting approach discussed earlier, with its implicit reinvestment assumption. 
.; 
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2.8'A SINGLE VENTURE SYSTEM 
MOVEMENTS A and B are clearly "single venture" operations. There is NO 
transfer of funds between contracts WITHIN THE LEASING ORGANISATION. 
It would be possible in A for the lending organisation which provided 
the funds for each new contract to re-circulate redemption receipts 
back into its leasing subsidiary or client organisation. But so far as 
the lessor is concerned each contract is regarded, administered and 
accounted for as if it was a single venture in total isolation from its 
fellows. It would then transpire that the aggregate of interest pay- 
ments, reductions in payments and receipts', recorded by accounting for 
each lease by the Investment Period method would exactly equal the net 
balance of interest receipts or payments in the books of account of the 
leasing organisation'. 
However, the key question may be posed: Does the movement of funds 
(depicted by types A and B) correspond with the "nature and financing" 
of leasing organisations 'in practice? 
If so then: * 
(i) Leasing organisations will have an ever increasing balance of 
funds committed to, presumably external, non-leasing and/or debt 
redemption investments -- unless this is the source of dividends 
attributable to share capital at a rate exactly equal to the 
build-up of such investment. 
(ii) A detailed observation of Table 2.5, in conjunction with movements 
A and B, raises the question of whether or not the initial capital 
. 4---for the lease contract'resembles' an'overdraft'in'natüre. ''" '' 
1. And, thus, Table 2.5 would be perfectly accurate and representative. 
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If we consider that the rate of reduction of this committment 
is not in any way contracted, but is dependent upon the size of 
the received rentals plus tax adjustments, then the repayment 
of the capital sum could be said to be at the lessor's discre- 
tion: the amount he repays will determine the level of interest 
he is charged. -To that end there is, if nothing more, an im- , 
plicit indication that the Investment Period method reflects a 
contract which is, funded by-overdraft. 
It has been noted before in this-Thesis (see Chapter 1, section 
1.10) that in the recent past the leasing industry in this coun- 
try -- together with-other-industrial concerns -- have been for- 
ced into what is (was) an almost total-dependence on short term 
debt. The long term debt market currently being the subject of 
very high rates of interest. 
While this-is certainly an important, albeit temporary, pheno- 
menenon, it would be safe to suggest that 5 years from now the 
debt market will have a different form and character than that 
observable today. Given this situation, where long term debt is 
available at 'realistic' interest rates, it will be prudent bank- 
ing policy to employ a mix of long and short-term debt (there- 
by trying to avoid borrowing short and lending-long). - 
Thus, the repayment of interest and capital on a specific leas- 
ing contract may bear little or no resemblance to the overdraft 
conscious/rapid repayment schedule depicted in Table 2.5. Thus, 
we may conjecture that if the accounting standard had been de- 
bated in a time when interest rates were different, then the E. L. A. 
I 
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submission would have been constructed in a somewhat diffe- 
rent manner. No account is taken of long term debt (or for that 
matter equity) in the proposed method. 
(iii) Leasing organisations are in danger of being less than fully ef- 
ficient. If the risk-adjusted rate of return on available and 
potential lease contracts is greater than the external non-leas- 
ing, non-capital redemption investment opportunities, then it 
would be inefficient to reinvest cash-flows outside the leasing 
business -- potential lessee's offer a return in excess of the 
external investment opportunity rate. Conversely, the organisa- 
tion should not be in the leasing business if it could not at 
the very least match this yield. Only if the two rates coincides 
is it correct to regard the two as economic substitutes for each 
other. 
The third observation contains serious implications for the rate at 
which interest should be charged or credited to the individual lease 
appraisal under the Investment Period approach. 
Should it be: 
1. The market cost to the organisation of borrowed funds, as the E. L. A. 's 
submission suggests [43, p13] 0 
2. Should it be the market costs of funds in general -- say the weight- 
.... .... .... . ....... 
1. In fact, as the operating costs of the leasing business probably exceed 
those of the management of a portfolio of equities and investments, the 
leasing yield, even after adjusti: ng for risk, will need to show a pre- 
mium over the yield on external investments. The reader is asked to note 
that "portfolio investment" should be understood to include keeping funds 
on deposit at a bank. 
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ed average cost of equity and borrowed capital? 1 
3. And in either case, should it be the market cost of existing or of 
new (incremental) capital? 
4. Finally, should it be the market cost of funds at all? 
It is argued here that it'should not be the market cost of funds of 
any sort, rather, it should be the'opportunity cost -- the yield that 
could be obtained from the best use of these funds. 
However: 
(a) If the "best use" is, in fact, the capital redemption or an ex- 
ternal portfolio of investments, then why is the leasing orga- 
nisation in business? Its prospective lessors must return a 
yield in excess of the "portfolio" yield. 
(b) If the "best use" is reinvestment in further-leasing business 
(up to the point where the yield on that further business is, 
after adjustments for risk and operating costs, just equal to 
the market cost of funds), then fund movements A and B are not 
the ones which apply. 
We should note that if the organisation is IN FACT redeeming capital 
and/or investing externally, even though these are not the "best 
1. On the argument that funds can only be borrowed "on the back of" equity, 
the existence of which affects the rate at which borrowing can be ef- 
fected, and the return of which is interactively affected by the amount 
and cost of borrowing (see Chapter 4). This can be distorted if a leas- 
ing organisation is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a bank, with a nominal 
amount of equity and virtually unlimited access to inter-company loans 
from the parent company. In that case the market cost of borrowing and 
the market weighted average cost of capital to the subsidiary are pretty 
much the same thing -- but they are not the same thing to the parent com- 
pany who could find itself misled in its lending (to the leasing subsi- 
diary) policy because of the use of a specific rather than an overall 
group cost of capital. 
., 
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uses" possible of the inflows from the contract, then the use of a 
specific capital cost in the CAPITAL DEFICIT period is "correct" in the 
sense that it will reconcile with the books of account. However, it is 
not "correct" in the CAPITAL SURPLUS period if the yield on portfolio 
investment is higher than the cost of capital, for the books of account 
will report the yield actually received. Furthermore, we may raise the 
issue of economic efficiency in the use of capital yet again, for if 
the yield on portfolio investment is not higher than the cost of capi- 
tal, then why is the organisation carrying out such investment? 
Of course, the efficiency or inefficiency of the organisation is not 
the concern of the accounting system, which"is concerned primarily to- 
report "what is" rather than "what should be". 
If funds movements A and B really are the "nature and financing" of the 
organisation, than the Investment Period approach to accounting for 
equipment leases is-"correct" as defined. And on that assumption, the 
interest computations of Table 2.5 are correct. 
The choice of the opportunity cost of funds as the reinvestment rate is 
bound up in the interpretation of what actually happens to funds within 
the leasing organisation. 
If they do re-circulate, within the company, and are put to use in fur- 
ther leases, than the yield they will obtain will be the average yield 
on the portfolio of leases currently undertaken by the lessor. 
So far, a "single venture" leasing organisation has been considered 
with financial movements and policies in accord with assumptions A and 
B. What about the alternative movements? . 
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2.9 A REINVESTMENT SYSTEM 
Practically speaking, it must surely be impossible to identify whether 
funds move into (are reinvested in) existing, as opposed to further, 
leasing contracts; whereas it might be possible to differentiate be- 
tween the utilisation of funds to reduce debt in the CAPITAL DEFICIT 
period and to reinvest in further projects in the CAPITAL SURPLUS 
period. However, this differentiation appears artificial. It would 
seem more plausible that the total of funds inflows, from all con- 
tracts at any one time, would be used to redeem a 'general' tranche 
of borrowed funds (rather than to attempt to redeem outstanding in- 
vestments in specific contracts). 
The reference to a 'general' tranche of debt, would thus encompass 
both long and short term funds which were, raised when the market was, 
perhaps, favourable, rather than a series of debt instruments brought 
in to equalise demand from the lessor's clients. 
Applying the Investment Period approach to a reinvestment flow of funds 
generates a number of questions: 
1. When are the funds reinvested ' 
(a) At what time during the contract period? There are several al- 
ternatives to. this question: As soon as the inflows are received 
(Movements D and F); as soon as the CAPITAL SURPLUS period ac- 
crues1 (Movements C and E); from the commencement of the con- 
1. Insofar as the rate of capital deficit is a function of the rate at which 
interest is charged to the amounts outstanding -- the rate of change is 
a function of the interest rate -- then Questions (1) and (2) are in- teractive. 
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tract (Movement'G) but only until the start of the CAPITAL SUR- 
PLUS period; at some other time? The most likely answer to this 
series of alternatives is that "reinvestment takes place when it 
is profitable to do so, and is of such funds as are available 
at that time": which effectively implies that it can be at any 
time in the life of the individual contract. Recourse must be 
had to a convention. Here it shall be assumed that reinvest- 
ment takes place when the contract moves into CAPITAL SURPLUS 
(as per E. L. A. submission). 
(b) At what time in the year does reinvestment take place? 
This is not the trivial question it may appear, because 
until reinvestment does take place, interest (under the Invest- 
ment Period approach) must be deemed to be accruing to the "do- 
nating" contracts. At high rates of interest, the impact on a 
contract can be significant not only in terms of amount, but 
equally importantly in terms of inducing the commencement of 
the CAPITAL SURPLUS period itself. 
Here the adopted convention is that reinvestment takes place on 
receipt of the inflow. 
2. 'What rate'of interest should be'used 
This is the same problem as was discussed in the "single venture" 
system. 
(a) Cost of funds or investment opportunity rate? Potentially there 
U 
_a 
conflict here; but, given that the purpose of reinvest- 
1. That is, the contract from which reinvestment takes place. 
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ment is the profitable use of funds, then the interest rate 
ought to reflect that profitability -- a reinvestment oppor- 
tunity yield should be used. Alternatively, the reinvestment 
of internally generated funds permits the lessor to grow with- 
out recourse to raising new funds": therefore, the interest 
rate should be the cost of new funds foregone. 
Are the two rates -- the reinvestment opportunity yield and 
the cost of new funds -- necessarily incompatible? Surely not: 
reinvestment in further leasing operations will be promoted un- 
til the yield on new business (assuming, diminishing, marginal 
productivity) comes into equality with the cost of new funds. 
Beyond this point it would be more profitable to use internal- 
ly generated funds to retire existing debt2 than to promote any 
new leasing business. (It may be noted that this stage will be 
reached when the premium from the yield in marginal leasing 
business over the opportunity gain of cutting back loan capi- 
"tal costs is just sufficient to compensate for the higher risks 
and operating costs involved in those leasing operations. ) Thus, 
the cost of funds establishes the "floor rate" of interest in 
the computation. 
(b) However, the actual yield on reinvestment recorded in the books 
of account will not be the yield on marginal reinvestment, but 
the average yield on all reinvestment. 
1. Subject to (i) a "loss" of internally generated funds in taxation and 
dividends and (ii) a growth rate faster than that which can be sustain- 
ed entirely by internally generated funds. 
2. It is assumed that the cost of existing and new loan funds are similar. 
Should there be a significant difference then the analysis becomes more 
complex but does not differ in principle. 
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Thus, the ASSC, if in agreement with the arguments discussed 
here, should not recommend a reinvestment rate based on cost 
of funds but one based upon the average earning opportunity ra- 
te available to the lessor. The question becomes, therefore, 
how does the'lessor determine his unique rate? In practice this 
is not such an easy question to answer (as the yield will cer- 
tainly vary'from year to year as economic factors within the 
market change) but a standard convention could be recommended 
along the line of average yield on the current, and recent past, 
leasing agreements. 
2.10 A PORTFOLIO OF'LEASES 
The discussion will now concentrate on one of the proposed arguments 
against the Investment Period method, viz: the multiple counting of pro- 
fit on the positive cash balances during what has been termed the CAPITAL 
SURPLUS period. The argument rests on the reinvestment of project cash- 
flows into alternative leasest -- the actual route of the cash-flows may 
be extremely circuitous and disguised (via several sequential bank 
accounts for example). But given that the yield on new lease contracts 
is higher then external investment then it is argued that it is eco- 
nomically logical for the lessor to pursue this financing policy. 
It will prove useful to forewarn the reader at this stage that any 
reconciliation of individual accounts (when ultimately consolidated 
to form the lessor's or the parent's Statutory Accounts) under the 
Investment Period system will be a complicated, if not monumental, 
1. -Via any of the alternative movements D, E, F or G. 
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task. (Of course, this may only be a hypothetical consolidation de- 
pending upon how the lessor actually records his transactions -- i. e. 
Single Venture accounting records or total company records. But if 
profit, interest and depreciation are based upon the Single Venture 
method, even if the actual figures are combined for the purposes of 
the lessor's ledger accounts, the lessor must be able to show to the 
auditors satisfaction that such implicit Single Venture accounts 
records do 'bolt together' to give the whole. ) In view of this, the 
accountant of the organisation may be subject to a high probability 
of error when aggregating the various transactions from numerous in- 
dependent accounts records. Thus, it is'possible to distinguish between 
a problem of "multiple recording" of interest/profit and the "special 
double counting" of interest/profit. The former is possible through human 
error, the latter may arise from an inherent errornin the accounting 
system, given that reinvestment takes place. It should be noted, how- 
ever, that in discussions with members of the E. L. A. their represen- 
tatives have indicated that the "Single Venture" system is a true re- 
flection of lessor business practice. Thus, when the lease contract 
in Table 2.5 is set-up the lessor would initiate an independent bank 
account which was in deficit (probably to the parent) by, in this case 
£2000. As the rentals and Capital Allowances are received a second 
bank account would be established which remains in credits. When con- 
sidered together the two accounts would receive interest gains and 
1. At some stage in the lease's life the two accounts'will be in balance 
and from that point on a surplus revenue will be generated. It may be 
said, therefore, that at this point the initial debt has been extinguish- 
ed; whether, in fact, it has or has not in terms of amalgamating the two 
accounts. 
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interest charges which, when aggregated, would equal the "interest" 
line 10 on Table 2.5. However, in the reinvestment system this asser- 
tion is challenged; in particular an examination is made of reconci- 
liation of interest charges and credits between the various indepen- 
dent accounting records when consolidating. 
Table 2.5 will now be reconsidered, and henceforth referred to as 
Lease No. 1. It is observed that the initial capital cost of the 
Lease is recovered in period 19x3, becoming positive on receipt of the 
first year allowance. The surplus is shown as £218 in line No. 9. As 
this money is now freely available to the lessor it may be assumed 
that he reinvests-it through the medium of a second lease (termed 
Lease No. 2). In common with its donating contract, it shall be assu- 
med that the lessor sets his rentals so as to receive a 20% return; 
which implies that the £218 of capital is recovered by 5 annual ren- 
tals of f61 -- i. e. the yield on this lease is, as Lease No. 1,20%. 
In the tables that follow the reinvestment of contract cash-flows is 
based upon the following two conventions (which concur with those 
used in the E. L. A. submission): 
(i) That reinvestment will occur for tf. e first time at the commence- 
ment of the CAPITAL SURPLUS period, and 
(ii) That reinvestment is simultaneous with receipt of inflows. 
The same taxation and other conventions as were used for Table 
2.5 will be adopted here. The relevant data will now be produced 
for Lease No. 2 using the Investment Period method: 
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TABLE 2.10 
LEASE'No. 2 =='PROFIT: AND'LOSS'ACCOUNT"" 
ACCOUNTING PRIMARY DEPRECIATION GROSS INTEREST PROFIT/(LOSS) 
YEAR-END RENTALS CHARGED EARNINGS CHARGED/ PRIOR TO COR- 
DEC. 31st. RECEIVED CREDITED PORATION TAX 
19x3 61 10 51 (16) 35 
19x4 61 25 36 (11) 25 
19x5 61 61 0 2.5 2.5 
19x6 61 61 0 6 6 
19x7 61 61 0 '10 10 
£305 £218 £ 87 (18.5) £78.5 
19x8 7.5 7.5 
19x9 5 5 
19x10 5 5 
etc. etc. * etc. 
The effect of this decision on Lease No. 1, Table 2.5, is quite 
dramatic: a new line is now required in this table entitled "Rein- 
vestment of Surplus Cash Flow" -- Line 9A. This would have an entry 
of (£218) giving a zero balance as follows: 
PART OF TABLE 2.5 REPEATED 
TIME: 19x3 (ORIGINAL) 19x3. (AMMENDED) 
LINE NO: 7 (782) (782) 
8 1000 1000 
9 218 218 
9A (218) to lease No. 2 
10 22 0 
11 210 0 
I 
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The result of this on the Profit & Loss account for Lease No. 1, Table 
2.8, would be to produce a zero entry in the year 19x3 of the column en- 
titled "Interest Charged/Credited" which currently has a figure of £22 
in it. Thus, returning to Table 2.5, the column for the year 19x4 now 
begins, nöt with an Amount Outstanding of 1240 surplus, but with zero. 
The rental received of £557 can be entered,, and the tax of (£278) de- 
ducted from the second year rental. Note that because of the time delay 
convention on taxation, tax relief of 151 will still be received in 
19x4, but because no interest is attributed to the £218 surplus it will 
not attract a tax charge of (ill) in 19x5. The year 19x4 would then end 
with a surplus in column 9 of 1330 (=0 + 557 - 278 + 51) which would 
once again be reinvested in, shall we say, Lease No. 3. 
It follows from this that NO interest figure would appear in year 19x4 
of Lease No. 1's Profit and Loss account. 
If this argument is continued it will be observed that: 
I. No interest would be credited to Lease No. 1 during its CAPITAL 
SURPLUS period, and -- 
II. A series of new lease contractsi would be started at the begin- 
ning of each period which would have a capital cost equal to the 
balance outstanding, using the adjusted calculations shown above: 
Lease No. 2= 1218; Lease No. 3= £330 etc. 
Thus, if the lessor had, in fact, used the SURPLUS CASH FLOW to under- 
take a second lease, and then proceded'to aggregate the two (or more) 
leases together using the Investment Period method, *then the follow- 
ing consolidated set of data would arise: 
1.. This argument can be complicated considerably as will be seen shortly. 
- 103 - 
TABLE 2.11 
'COMBINED'PORTFOL'IO'OF LEASES'NO. 'l: AND'NO. 2 
ACCOUNTING 
YEAR-END 
DEC. 31st. 
PRIMARY 
RENTALS 
RECEIVED 
.. 
DEPRECIATION 
CHARGED 
............ 
GROSS 
EARN- 
NINGS 
....... 
INTEREST 
CHARGED/ 
CREDITED 
... ... .. 
PROFIT/(LOSS) 
PRIOR TO 
CORPORATION TAX 
............ 
19x1 557 101 456 (144) 312 
19x2 557 228 329. (103) 226 
19x3 Li 557 557 0 22 22 
618 } 567 1 51 }6 
} 57 
L2 611 10 51 ( 16) 35 
19x4 L1 557 557 0 57 57 } 618 } 582 } 36 }46 
} 82 
L2 61 25 36 U. 11) 25 
19x5 L1 557 557 0 89 89 
618 } } 618 0 191.5 
}91.5 
L2 - 61 61 0 2"5 2.5 
"19x6 L1 0 0 0 68 68 
61 61 
}0 }74 }74 
L2 61 61 0 6 6 
etc. 
r 
If the Portfolio Profit and Loss account shown above is a'valid state- 
ment of the Lessor's activities and transactions then it should be pos- 
sible for the company's auditors to reconcile the 
tä Lease No. 1 during its CAPITAL SURPLUS period 
Lease No. 2 for its use of those funds during its 
period1. (The point has previously been made that 
to Lease No. 1 in its CAPITAL SURPLUS period will 
interest credited 
Pith that charged to 
CAPITAL DEFICIT 
interest credited 
not, in fact, exist 
if there is internal reinvestment from this point on in the lease's con- 
tract). . It. would. follow. from. this that,. for. the. Investment. Period 
1. On the specific understanding that the two rates are the same: in this 
case 10%. 
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method to be accurate, the "interest charged/credited" column should 
sum to zero in the periods where funds are flowing from one lease to 
another'. What then, causes the discrepancy in this column in Table 
2.11: namely, 6,46,91.5,74 etc.? 
If period 19x3 is considered the inconsistency amounts to 16: this is 
a result of reducing the amount outstanding in Table 1.9 (19x3) by 
the rental received of f61 -- (there is a slight difference of 0.1 
due to rounding, thus 6= 61 x 10%). 
The lessor, under the Investment Period system, claims an "income" 
of f22 (being a "receipt of interest") on Lease No. 1; and admits 
a "charge" of f16 (being a "payment" of interest) on Lease No. 2. 
However, the "charge" of the f16 arises from the investment of the 
same fund (f218) that was generated by the CAPITAL SURPLUS period 
of the donating lease -- that is, Lease No. 1 "donates" capital to 
Lease No. 2. Can we meaningfully ascribe the two sets of interest 
data to the same capital? 
1. The reader may conjecture that the discrepancy is in fact caused by the 
use of the two different interest rates -- the yield on the contract being 20%, and the reinvestment rate 10% -- if these two figures were the same, at 20%, would the interest column then-sum to zero in each 
year? The answer is NO. 
If we take Lease No. T and apply a 20% interest rate to it (at line 10) 
we would obtain the following: 
TIME: X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 
LEASE No. 1, INTEREST 3 83 155 121 57 78 
This lease would than go into CAPITAL SURPLUS in X3, giving a potential 
capital input into Lease No. 2 of £14. However, this makes no signifi- 
cant impact on the interest figures because of its relative size so we 
shall ignore it and concentrate instead on Lease No. 3, commencing in X4. 
This has a capital input of £396, which if imputed into a 20% yield lease 
would give a repayment schedule of £110/annum for 5 years. Calculating 
the interest on this schedule gives: 
TIME 'X4 X5 ' X6' X7 ' X8 
LEASE No. 3, INTEREST (57) (46) 0 16 30 
The disparity between the two schedules is again very apparent. 
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It might be argued that the two interest figures are really an inter- 
nal transfer price for the use of funds and that they will "net out" 
on aggregation. The immediately preceeding Table 2.11 shows that in 
fact they do not because of the 'intrusion' of the first rental in 
respect of the reinvested (receiving) lease. 'Büt, of course, that re- 
ceipt will (should)'be'ät'once'reinvested'in'lease No. 2A -- the in- 
terest charge on which, in its first year of operation, should just 
offset the interest imputed to the first year's rental receipt on Lease 
No. 2. 
If the previous paragraph is found to be rather complex, then the dif- 
ficulty will be appreciated of trying to follow the intricate paths of 
rentals and interest -- some real, some ficticious -- in the following 
years 19x4,19x5, etc. 
It will be further appreciated that as time passes the whole problem 
cascades into an extreemly complex hierarchy of lease contracts whose 
parentage was Lease No. 1. 
This compounding effect will ultimately have lease rentals entering 
the leasing organisation (net of interest charges, taxation, and capi- 
tal allowances) which will be pledged to further leases. The whole sys- 
tem will be subject to timing lags and gains (particularly taxation) 
which will be extreemly difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile 
with the interest/profit figure granted to Lease No. 1 in the CAPITAL 
SURPLUS period. 
Thus, if lease contracts are evaluated using the Investment Period 
method and the aggregated together into a combined portfolio Profit 
and Loss account then (on the assumption that there is reinvestment 
0 
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and that the sums generated by one lease are used to finance another) 
then there is a very real danger, of "multiple recording" of in- 
terest data which could become a "multiple counting" of interest re- 
ceipts. This arises because Lease No. 1's surplus cash-flow is ascri- 
bed a series of earnings which are generated by Lease No. 2, and so 
on and so forth through a gamut of leases, each of which would be al- 
lowed to display an independent profit. It would thus become an im- 
possible task to reconcile the interest gains and charges from each 
lease back to the Nominal Ledger because the relevant figures are sub- 
merged in a labyrinth of lease contracts. 
It might be argued that no aggregation into a Portfolio Profit and 
Loss account is intended. This would seem to imply that the Investment 
Period system of accounting for leases is not a public reporting sys- 
tem, and that it is essentially a management accounting system whereby 
management can see the "profitability" of each lease -- as it were, 
"pas seule". Transfer prices are a familiar aspect of profit centre 
responsibility accounting and in essence that is what we would have 
l. here 
1. One observation may be made however. Most authorities, see SOLOMONS 
125, Ch. 6 1, T0IP1KINS C 131 J and HOPWOOD C 77 1 record the very 
considerable difficulty of measurement and behavioural 'responses asso- 
ciated with transfer prices and their frequently near disastrous effect 
upon profit centre responsibility accounting. The discussion on this 
issue will be left with the following observation: senior management is 
in the habit of wanting management accounts to demonstrably reconcile, 
preferably through aggregation, with the period-end Profit and Loss 
account. --- a habit which may have some unfortunate outcomes in the 
case under consideration. 
0 
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Implications for the Reporting'of'Lessor's Profits 
1. If lessors adopt the Investment Period method of accounting in its 
current form (and by the same taken the lessor's auditors do not 
object to its use)ýthmthe interest gain which is attributed to 
each lease's cash-flow generated in the CAPITAL SURPLUS period will, 
apropos the "Single Venture" method of calculation, become profit. 
If such Single Venture. projects are consolidated in the lessor's 
parent bank's accounts then errors in profitability may ensue. - 
As was demonstrated in the argument on lease portfolios and the 
"reinvestment assumption", if cash-flows are to be reinvested within 
the company then 
(i) they will contribute towards the initial capital input for a 
series of further leases into the future; and 
(ii) it will automatically follow that a'fictitious profit will be 
recorded on the second and subsequent leases ........ 
which has previously been allocated to (subsumed within) 
the profit schedule of the initial lease during its CAPITAL 
SURPLUS period. 
If this procedure is continued over a number of years and a number 
of lease contracts then the-proposed accounting data of Tables 2.5 
and 2.9 will create a totally illusory effect on the group's profit 
statement because the profit will be exaggerated by each new lease. 
In short a "double counting of profits" will be observed. 
2. As will be seen later in the Thesis (Chapter 7) most U. K. lessors 
do employ a mix of different sorts of capital -- some long, medium 
and short-term debt together with an equity stake. 
However, economic circumstances today make it common practice to 
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raise a tranche of capital for a specific leasing venture. This debt, 
and its associated interest costs, are then transferred to the lessee 
through a specially designed lease repayment schedule which mirrors 
that cost. At first sight, therefore, it would appear to be a logi- 
cal extension of marginal cost pricing to allocate interest burdens 
to specific contracts in accordance with the prevailing money costs 
when the deal was signed and the monies (supposedly) raised to back 
the project. But, it has been argued that funds circulate within the 
leasing company and as such any previously raised money, in what- 
ever form, will still be present in the organisation; albeit impos- 
sible to identify or isolate. Thus, for example, the lessor's equi- 
ty base remains within the leasing organisation as an integral part 
of the overall pool of funds through which the lease contracts are 
fundedl.. Hence, the use of a specific debt instrument, with its im- 
plicit interest rate, as a basis for determining the profitability 
of an individual lease fails to reflect (what is believed to be) 
the true "nature and financing" of the leasing organisation. The 
funds used to support a lease are actually (if indirectly) financed 
by a combination of past and present financial instruments which have 
an 'economic cost' equal to their reinvestment opportunity rate. 
1. A second line of argument which is applicable here (the issue has been 
raised before in footnote 1, page 92; it will be considered again in 
more depth in a later Chapter) is the problem of allocating the cost of 
specific form of finance to a specific project or lease contract; what 
will be termed "discriminatory financing". The cost of one form of 
finance cannot be considered in isolation because its costs are heavily dependent upon the type and size of other sources of finance used by the lessor. 
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2.11 A MODIFICATION'TO'THE'INVESTMENT PERIOD METHOD 
In Table 2.12 some, but by no means all, of the problems inherent in 
the Investment Period system have been removed. This illustration uti- 
lises a 15% interest rate -- 10% cost of funds, plus a 5% premium to 
cover risk and operating costs -- which presupposes that further leas- 
ing business will yield at last that returns. reinvestment'back into 
the contract in the later years of its life is also necessary to finance 
the "tail" of tax liabilities arising out of the later rentals. Pro- 
vision could be made for this if a sinking fund was established in 
the years of capital surplus x3, x4 and x5 (a sum of approximately 
f120 would suffice per annum) thereby equalising the tax costs. It 
would then follow that reinvestment in the contract's CAPITAL SURPLUS 
period would be that much less. 
The problem of late tax liabilities apart, in Table 2.12, no interest 
accrues to, or is charged against, the contract from the commencement 
of the CAPITAL SURPLUS period. As was argued, to impute any "earnings" 
to the contract during this period is double counting2. 
If this difficulty is assumed away, as it were, we might say that the 
reinvestment disbursement from "our" contract ought to result in a 
credit to "our" contract in its CAPITAL SURPLUS periods'which would 
exactly equal the charge for interest imputed to the recipient con- 
tracts in their CAPITAL DEFICIT periods. 
1. Just what is meant by "yield at least 15%" remains uncertain --- is it the true yield or the discount rate implicit in either Tables 2.5 or 
2.12? See "major differences No. (1) and (2)" in the text immediately 
following Table 2.5, page 80, supra. 2. The earning potential of the cash surplus is reflected in the rentals 
of subsequent lease agreements. 
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Under a reinvestment system of cash-flows there can b. e no recording 
of interest charges or credits to the individual contract. Insofar 
as Table 2.8 is an integral part of the Investment Period approach 
to accounting for equipment leases; as the column in that Table 
entitled "Interest (charged)/credited" does not exist, then the 
Investment Period approach cannot be sustained as an accounting 
procedure. 
0 
1- 
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2.12 CONCLUSION 
The Investment Period approach. '(so far as concerns the integral compu- 
tation of interest cash-flow) appears to be supportable only if leas- 
ing organisations do, in fact', ' manage the financing of their contracts 
on a "Single Venture" basis. This may or may not correspond to the 
facts of lease operations -- it is argued here that it does not. 
Nonetheless: 
1. There is implicit in the method a vague and arbitary determination 
of the period over which the contract should be valued: for there 
is implicit in the "Single Venture" basis a residue of contract 
cash-flows which can presumably earn interest to infinity. This 
carries implications for the size of external deposits to be presu- 
mably seen in the lessor's accounts. 
2. There is no clear indication as to what rate of interest should 
be used when the cash-flows are reinvested. It has been argued 
here that the Investment Opportunity rate is the most appropriate, 
however, the E. L. A. suggest the market cost of funds. 
3. The issue of depreciation, and how it is derived, is potentially 
a very dangerous policy for the lessor to pursue. 
Distributable contract cash-flows are to be reported under this 
system when the lessor is most heavily committed to repaying the 
initial capital sum. This, 'is not only unwise, but it contradicts 
the axiom that profits fröm an operation should be proportional 
to the capital invested: This latter argument applies with equal 
force to the proposal that depreciation should be expressed as a 
residual between rentals land gross income rather than a cost of 
a 
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operating. 
4. It is proposed here that any method of accounting for leases in 
the books of the lessor should be based on the actuarial or pure 
discounting process shown in Table 2.8. This recommendation is 
based on the sound underlying economic rationale of this system. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH LEASING 
DECISIONS ARE TAKEN 
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3.1. INTRODUCTION 
It is the intention of this Chapter to consider what economic circum- 
stances influence and motivate management when they are formulating 
a particular financing decision or capital budgeting strategy. It is 
argued that in doing so we will define the framework within which to 
discuss the results of the Industrial Survey and theoretical arguments 
that follow in later Chapters. Hopefully, one outcome of this dis- 
cussion will be a clear view of the financial environment facedl by 
management and the economic climate within which industry takes in- 
vestment and financing decisions. 
It is stressed at this point that the reasons and extent of the fail- 
ure of the U. K. economy to attain those levels. of growth in Gross Na- 
tional Product which would simultaneously secure the stability of 
Sterling, the reduction of inflation, higher levels of employment 
and improved standards of living have been well catalogued elsewhere 
in the verbal and written comments of politicians, trade unionists, 
academics, public servants, private industrialists etc., and as such 
they will not be rehearsed here. It is taken as axiomatic -- "the wide 
consensus of the opinions of acknowledged authorities" -- that the U. K. 
economy is experiencing difficulties. 
One phenomenon that has received widespread attention, has been the 
comparatively low level of, industrial spending on new and replace- 
ment production equipment which has characterised the period. As will 
. 
be discussed below, opinions differ as to whether this has been a,. - 
cause of our lack of national economic progress; or a result, in that 
management confidence in the level of future economic activity and 
profitability is fundamental to the decision to incur capital expen- 
1. That is, faced at the period of the Industrial Survey (Chapter 7): 
1974-75. 
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diture; or an inevitable'by-product of an "excessive diversion" of 
economic resources to the non-market sector. 
3.2. 'FIXED CAPITAL*FORMATION'IN'THE'UNITED'KINGDOM 
I THE BACON AND ELTIS ARGUMENT 
BACON & ELTIS arguer that during the last decade, and possibly longer, 
there has occured a significant'structüral change in the economic pos- 
ture of the United Kingdom. Their argument, which is produced below, 
is based on a series of events and Government actions which they be- 
lieve have contributed to our general economic deterioration and pre- 
sent deficiency of industrial investment. 
In an effort to mitigate the effects of unemployment in the various 
economic downturns that have occured in the past 15 years, succes- 
sive Governments have intervened in the economy. Their modus operan- 
di has been based upon an attempt to "turn-around" any prevailing 
recession by"encouraging state-backed projects and by-redirecting 
a significant proportion of the surplus labour made available into 
the public sector. 
To substantiate this assertion BACON & ELTIS state that during 1970- 
1973, for example, approximately half a million new workers became 
engaged in the Health Service, the Education Service and Public Ad- 
ministration in general. They consider this trend to be disconcerting 
and in marked contrast to the economic posture of some of our indus- 
trial competitors: if we take the period 1955-1973 manufacturing em- 
ployment in the U. K. actually fell by 13%; 
1. This was originally propounded in a series of articles in the Sunday Ti- 
mes (see 2nd, 9th, 16th, 23rd and 30th Nov. 1975) and subsequently publish- 
ed as C9J. All statistics quoted in this section of the Thesis are derived from this source. 
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whereas it rose by 11% in France, 31% in Germany, 57% in Italy and 
by 155% in Japan. BACON & ELTIS consider that this change in the em- 
ployment profile of the U. K. labour force has had far reaching conse- 
quences for the industrial sector. 
In formulating their strategy of economic management the Government 
is-considered to have chosen this line of action because, in the 
first instance at least, such a transference of labour could be accom- 
plished without the need for a substantial infusion of capital. It 
was recognised that this would not be the case if this extensive-work- 
force were to be redeployed,, or recycled, back into productive em- 
ployment:: to enact this policy would require a large infusion of-. - 
funds into the private sector, which since the mid 1960's has experien- 
ced falling levels of profit' and an abatement in industrial spending2. 
A further motive influencing the Government to induce this change in 
the labour force was, that, in the post 1974 years, the public sector 
was, by comparison, a low wage-rate employer. As such any strategy 
of this nature could reasonably be considered to be a relatively inex- 
pensive expedient. 
However, since the initiation of.. this philosophy the situation has- 
changed: for the burden of public expenditure has risen with daunting 
1. Profits in the manufacturing sector were 17% of manufacturing output in 
1964; falling to 7% in 1970,71 and 72; and a mere 3% in 1973. 
2. The ratio of Industrial Investment to Industrial Production was 7j% to 
8% in the mid 1960's, falling to 2.8% in 1972,3.6% in 1973. and 5.3% 
in 1974. The latter years are worsened considerably when the in= 
fluence of heavy investment in the North Sea is removed from the figures. 
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speed, largely, it is argued, due to the favourable money wage rises 
negotiated in this sector during the last three years. To add to this 
burden, it has also been a concurrent policy of Government to support 
various industrial projects on a vast scale (Concorde, Rolls-Royce, 
British Leyland etc. ). Such ventures have not only consumed a great 
deal of resources -- depriving the remaining industrial sector -- but,. 
so far at least, they have fallen far short of producing revenues 
greater than their costs. Furthermore, due to a combination of high 
technology, poor estimations of expenditure and weak financial con- 
trol they have overspent budgets many times.. 
This shift of resources into the publicly owned sector. has, according 
to the BACON & ELTIS argument, largely been irreversible in the periods 
when it was least required. They argue that the drain of labour out of 
the manufacturing sector would have been acceptable if it was only a 
temporary measure; but. this has not been the case. 
For in the periods when the economy has begun to experience-favourable 
conditions, the-"boom" has always failed to be, consolidated because 
there has not been an adequate supply of labour to support it. 
Having experienced this phenomenon, management has actively pursued 
labour saving machinery which tended to exacerbate the unemployment 
problem in, 'slack' periods, so that still more of the workforce was 
drawn into the public sector. 
Because manufacturing industry has a contracting workforce, those 
that remain in productive employment have been expected to support a 
growing unproductive element in the economy. It is argued by BACON & 
ELTIS that the, only way in which the Exchequer can sustain this posi- 
tion is to borrow heavily abroad and to increase the taxes on indivi- 
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duals and the Corporate Sector. Thus, the companies, observing the 
rising level of taxation and'the increasing difficulty of earning a 
"reasonable" return on capital (coupled with world-wide problems of 
inflation, increasing commodity prices and interest rates: see sect- 
ion 3.3), contracted their activities by unburdening themselves of 
still more labour and so the-downward spiral is set in motion. It 
is further postulated that the rising toll'of taxation on the wages 
of industrial employees has had the psychological effect of reducing 
the desire to increase their productive efforts, which on an after- 
tax basis do not appear to be'adequatly rewarded. In'fact, the rise 
in productivity that has been seen in the U. K. (a'growth in output per 
man between 1961-1974 of 4% per annum') has always been off-set by 
a notable reduction in the number of hours worked. 
In summary, therefore; the failure of the U. K. to invest adequately in 
industrial plant and machinery is'a by-product of excessive pressures 
being placed on the'corporate sector by the very substantial transfer 
of labour into'the non-market sector. The current economic posture 
(which has witnessed an increase in non-market expenditure from 44% of 
the pre-tax marketed output of the economy in 1962, to approximately 
61% of this value in 1974/1975) simply cannot be supported by manufac- 
turing industry. Faced'with a massive diversion of industrial produc- 
tion into Government financed activities, ' the corporate sector has re- 
acted to the'constraints placed upon it by contracting its fixed'capi- 
tal expenditure programmes. 
1. Which, in comparison to West Germany, France and Italy, who all achieved 
rates of 5.5% per annum, is poor. 
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Several leading UK economists have responded to the BACON & ELTIS 
thesis (see Sunday Times of footnote 1, page 115) and their contribu- 
tion to this debate is synthesized below. In section 3.3 of this 
Chapter we will move away from the "macro-economic view of our struc- 
tural problems" and consider the role of managerial confidence and 
corporate liquidity both of which have clearly been contributory 
causes to the decline of capital investment in the U. K.. 
II*CONFLICTING STATISTICS AND'OPINIONS 
Many of those who disagree with BACON & ELTIS imply that the statis- 
tics they chose to elucidate their argument are not relevant, or are 
given undue emphasis. For example, one writer notes that while the 
increase in the level of public sector employment between 1961 and 1974 
was indeed of the order of 45%, BACON"& ELTIS had overlooked the 'faQt' 
that 73% of the extra workers were women, many of whom were employed 
on a part-time basis. Hence, they could not have seriously deprived 
industry of manpower! 
However, the crux of the debate centres upon the conflicting statisti- 
cal evidence which can be used to indicate that, either UK management 
is not significantly different in its investment policies than other 
countries, Or that poor management/worker relations and simple bad 
management lie at the root cause of our industrial-economic problems. 
It is frequently said that the U. K. does not invest sufficient capital 
into industry, and indeed this is borne out when the levels of'manüfac- 
'türing'investment'per'emplöyee is considered: in 1971 the figures for 
the U. K. were 56% below those in West Germany and 148% below those in 
France. If growth in investment is fundamental to growth in GNP then this woul, 
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seem to indicate that it is the failure of the U. K. to invest which 
has caused us to fall behind our international rivals. However, if 
another survey is taken, which sought to establish if the U. K. was 
loosing its international competitiveness because it had failed to in- 
vest adequatly in new plant (and by implication it was currently, ope- 
rating on a legacy of productive assets that were growing steadily ol- 
der and presumably less efficient), it is shown that the'service'life 
" and'average life of U. K. and U. S. A. machine tools in 1971 was almost 
exactly the same. Thus, the U. K. workforce was running on machinery 
which had a comparable average age with one of the most advanced econo- 
mies in the world. 
Yet further conflict can be seen when we move away from the figure of 
mänüfacturing'investment*per'employee to a ratio which shows U. K. mana- 
gement's capital spending policy in a" favourable light: namely; 'invest- 
" ment'as'a percentage'of'mahüfactüring'dütpüt. Taking the period 1953- 
1971 the U. K. invested 13.1% of its manufacturing output. This can be 
compared with a figure of 13.9% for France over the same period, and 
only 11.9% for Germany. From this, management representatives conclude 
that their current investment activities compare extremely favourably 
with our European competitors. Given a reduction in the heavy taxation 
on profits and dividends (which they argue has suppressed the level 
of funds available for investment) then the current U. K. investment 
targets would rise and comfortably exceed those of its EEC rivals. 
This argument is countered by those who place bad management decisions 
at the forefront of the list of problems. Such economists favour look- 
ing at the 'quality' of investment, rather than sheer quantity (citing 
that investment, per se, is not the answer: vide, the aircraft indus- 
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stry and electric power generation). Thus, using the period 1953- 
1971 it is observed that Italy and France produced 500/10 more output 
per f of capital employed than the U. K., and Germany managed to secure 
170% more output than this country.. 
And finally to add yet further credence to the poor management theo- 
ry, a study of machine and labour usage in the Midlands indicated that 
in a full working day, 50% of the available machine time was unused. 
This was attributed to a combination of poor scheduling, poor plant 
layout and excessive handling of materials, bad management and unnec- 
essarily long periods of employee absenteeism from the place of pro- 
duction. 
III INTERIM COICLUSION 
From the wealth of contesting statistical evidence that has been pre- 
sented, it is considered to be outside the scope of this Thesis to draw 
firm conclusions. Cause and effect are frequently so entangled that 
meaningful judgement or deduction on this highly complex macro-econo- 
mit debate cannot be accomplished in so short a space. However, it does seem 
to be a relatively safe deduction that the attained level of-industrial 
investment in fixed assets is ät least one major contributory factor to 
the present unsatisfactory state of the U. K. economy. 
Therefore, the next section will discuss two very important industrial 
problems that can be more satisfactorily explored within the framework 
of this study. Section 3.4. will consider a procedure which can be of 
significant help in alleviating these difficulties; with leasing playing 
a major role in stimulating fixed-capital investment. 
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3.3 MANAGERIAL CONFIDENCE AND'CORPORATE: LIQUIDITY 
During the period covered by this research study the corporate sector 
was experiencing a series of fluctuations in its liquidity position 
(vide Table No. 3.1, overleaf)'. At the time of the Industrial Survey, 
the first two quarters of 1974, the oscillation was entering a severe 
trough during which Industry had great difficulties acquiring exter- 
nally generated finance. The following quote reflects managerial con- 
sternation during this period: 
"The decline of U. K. stock market values has discouraged 
new equity issues; and high nominal yields have made deben- 
ture issues look too expensive. With large uncertainties 
concerning the prospects for profits and the future rate 
of inflation, companies have been unable to judge whether 
they could achieve a real return on new investment adequate 
to justify raising new funds in either form. Gearing con- 
straints, too, are becoming more prevalent; and both banks 
and companies are now anxious to conserve for increasing 
working capital such further room as they may still have for 
further growth in bank finance". 
BANK OF ENGLAND QUARTERLY REVIEW DEC.. 1974, p. 395. 
A year later the Bank was to report that 1975 saw the largest amount 
of equity funds raised on the London Stock Exchange for several years - 
1. Table 3.1 source: "Department of Industry Survey of Company Liquidity" 
first undertaken on 10th Dec. 1974, see ECONOMIC TRENDS of that date. 
The survey covers approximately 215 of the largest U. K. companies. Data 
is taken quarterly and published in TRADE AND INDUSTRY. The figures re- 
present the outstanding amounts at the end of each reporting period. 
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-a total in excess of 112,000 Million. 
It is to be noted, however, that while this sum is undoubtedly large, 
the ability to raise new equity was not widespread across all indus- 
try. , 
The funding of U. K. industry over the previous ten years is put in 
perspective by the National Economic Development Office's report 
"Financial Performance and Inflation" (6 FEB 1976)2, which notes that 
the decline of industrial investment has been mirrored by a sharp down- 
ward trend in Return on Assets and a negative rate of Net Real Retent- 
ions. 
RETURN ON ASSETS (i) 
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
1965 1970 1973 
10.2% 7.0'1'0' 6.0% 
NET'REAL RETENTIONS (ii) 
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
1965 1970 1973 
15.3% -10.3% -18.8%. 
(i) Return on Assets is calculated by NEDO as Profit less Stock 
Appreciation divided by the value of fixed assets on a replacement. 
cost basis. 
(ii) Net Real Retentions are defined by NEDO as the percentage of 
Gross Trading Income after allowing for Stock Appreciation and 
providing for replacement cost depreciation. 
1. Almost all the new equity raised was in the form of rights issues 
induced by a rapid recovery of the market in the first quarter of 
the year. A substantial part of this volume was taken up by the 
extra-ordinarily large British Leyland issue together with a concen- 
tration of issues from firms in the food and chemical industries. 
2. The report is based upon an examination of over 12,000 quoted public 
companies covering more than 60% of the total net asset value for all 
industrial and commercial companies in the U. K.. 
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The collapse of fixed capital formation in the U. K. is considered to 
be a product of insufficient internally generated finance to support 
on-going activities (a subject which shall be returned to in section 3.4. ).; 
NEDO remark: 
"The inability to sustain the flow of adequate internally 
generated funds could have meant that many companies were 
reluctant to move into new investment areas, since the out- 
side funds which would have been required had already been 
pre-empted to maintain current operations". 
This can be demonstrated in Table 3.2, where the Sources and Uses of 
Capital Fundsl by U. K. industry shows the inexorable rise in the pro- 
portion of finance needed to support Stock Appreciation and the in- 
creasing drain of interest repayments2. The levels of debt now attain- 
ed by many companies is also exceedingly high, as shown in line 2 of 
this Table. 
Thus, while these statistics do not explain the current economic po- 
sition they are clear indicators of the strains that management is 
subjected to. It is a truism of industrial life that confidence in 
the future is the key element in motivating investment; and with the 
propect of producing a positive, worthwhile, return on capital being 
very slender, the overwhelming financing problem in the short run 
1. Table 3.2 was compiled from the H. M. S. O. monthly publication FINANCIAL 
STATISTICS (further information of a broadly similar nature may be 
gleaned from the reviews published by the BANK OF ENGLAND and BARCLAYS 
BANK). The Statistics are found in Table 82: "Sources and Uses of Capi- 
tal Funds for Industrial and Commercial Companies". 
2. From NEDO's data (compiled so as to take into account inflation) the 
rise in Stock Appreciation was from 4.5% in 1965 to 32.3% in 1973. In- 
terest payments rose from 7.7% of Gross Income on 1965 to 13.6% in 1973. 
The figures shown in Table 3.2 show a somewhat higher trend. 
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has left industry in a very restricted position from which to under- 
take'its longer-term planning and capital budgeting: delaying the 
whole matter until such time as the position notably improves. 
A marked turnaround in corporate liquidity was eventually achieved in 
the second and third quarters of 19751, and was attributed to the 
ameliorating effect of tax relief on stock appreciation introduced 
by the Chancellor in the Autumn 1974 budget2. Despite this surge in 
liquidity the corporate sector was still running a financial deficit 
of £3800 Million, and according to a Department of Industry survey3 
there was no intention of using this new sourceýof funds for fresh in- 
vestment. Indeed it was expected that the level of capital expendi- 
ture would fall by between 5 to 8% in 1976, following a decline in the 
previous years investment of 13%. ' 
The liquidity that had become available in this period is thought to 
have either (i) been'stored as a protective measure in readily acces- 
sible pockets of cash or Treasury Bills; or (ii) been used to restore 
overdraft and short-term debt facilities that had been heavily exten- 
ded in previous periods (see line 2, Table 3.2); or (iii), been 
kept in reserve in readiness for the next up-swing in the economic 
cycle when it will be used to restore inventories and working capital 
1. U. K. Central Statistical Office report dated 20-1-1976. 
2. It must be stressed, however, that this fiscal adjustment will only 
defer taxation payments: in future years the corporate cash-flow will 
braced under an extra strain as taxation outflows effectively 'catch- 
up' (higher effective rates of tax being paid in these years). The 
measures initiated by the Chancellor have led to an increase in the 
holding of financial assets -- bank deposits, cash-in-hand, and Tres- 
sury Bills -- for U. K. companies during the six months to Sept. 1975 
of £13,000 Million; or three times the level for the same period in 
1974. 
3. "Survey of Business Opinion" DOI. JANUARY 1976. 
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requirements. 
This brief description of the liquidity position of the U. K. Corpora- 
to Sector indicates that many companies have been exposed to very 
serious cash-flow strains, particularly in 1974/1975. Looking at the 
last decade as a whole, it is quite clear that; 'whäteVer'the'cause, 
there has been a most remarkable deterioration in manufacturing in- 
dustry; with real profits after proper adjustment for inflation be- 
coming negative; with all aspects of working capital becoming more elf- 
ficult to fund out of internal sources; and with the inevitable con- 
sequence of higher and higher levels of debt being employed to sup- 
port the on-going levels of production. New equity capital, with the 
exception of the rights issues discussed earlier, has been practical- 
ly non-existant. All of which, as the Department of Industry observed, 
has. led management to suspend their investment programmes until it 
is quite apparent that a positive real return can be sustained on 
new capital investment. 
The following section will now go on to discuss a method, termed LINK- 
AGE-LEASING, which can be actively pursued by industry in an effort to 
boost their industrial spending on capital assets, without having to 
place still further strains on liquidity. One way in which Government 
actively attempts to intervene in the promotion of new investment in 
industry is through the system of Capital Allowances on plant and 
machinery. This boost to corporate cash flow does, however, cause mark- 
ed fluctuations in the liquidity position of many companies. Further- 
more, it has not always been possible for companies to exploit and 
fully utilise the available Allowances sometimes because the prevailing 
economic conditions have demanded a rigorous channeling of-all available 
funds into the promotion of current operations and sometimes because 
inflation-induced cost increases combined with product price controls 
have reduced taxable profits to a level at which Capital Allowances 
against tax cannot be absorbed. 
- 12 9-'. 
3.4 FINANCIAL'LINKAGE1: 'THE'ROLE'OF-LEASING'IN'FIXED'CAPITAL'AND'WORKING 
CAPITALFORMATION. 
Throughout the period covered by the U. K. Industrial Survey2, it was 
repeatedly stated by the managers and financial executives involved, 
that: although they had comprehensive' capital expenditure programmes 
waiting to be implemented, the re-timing, scaling-down and even aban- 
donment of replacement and expansionary investment was the result of 
a shortage of internally generated corporate' funds. 
Management attributed this shortage to the low rates of after-tax pro- 
fitability being made by on-going and anticipated investment; together 
with the ever increasing drain upon cash-flow caused by the need to 
finance inflated costs of working capital. 
In this section of the Chapter we are concerned with. the influence of 
leasing in stabilising the random ebb and flow of funds between working 
capital and fixed capital, as a result of the outright purchase of 
assets and the subsequent receipt of the Capital Allowances. In re- 
sponse to the various economic pressures, an increasingly large amount 
of funds are having to be diverted into working capital; the effect 
of which is analogous to the application of a tourniquet to the flow 
of funds into fixed capital formation. This imbalance can be redressed 
by reducing the appropriation of funds to working capital (which is 
not always an advisable step if manufacturing levels are to be main- 
1. Financial linkage will be discussed again in the context of a feasible 
solution/methodology to the integrated investment and financing decis- 
ions. At this point we shall concentrate on the linkage and flow of 
funds into and out of the fixed and working capital of an organisation. 
2. The results of which are to be found in Chapter 7. 
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tained) or by resource to externally generated finance (which as shown 
in Table 3.2, supra, and frequently confirmed in conversation, is an 
increasing necessity in Industry). 
This position may be illustrated by means of a funds flow diagram which 
is intended to represent the cyclical nature of cash-flow through the 
organisation. Using as'the starting point the top left-hand corner the 
input of debt and equity is shown being channeled into the fixed capi- 
tal formation of the company. (see Fig. 3.1. overleaf). 
This investment results in four forms of cash-flow: the normal opera- 
ting flows obtained from the assets in their productive capacity; any 
Government grants which may attach to the assets; the associated Capi- 
tal Allowances which, providing sufficient taxable profit exist, are 
a reduction of taxation outflows; and, finally, the salvage value of 
the plant and equipment. From this gross cash-flow is deducted the sig- 
nificant 'leakages' of Corporation Tax and debt servicing costs, leav- 
ing the residual to be divided between the payment of a dividend and 
corporate retentions. 
Whatever cash-flow is retained has three possible avenues of application: 
additions to working capital; the refunding of debt; and the creation 
of further lump-sum capital expenditures. 
Consider now the problems that-prevail when a company is experiencing 
difficulties in its profitability and liquidity, together with a general 
inflationary pressure on interest rates and most aspects of its work- 
ing capital requirements. Thus, in terms of cash flow levels and cir- 
culation, the company's areas of greatest vulnerability are: 
1. The permanent haemorrhage of cash out of the system due to 
taxation, interest and dividend payments. 
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2. The need for a substantial diversion of resources into the 
pool of working capital in order to sustain production levels, 
to fund stocks and work-in-progress, and to maintain the terms 
of trade credit extended to customers. 
3. The significant reduction, in response to items 1 and 2, of 
cash-flow available for new. investment. 
If two further considerations are now introduced, whose influence on 
the funds flow requirements of an organisation is to exacerbate the 
instability and cause abrupt fluctuations in the cash-flow cycle', the 
role of leasing in financial linkage2 can be demonstrated. 
Firstly consider the interposition of Capital Allowances in the cycle. 
In terms of the movement of cash-flow, the capital expenditure - Capi- 
tal Allowance system introduces a considerable instability into the 
cash pattern of the company -- when the asset is purchased there. is a 
sharp cash-outflow, which is then followed some time later by an equal- 
ly sharp partial3 recovery of funds as the allowances become operative. 
There is, however, a very important difference in the two portions of 
1. The concern with the variability of corporate cash-flow will be discus- 
sed further when Debt Capacity is considered. The arguments will not be 
defended here; but suffice it to say that, in general, a more realistic 
system of assessing the appropriate debt levels of a company will be 
enchanced by a stable cash-flow profile. 2. Financial linkage has been defined by FAWTHROP thus: [45p. 195] "The 
ability of investment projects to generate funds for the financing of 
subsequent or contemporary projects either in the form of reinvestable 
cash-flows or hypothecable assets". See also FAWTHROP C 45 1 and C 46 ]. 
3. Partial because the 100% First Year Allowance has a cash-flow value on- 
ly equal to the rate of Corporation Tax; currently the cash-flow reco- 
very will be 52% of the value of the capital expenditure. 
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this cash-flow oscillation: 
. While the cash-outflow is clearly fixed capital formation 
the cash-flow (at least in the first instance) is an 
accretion to working capital. 
It is inadvisable to be too dogmatic about the latter half of this 
statement because the ultimate use of the cash-flow, saved by a 
reduction in Corporation Tax liability is a disguised and complex 
function of the "sources and uses of funds" matrix of an organisation. 
However, in the first instance (unless there is a deliberate policy 
to the contrary) the Capital Allowances will actuate a transfer of 
of funds from fixed capital to working capital within the companyl. 
Central to the present discussion is the argument that during a period 
of high inflation and liquidity strains, there will be an induced ten- 
dency for the cash-flow generated by Capital Allowances to remain in 
working capital. For, if manufacturing output is to be maintained, this 
vital injection of funds2 becomes irrecoverably enmeshed in the work- 
ing capital of the organisation. 
In consequence there is a break, 'or severe blockage, in the cash-flow 
cycle: resulting in curtailment of funds available for 'outright pay- 
ment' capital expenditures. 
1. If a policy to utilise the Capital Allowances for further fixed capital 
formation is sanctioned and meticulously observed, then a full cycle of 
funds within the company is achieved. This, in turn, will start a fur- 
ther, albeit reduced, pattern of oscillation in period cash-flow. 
2. To be more accurate this is a reduction of outflows ..... which in a pe- riod of financial stringency could be expected to be a thankful, but on- 
ly briefly commented upon, alleviation of pressure (a subtle psycholo- 
gical difference existing in the minds of managers between the saving 
of an outflow and-the receipt of a cash inflow). See DONALDSON C 39, 
Chs. 7,8 and 9]. 
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It is contended here that this distortion of funds flow disposition 
within-an organisation may, over time, have serious prejudical conse- 
quences upon the long-term growth rates of those companies subjected 
to the influences being discussed. And extending the impact of this 
argument into a more general context, it will be equally detrimental 
to the economy at large. 
The second aspect of linkage is concerned with the stability or smooth- 
ing of interperiod cash-flows. The role of leasing in the linkage pro- 
cess is catalytic: it helps to dampen interperiod cash-flow variabili- 
ty by restoring the imbalance of funds disposition. There are three 
ways in which leasing makes a contribution to linkage: 
1. A significant problem limiting the optimal exploitation of the 
linkage procedure is that capital expenditures, by their'very 
nature, tend to involve the committment of large sums of cash. 
Thus, the cash-inflows generated by previously implemented ca- 
pital expenditure projects would have to be aggregated (retained) 
until they reached a sufficient sum. The advent of Instalment 
Debt has provided an opportunity to modify this practice consi- 
derably. The importance of leasing in the linkage process is para- 
mount: 
It provides'the medium through which the cash=flows from current 
projects can'be chänneled'into the immediate financing of subse- 
gbent capital expenditures. 
The alternative to this procedure is a period of deferment until 
such time as sufficient inflows have accumulated in the working 
capital of the organisation to expedite outright purchase capital 
- 135 - 
expenditures'. The convenience which leasing provides in quickly 
putting to use an asset in return for an initial instalment firstly 
speeds-up the acquisition of plant and equipment2, and secondly, 
contributes to the stability of the company's overall cash-flow 
prof i1e3 
2. It'has previously been noted that capital allowances are an oscilla- 
'tory influence on period cash-flows. Furthermore, it has been argued 
that financial management is frequently subjected to a variety of 
manufacturing'and production pressures which mitigate against the 
transfer of Capital Allowances out of working capital into fixed 
capital. The circumstances must now be considered under which the 
Capital Allowances will not become available at the earliest pos- 
sible moment -- an event which, prima facie, will achieve an ini- 
tial damping of sudden cash-flow movements (the Allowance would then 
be spread over several periods), but which will be a serious loss to 
the worth of the project-(as it may depend heavily on the early re- 
ceipt of this cash-flow for its viability). 
Capital Allowances'are to be set-off against the company's Corpora- 
tion Tax liability and, as. such, their realisable value is dependent, 
inter alia, upon the existence of sufficient taxable profits. However, 
1. This is the practical problem refered to at the start of this section 
of the Chapter. 
2. A prime advantage inherent in the controlled application of linkage in 
the capital budgeting and financing process is the stimulus it provides 
to corporate growth: viz, the new plant and equipment will generate 
additional cash-flows which in turn can be pledged for still further 
leasing etc. 
3. This stems from two causes: the ability to tailor the schedule of lease 
instalments to a given pattern over time; and secondly, because the initial cash disbursements are comparatively small, leasing provides the 
ability to postpone or bring forward asset acquisitions more easily 
without violently perturbing overall financing strategies. 
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given either: 
(i) A sustained period of poor profitability; or 
(ii) A deficiency of taxable profits in a given period due solely 
to the existence of substantial Capital Allowances generated 
by previous capital expenditures and brought forward unused 
to the given period; 
then to incur any new capital expenditure will place in jeopardy the 
'value' of their associated Capital Allowances. 
In both cases, they will suffer a diminution of value due to an en- 
forced deferment in their use; or, they may be regarded as lost alto- 
gether until such a time when sufficient taxable profits arise to ab- 
sorb the accumulated Allowances --- which, from a discounting viewpoint, 
may be 'prudently' regarded as sufficiently distant as to be of little 
consequence or worths. 
In this situation capital investment programmes become subject to se- 
rious revision: the value of the Allowances in NPV terms are generally 
a substantial fillip to the profitability of the asset; so much so that 
their delay may prejudice the project's implementation. Here leasing 
1. Advanced Corporation Tax constitutes yet a further drain upon corporate 
liquidity (ACT is discussed again later in Chapter 6). Low profits and 
high capital allowances combine to reduce taxable profits to a level 
where many companies are in danger of losing, or at any rate significant- 
ly defering, the ability to set-off ACT against Corporation Tax: with 
a consequent risk of unrelieved ACT leading to a higher effective level 
of taxation (see BUCKLEY E 27 ]). Nor should it be overlooked in the 
context of the shift of operations overseas, which many companies are 
undertaking to participate in the higher levels of profitability to be 
gained there, the fact that ACT is not available for the purposes of 
calculating double taxation relief. For a detailed and complex study 
of the impact of taxation and inflation upon corporate liquidity, see LAWSON C 84 ] 
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offers a unique advantage; for instead of postponing or even forfei- 
ting'the allowances they can be "sold" or transferred to a leasing 
subsidiary of a major bank with substantial taxable profits. In ex- 
change the lessor will offerýa reduced schedule of lease instalment 
paymentsl. 
3. The third contribution of leasing is shown diagramatically on the 
flow of funds chart previously presented. It has been indicated 
that the payment of lease instalments is out of the working capi- 
tal of the organisation. This statement is justified on the fol- 
lowing, partly empirical partly deductive, grounds: 
1. During the interviews conducted as part of the Industrial Sur- 
vey, it was found that the overwhelming majority of financial 
executives treated lease repayments as a form bf operating cost 
which would be discharged out of the cash balances on hand. In 
conversation most executives argued that this represented the 
simplest and most effective method of payment; for the sums in- 
volved, no other form of action was considered necessary. 
2. The suggested alternative to this was to establish a 'back-to- 
back' funding operation (that is: the pyramiding of debt: one 
source of finance would become available on the appropriate date 
1. A discounted evaluation of the trade-off is necessary to ensure the via- 
bility of this approach: namely, the DCF value of the allowances (on the 
assumption that they will be received in period t+? ), versus, the DCF 
value of the reduction in lease payments brought about through the sale 
of the allowances. Given a favourable comparison, leasing provides, pri- 
ma facie, a smoothing and improvement in cash-flow together with a 'lift- 
ing' or amelioration in profitability. Clearly, there is a greater in- 
centive to undertake fixed capital formation if the leasing terms re- 
flect the allowances which, under the 'purchase' alternative, would be 
lost or reduced. For a further discussion of this problem see Chapter 8. 
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to support the repayment of another source). However, for most of 
the companies interviewed such devices were hypothetical, being 
frequently too costly and too complicated for the leasing agree- 
ments they envisaged undertakings. Discussions with several lessors 
did suggest that for very large leases it would not be uncommon 
for them'to arrange such complex funding operations with their 
parent bank if they thought the circumstances warranted it. 
To summarize the argument, it may be stressed that the 'linkage' of 
working capital and fixed capital through the use of leasing leads to 
an important rectification of the previously noted distortion in the 
company's overall funds disposition'(see the diagram on page 128). The 
periodic drain of large sums of cash-flow from the pool of working 
capital, which previously had to be removed from their productive röle, 
accumulated and withdrawn to fund the capital expenditure programme, 
is thereby mollified.. 
LINKAGE-LEASING assists both the fixed and working capital structure 
of a company by utilising their inter-relationship in a complementary 
strategy: firstly, this procedure withdraws a much smaller amount from 
the working capital component when the asset is first commisioned, the 
instalment payments are spread over a period of years; and, secondly, 
the capital expenditures which result from the leasing arrangements 
will generate new cash-flows which will be reintroduced into the pool 
and in turn used to support still further leasing. 
1. The. company's overdraft facility is here excluded, as it is assumed to 
be an integral part of the working capital system. 
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Once underway the procedure can achieve a self-supporting posture: 
the quantity of leasing in use is a function of the level of working 
capital, which is a function of the generation of cash-flow from the 
assets which are leased. This process must be controlled however; and 
how this constraint is incorporated into the LINKAGE-LEASING strate- 
gy will be discussed later. Meanwhile it is noted that linkage achie- 
ves a congruency, or integration, of the company's investment and 
financing plans. 
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3.5. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this Chapter has been two-fold: 
firstly, an attempt has been made to demonstrate the very forbidding 
economic environment in which corporate financial management has had 
to make decisions; and, secondly, given that companies are experien-" 
cing problems with their financing, liquidity and in some cases via- 
bility, a means of alleviating some of these difficulties has been 
suggested termed LINKAGE-LEASING. 
The principal conclusions regarding the industrial environment, and 
its influence upon the investment and financing decisions of an or- 
ganisation, may be summarized thus: 
(1) During the mid 1970's there has been a most conspicuous increase 
in the use of debt financing by U. K. industry --- with the quan- 
tity of debt in use reaching unprecedented sums. However, most 
of this increase, represented a disconcerting reliance on short- 
term debt and overdraft facilities. Despite this surge in debt 
usage, the U. K. is still relatively low geared by comparison with 
its international competitors (see Figure 4.7, Chapter 4). 
(2) There has existed very high rates of interest on corporate debt 
during this period. This has, inter alia, (i) had the effect of 
discouraging new capital expenditure because of the prohibitively 
high returns required from the asset to fund the capital, and (ii) 
it has placed a significant increase on the immutable prior claims 
on corporate cash-flow, thereby increasing the risk of illiqui- 
dity. 
(3) There has been severe pressure on all aspects of working capital, 
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with very significant inputs of capital being required to sustain 
levels of production. This has been partially, but only temporari- 
ly, ameliorated by the granting of tax relief on stock apprecia- 
tion. 
(4) Real profits, adjusted for the effects of inflation, have been 
diminishing rapidly in recent years to the extent that some com- 
mentators argue that in several sectors of industry it is current- 
ly negative. 
(5) Companies have experienced great pressure on their liquidity 
throughout the period. 
(6) Industrial productivity has been low in the U. K. and has not match- 
ed our European competitors. 
(7) The level of investment in fixed capital formation has deteriora- 
ted and is regarded by many authorities to be in-need of a sub- 
stantial fillip if the U. K. is to compete effectively in world 
markets. 
(8) Managerial confidence has been low in view of all the foregoing 
factors, which has resulted in a reluctance to invest in new plant 
and machinery until the prospects for a real return seem secure. 
(9) Instalment Debt, leasing, has been one of the few-consistently 
available sources of medium term debt available throughout the 
period, filling what for some companies may be a financing gap. 
The latter half of the Chapter, concerning LINKAGE-LEASING, attempted 
to establish a means whereby companies could relieve some of the above 
problems. The intention of LINKAGE-LEASING is to stimulate and increase 
the levels of fixed capital formation while simultaneously assisting 
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cash-flow stability and relieving some of the pressures on working ca- 
pital. It was argued that LINKAGE-LEASING can restore the often dis- 
turbing funds flow disposition of a company caused by an outright 
purchase/Capital Allowance system. The paramount relevance of Instal- 
ment Debt in stabilising the periodic ebb and flow of funds into and 
out of working capital was also demonstrated. 
'I 
CHAPTER 4 
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: ISSUES IN 
FINANCIAL THEORY OF RELEVANCE TO THE 
LEASING DECISION 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Any basic analysis of the leasing decision should be concerned to pro- 
vide a methodology whereby the various elements of that decision can 
be defined, quantified and appraised. The fundamental question to be 
answered is: shall the company lease a particular asset or shall it 
not; and, if so, which leasing contract shall be used. 
The elements of the analysis will be the cash-flows generated by the 
decision compared against some accept/reject criterion. 
Further reflection, however, quickly brings about a realisation that 
this basic analysis is insufficient. The leasing decision is unique 
in. that it is at one and the same time a decision to acquire the as- 
set and a decision as to how that acquisition is to be financed. 
Traditionally, these two decisions -- the investment., and the financing 
decisions (henceforth the I&F decisions) -- have been separated, 
both in theory and in practice. 
The challenge posed by the leasing decision -- that the two be inte- 
grated -- necessitates a preliminary examination of the issues invol- 
ved in this aspect of financial management. 
Stemming from this consideration are other contributory issues which 
must also be discussed fully if the particular richness of the leasing 
decision is to be appreciated. 
Leasing is a form of debt and, therefore, two principal questions must 
be considered: how much debt should an organisation use; and what is 
the role of debt in the total capital structure of the organisation? 
The analysis of the leasing decision itself utilises a discounting 
approach which, quite clearly, requires the selection and use of a cri- 
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terion accept/reject rate. It will be taken as'axiomatic that such a 
rate is in some way related to the corporate cost of capital. At once 
the question arises: to what extent is the leasing decision analysis 
to take into account the impact of changes in the capital structure 
and the use of debt on the very criterion rate which is the key 
element in the analysis? The interactivity is quite apparent. 
These are issues which form the financial policy matrix within which 
the specific leasing decision must be taken. The leasing decision 
must be consistent with all other; elements in that matrix, and by 
implication these elements must be considered before the leasing 
decision itself, forming as they do the constraints to which 
the leasing decision must be subject. 
Thus, the large balance of this Chapter moves away from the immediate 
leasing decision to consider those elements of the conceptual frame- 
work within which that decision must be set. Given that a substantial 
part of the whole body of financial theory is contained within these 
elements, it must follow that the present discussion must be eclectic 
in its content and summary in its presentation. 
Advantage will be taken, however, to comment upon the methodologies 
which have been used to deal with the many interdependencies which 
exist between the elements of this conceptual framework: with the pla- 
ce of leasing within these methodologies being reconsidered as part of 
the discussion in Chapter 5 (where corporate taxation and mathematical 
modeling will be considered). 
As a guide to the ensuing discussion in this Chapter, the following 
issues will be raised: 
1. What is the significance of the integration of the I&F decisions? 
What methods may be used to examine such integrated decisions? 
2. What is the appropriate hurdle rate to use in integrated decisions? 
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3. What is meant by the "debt capacity" of a company? 
What constrains the development of the capital structure? 
How are decisions on debt levels and financing mix made in industry? 
Do companies have a pre-arranged "Strategy of Financial Mobility" 
to be used in the event of unexpected peril or unexpected opportuni- 
ty? 
Is there evidence of such a strategy in U. K. industry? 
?o 
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4.2 INTEGRATING THE INVESTMENT AND FINANCING DECISIONS 
Much of the early writing on capital budgeting' was founded on the con- 
cept that the investment decision could and should be administered se- 
parately from the associated financing decisions of the company. The 
justification for conducting the analysis of the two problems indepen- 
dently, undoubtedly had its roots in the concept that a pre-deter- 
minable, stable and supposedly optimum capital structure existed to- 
wards which all companies gravitated2. The convenience of this assumpt- 
ion was most beneficial in the field of financing policy with debt and 
equity being supposedly raised and employed in fixed proportion to 
each other. 
However, current literature3 on financial management is questioning 
the artificial separation of the two decisions and considering the pro- 
blem anew. Firstly through the medium of financial models which, attempt 
to integrate the two, decisions, and secondly via an approach which 
examines a single investment project plus its associated financing de- 
cision. 
1. The first approach seeks to integrate the entire set of investment 
and financing decisions. This is most notable in the body of lite- 
1. See FISHER [56 ], MODIGLIANI & MILLER [100]; SOLOMON [151], WESTON & BRIG- 
HAM [145], VANCIL [136], VAN HORNE [139]. 
2. It is a moot point, however, as to whether management (and indeed some 
theorists) were of the opinion that market forces alone would ensure that 
the company would acquire an optimal capital structure; or, given the 
often prudent, historical perspective of bankers (and perhaps to a lesser 
extent financial analysts) a company's current policy would be granted 
institutional approval if it did not exceed the accepted norms. Capital 
structure, as DONALDSON [39 ] noted, would thus become sanctified through 
the passing of time, rather than through considered analytical judgement. 
3. See CHAMBERS C 30], PETERSON [111], WEINGARTER [142], DONALDSON [40 
AMEY C 11, CARLETON [ 29], LUSZTIG & SCHWAB C 90], HALSTEN C 69 ], 
& MYERS [105 ]. 
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rature which is concerned with modeling the two processes of a com- 
pany in such a way as reproduce a simultaneous, optimal, solution 
to both problems. Integration takes place through the use of Linear 
Programming Mathematical Models which require a complete specifica- 
tion of the project opportunities available to a company upto the 
model's "horizon" (which may, for example, be five years hence) to- 
gether with a list of accessible financial sources, the limits of 
their availability and their cost. It is claimed that such models 
provide the necessary (perhaps the only) framework within which to 
analyse the subtle interactivities of the two decisions. 
2. The second approach is concerned with an independent investment de- 
vision and its accompanying funding decision. This area has parti- 
cular relevance to the leasing decision because when a company leas- 
es it must make a simultaneous judgement on the profitability of 
the proposal together with a choice as to the most appropriate fi- 
nancial source to fund the project. 
Prima facie, it would appeär that the first approach affords a more 
comprehensive and internally consistent methodology: but the second 
affords particularly detached insights into the integrated decision 
process. 
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4.3 INTERACTIVITIES AND'INTERDEPENDENCIES 
It can be argued that, other than in the artificial circumstances of 
the perfect capital markets, the separation-of the I&F decisions is 
an oversimplification which may have quite serious and detrimental ef- 
fects upon capital budgeting and evaluation procedures. 
The traditional basis upon which the integration of the two decisions 
is proposed, is concerned with a complex computational interdependency 
which occurs in the capital budgeting procedure, when the corporate 
"borrowing rate"'and "lending rate" diverge (technically: a state of 
capital rationing). The interdependency is rooted in several basic 
tenets of financial theory and is sometimes refered to as HIRSHLEIFER'S 
PARADOX2. 
in his now classic paper [75 1 HIRSHLEIFER argued that the use of a 
discount rate based upon the weighted average cost of capital, would, 
in such circumstances, be "at best only a partial indicator of optimal 
investments" because it failed to consider the associated financing 
decision. Thus, he argued that the aggregate impact of the company's 
investment decisions woulddetermine the required total of finance 
needed to support the investment programme. The cost of that finance - 
- the cost of capital, the minimum criterion rate in any discounting 
1. See MODIGLIANI & MILLER [100]. Throughout this discussion emphasis will 
be placed on 'practical', imperfect market conditions; with subsequent 
analytical procedures to solve the leasing decision being firmly based 
on a desire to evaluate the problem within the bounds of these frequent- 
ly difficult, but nonetheless, pragmatic conditions. 
2. See HIRSHLEIFER, [75, pp329-72] or [ 76, CH 3 1. Resolution of this para- 
dox will not be considered in this Chapter; fuller comment is delayed until 
the discussion on financial modeling in Chapter 5. 
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procedure -- will be influenced by the quantity of capital' that is to t 
be raised and by the mix of different types of capital that are to be 
employed. 
The interdependency can be stated thus: the corporate "borrowing rate" 
(the market cost of capital to the company) can only be determined af- 
ter the results of the investment'decisions have established the de- 
mand for funds. However, until the amount of capital to be raised is 
known, the discounted cash-flow hurdle rate cannot be determined (as- 
suming that the cost of funds is sufficiently affected by the demand 
for it). But, the demand for capital can only be confirmed once a sche- 
dule of accepted projects is available. 
The circularity frustrates an immediate solution because it is impos- 
sible to assess which projects will be accepted until the appropriate 
hurdle rate has been established; but the hurdle rate is only known 
once the final group of investments has been accepted. 
A similar interrelationship can also be observed in the taxation con- 
sequences of the 'lease or buy' decision. 
The policy of separating the investment and financing decisions quite 
frequently results in the absurdity of accepting an investment project 
(after bringing into account the Capital Allowances which will enure 
to the outright-purchase of the asset), only to subsequently scrutinize the. 
financing of that project by alternative leasing contracts none of which would 
generate those Capital Allowances. Thus, the, possibility of the receipt of 
a Capital Allowance as part of the outright-purchase decision means that the 
investment decision cannot be finalised until the related financing decision 
is concluded. Conversely, the means by which the asset is to be financed 
cannot be evaluated until the investment decision is resolved. 
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The circular nature of the above interdependencies leads inevitably 
to the conclusion that both aspects of the decision process should be 
considered simultaneously if the interrelationships are to be satis- 
factorily resolved. 
Two further interactivities need briefly to be mentioned in the capi- 
tal budgeting process: namely, the effects of investment risk' and 
financial risk upon the cost of capital. The first interrelationship 
concerns the nature and mix of accepted capital expenditures upon the 
corporate risk posture in the eyes. of the capital market, bankers and 
other suppliers of capital. Thus, if a company is seen to be adventuring 
further into risky types of capital expenditure then -- in the absence 
of portfolio-type activities elsewhere which may compensate or negate 
this risk2 -- it will be a reasonable supposition that suppliers of 
capital will require a compensatingly higher rate of return if they are 
to supply new funds (or maintain their existing supply) to the organi- 
sation. 
If the risk posture is sufficiently changed by the combined influence 
of the investment decisions then it may result in an increase in the 
various yields required on the component parts of the cost of capital. It 
would follow that the capital budgeting system (being esentially a static- 
1. The impact of Investment Risk upon the cost of capital is a function of 
the level of correlation between the expected return of the project and 
that of all the other projects that comprise the company. See MAO C 93 
, pp375/6]. 2. Interactivity between the projects within the accepted set may produce 
aggregated yields, or cash-flow profiles, that are positively/negatively 
correlated to each other. This may lead to more or less stability in the 
equity return; an increase or decrease in security for the creditors; with 
the ultimate result being an increase or decrease in the overall cost of 
capital. See MAO [93, p3761. 
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equilibrium representation of corporate activity) may fail to take 
proper account of the investment risk attributes of the projects under 
consideration, and in consequence accept a set of projects which results 
in an increase in the yield criterion against which their initial accep- 
tance was positedl. 
Mention has already been made of financial risk in the HIRSHLEIFER' 
paradox: this is the phenomenon whereby changes in capital structure 
may precipitate a re-adjustment of the current yields required on the present` 
sources of corporate funds. 
This is a very real problem to practicing management because, percei- 
ving the quantity of capital required to fund the investment programme, 
some decision must be made on the strategic "mix" of capital to be 
raised -- so much in equity capital, so much long-term debt, so much 
leasing etc.. The suppliers of these different sorts-of capital, per- 
ceiving the proposed and current financial mix, will form their im- 
pressions of the financial risk posture of the organisation. This will 
influence their present and future expectations regarding dividend and/ 
or interest -- the elements of the cost of capital discount rate -- 
resulting in a change in hurdle rate. 
This is a much more subtle interactivity which in practice is very dif- 
1. In practice this problem is by no means easy to solve. To do so would 
necessitate the analyst having detailed prior knowledge of the behaviour 
of different cost schedules for various sources of funds as they respond 
to changes in the capital mix. (This topic is discussed further in the 
context of a "Strategy of Financial Mobility" later in this Chapter). 
Nonetheless, this interactivity is present and has been the subject of 
debate for many years: See SOLOMON [151, p1531. 
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ficult to detects. Exactly how shareholders, bankers, finance companies 
etc., react to changes in the capital mix of an organisation when such 
changes take place is by no means clear2. Industrial research carried 
out as part of this Thesis, see section 4.7, has indicated that Bankers- 
and other professional people tend to work on rule-of-thumb Balance 
Sheet ratios and profits forecast when discussing capital issues of 
all sorts ..... but just how the market as a whole reacts to changes 
in capital structure when it is presented to them as a 'fait accompli' 
is not at all clear. What other research that has been carried out in 
the U. K. -- notably the extensive pioneering survey of Fisons Ltd., 
by BRISTON [ 22 ] and later by REDWOOD C 114 ] -- has shown how diffi- 
cult it is to elicit a uniform, representatieve view of shareholder 
opinion (on financing policy for example) that may guide and benefit 
management when making such decisions. 
INTERIM SUMMARY 
There can be little doubt that the interdependencies and interactivi- 
ties that have so far been discussed are issues of fundamental impor- 
tance to practising financial management. 
Any leasing decision analysis which lays claim to being comprehensive 
1. Vide: the conflicting statistical evidence used as testimony in the MM 
vs. traditional school debate on capital structure: see MM C 150 ], WESTON 
[ 144 ] and BARGES [ 10 ]. For a discussion and critisism of the various 
approaches used, inferences drawn, and validity of the data samples used, 
see MAO [93 , pp441-52 ]. 2. And it is frequently a delayed reaction occuring sufficiently hence to be submerged in a sea of other events, any one of which may also have 
contributed to the change in required yields. 
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must acknowledge that, because of the inherent interdependencies which 
accompany the integration of the I&F decisions, the final solution 
procedure is subject to implicit errors. The inter-relationships thus 
far considered are certainly complex and often very subtle: but an abi- 
lity to specify the nature of the intricacy does not imply an ability 
to model the process. 
Argument now follows as to what is the appropriate discount rate to 
use in an integrated decision model: this involves a consideration of 
capital rationing. 
4.4. THE MARGINAL EFFICIENCY OF CAPITAL 
As will become clear in Chapter 6, when the opinions of other writers 
on leasing will be discussed, there is extensive debate in the litera- 
ture as to what is the appropriate discount rate to use in the leasing 
decision. Broadly, three categories may be distinguished (1) the weight- 
ed average cost of capital (2) the marginal efficiency of capital, and 
(3) the implicit interest rate of the lease contract. Debate on the 
latter category is delayed until the next Chapter when the Value Addi- 
3 
tivity Principle will be examined within the general context of "dis- 
criminatory financing". 
HIRSHLEIFER C 75 J has demonstrated that when capital markets are im- 
perfect a company's borrowing rate and lending rate diverge. In such 
circumstances, the weighted average cost of capital is shown to be ir- 
relevant as an acceptance criterion and has to be replaced by the mar- 
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ginal investment opportunity rate'. As WEINGARTNER E1421 then proceeded 
to indicate, in the context of mathematical programming models of the 
capital rationing problem, the task of investment appraisal then be- 
comes one of optimally matching the "pool" of funds to the "pool" of 
projects2. 
Capital rationing has been extensively debated in the literature from 
two standpoints: firstly there has been disagreement as to what was 
the precise rationale governing the quantitative limit on funds availa- 
ble for investment; and, secondly, the finance/operational research li- 
terature has been concerned to model the process and discuss the results 
in meaningful economic terms. 
Within the former debate two opposing views emerge which have been broad- 
ly categorised-as "hard" and "soft" rationing. 
HARD RATIONING3 
Advocates of "hard" rationing argue that when a company is, perhaps, 
subject to a poor credit rating as aresult of high levels of indebted- 
ness, or is in an industry with potentially high risk, then the firm 
will face a steeply rising marginal cost of funds. When this occurs, 
the prohibitive cost of finance creates an absolute limit on funds. 
1. That is, when capital rationing exists, the lending rate in project select- 
ion becomes the IRR of the marginally rejected project not accepted due 
to the constraint on capital .... the problem clarified by HIRSHLEIFER is that the marginally rejected project can only be identified once the 
optimal solution has been attained. 
2. The concept of opposing pools of funds and projects is that of VANCIL 
[136]. It exemplifies the need to optimize the aggregate of capital ex- 
penditure decisions rather than to optimize each project on a one-by-one 
basis. 
3. Notable writers who concur with this view are BAUMOL & QUANDT 1133, AMEY & EGGINGTON 12] and MAO 1 93 ]. 
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This may take three forms: (1) the company's Bankers refuse to extend 
further credit facilities , (2) the company may be at the limit of 
its 
Directors Borrowing Powers as laid down by the Articles of Associations, 
or (3) there exists a contractual limit to borrowing specified in a 
Trust Deed, or restrictive covenant, which circumscribes new fund rai- 
sing activities. Thus, "hard" rationing is taken to imply that projects 
may only be financed out of internally generated funds (the external 
sources being depleted; as per category 1). 
However, it is argued here that "hard" rationing is frequently behavi- 
oural rather than factual: management BELIEVES that there are no exter- 
nal funds available, and so acts as if there was "hard" rationing. 
(This statement will be re-examined when debt capacity is discussed in 
section 4.6, and later when the leasing strategy termed "Spill-Over" 
is introduced in Chapter 7). 
SOFT RATIONING2 
A company is subject to "soft" rationing quite often at its own discre- 
tion: an internal constraint is observed by management on the level of 
finance available for projects. This may take the form of an administra- 
tive device to budget the pool of funds between, say, divisions; or it 
may be a self imposed restriction on funds distribution which is part 
1. This reason is not always inflexible as (i) it depends on the interpre- 
tation of "borrowing", which may not include leasing for example, (ii) 
it is always possible to call an AGM to alter the limit (easy enough 
in a small company, although it may be a more complex operation in large 
companies), and (iii) there is always an element of convenient forgetful- 
ness as to the existence of such clauses. 
2. Notable writers who concur with this view are HIRSHLEIFER [75 ], WEIN- 
GARTNER [142 and CARLETON [29 1. 
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of a strategy (often mistaken) to raise the overall return on capitals. 
"Soft" rationing is often a reflection of the frequently met manage- 
rial prejudice against the use of debt. Besides being considered 
morally wrong, the management of such companies believe that recourse 
to debt can, in the final analysis, only lead to a dilution of 
managerial power and control. 
This reluctance to use debt may also be a product of financial conservatism 
.... the current proportion of debt does not disturb the historically 
conformed to debt-equity ratio; or it may be a more sophisticated ap- 
proach (advocated in this Thesis) which takes into account the possible 
repercusions from a change in debt levels upon the maximum sustainable 
limit which can currently be supported by the cash-flow being generated. 
One further approach to the concept of "soft" rationing is based on the 
belief that a sector of the financial market is in a""temporary stage 
of saturation (as in the case of the rights issue market in the latter 
half of 1975). Reasonable advice would then suggest that a request for this 
form of funds, at this particular moment, would be incorrectly timed. 
A corresponding problem to this rests in the, inconvenience, not to 
mention external scrutiny, that accompanies a visit to the market: 
if funds are raised piecemeal it often creates the illusion of poor 
financial planning, and, because of transaction costs, it can often 
prove expensive (the market takes a more benevolent view of large, pre- 
ferably infrequent, issues). Furthermore, once a new equity or major 
debt operation is foreseen by the company current spending will be 
1. If an artificially high hurdle rate is used to screen projects then 
many of the essential medium-profit activities will be rejected often 
in favour of investment which carry an unduly high level of risk or un- 
certainty of return. 
- 157 - 
curtailed so as to avoid placing an intolerable strain on existing resorces 
which may precipitate, or otherwise prejudice, the fund raising ope- 
ration. It must also be remembered that the company will be subject to what 
is perhaps a vital period of delay from inception of the fund raising exer- 
cise to receipt of the finance which may contribute to the rationing problem. 
4.5. THE APPROPRIATE DISCOUNT RATE TO BE USED IN THE LEASING'DECISION 
In Chapter 3, the concept of "LINKAGE-LEASING" was introduced as a 
method to enable companies to circumvent some of the problems of work- 
ing capital financing and to encourage fixed capital formation. The 
proposed "LINKAGE-LEASING" package can therefore be seen to offer a 
most valuable corporate strategy: in that it assists in the stipulated 
relaxation of what otherwise would be an unacceptable capital rationing 
situation. That is, funded debt, retained earnings and equity provide 
insufficient finance for the projects under review and therefore as an 
intermediate measure the company has recourse to a planned amount 
of Instalment Debt (planned as per the considerations to be discussed 
further in section 4.6)1. Consequently, the capital rationing constraint 
1. To preface this debate: it will be argued that the exact way in which the 
planned share is determined will NOT be a function of some Balance Sheet 
ratio. Rather, it is a question of establishing the ability of a firm's 
cash-flows (generated by the ultimate set of accepted projects after 
'LINKAGE-LEASING' has been optimised) to service and liquidate the exist- 
ing debt plus newly introduced debt -- what has been termed the 'debt 
supportiveness of cash-flow'. As such, any constraint placed on the level 
of leasing to be employed will not be predeterminable or rigid, but it 
will depend upon the contribution made by the cash-flow of all accepted 
projects to the debt capacity of the company. It will be appreciated that 
this is a complex and intricate routine which would require considerable 
sophistication in the application of an iterative technique. An initial 
attempt to solve this problem will be made. The reader is also refered 
to the two texts of DONALDSON .[ 
39 ]&C 40 1. 
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may still pertain, albeit not as tightly. 
It is possible to illustrate the concept of 'LINKAGE-LEASING' in the 
single-period case, by using the investment opportunity scheduler facing 
the company before and after the use of leasing. (It is recognised that 
this is a highly-simplified illustration, nonetheless it does provide 
an important insight into the problem of establishing a correct discount 
rate for the leasing decision. The multiperiod case cannot be shown dia- 
grammatically in other than n-dimensional space). 
FIGURE 4.1 
THE NON-CAPITAL RATIONING EQUILIBRIUM POINT 
RETURN ON 
CAPITAL % 
COST OF CAPITAL 
PRE-LEASING 
LENDING 
RATE ja 
BORROWING 
RATE 
WEIGHTED AVERAGE COST 
OF CAPITAL 
INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY 
SCHEDULE. 
1_ 
LIMIT ON 
CAPITAL 
AVAILABLE 
CAPITAL, £ 
1. For further discussion of Figure 4.1, see MERRET & SYKES [98 , pplll-1141. 
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The company can only attain position a on the investment opportunity 
schedule because of the intervention of the capital rationing constraint. 
Economic logic, however, would signal the company to accept projects 
upto the intersection of the investment opportunity schedule and the 
cost of capital curve at the point a --- the non-capital rationing equi- 
librium point. 
With the introduction of leasing, see Figure 4.2, the capital rationing 
contraint softens and the company can move down the curve to an area 
approximating to ß: on the assumption that the 'debt-supportiveness of 
cash-flow' constraintlbecomes binding before equilibrium is reached, 
thereby preventing some of the projects being undertaken between ß and y 
F+rr, IIRF a_9 
LINKAGE-LEASING: THE DISCOUNT RATE PROBLEM 
RETURN ON 
CAPITAL % 
INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY SCHEDULE 
i 
Gain N 
obtained 
through 
Leasing I 
Loss due 
to change 
in cost 
of capital 
DEBT SUPPORTIVENESS CONSTRAINT 
BECOMES ACTIVE 
COST OF CAPITAL - POST LEASING 
COST OF CAPITAL - PRE 
LEASING 
. 1-1 
CAPITAL, £ 
1. See footnote 1, pagelS7. The basic concept is that although Instalment Debt relaxes a hard capital rationing constraint, the ability of cash- flows to service instalment debt is a decreasing function of the amount 
of debt taken up. A partial rationing situation results, which approaches, but does not totally converge upon, the non-rationing equilibrium point. 
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Hence, the ultimately. chosen mix of projects and new finance will be 
determined by the intervention of the 'debt-supportiveness' constraint. 
Unfortunately, the position of a is. indeterminate at the commencement of 
the capital budgeting exercise. As HIRSHLEIFER and WEINGARTNER have 
noted, it is this intermediate stage a-B in the integrated investment and 
financing decision which has presented a series of complex problems in the 
identification of an appropriate hurdle rate. The interdependency between thel 
injection of new funds and the appraisal criteria used (especially if the 
capital equilibrium point is not reached .... position y in Figure 4.2. ) is 
incapable of being adquately acknowledged by anything other than a dynamic 
hurdle rater. Thus, because the leasing decision is a simultaneous I&F 
j 
. 
decision, one of the more pertinent critisisms which may be leveled at any 
lease algorithm is that it will be static in nature: the decision procedure, 
-- and in particular, the hurdle rate'can'never'be'representative'of the 
true situation. Because of the dynamic nature of the problem it is ar- 
gued to be currently impossible to cope adequately (optimally) with the 
inherent complexities of a truly rigorously integrated system. 
....... .................................... 
1. To clarify this term: a dynamic hurdle rate would start from a value 
based upon the existing cost of capital of the company, but would vary 
with each iteration of the: analysis to reflect either the marginal effi- 
ciency of capital, or the new cost of capital which has arisen because 
of the introduction of new funds into the company. 
Prima. facie, mathematical modeling approaches to the joint I&F decisions 
would appear to present the ideal solution to this problem. However, it 
will be argued in the next Chapter that the very structure of such models forces the joint decision towards an artificial, totally stable, hurdle 
rate at the horizon. 
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Until a truly viable technique presents itselfl and resolves this most 
intractable problem, it must be openly recognised and accepted that any 
leasing decision procedure will be fallible on this issue. 
RECOMMENDATION 
The determination of the 'correct' discount rate remains a major ob- 
stacle in any lease analysis. It has been argued that for the discount 
rate to correctly reflect the inherent dynamic instability of the in- 
tegrated decision system, it would be necessary to have advanced know- 
ledge of the final solution (the appropriate cost of capital or margi- 
nal efficiency of capital is not known until the problem is complete). 
Thus, in the absence of a method to establish the suitable marginal 
efficiency of capital, it would appear that there are two' alternative, 
practical, solutions to the discount rate problem: 
1. The pre-leasing weighted average cost of capital 
This would be quite acceptable if the extent of leasing to be under- 
taken was not large enough to disturb materially the original cost of 
capital, and there existed a non-capital rationing situation on completion 
1. And BAUMOL & QUANDT E 131 suggest this to be unlikely. Their argument may 
be summarised thus: If, in a mathematical programming formulation of the 
joint I&F decision, the objective function is the maximisation of net 
present value; then, if the discount rate used is determined by the dual 
evaluators (the dynamic concept outlined above) the only solution is a 
trivial one. However, see ASHTON & ATKINS [61. Their paper suggests 
that while on the contrary it is mathematically possible to prove that 
a solution other than a trivial one exists, the answer depends upon the 
assumptions related to the consumption time preference (utility function) 
of the shareholders. The core of the B&Q problem still remains, however. 
This problem is re-examined in Chapter 5 section 3, when financial model- ing is considered. 
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of the joint analysis (that is, funds supply and funds demand had 
been balanced through leasing). 
2. The post-leasing weighted average cost of capital 
If it is assumed that (i) the initial posture of the company indi- 
cates a severe capital rationing problem in view of the quantity of 
funds currently available, and (ii) the 'debt-supportiveness' con- 
straint indicated that a large tranche of leasing could safely be 
used: then it would be necessary to estimate what the assumed post- 
leasing cost of capital would be if all the available leasing capacity 
was to be employed to alleviate the capital rationing problem. 
An immediate problem with both approaches is that they can be said to pre- 
judgepart of the simultaneous solution: they assume., implicity and 
explicity respectively, that the financing decision has been made. 
Clearly, the use of either figure will cause the answer to be inaccura- 
te; but their use is, in part, vindicated as the most suitable, if not 
the only surrogate available. 
Further discussion of the discount rate in the leasing decision will 
be undertaken in section 5.1 of the next Chapter, but the above recom- 
mendation will remain. 
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4.6 CORPORATE DEBT CAPACITY AND FINANCIAL LINKAGE I 
I INTRODUCTION 
What follows is a pragmatically oriented discussion of two 
important aspects of financial management -- the DEBT 
SUPPORTIVE (SERVICING) CAPACITY OF CORPORATE CASH FLOWS and 
FINANCIAL LINKAGE -- both of which rely upon the judicious use of 
leasing if their contribution to the company's financing 
strategies are to be optimally exploited. 
The ensuing examination of these issues reveals a strong inter- 
relationship between linkage and debt capacity that embraces all 
the company's investment and financing decisions. In summary, 
linkage will-be seen to involve the 'shifting' of project 
opportunities between different time periods and the concurrent re- 
arrangement of financing patterns which accompany those investments. 
It will be noted that the management of the linkage process requires 
the smoothing and/or supporting of the corporate cash-flow profile 
in anticipation of improving the debt bearing capacity of the 
organisation. This raises the question of how debt capacity should 
be measured, which leads to the argument that it is a function of 
("free") cash-flow. The following stage of the discussion relates 
to the exploitation of the expected improvement in debt capacity 
and asks the question : which debt source should be introduced to 
optimally exploit this capacity, and has leasing any special 
qualities or facets which make it an attractive candidate? It will 
be argued that because of the exceptional flexibility of lease 
financing ("tailor-made" contracts) it can make a most significant 
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contribution to linkage and corporate profitability. Finally, 
an examination is made of a slightly modified linkage process 
which provides a simple, albeit robust, mechanism for identifying 
and re-distributing free cash-flows so that they can be used to 
fund new projects through leasing. 
It should be noted at this stage that it is possible to examine 
linkage from either of two standpoints. Financial linkage can be 
achieved by the relatively simple application of an iterative 
procedure ; or it may be an inherent feature of a sophisticated 
mathematical programming model of the investment and financing 
decisions2. In keeping with the development of the argument thus 
far in the Thesis, concern will first be given to the FAWTHROP 
methodology. Further discussion of the role of linkage in 
. financial modeling will be delayed until Chapter 5 where the 
relevance of linkage to project appraisal criteria will also be 
considered. 
II THE DEBT SUPPORTIVE CAPACITY OF FREE CASH-FLOWS 
Broadly, the corporate risk which is associated with the use of 
debt financing can be said to consist of two elements: 
1. That debt servicing payments will so absorb the after-tax 
net cash-flow that there are no funds available for 
distribution to the shareholders; and 
1. Vide, FAWTHROP C 46 1 and C 153 7 
2. Vide, CHAMBERS j 30 
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2. That the after-tax net cash-flow will be inadequate to 
service debt so that at best corporate management will be 
seriously hampered in the direction of the organisations 
affairs, or at worst the organisation itself will have to be 
wound-up and its assets realised to satisfy the suppliers of 
debt capital. 
The argument as to what constitutes the real debt capacity of a 
company must, therefore, be firmly grounded in cash-flow terms ... 
for in the end it is cash and not Balance Sheet ratios which repay 
debt. Historically, however, the surety to a lender of debt 
capital has lain in: 
(A) The capacity of the company to service and repay the debt -- 
which has often been crudely and incorrectly signalled byt 
(i) a debt/equity ratio, and/or; (ii) a cover ratio; and, 
(B) The collateral offered by the asset involved. 
As will be reported later in section 4.7, when the results of 
part'of the supporting field research are considered, cash-flow 
forecasts and analyses now replace (A) as a more imediately 
relevant signal of corporate debt. capacity. (However, given the 
fallibility of forecasts they are not necessarily, but they are 
1. It is argued that DONALDSOi is correct when he dismisses the 
traditional Balance Sheet debt-equity ratio as being an 
"unnecessarily crude and unreliable way of expressing debt 
bearing standards. " C 39, p150 3 
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1 hopefully, a more correct signal ). Asset collateral still 
remains, but it is more explicitly recognised today that 
exercising the collateral can leave the financial institution concerned 
with more problems than it had anticipated. Preference is clearly 
given to the repayment of the debt. - 
DONALDSON argues that while the Balance Sheet debt/equity ratio is 
certainly a simple, commonly understood, and widely used method of 
specifying corporate debt capacity, it is often granted a precision 
which it quite simply does not possess: 
"Standards tend to remain fixed over an indefinite time and 
providing that they are sufficiently conservative, experience 
only tends to confirm their validity. One of the dangers of a 
fixed single standard (of debt capacity) is that it gives the 
unwarrented impression'of absoluteness. At times such a 
standard appears to be employed as if debt up to some pre- 
determined level involves no risk but beyond that level produces 
a sharp and unacceptable increase in risk. This can be very 
dangerous thinking. " 
DONALDSON [ 39, pp 145/46 3 
The traditional measures of debt capacity, it is argued, fail to 
take into account the unique circumstances of the company -- in 
particular its periodic cash-flow pattern -- which are 
absolutely crutial when setting debt standards. In place of the 
more usual debt policy based upon a debt-equity. ratio (which in 
terrors of empirically observed policy-making often implies a 
1. "We might not hit "bulls-eye", but at least we are shooting 
at the right target. " -- private correspondence with the 
Assistant General Manager of a leading U. K. finance 
institution. 
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compliance with some industrial average ratio ), DONALDSON 
substitutes an internal analysis of a company's ability to 
service debt conitments in the event of a prolonged (simulated) 
recession befalling the company which produces a consequent 
reduction in cash-inflows. 
The thrust of DONALDSON'S argument is directed towards a 
company's capacity to withstand the "maximum adverse" operating 
conditions it is likely to encounter. The extent of that 
capacity is in terms of whether sufficient net operating cash- 
flows exist, over the duration of such conditions, to cover the 
immutable prior claims caused by existing debt levels plus any 
other unavoidable outflows which have to be continued 
irrespective of the prevailing conditions. 
Any excess of cover, above an agreed contingency or safety margin, 
is argued to be an index of underutilised borrowing capacity. 
This argument has been amended slightly by FAWTHROP into a debt 
strategy under normal on-going conditions; the writer concurs 
with the viewpoint expressed: 
"What ought to matter is not some arbitary ratio of debt 
to equity, but the ability of a firm's cash-flow to service 
and liquidate debt - what might be termed the 'debt supportive 
capacity of cash-flow'. " 
FAWTHROP [ 45, p195 
1. As DONALDSON critically notes of this policy : "The hazards 
inherent in an approach to policy formulation where everyone 
looked at his neighbour for guidance are readily apparent. " 
[ 39, p92 I See also section 4.7 infra. 
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Debt capacity is here argued to be a positive increasing function, 
firstly, of the magnitude of positive corporate cash-flow, and 
secondly, but equally importantly, cash-flow stabilityI over time. 
These relationships will be pursued further in the ensuing 
discussions, but it is considered worthwhile to stress at this 
point the fundamental relevance of cash-flow stability in financial 
management. 
During the associated field research a large number of conversations 
with Bankers of all sorts developed clear evidence that a company 
which furnishes some indication of a stable cash-flow profile 
throughout the period for which the loan is required, might well 
evoke a more sympathetic leader response2 than a company which 
presents a very volatile series of periodic cash-flows which in 
certain years fell to potentially hazardous low levels. Thus it is 
hypothesised, as a general banking/financing principle, that : 
the more stable the cash-flow series is, and the higher is 
7 
1. See BARGES C 10 a: or BENISHAY 116 lwho found, for example, 
that there existed a significant positive correlation 
between shareprice and stability of earnings. 
2. Typified by an increased confidence in the borrower's 
ability to repay and a willingness of the lender to 
extend further debt facilities. 
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the lowest cash-flow in the-series, the higher will be the 
borrowing capacity of the organisationI As will be noted 
in section 4.7 later, the stability of cash-flow is highly 
2 
valued by Bankers and suppliers of industrial debt : when asked 
whether in their professional opinion the stability of cash-flow 
was synonomous with a reduced level of risk for the suppliers of 
debt capital, there was a consistent positive response that it 
was. 
Thus, much significance is placed upon a company actively 
striving to achieve a stable, controlled, cash-flow series. 
This clearly implies that management should devote a considerable 
amount of time and resources to that end -- the results of. which 
will be subject to a great deal of external scrutiny and 
Strictly, such a hypothesis should be shown to be valid by 
some statistical enquiry. However, it is argued that to do 
so would be a major piece of research in itself given that 
the Banker's "yes or no" to the borrowing application is a 
function of many imputs of which cash-flow stability is but 
one. It would be necessary to capture data on a large 
population of Banker's decisions and to devise an appropriate 
multiple regression, or analysis of variance, test. 
To capture the data on an ex-post basis would be to prejudice 
the accuracy of the analysis (guide lines to bank officers are 
not sufficiently developed to ensure total consistency between 
decision variables and the decision itself) and an ex-ante 
operation would require resources of time not available to 
this researcher. 
2. Either in private conversation, as part of the-field research, 
or on mutually attended courses. 
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assessment by the lenders of capital. Financial managements 
attention, therefore, must be drawn to one important caveat 
the increased discipline and stewardship required under such a 
system demands that management must meet budget submissions, forward 
plans, goals and targets in cash-flow terms --- which'is a far 
more exacting and professional task than being simply expected 
J 
to maintain a debt-equity ratio. 
Thus, the following propositions have now been established : 
(i) the use of a debt-equity ratio as an index of debt capacity 
is unreliable and unnecessarily coarse; (ii) preference should 
be given to an analysis of the debt bearing capacity of cash- 
flow, which will be a unique measure for each company and each 
set of circumstances; and finally (iii) cash-flow stability is 
a desirable corporate objective. 
In the ensuing discussion of financial linkage reference will be 
made to the terms : "free cash-flow" and "residual or latent 
free cash-flow"; these will now be defined. In practice when 
management is instigating the proposal under deliberation the 
analysts would have to quantify each item on a period-by-period 
basis when conducting their own internal analysis of their 
company's debt capacity. The cash-flows described below are 
based upon forecasted (expected) investment and financing plant 
which are anticipated to be implemented by the company over its 
planning period. Thus: 
DEBT CAPACITY 
FREE CASH-FLOW 
RESIDUAL (LATENT) 
DEBT CAPACITYI 
f(CF) 
= CF-(DE+TL+DIV+RES(EXT+CON)) 
=f (FREE CASH FLOW - DSC) 
ý. Residual et capacity-implies under-utilised or un- appe debt 
capacity, and not the size of pre-negotiated debt reserves. 
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where 
CF = Total gross cash-flow of the company from operations 
and investments. 
DSC = The contractual debt servicing costs of interest and 
capital on existing sources of debt. 
DE = Discretionary (cancellable) expenditure such as R. &D., 
Marketing, etc; capital expenditure is a special form 
of this category. 
TL = Tax liability due in each period. 
DIV = Planned distributional outflows 
RES = Precautionary reserves of liquidity, which may be 
EXT(RES) = extant reserves, such as minimum levels of 
cash balances and deposits; or CON(RES) = contingent 
reserves such as commitment fees payable or 
conpensating balances, or any pre-negotiated 
emergency lines of credit. 
III. FINANCIAL LINKAGE 
If a company wishes to exploit fully the process of financial 
linkage then it is essential that efforts be made to'maximise 
simultaneously its debt-supportive capacity of cashi-flow. 
In the previous section it was argued that undue fluctuations 
in the company's cash-flow pattern were to be avoided. Bankers 
and Finance House representatives repeatedly indicated during 
the Industrial Survey that, in their view, large variations in 
cash-flow levels on behalf of a client company would clearly be 
seen as a sign of liquidity weakness --- that is, it would be 
taken to tacitly imply that management was not firmly in control 
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of the company's cash-flow supply and demand and, as such, the 
Bank's position in the organisation was put to additional risk. 
In debt negotiations, a preference was increasingly being shown 
for a reasonable degree of uniformity in the client's cash-flow 
submission because this constituted a positive indication that 
the company was actively concerned about liquidity levels and 
their capacity to service the newer higher levels of immutable 
prior claims thereon. 
Concern was also being given by the Banks. to the 'expected 
minimum' level of cash-flow that the client was anticipated to 
achieve over the planning period under review : for the lower 
this figure was, the lower would be the company's maximum 
sustainable debt capacity. Clearly, the Bank's expressed a 
distinct unwillingness to extend debt facilities whose servicing 
costs (in combination with the company's other expected cash- 
outflows) would come perilously close to the level of cash-flow, - 
which would be expected in the least advantageous cash-flow 
circumstances. 
Thus, in addition to stabilising the company's overall cash-flow 
profile, management should also endeavour to raise the "weakest 
link" - or the lowest element in the projected cash-flow series - if 
debt capacity is to be naximised. This can be achieved-in two ways: 
(i) through the re-scheduling of project starting dates so that 
cash-flow peaks and troughs can be smoothed-out by regulating 
capital expenditure outflows, Capital Allowance inflows and 
1 
the method of financing this expenditure ; and, 
1. The introduction to certain aspects of this discussion is to 
be found in section 3.3, p122 et. seq. 
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(ii) by undertaking projects which, although they may have a 
relatively poor tdPV, nevertheless provide a cash-flow 
pattern which boosts corporate liquidity in a period when 
additional funds could be profitably used to support other 
alternative investment opportunities which otherwise could 
not be initiated at that time. 
The process of financial linkage, as FAWTHROP C 46'J demonstrates1-, 
embodies these two requisite characteristics as part of an 
integrated investment and financial planning system. In the 
application of linkage, projects are selected as much on the 
basis of their contribution to corporate liquidity during specific 
periods, as to present or future profitability. 'Equally, linkage 
places considerable value on the ability of positive cash-flows, 
derived from implemented projects, to be channeled towards' 
the generation and support of new debt capital. 
The framework and rationale of linkage utilises the simple concept 
that project cash-inflows become an important source of funds for 
new investment. However, this can be achieved in two distinct 
ways : either directly, by the immediate application of those 
funds into productive investment; or more subtly, through the 
pledging of those funds to the servicing requirements of further 
debt which in turn can be transformed into new investment. 
1. For a complete numerical illustration of this method which 
describes the concept of finagcial, linkage and cash-flow inter- 
period smoothing, see FAWTHROP C 461or [153 '] It would clearly 
be tedious to repeat here (without very restrictive editing) 
the extensive and detailed exemplar model developed by FAWTHROP. 
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Within this framework, the multi-period management of the linkage 
process is closely allied to the borrowing capacity of the 
organisation. The major influences on cash-flow, the capital 
investment in projects, must be re-timed or 'shifted' in order to 
achieve the following central objectives which equate linkage 
management and debt capacity : 
(a) "smoothing" -- corporate cash-flow should be smoothed in 
order to minimise the inter-period 
fluctuations; and 
(b) "supporting" -- the minimum period cash-flow should be 
maximised to raise the level of the 
"weakest link". 
The concepts of "smoothing" and "supporting" are prominent facets 
of linkage because they effect a re-distribution of free cash-flow 
between the various planning periods and capital budgets. The 
re-allocation will improve the borrowing capacity of the 
organisation by transforming the same aggregate of free cash-flow 
into a more efficient borrowing base. 
One problem with the concepts of "smoothing" and "supporting" is 
that although both aim to improve the debt capacity of the 
company by increasing the security and supply of funds to the 
capital suppliers, the two objectives are not necessarily 
consistent. For example, a "supporting" shift of funds may indeed 
lift the period cash-flow minimum .... but it may also 
simultaneously, increase the period cash-flow maxima even further, 
thereby increasing the inter-period variability. 
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A further problem arises over the question of what type of 
borrowing to raise in order to absorb the increase in debt 
capacity made available by the "smoothing" and "supporting" 
procedure. It will readily be appreciated that there is an almost 
limitless assortment of debt instruments available. 
1 Without a 
policy directive, the corporate treasurer would have to exercise 
a good deal of subjective judgement in order to blend fluctuating 
patterns of free cash-flow and possible debt alternatives over a 
multi-period horizon. 
It is argued below that there are compelling reasons why leasing 
should be chosen on its intrinsic merits alone to constitute the 
principal financing instrument used in linkage. ` however, the 
problems associated with cash-floe! "smoothing" and "supporting" which 
stem directly fror. the need to move projects between periods, frequently 
rakes the management of the linkage process difficult. An amendment 
to linkage, which hopes to achieve the same objectives but using a 
much simpler procedure, will now be proposed. 
1. For example, any combination of : maturity -- long, medium 
or short tern -- or irinediate recall debt which may take funded, hypothocated, conditional or instalment form; 
different termination agreements such as balloon payments, 
sinking fund, or convertibility; and alteration conditions in 
the form of indentures or covenants; ccmitment fees and 
compensating balances will further widen the range of possible 
instruments. 
2. The choice of leasing is in part a reflection of the managerial 
preoccupation with this type of finance as a major form of 
industrial instalment debt. See secticn 7.2, Chapter 7. 
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IV. LINKAGE-LEASING 
The role of leasing in that nay be terred LIf'AGE-LEAS ING 
is optimally to exploit the fluctuations present in the 
cor, pany's latent borrowing capacity which has been identified 
through the analysis and enumeration of residual free 
cash-flow. The application of leasing to absorb the inherent 
borrowing capacity available in this "un-cormiitted" free 
cash-flour, enables the company to promote additional investment 
opportunities in those periods : -ehen a surplus of free cash-flow 
is recognised. 
The supre^ei "ý versah 1e nature of leasing cakes it the nest 
aýpro-, riate and convenient vehicle for such. an enterprise in 
two '-lays . 
(i) the periodic lease repayner. t schedule will distribute 
the effect of a capital expenditure's cost over 
several years, thereby avoiding the sharp fluctuations 
in cash-flow caused by the outright purchase of the 
asset and the receipt of the Capital Allowance; 
- 177 - 
(ii) the facility offered by Lessors to arrange 'tailor-made' 
financing schemes means that a leasing contract, or more 
probably a group of contracts, can be negotiated and 
designed which will mirror and fully harness the company's 
unique pattern of available free cash-flow. It is argued 
that other forms of (non-instalment) debt do not provide 
the same degree of flexibility afforded by a well planned 
leasing scheme. 
It is this elasticity of financing payments which provides the 
key to the proposed anendment to financial linkage. For, if 
leasing schedules can be judiciously tailored' then it follows 
that they can be designed to complement, or fit, 'the pre-linkage 
management free cash-flow profile. 
2 Leasing provides an 
alternative use of free cash-flow because, with few exceptions, 
a lease agreement could be arranged which will optimally 
exploit the possible variations and inconstancies of this 
resource. 
Consideration will now be given to the problems associated with 
how the proposed LINKAGE-LEASING system would operate and be 
implemented in practice. It should be noted that the proposal 
about to be outlined is relatively simple, in that management 
could apply it without the assistance of extensive computational 
aids and, in consequence, the process may well be sub-optimal. 
I. As indeed they can : see the reply to question QL5 in the 
Lessor survey, section 7.3, Chapter 7. 
2. That is, the free cash-flow pattern resulting fron the basic 
selection of investment projects and acconpanying financing 
plans, but prior to the introduction of leasing. 
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Arguably optimality is not that critical : the characteristic 
sought is feasibility rather than rigour or elegance in model 
construction. 
As a basis for discussion four central topics will be raised 
which together form, the substance of the suggested scheme: 
I. What quantity of debt can a known pattern of free cash-flow 
support? 
2. What is the optimal, or 'best' feasible, apportionment of 
free cash-floor between lease contracts and other existing 
and competing forms of debt? 
3. tlhat projects are to form the list of potentially leaseable 
investments and which are to be purchased outright? 
4. How are the incremental benefits created by the introduction 
of leasing to be quantified? 
Consider the first two issues together : it is proposed that the 
exploitation of an organisation's debt-supportive capacity can 
best be accomplished in two distinct yet'conplenentary steps: 
Firstly: management must decide upon the financial mix which 
the company intends to employ in the CENTRAL CORE of 
debt. 
(The argument to follow assumes that management has 
formed an appropriate conclusion -- taking into 
account all the unique circumstances, market forces 
and risk attitudes of the company -- about the mix of 
principal debt resources it wishes to employ. These 
decisions should be made in full cognizance of the 
debt-supportive conditions that pertain at the time 
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each individual tranche is raised and clearly should not 
contravene any constraint on debt usage that these may 
imply. However, the precise rationale governing the 
evolution and selection of a specific strategic debt 
mix is not at issue here. No exemplar solution can, or 
should, be given as to what constitutes the optimal debt 
configuration for all circumstances, conditions and 
industries because the matrix of decision variables 
which influences the choice of a particular portfolio 
is unique to each company). 
Secondly: to achieve maximum exploitation, management must 
simultaneously complenent the above policy with a 
package of lease contracts which will be used to consume 
the residual fluctuations in free cash-flow, which remain 
after the servicing costs of 'core' debt have been 
deducted. The precise manner in which this 'package 
of instalment debt' will be established requires a 
procedure to deploy "blocks" of residual free cash-flow 
in lease contracts. 
The basis of this procedure is shown in Figure 4.3 below. It 
assumes that management has established the period-byeperiod 
residual cash-flow pattern and is attempting to match it with 
debt contracts (exactly hot, it has performed this operation will 
not be considered at this point). The various "blocks" of 
Figure 4.3 represent different lease agreements. The height of 
each block denotes the amount of free cash-flow thus absorbed -- 
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shown in this example by leases employing consistent payment 
schedules, although complementary non-uniform schedules 
could be employed where relevant -- and the length of'each block 
depicts the duration of each contract. 
FIGURE 4.3 
LEASING ACID THE EXPLOITATION OF RESIDUAL FREE CASH FLOW 
RESIDUAL 
FREE 
CASH-FLOW 
ii 
/1 
12 
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t=o T 
It is argued that the 'best' feasible exploitation of the 
residual free cash-flow is attained when-a set of project 
opportunities and lease contracts are found which simultaneously 
achieve: 
(i) the highest set net present value (in conjunction with 
the outright purchase project set financed by long-tern 
funds), whilst, 
(ii) leaving the minimum quantity of free cash-flow unused. 
Consider the second objective. It is argued that the volume 
of free cash-flow pledged to new lease contracts will rarely 
be totally exhausted, inevitably some un-pledged funds will 
remain. There are four possible reasons for this: 
6 
RESIDUAL FREE I'I 
6 CASH-FLOW 
PRO ROFILEIi-Ii 
58 
I. A lack of confidence on the part of management that the 
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assessment of free cash-flow is sufficiently accurate : as 
more debt is approved the estimate of how much free cash-flow 
remains becomes more unpredictable. In effect, the nearer 
the margin the more uncertain that margin becomes. 
2., (i) The cost of debt will be an increasing function of 
its utilisation and as a result larger quantities of 
free cash-flow are required to support the same level of 
instalment debt I; and, 
(ii) Given a finite marginal efficiency of capital curve, 
the need for debt will decrease after a certain point 
because there are no perceived opportunities left to 
utilise it. 
3. In reality it will not be possible to obtain such finely 
tailored lease contracts to ensure that every last penny of 
free cash-flow can be exploited. The best that management 
can do is attempt to keep such quantities of unused 
borrowing potential to a minimum. i-idwever,, as additional 
quantities of debt are undertaken to this end, it will 
1. As FAWTHROP notes [ 46, p17 3: "By a strict relating of 
borrowing power to truly free cash-flow; and by recognising 
that financial risk is an increasing function of gearin (so 
that the amount of free cas - ow committedto new debt is 
generally a declining proportion of the available quantity of 
free cash-flow) excessive pyramiding of debt is avoided. " 
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become increasingly difficult to find projects which have 
complementary starting dates, duration, and repayment 
schedule to precisely match the last remaining fluctuation 
in cash-flow. I 
4. Cash is not the only resource consumed in project 
implementation. There may be equally binding constraints of 
human resources, or of institutional resources such as 
necessary planning permission. Where overseas investment is 
involved, there may be organisational constraints such as the 
required percentage of local ownership. 
It should be noted (in anticipation of the evaluation procedures 
to be developed in this Thesis and the results of the Industrial 
Survey relating to observed leasing strategies in practice) that 
there are three leasing cash-flows implicit in diagram 4.3. 
ONE Cash-flow relating to those leasing commitments already 
entered into and forming part of the on-going cash-flows. 
Hopefully these will have been accepted in accordance 
with the integrated lease valuation model proposed in 
Chapter 9. 
TWO Leasing comitments now being entered into as part of 
the "core" financing programme of new projects (see 
page 178) and which will have been decided upon as 
part of same integrated evaluation procedures 
developed later in the Thesis. 
THREE Leasing commitments entered into as part of the 
exploitation of the debt servicing capacity of cash-flows. 
. 
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". 
Such leasing decisions might be termed 'second-line' 
decisions which are still within the planned financing 
mixI : for the strategic eploitation of borrowing 
capacity is part of the master financing plan. Again-, 
therefore, the integrated valuation model would be used. 
However, it must be conceded that at the margin of the 
financial plan some leasing decisions will have strong 
undertones of "spill-over financing". I This would 
imply that the valuation procedure appropriate to that 
type of leasing decision was used. It may well be that 
in such cases there will be a certain ambiguity as to 
whether the leasing decision is "planned financing mix" 
or "spill-over", and a subjective judgement might be 
necessary to resolve what is, after all, a largely 
philosophical question. It seems reasonable to suppose 
' however, that. the number or value of such leasing decisions 
would be small. 
It will be recalled that the prime purpose of LINKAGE-LEASING is to 
utilise the residual cash-flow resources to generate new projects 
through leasing. By implication, therefore, a group of acceptable 
projects rust exist immediately prior to this analysis if any 
residual cash-flows are to be available for distribution. 
1. Defined in Chapter 7. 
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Thus, a very important question lies at the heart of the 
LINKAGE-LEASING recommendation : which projects constitute the 
potential group of investments to be tested for possible funding 
by leasing? Rationally and economically the answer would appear 
to be : choose those projects which when financed in this 
manner produce the maximum return to the company. Unfortunately 
such an apparently obvious solution contains a most serious 
practical weakness : namely, to ensure 'optimality' management 
must obtain potential lease contracts for every project under 
consideration and evaluate every possible combination of 
alternatives, if it is to guarantee that the best amalgamation 
of outright purchase and leasing has been attained. The 
impracticability of this approach is self-evident and in the 
interests of feasibility and the attainment of a workable 
procedure, a compromise solution must be found. 
It is proposed that the selection of potentially-leasable 
projects be confined to the following project opportunities 
and concurrent cash-flow circumstances: 
ONE The collection of projects which are more open to lease 
financing because of the competitive'terms they can be 
expected to attract : viz, certain TYPES of equipment -- 
especially computers, transport fleets, certain 
production equipment, etc., -- which possess the joint 
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characteristics of large capital outlay and a limited 
engineering or technological lifespan. 
TWO Specific situations which (on an ad hoc, prima facie basis) 
appear to deserve closer management scrutiny to assess 
whether significant linkage benefits cari be derived from 
then. Two typical examples will serve to illustrate this 
point; the first relates to capital shortage at the time of 
the analysis, and the second relates to an expected 
capital deficit during some future budgeting period. Thus, 
management must look for : (a) projects whose adoption is 
justified on profitability grounds but whose timing is 
coincidental with a trough in cash-flow, or whose collective 
capital outlay would cause an excessively sharp dip in an 
otherwise satisfactory level of free cash-flow; and (b) 
projects which may not be profitable themselves but which 
provide a boost of cash-flow at a much needed time, thereby 
allowing other projects to be undertaken which could not 
otherwise be funded. 
1. More specifically, equipment which the company anticipates a 
continued use of over the planning horizon (and beyond) but which 
may be subject to a catastrophic loss of value as a result of 
technological break-throughs etc. The leasing relationship 
offers a degree of security because, in such an event, the lessee 
can "trade-up" -- enter a new lease and surrender the old contract 
thereby securing the newer, more expensive equipment. The issue of 
leasing as a hedge against technological obsolescence is discussed 
by FAtJTHROP C 1531. 
ýý1 
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It follows' from what has been said in 50 above, that within 
LINKAGE-LEASING it is the marginal projects which will be funded by 
leasing. This implies a specific ordering of financing events 
'buy' the most profitable projects then if possible, lease as many 
of the remaining projects which are unaccepted but nonetheless 
profitable. 
Arguably, a genuine case for concern can be expressed about 
matching lease financing to the "least attractive" investment 
opportunities. Why should the 'best' and by implication most 
profitable, projects be bought outright? ' 
This is a perplexing question which is extremely difficult to 
ansº-rer satisfactorily. It involves a circularity in capital 
budgeting/financing policy : the distribution of the company's 
pool of funds to project opportunities can be undertaken in the 
sequence, buy some projects then lease some of the remainder; or, 
1. An argument is raised at this point but its quantitative 
implications are not pursued further until the discussion of RESIDUAL 
CAPITAL BALANCES in Chapter 9. 
Consider the following. If the final financing solution indicates a 
mixture of leasing and outright-purchase capital expenditure, then 
it is argued that there is a critical interdependence of existence 
between the two groups of projects. T ie nurber of projects which 
are leased depends upon the number of projects which are bought, and 
vice verca. Any redistribution of the pool affects the total number 
of projects undertaken. 
If the full set of accepted investments is to be initiated, then those 
projects which are leased could be said to have 'surrendered' their 
privilege to be bought and in consequence, effectively re-allocated 
some of the capital they would have absorbeäto other outright- 
purchase projects. 
Thus, if (as a result of a methodological convention) the allocation 
of capital is such that the leased projects, perforce, offer 
relatively poor returns in comparison with 'boügi 'investments then, 
in a truly equitable appraisal, the leased project should receive some 
credit -- a notional redistribution of return -- for enabling the 'best' projects to be bought outright. The opportunity cost RESIDUAL 
CAPITAL BALANCES analysis considers this problem. 
- 187 - 
equally possible, the analyst could decide to commence the sequence 
by leasing a group of assets (which may contain some of the most 
profitable opportunities) and then buy whatever is available with 
the remaining funds. 
It is difficult to state categorically that one approach is superior 
to the other, except that logically the quantification of available 
residual free cash-flow and its pledging to leasing can only be 
initiated and later optimised once the donating projects have been 
accepted and the relevant cash-flows established. 
1 The issue is 
further complicated, however, when one considers that the linkage 
procedure is by nature iterative : the smoothing of inter-period 
cash-flow leads to an identification of the company's latent debt 
capacity which once identified, can be used to fund other projects; 
however, each new project which is funded in this manner will 
simultaneously absorb and generate free cash-flow, thereby enabling 
the system to 'organically' grow; the constraint on this process 
being the limit to debt-supportive capacity of cash-flow. 
1. The quantification of residual free cash-flow will, of course, be 
on an AFTER TAX basis. This presupposes that the associated 
problems of taxation assessment, incidence and timing have been 
satisfactorily resolved. These issues, while subsumed in the 
above analysis, are nevertheless of major consequence to 
capital budgeting and the LINKAGE-LE O proce ure. In 
consequence, taxation is discussed at length in Chapter 5. 
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Manifestly, the circuristances-call for an iterative model capable 
of evaluating the many interactions and quantifying the 
repercussive effects of the adoption of one project (however financed) 
upon the remainder of the group. (Such a financial nodel will be 
discussed in the following Chapter). 
What procedure should be-adopted by an organisation without major 
modeling facilities yet which wants to exploit its full 
borrowing potential? It has been argued thus far, that two groups 
of cash-flows can be allocated to leasing : (a) the profile of 
residual free cash-flow; and (b) a re-distribution of the "pool" 
of funds which ordinarily finance outright-purchase capital 
expenditure 
I. The most effective (non-modeling) sequence, 
therefore, requires a specific ordering of investment and financing 
events2 which may be ' deronstrated using the following single-period 
illustration: 
I 
1. By definition (a) is dependent on (b) : the amount of funds 
committed to outright purchase will regulate the quantity 
of residual free cash-flow. 
2. Which are as close to the concept of a simultaneous consideration 
of the I&F decisions as possible. 
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FIGURE 4.4 
OUTRIGHT PURCHASE AND LEASING WITHIN THE CAPITAL BUDGETING PROCESS 
A 
CAPITAL CONSTRAINT 
_RETURN Cß DEBT SUPPORTIVE CAPACITY CONSTRAINT 011 
CAPITAL D' 
D" 
`_. 
11EIGHTED AVERAGE COST OF CAPITAL 
INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY SCHEDULE 
Jim. 
£ CAPITAL 
* N. B. The weighted average cost of capital curve may rise after 
the introduction of leasing. 
The sequence would then be as follows: 
A-B (i) projects accepted using own funds. 
(ii) cash-flow pattern evolves; free cash-flow quantified and 
allocated to "core" debt sources. 
(iii) residual free cash-flow identified and period-by-period 
profile established. 
B-C & 
B-D'/D" both occur simultaneously upon near completion of A-B 
B-C (i) redistribution of the pool of funds as a result of 
introducing leasing. 
(ii) decision choice between using own funds to buy projects 
between B-C or lease those between B-D' or B-D" 
(iii) various leasing repayment schedules - "blocks" - compete 
to optimally exploit the residual free cash flow profile. 
1.! This diagram is considered further in section 4.6, V. 
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11 
B-D I /D : (i) elasticity of project set created through leasing, 
' 
Hore projects undertaken between B-D or B-D11. 
(ii) either debt-supportive capacity of cash-flow 
constraint intervenes_`at 
D; 
or weighted average 
cost of capital, which has risen to DtI through 
lease financing, curtails investment. 
Within this proposed LINKAGE-LEASING franework three facets of 
the leasing decision emerge and compete for priority: 
I. Choose the lease which has the lowest UPV-cost. 
2. Choose the lease which creates the best linkage and debt- 
supportive capacity cash-flows. 
3. Choose the lease which optimally exploits, and hence best 
mirrors or fits, the jagged profile of residual free cash-flow. 
These criteria do not necessarily coincide and it is possible that 
they may not even produce the same answer. For example, 
hypothesise a lease versus: debt comparison within the above 
framework. Suppose that the debt alternative emerges - by an 
agreed method of analysis - as the 'cheapest' source of funds. 
However, it is Only available on fixed terms and cannot be'tailored'. 
Which financing source does the company choose? Either (a) the 
cheapest type of debt, even though it may make the cash-flow 
profile worse; or (b) the leasing option which, although more 
costly, nevertheless leads to a better. utilisation of free cash-flow? 
The selection of a source of funds just because it appears to be the 
cheapest could well turn out to be a myopic appraisal which has 
neglected more critical aspects of the decision. When viewed 
within a wider perspective the analysis has overlooked the 
repercussions of the decision upon the company's debt supportive 
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capacity, the effects on cash-flow smoothing and supporting, 
the contribution to linkage, and the manner in which the project 
absorbs residual free cash-flow. 
Within this complex and interwoven framework leasing can be seen to 
play a considerably more influential role in corporate affairs 
than a simple least-cost comparison could denote or than has hitherto 
been recognised in the literature. 
Patently, however, to OPTI1IISE the collection of variables acid 
concepts listed above would require a dauntingly complex iterative 
process1 : the construction of which, though highly valuable, lies 
outside the time available to the researcher. Summarising the 
arguments presented thus far under the general framework of 
LINKAGE-LEASING management, a less ambitious and less intricate 
procedure emerges which is hopefully economically and 
conputationally efficient, robust and feasible. 
Thus, management should adopt the following capital Budgeting/lease 
1. Arguably stretching beyond the scope of the most advanced models 
currently available : see Chapter 5, section 5.3. 
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financing sequence in order to enlarge the number of investment 
opportunities undertaken through the exploitation of latent debt 
capacity. Thus management should: 
I. Establish the marginal efficiency of capital discount rate 
which selects the optinal set of outright-purchase investments 
for a given pool of funds. 
2. Determine the initial free cash-flow and residual free cash- 
flow patterns using the previous definitions. 
3. Do sufficient profitable, but as yet unaccepted, projects 
exist to warrant a determined search for new sources of funds 
to boost the existing pool? 
4. If yes, then the next step involves the simultaneous 
consideration of the 'elasticity' of the available internal 
funds and the expansion of the project set by re-allocating 
previous outright-purchase cash-flour expenditure to new lease 
contracts. This implies a shrinking of the funds allocated to 
'buy' projects which will trigger-off an expansion of the 
total'set of investments through leasing. 
5. Management enters into lease contracts for those projects 
which are around, both above and below, the marginal efficiency 
of capital hurdle rate, and for those projects which may rank 
below the weighted-average cost of capital but which have 
advantageous and complementary cash-flow profiles to those 
It cannot be stressed too firmly that this proposal is not an 
optimal procedure; rather, as previously stated, it is Hopefully 
a realistic and feasible approach to a most complex iterative 
problem. 
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established at stage 2. The contracts should be flexible, 
relatively impernanent and securable quickly so that the 
available investment opportunities nay be taken and con'enced 
on schedule. 
6. -tlith the aid of this newly acquired financing data (and the 
previous cash-flow information pertaining to on-going activities 
and the provisionally accepted set of outright-purchase projects) 
management begins the iterative scheduling of leasable projects 
to complement the 'own-funds' set and to utilise the latent 
debt capacity inherent in the specific residual free cash-flow 
pattern. 
7. The 'best' solution is attained when the full LINKAGE/LEASI1G 
potential has been derived from the cash-flow pattern and the 
highest total-set fI'PV achieved. 
Clearly, this course of action lacks many of the refinements and 
subtleties inherent in a full financial model. Nevertheless, it is 
put forward as an interim methodology, capable of implementation by 
the many companies who do not have the resources to instigate a more 
powerful mathematical programming solution to linkage. ' 
It will be observed that two leasing criteria lie at the heart 
of the procedure : (i) the "lease or buy" decision; and (ii) the 
use of leasing to optimally absorb residual free cash-flow. For the 
purposes of the proposal the first criterion depends upon a decision 
algorithm, which will be fully explored in Chapter 9; the second 
criterion, however, relies upon iteration and inspection which 
1. It is important to reflect that financial models are by no means 
free from theoretical and practical difficulties as will be 
-discussed in Chapter 5. 
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although prone to inaccuracies are none the less sufficiently 
precise for the suggested proposal. 
V. COROLLARY : CAPITAL RATIONING AND PROJECT INDIVISIBILITIES 
Two important corollaries follow from the arguments presented above. 
Earlier in this Chapter it was noted that previous writers on the 
topic of capital rationing would divide it into two categories, 
referred to as "hard" and "soft" rationing. However, it is now 
argued that these classifications are spurious and the rationing 
of capital, per se, is a misnoner. 
Consider the introduction of leasing into the capital budgeting 
procedure. The internally generated earnings at a conpany's 
disposal could (if it was so decreed) be distributed in such a way 
as to finance the initial payments on a group of lease contracts 
which covered most of the investment opportunities it was facing. 
The Industrial Survey was to indicate, however, that this financing 
strategy is most unlikely : companies prefer to divide their 
available capital between the outright purchase of the majority of 
projects and the leasing of some of the remainder. The effect of this 
action is to produce a redistribution of the pool of funds which in- 
turn results in a 'tapering-off' or 'slackening' of the capital 
restriction. 
I For example, £1000 of capital can be divided into, 
say, E800 for outright purchase acquisition and £200. for the first 
leasing instalnents of a group of assets. The proportional split 
dictates how many projects can be ultimately undertaken because, 
quite clearly, the greater the quantity of funds allocated to 
leasing, the greater the number of projects 
I. See Figure 4.4 supra. 
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initiated. I Thus, the rationing constraint can be said to relax 
(taper-off) in accordance with the distribution of capital between 
leasing and buying. 
Given that sufficient quantities of debt-supportive cash-flow 
capacity exists, then it is quite feasible that the company could 
completely eliminate the 'artificially conceived and erected' 
capital constraint by using the funds already at its discretion to 
buy and lease the investment opportunities open to it. 
It follows, therefore, that the REAL constraint imposed on the 
company's ability to undertake projects is not capital, but either: 
I. An elimination of debt-supportive capacity (thereby preventing 
further investments being funded : the real constraint); or, 
2. Simply expending the list of acceptable/profitable projects 
because capital equilibrium has been reached. 
The second major issue follows directly from this argument and is 
concerned with the problem of discontinuities in. project appraisal. 
2' 
1. It follows that the pledging of free cash-flow to debt capacity 
will generate a larger capital base than would be the case it if 
was used to fund outright purchase acquisition : £1000 spent on 
new assets requires and uses £1000 worth of cash; £1000 of the 
current year's residual cash-flow pledged. to a5 year lease 
contract may acquire £3000 worth or more of assets. 
2. First raised by LORIE & SAVAGE[ 89, p231) but more frequently 
referred to today as "project indivisibilities": see ! °1AO [93, 
p228 et. seq. ] where he notes that they are "a serious problem 
to be reckoned with in the investment decision. " 
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It is argued that this "problem" is rendered (almost) invalid 
with the introduction of leasing into the capital budgeting 
procedure1. Thus, it is potentially always possible to fund 
marginally accepted/rejected projects by re-allocating the 
'outright-purchase' capital it would have absorbed from the 
budget, to the first repayment of a "tailor-made" lease contract. 
As MAO correctly observes, indivisibilities are a significant 
problem in project appraisal when the capital budget is rigidly 
fixed; but if leasing is introduced and the pool of funds is 
re-distributed, then their existence, iroportance and the 
computational difficulties they give rise to are no longer such 
serious issues : indeed, it is argued that they will prbbäbly 
not exist at all. 
4 
1. The only exception being at the extreme margin when the 
debt-supportive capacity constraint may intervene to prevent 
an asset being leased. However, 'tailoring' and the 
relatively nominal quantities of funds needed to commence a 
leasing contract means that, in practice, a marginally accepted 
lease project (on the grounds of capital allocation alone) 
seems most improbable. 
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4.7' CORPORATE DEBT CAPACITY AND DEBT FINANCING STRATEGIES: 
AN INDUSTRIAL PERSPECTIVE' 
Any enquiry into the role of leasing in corporate financing strategies 
can never be satisfactory undertaken unless there is a preliminary ex- 
amination of how U. K. financial management perceives and uses debt. 
Thus, the following extract from the Industrial Survey was specifical- 
ly designed to determine what attitudes dominate and influence managers 
when they are setting debt policies and measuring debt capacity. 
Hopefully, this will provide the external observer with accurate and 
unbiased information from a representative sample of U. K. companies. 
The concepts and arguments of DONALDSON [39], to which the writer 
personally subscribes, were used as a framework within which to struc- 
ture query and discussion of debt as a whole. 
I. CORPORATE DEBT CAPACITY: HOW IS IT DETERMINED? 
The part played by debt within the overall financing strategy of a com- 
pany, and in particular the methods management selected to determine 
the extent of debt they were prepared to utilise in their company's 
capital structure, were significant aspects of the industrial 
research. Apart from their familiarity with and ready acceptance 
of Bank overdraft, observers have commented in the past upon the 
reluctance of managers in some areas of U. K. industry and commerce 
1. What follows in this section of the Chapter is the group of results drawn from the field research which are concerned with debt financing. The major part of this study is-discussed in Chapter 7, where all the details of the survey are to be found --- as such, the reader may care to see page before commencing this section. 
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to utilise debt. The conservative nature of U. K. financing 
policy -- or the professional prudence of the executives which 
have direct control over such policy. -- is very apparent, as is 
clearly demonstrated in Figures 4.5 and 4.6. By comparison 
with many of our international competitors, the U. K. business 
community would appear to have lagged considerably behind in 
its employment of debt. 
However, in recent years there has been a marked upward trend in 
U. K. gearing ratiosI Hore, one suspects, as a result of an often 
desperate search for funds to sustain production and working 
capital levels, than as a conscious exploitation of the gains 
fron financial leverage and the opportunities afforded by 
financial linkage. Many conpanies are/!, ere being forced to use 
an hitherto unprecedented quantity of debt in their capital 
2 
structure. 
See Figure 4.5 and Table 3.2 in the previous Chapter. 
2. This was especially true of many of the companies interviewed 
where the following 'evolving strategy' seemed to prevail: 
"What appears risky to most management is whatever exceeds 
anything done in the past. The stated debt policy is 
frequently the high water mark of successful past experience. 
The management will tend to adhere to this limit until events 
force it to consider a higher level, at which time it will 
cast around for industrial precedent or lender approval in 
order to reassure itself that risk is tolerable". DONALDSON 
[39, p248]. 
I 
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FIGURE 4.5 
CORPORATE GEARING RATIOS1 
GEARING2 
70% JAPAN 
60% ITALY 
50% GERMANY 
40% UNITED STATES 
30% UNITED KINGDOM 
20% 
10% 
67 68 69 70 71 72 73 YEAR 
FIGURE 4.6 
INCREMENTAL CORPORATE GEARING RATI03 
YEAR GERMANY FRANCE ITALY NETHERLANDS U. K. 
1968 0.91 0.31 0.71 0.59 0.29 
1969 0.94 0.29 0.65 -- 0.36 
1970 0.96 0.43 0.63 -- 0.41 
1. Source: OECD Financial Statistics, April 1974. 
2. Gearing is defined as: Capital + Reserves - Intangibles + Long Term 
Debt + Bank Debt (Net of Cash) = Total Capital. Debt as a'percentage 
of total capital = gearing 
3. Source: COATES & WOOLEY [361 . The Incremental Ratio = Increase 
in 
Long-term debt divided by Increase in Long-term debt + Increase in 
equity. 
As a precautionary note it may to be added that the comparability of 
these figures is often suspect because of the uniqueness of the U. K. 
bank overdraft system and its disclosure in the company's current 
liabilities and not as capital employed. 
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There was, needless to say, an acute awareness that an excessive and un- 
controlled use of debt could be disastrous-- with current developments 
in the Secondary Banking Sector'and the unhappy experiences of some 
property and leisure firms setting a daunting precedent. The clarity 
of this warning (the observed correlation between excessive uses 
of debt and corporate insolvency) had prompted many executives to 
reassess their debt policies to reflect the more difficult trading con- 
ditions they were then facing. To that extent the results of the field 
research are most valuable: the period of the study coincided with an 
era of reappraisal, when many of those interviewed found it increasing- 
ly crucial to relinquish historic "rule of thumb" Balance Sheet ratios 
and to focus attention on some criteria which reflected their circum- 
stances. In analysing the results, therefore, it must be remembered 
that the economic conditions facing management had placed their debt 
policies and strategies in a state of flux. 
The increasing willingness to accept debt by U. K. companies is mirro- 
red in the positive intentions of a large majority of the financial 
executives questioned'. 
................. 
1. In their answers some respondents would make more than one reply, where- 
as others would decline to answer a particular section. Hence, the aggre- 
gated answers (shown in the various boxes) will not always exactly equal 
the sample size of the companies studies; which was 54. 
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Q. 1. "Judging from the reported comments of their chairman, some com- 
panies seem to plan their capital expenditures in a given period 
entirely out of the sum of depreciation plus retentions genera- 
ted in that or a preceding trading period". 
Do you tend to implement this sort of constraint? 
ALWAYS USUALLY SOMETIMES "SELDOM NEVER 
Is it implemented 
Rigorously 14 19 
Firmly 2 
Flexibly 96 
Relaxedly 
Evidently, the restriction of capital expenditures to internally gene- 
rated financial sources, which some five years ago seemed to be cocron- 
ly accepted by company executives as being indicative of good financial 
management, is no longer the force it was. This tendency is fully con- 
firmed in question Q. 2, (see below) where capital expenditure programes 
would rarely appear to be curtailed because of a deliberate reluctance 
to use debt to bolster funds. 
The first line of debt capital supply is most evidently the Bank Mana- 
ger. What is surprising', however, --- especially if a common strategy 
is trying to be discerned, or a trend or hypothosis established --- is 
the catholicity of the second choice of debt financing. 
It would appear, and indeed it was to be confirmed in subsequent con- 
versations with those involved, that a great deal of personal preferen- 
ce existed: such things as ease of negotiation , familiarity, established 
contracts, all playing a vital part. It is also noticable that leasing 
-2C2- 
Q. 2. 
(i) "Would you resort to debt to finance YES NO 
capital expenditure? " 44 1 
(ii) "Would you tend to use a series of YES NO 
short-term debt expedients, periodi- 39 3 
cally 'consolidated' by a longer-term 
funding operation? " 
(iii) "Which type of debt would you use? " 
FIRSTLY AS SECOND CHOICE 
IF THIS WAS NOT 
AVAILABLE 
AS A LAST 
RESORT 
3 
MERCHANT BANK LOAN 5 9 3 
FORMAL DEBENTURE 3 4 8 
HIRE PURCHASE 0 2 4 
LEASING 4 91 7 
BILL OF EXCHANGE 2 2 2 
ACCEPTANCE CREDIT 1 7 5 
OTHERS 0 1 (term loan) 1 (Eurodollar) 
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enjoys an unusual reputation: being, at one and the same time, a prin- 
cipal second source of finance and a ". source of finance that most com- 
panies love to hate! "' However, as will become evident in Chapter 7, 
question Q11, the sample of companies revealed that lease financing 
was used, whatever the state of mind of the executives who authorised 
that use. What is more, there was a distinct trend towards an increas- 
ed use of leasing by the sample during the three years prior to the 
field research being undertaken. 
Without doubt, the principal concern which financial management must 
have in its use of debt is the increase in risk to the company which 
is inseparable from that use: the phenomenon of 'financial risk'. -As 
was anticipated, question Q3 indicates very clearly indeed the over- 
whelming preponderance of opinion that there must be some constraint 
on the corporate use of debt. Ninety five percent of-those interviewed 
categorically stated that there was, and ought to be, effective limits 
on the borrowing capability of an organisation's Board of Directors. 
The question is, how should that limit be set? 
1. This apparent equivocation reflects the different experience of leasing 
by the sample of companies. For many of them, leasing contributed many 
advantages to their financing strategy, although it was by no means the 
linch-pin of their policy. The contribution would depend upon the pre- 
vailing circumstances, as will be explained in Chapter 7. For other com- 
panies, leasing was not a part of their normal financing policy at all, 
although they would be prepared to consider it in extreme circumstances. 
(The use of leasing as a major line of defence against unexpected demand 
for funds is considered further in Section 4.7 II). 
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Q. 3. 
"Do you consider that there is a limit to the amount of debt a 
company ought to use (apart from the limits imposed by the borro- 
wing powers of directors)? " 
YES NO 
50 1 
q. 4. 
"Does this Limit tend, in'fact, to be set by any or all of the 
following factors? " 
'The ratio of debt to equity 
in the Balance Sheet'. 
'The prior charges cover in 
the P. & L. account. ' 
'The prior charges cover 
afforded by a cash-flow 
forecast of some kind. ' 
'Pushing borrowing up to the limit obtainable from all 
sources of lending open to 
the company, without regard 
to any special ratio or 
indicator. ' 
. VERY. RELEVANT RELEVANT. IRRELEVANT 
35 11 2 
23 19 6 
17 19 12 
3 12 " 33 
In question Q 4, the opinions of the interviewees were sought on two 
commonly used measures of debt capacity -- Balance Sheet gearing and 
Prior Charges cover. 
Importance is clearly placed upon the maintenance of a "respectable" 
- 205 - 
debt-to-equity ratio in the Balance Sheet': there can be little doubt 
that this is given a high priority by management. However, it was evi- 
dent (as the subsequent interviews were to reveal) that the regard for 
this ratio was as much, if not more, something which was emphasised to 
corporate executives by their external advisers, as it was the belief 
or experience of the executives themselves. (Considerable attention being 
paid at Board Level as to how the professional advisers in the Banks and 
Finance Houses would react to a proposed level of debt, rather than rJ 
taking the more positive step oftnegotiating a tranche of debt, secure 
in the knowledge that the total quantity of-debt to be serviced was co- 
vered by a certain multiple of free cash-flow). 
There were MANY occasions when the 40% Balance Sheet limit to debt fi- 
. nancing was mentioned. ---. almost as. a. conditioned. response?.. 
Despite 
1. The field research indicated that this ratio was firmly based, and applied, 
on book values. It would appear, in the U. K. at least, that the controver- 
sy discussed by BARGES [ 10] between the measurement of gearing in book 
value or market value terms, is not an issue of extensive debate in practice. 
2. It is interesting to conjecture what would have been the reply to this 
question had it been asked just a few years ago: 25 to 30% seems to have 
been adjudicated correct throughout the 1960's; see DONALDSON [39 1 or 
SYKES [127]. An American study by LEV [87 ] revealed a most interesting 
psychological-phenomenon: he. devised a statistical model to test "whether 
firms tend to adjust their financial ratios to industrial averages". From 
a sample of 900 companies, LEV concluded that the empirical results were 
consistent with this hypothesis. The respondents of the UK survey under 
discussion rarely questioned the validity of the 40% debt limit .... it 
would appear to have become established folklore in financial circles. 
It is equally intriguing to surmise what forces (both economic and psy- 
chological) are at work in the various countries listed in Figure 4.4 . The research by COATES & WOOLEY came to no positive conclusion about which 
of a list of economic factors (issue costs, taxation levels, rates of in- 
flation, peculiarities of the national capital markets) influenced or sti- 
mulated the wide disparity in the use of debt throughout Europe. Prelimi- 
nary evidence obtained in an empirical research study of Belgium and the 
Netherlands (conducted by the writer in 1975/1976) into the use of instal- 
ment debt, suggests that: as in the U. K., the psychological security of 
adopting financing postures which accord with the slowly evolving tradi- 
tions of the community within which the company operates, is on balance 
probably as important, if not more so, than the economic parameters stu- 
died by COATES & WOOLEY. 
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this tendency towards an acknowledged group norm, no respondent could 
furnish a satisfactory explanation why 40% was the optimal "magic fi- 
gure". As DONALDSON notes: 
"One of the dangers of a fixed single standard, is that it 
gives an unwarrented impression of absoluteness. At times 
such standards appear to be employed as if debt up to some 
predetermined level involves no risk, but debt beyond that 
level produces a sharp and unacceptable increase in risk". 
DONALDSON [39 , p146] 
A number of financial executives did express significant scepticism as 
to the validity of a rigid debt-to-equity standard of debt capacity; 
and indeed many of the companies were experimenting with larger quanti-" 
ties of debt as a permanent addition to their capital, structure. 
These companies may be broadly-catagorised into-three types. Firstly, 
the sample contained a limited number of, invariably large, companies 
with well organised finance functions, who devoted a considerable amount 
of time and resources to the question of what constituted an appropri- 
ate debt level. When negotiating new debt contracts it was normal com- 
mercial practice to volunteer a detailed cash-flow projection for-the 
asset in question and, if requested, for the company as a whole. Their 
assessment of debt capacity was analogous to the previously discussed 
"debt supportive, capacity of free cash-flows"; and although this esti- 
mation, would vary in sophistication between the various companies, 
it was a common practice to programme the problem in the form of a 
- 207 - 
financial models. 
The second group of companies were becoming increasingly dissatisfied 
with the mechanistic application of Balance Sheet gearing ratios. The 
preponderance of this sample may be detected by the number of-respon- 
dents who found either, or both, of the two cover ratios to be "very 
relevant" or "relevant". Some 65 to 75% of those who replied indica- 
ted that one of the cover ratios was slowly beginning to take prece- 
dence in setting their debt capacity standard. Prima facie, this trend 
is encouraging. However, the answers to question, Q4, must be treated 
with considerable circumspection. 
In clarifying their opinions on the use of a Prior Charges cover, de- 
rived from the Profit and Loss account, most executives readily accept- 
ed that such information was of only limited value -- being but a poor 
surrogate for a true cash-flow Prior Charges cover.. A similar response 
was forthcoming from those companies who defined cash-flow as 'retain- 
ed earning plus depreciation charged in that year'. 
For the 17 companies who replied that they considered a cover ratio 
based upon a forecast of-cash-flow to be "very relevant", many were 
to subsequently suggest that this answer was based more on positive 
intention, rather than on an actual practice which was fully operatio- 
nal. They were giving a high priority to developing the necessary tech- 
niques, restructuring their management and financial accounting data 
systems, experimenting with computer packages etc., but as yet their 
experience was limited. 
1. Invariably this would be of the 'simulation-type' of model: thereby en- 
abling management to simulate various potential problems --- asking "what 
would happen to the level of cash-flow if ....? " type of questions. This approach differs from the 'optimisation-type' of model to be discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
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The final group of companies (which occasionally encompassed some 
".. firms in the previous category) revealed that their capacity to absorb 
further tranches of debt was'not (as the researcher would have pre- 
ferred) a result of their ability to support higher levels of debt ser- 
vicing costs out of improving quantities of free cash-flow, but was 
more, they implied, a function of some special merit in the eyes of 
their financial advisers. Their new debt level would still be set by 
traditional Balance Sheet ratios, although they would be allowed 
to-reach a higher value., 
Generalising on the results of question, Q4, it was clear that several 
of the executives were inconsistent between their opinions and the 
implementation of those opinions. Despite scoring the highest number 
of replies, the widespread use and acceptance of gearing ratios as a 
measure of debt capacity is evidently slowly on the wane. The dispa- 
rity which existed in the sample between the dogged application of 
well-worn debt-to-equity ratios and the widely acknowledged importance 
of liquidity coverage and accurate cash-flow data, reflects the period 
of change captured in the study. For, in the final analysis, all that 
a Balance Sheet ratio can be is some readily accessible crude proxy 
for a more rigorous examination of the debt-servicing adequacy of cor- 
porate cash-flow. 
The crudeness of this proxy is revealed in question, Q5, where there 
appears to be no clear outstanding reason why a given debt-to equity 
ratio is or is not acceptable. Grouping the "very relevant" and "rele- 
vant" categories together it is observed that: in (i), just over 50% 
thought it was in some measure set by "an'acceptable ratio for. U. K. 
industry at large" (but 40% thought this to be irrelevant); in (ii), 
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Q. 5: 
"If you consider that the DEBT/EQUITY ratio in the Balance Sheet'is 
at least 'RELEVANT': is the standard for that ratio set by any or all 
of the following": 
(i) "An acceptable ratio for U. K. 
industry-at large" 
(ii) "An acceptable ratio for 
companies in your industry" 
(iii) "An acceptable ratio for 
companies of your size" 
(iv) "An acceptable ratio for your 
company because: - 
(a) It will minimise the over- 
all cost of finance 
(b) It will be acceptable to 
your shareholders 
(c) It does not seem too risky 
to management in terms of 
company survival 
(d) It does not seem too risky 
to management in terms of 
'flexibility' or 'future' 
room to manoeuvre'. 
(v) "An acceptable ratio as specifies 
by your Merchant Bank or other 
financial adviser". 
VERY 
RELEVANT RELEVANT. IRRELEVANT 
9 17 21 
16 14 17 
13 17 16 
21 15 11 
18 22 8 
16 17 14 
20 16 10 
12 18 17 
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some 55% felt that the appropriate ratio was a function of the indus- 
try or similar organisations (but 30%thought this to be quite irrele- 
vant); in (iii) nearly 60% of the respondents thought it had something 
to do with the size or relative importance of the company (but, again, 
30% thought this was irrelevant). Apparently, a great deal of confusion 
predominates managerial thinking in the above three issues. 
However, the intentions of the respondents were quite consistent in 
section (iv) -- indicating the seriousness with which management re- 
gards the reactions of their shareholders: significantly, section (iv: 
b) received the fewest "irrelevant" replies. The vast majority of the 
sample, 75%, showed concern that their debt. policy must be acceptable 
to their equity-holders or adverse reaction'would follow (either di- 
rectly, through the sale of their shares, or via the return they would 
demand on their investment -- the cost of equity finance). 
Sections (iv: c& d) are of particular interest. It is likely that ma- 
nagerial concern in"terms of "future room to manoeuvre" which figured 
fairly prominently in the replies, really relates to "future room to 
manoeuvre in raising additional finance" ---. which again has strong 
connotations with shareholder reactions. Yet, not one respondent was 
able to point to any clear example or evidence of shareholder concern, 
with Balance Sheet ratios: there prevailed an almost universal uncer- 
tainty as to the role or wishes of shareholders in setting debt poli- 
cy. Indeed, several respondents felt that their shareholding was made 
up of so mixed a group of people that it would be quite impossible to 
establish a common "shareholder posture" so far as concerned the ca- 
pital structure of their organisation. The only construction that can 
be placed on this ambivalent attitude (if indeed it is an explanation) 
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involves a circularity. The shareholder grants an in absentia authority 
to his professional adviser to inform him of the risks inherent in a 
company's financial mix. The' professional adviser (who may be a Stock 
Broker or Merchant Banker) uses market stereotypes of acceptable debt- 
to-equity ratios, rather than rigorous enquiry into the debt servicing 
adequacy of corporate cash-flow. If the debt ratio exceeds certain his- 
torical standards then there are instructions to sell. The professio- 
nal adviser -- now acting in his other capacity as industrial finan- 
cier -- informs the company of how their shareholding body would react 
to changes in the capital structure. The company is relucant to raise 
further debt because of the possible reactions of the shareholders when, 
unwittingly, it is the existence of an uncompromising professional 
opinion as the intermediary which is the real constraint. 
One final point may be raised concerning the possible misinterpretation 
of the results in section (v). Some 30 companies, out of the 54 quest- 
ioned,. stated that they relied on the debt capacity standards of a lend- 
ing institution. Prima facie, this would appear to be evidence of a 
large scale abdication of responsibility on behalf of the executives 
involved (similar to that observed by DONALDSON in his study and re- 
presented by the uncritical adoption of the traditional Balance Sheet 
standards of debt capacity previously discussed)1. 
However, the replies embodied two distinct attitudes on the part of 
the Banks, and their customers, as to what constitutes an appropriate 
1.. "Few corporate officials would be flattered by the assertion that such a 
critical element of debt policy as the limits of debt capacity was not an 
independent decision but rather was based on an uncritical acceptance of 
other people's opinions or actions. Nevertheless, the observations so far 
on the source of operating standards of debt capacity suggest that this 
is substantially true in a number of instances". DONALDSON [39 , p1183. 
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debt level. The first of these accords with the acquiescent nature of 
some companies to the recommendations of their Bank. 
The second, and increasingly more prominent attitude, concerns the 
positive steps being taken by Banks to guide and assist their clients 
in the task of preparing cash-flow forecasts ...... from which debt 
bearing standards can be derived. On balance, the research indicated 
a slow turning towards the use of cash-flow projections, generally 
as an important managerial instrument of financial planning and con- 
trol, although the time of the Survey such a trend was in its adoles- 
cence, if not infancy'. Thus the reliance of many executives upon the 
1. The state of flux in debt policy disclosed throughout the field research 
offers an interesting comparison of attitudes to those now being pursued 
by the Banks. A number of respondents expressed firm opposition to reveal- 
ing cash-flow projections, feeling that such "delicate" information should 
be restricted to the Board. As one finance director remarked: "I don't think 
in a big and financially sound company like ours that the Banks have the 
option to ask for such information. Your projected cash-flows are your own 
affair and to offer them up like that is not on, unless you are driven to 
it. I have not seen any evidence of the Banks seeing anything of ours pro- 
jected into the future". 
However, several executives openly censured the Banks for their continued 
rejection, or more accurately distrust, of cash-flow projections: believ- 
ing them to be remiss in not employing this vital data as a more meaning- 
ful debt-capacity indicator during financing discussions. As one treasu- 
rer remarked: "I think that cash-flow is something that financial analysts 
have got to get their teeth into, certainly in this country. In prospectu- 
ses for debentures it is not unusual to see a cash-flow statement showing 
how these funds are to be flowing and hence how they can service the debt. 
I think it is absolute' crucial to the lending of money. When I deal with 
Banks they do not expect me to produce too much in the way of forecasts in 
this area. I think they could smarten up quite a lot here". 
Since this study was undertaken a number of discussions with senior execu- 
tives in the larger joint stock Banks indicate that the present squeeze 
on corporate liquidity has produced a rapidly increasing use of cash-flow 
projections as a major verification instrument on application for over- 
draft facilities -- often at the Banks request. 
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external advice of the Banks and Finance Houses is indicative of the 
reciprocal benefits both will obtain from more detailed quantification 
of cash-flow data. Such an action should not be misconstrued as an 
'abdication of responsibility', but as one part of the learning pro-. 
cess towards a constructive instigation of a more rigorous analysis -- 
which in the end will achieve the common objective of a realistic debt 
level. 
However, one of the obstacles to change is the suspicion by both 
parties that forecaster can not be fully relied upon either 
because the future state of the economy and government policy 
are too unpredictable, or because managers and bankers continue to 
f 
dislike any but the simplest of forecasting techniques. 
If the Balance Sheet ratio continues to be regarded as a primary deter- 
minant of the amount of debt which an örganisation-can safely use, it 
becomes important to know what is generally considered to constitute 
"debt". Question, Q6, is instructive in this respect: 
I 
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Q. 6. 
"In thinking about DEBT/EQUITY 
ratios would you include": 
YES NO 
OVERDRAFT 45 5 
HIRE PURCHASE 19 30 
LEASING 13 35 
BILL OF EXCHANGE 25 24 
It would appear that in very many of the companies questioned, instal- 
ment debt would not be included in arriving at a figure for debt. (In- 
direct support for this attitude is given by the fact that very few 
of the auditors whom the researcher has questioned over the past few 
years regard leasing, especially, as falling within-the limitations on 
Director's borrowing powers as set out in the Articles of Association 
of a company). In fact, this question reveals an inconsistency which 
typifies this area of research. In discussing their answers, few if 
any respondents professed themselves to be influenced by the argument 
that leasing is "Off Balance-Sheet finance", thereby not affecting bor- 
rowing capacity yet improving the apparent return on capital employed'. 
The non-inclusion of instalment debt when computing debt-equity ratios 
appears, therefore, to be an act of inadvertent omission rather than 
deliberate commission. Yet, when asked2 why they thought leasing conti- 
nues to grow as a method of finance (despite the fact that the same 
respondents had already replied that they thought it an expensive form 
YES NO 
45 5 
19 30 
13 35 
25 24 
1. See Question QL18, in Chapter 7 
2. See Question QL20, in Chapter 7 
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of finance) a very typical reply was of the kind: "it leaves conventio- 
nal credit lines clear"; "it relieves a shortage of borrowing power"; 
or "it meets a desire to have a better (less'debt ridden? ) Balance 
Sheet". Evidently, the "Off Balance Sheet finance" attribute of in- 
stalment debt is "O. K. for the other company", but smacks too much of 
questionable financial practice to claim it for oneself. 
These issues will be reconsidered in more detail during Chapter 7. 
II A STRATEGY OF FINANCIAL MOBILITY 
One important aspect of corporate debt policy thus far not considered, 
concerns the character and composition of the group of debt instruments 
which an organisation may have previously negotiated, but which current- 
ly remain dormant. These "concealed" resources, and their implementa- 
tion, represent what DONALDSON [40] 'has termed a "Strategy of Financial 
Mobility". 
This concept is based upon the argument that an organisation is heir 
to all sorts of unexpected opportunities and perils'. It is, therefore, 
the responsibility of financial management to devise a programme out- 
lining the various sources of emergency reserves of funds and how much 
of these funds should be drawn in different circumstances. In "normal" 
times, these reserves will remain untouched. DONALDSON's empirical study 
indicated that the typical contingency programme of recourse to such 
reserves is: (i) agreed overdraft facilities, (ii) a planned sequence 
of cut-backs on operating expenses, (iii) a planned pressure on trade 
1. Sudden strikes, economic recession or boom, equipment or plant failure, 
unanticipated market openings etc., all being typical examples. 
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credit and liquidation of short-term assets such as stocks, (iv) pre- 
determined, and at least partially prenegotiated, recourse to medium 
and long-term debt (supplemented by special techniques such as sale and! 
lease back: and having as part of the objective of this exercise the 
refunding of short-term debt, such as bank overdraft, in order that 
these sources may once more be available), (v) a programme of potential 
disinvestment in the long term assets of the company, such as selling- 
off subsidiaries, (vi) a continuing discourse with professional advi- 
sers on the possibility of issuing equity so that, if need be, this 
"last resort" finance could be readily brought into use. 
As DONALDSON notes there will be financial variations in the program- 
me according to whether the situation is one of unexpected peril or 
unexpected opportunity. Nevertheless, the enactment of the strategy 
is similar in both cases: financial management has a duty to organise 
emergency lines of credit and keep them up-dated so that they may be 
exploited at short notice when the time comes. Equally, (but perhaps 
a more difficult task), it is also necessary to evaluate the cost of 
having a "strategic reserve of financial capability", and to compare 
that cost with the corresponding benefits. 
Thus, the Industrial Survey attempted to determine whether U. K. compa- 
nies had premeditated policies of financial mobility and whether (in 
view of the topic of this Thesis) they included instalment debts. 
There were several questions in the field research which were relevant 
1. The attributes of leasing that it is flexible, available almost instantly, 
and is an impermanent addition to the capital structure, would seem to make 
it a highly attractive component of such a strategy -- whether in unexpect- 
ed peril or opportunity. 
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to a strategy of financial mobilityl: question, Q2 (ii) indicated that 
a vast majority of respondents would periodically consolidate a series 
of short-term debt expedients by a longer term funding operation (this 
readjustment of the capital structure being necessary to regain short- 
term flexibility in, say, bank overdraft or short period loan facili- 
ties? ); question, Q2 (iii) signified the great variety of debt instru- 
ments which would be called upon as a second choice of debt and an equal- 
ly wide variety of preference for last resort financing (a demonstra- 
tion of the almost infinite combination of funding sources that are 
used in practice to assist in the process of financial mobility); 
question, Q5 (iv: d), evinces the concern management have for flexibi- 
lity in their capital structure and the conscious wish not to con- 
strain future manoeuvrability by over-committing certain resources now, 
which would be more valuable to the company at a later period. Finally, 
questions Q7 and 08, were concerned with quantifying the extent of the 
debt cushion management felt was desirable to have on calla. 
1. Note: as the companies in the Survey were all 'financially sound', the in- 
terviewer did not have the opportunity to discuss the later, more drastic, 
stages of mobility concerned with strategies to cope with very serious 
problems or imminent insolvency. Thus what follows (and part cularly Figure 4.7 infra) represents an industrial strategy of mobility in diffi- 
cult but not severe conditions. 
2. As one executive replied: "It is necessary to retain some flexibility as 
some of the planned expenditure will not be made, and opportunities may 
arise which require additional cash expenditure. This flexibility is nor- 
mally achieved by having surplus short-term borrowing facilities, which for us includes leasing". 
3. Regretfully, the Survey did not include a question on the composition of the debt cushion. Conscious of this omission, the matter was pursued in 
more depth at the subsequent interviews. 
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0.7. 
"Has your company negotiated a debt cushion: the 
difference between the amount of debt presently in 
use and the amount that is available on call if 
deemed necessary? " 
YES NO 
29 3 
0.8. 
"Could you place an approximate figure, nearest 10%, 
on the extra credit available on immediate call over 
that in current use? " 
PERCENTAGE CREDIT AVAILABLE 
0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-80% 80"+ 
Number of companies 5 10 534 
There was conspicuous evidence both in the questionnaire results and 
the conversations which followed, that the prevailing economic problems 
had compelled many of the companies to marshal their resources of mo- 
bility. With varying degrees of definitivenessl, their policies and 
strategies would include an assesment of the probable magnitude of each 
financial resource, the likelyhood of its attainment, and some impre- 
cise ranking of the order in which they would be used. 
1. The strategy was rarely as clearly rationalised, articulated or implemen- 
ted as DONALDSON's exemplar model; but there can be little doubt of its 
existence and increasing relevance in practice. 
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Q. 9. 
"In planning your investment strategy or financing strategy 
which of the following estimates would you use? " 
Replies 
most likely 34 
worst possible 15 
most optimistic 5 
Q. 10. 
"If you do, in fact, consider more than one type of estimate, 
is this complemented by more than one strategy or plan which 
could be called upon as events change? " 
YES NO 
23 12 
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An attempt has been made in Figure 4.7'to generalise, into one diagram, 
the typical 'image' which U. K. management possesses when they are dis- 
cussing financial mobility. It must be stressed that the construction 
of this illustration is built upon the PERCEPTIONS of management 
which may differ markedly from the actual events which follow the in- 
stigation of a given strategy. It should be possible to establish an 
individual profile for each of the companies studied, with correspon- 
dingly more or less debt alternatives, different cost schedules, various 
current capital mixes etc. l. Each financial mix will be unique: the 
debt portfolio will be a complex, interwoven structure designed to meet 
a multitude of objectives. 
Each company will have a balance of resources which are capable of 
withstanding unexpected events to a greater or lesser degree, depen- 
ding upon how the debt mix restricts future manoeuvrability. This is 
generally a function of the level of exploitation of each pocket of 
debt (the simplest example being the overdraft ceiling : if it is ful- 
ly committed it will leave the company dangerously exposed to any sud- 
den demand for cash); Similar arguments are presumed to apply to other 
sources of funds2, with the experienced treasurer perceiving where the 
'limits' of the various debt instruments will be and how their cost 
I. As such, the abstraction carries no special merit as a strategy of finan- 
cial mobility, although it is felt to represent the most frequently met 
policy in the larger coirganies of the sample. (Smaller companies would 
have to rely very heavily on their overdraft facility, perhaps complemen- 
ted by, say, a leasing policy). 
2. "...... there is no clearly defined relationship among debt contracts 
of different maturities and institutional connections. The normal tenden- 
cy is to treat corrrercial bank debt as one. pocket.. and term debt with in- 
surance companies as another pocket. 'Eäch'has'its defined'capacit , which appears unrelated to use of the other [40 p emphasis 
supplied. 
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structure will (approximately) vary if the current debt mix is changed. 
No apology is made for the inexactness of this statement because it 
depends upon abstract qualities of feel and perception rather than 
quantifiable measurement -- it is an inevitable consequence of the un- 
certainty surrounding the topic. 
Thus, given a determined effort by management, the composition and 
shape of the various parameters shown in Figure 4.71can be established. 
The diagram comprises of the following groups of information: 
1. A list of each financial source being used by the-company together 
with a presumed cost schedule (which may be conjecture or based upon 
information from the Finance Houses involved) of how the cost of 
a particular debt instrument will alter the more it is used. 
2. A debt 'envelope' representing the current financial mix -- this 
shows how much of each debt source is currently being used and 
how much it costs. 
3. An assumed maximum limit on each capital source'. Note that the, 
cost curve is asymptotic with the vertical axis at this point im- 
1. This is very much a behavioural response by management (see also the foot- 
note below Figure 4.7 ). There exists quite distinct, and easily discern- 
able, limits to the price and type of debt that financial executives find 
acceptable (industrial hire-purchase and, to a lesser extent, leasing be- 
ing spurned. by some of the respondents because they would find it perso- 
nally embarrassing to be seen using it: see Chapter 7). Viewed in a wider 
perspective, strong motives exist to reject debt if it is thought (by 
others) to be too costly -- a loss of professional status would appear to 
result from a reduced credit rating -- or if the debt source is accompa- 
nied by what may seem to be excessively restrictive conditions. As DONALD- 
SON notes [40 , p203]: "Financial resources for any given company over any 
normal planning horizon are finite; they can be exhausted. The standard 
argument that funds are always available" at a price" ignores the fact 
v: iat there are distinct limits to the price that can and will-be paid". 
The evidence of the UK Survey certainly confirms DONALSON's opinion. . 
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plying (notionally) that management believes that no more funds 
will be forthcoming at any price. 
4. An absolute ceiling on the price of funds that an executive-is 
prepared to pay. 
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FIGURE 4.7 
STRATEGY OF'FINANCIAL MOBILITY 
DEBT COST % 
Absolute ceiling on debt 
LEASING costs (arbitrarily or ratio- 
nally) set by management'. 
A 
OVERDRAFT 
SHORT TO 
B MEDIUM-TERM LONG TERM DEBT. DEBT 
ASSUMED MAXIMUM 
LIMIT OF EACH CAPITAL 
SOURCE. 
A 
CURRENT FINANCIAL MIX 
DEBT CAPITAL f 
A-A = Resource disposition during initial stages of a strategy 
of financial mobility: note the impermanent nature of the 
debt instruments involved. 
B-B = Restructuring of the capital mix and a consolidation of 
short-term debts. 
1. The existence of some 'cost-barrier' beyond which management was not pre- 
pared to consider a financial source was very evident in the survey -- for example, one executive had recently recommended to the board that at 
24% the quote for a lease contract was simply too high, however he would 
acquiesce to the use of leasing at 20%: the limit is thereby defined. In 
general, executives would refuse to consider a debt instrument beyond a 
well defined figure, typically Bank rate plus x%. 
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There are three major critisisms of Figure 4.7 , all of which 
highlight 
its simplicity: 
Firstly, the cost curves are continuous when it is more probable that 
they would be stepped to denote precise breaks, or upward shifts, in 
the cost of a debt source as more is consumed (although where these will 
occur is clearly a most difficult problem in forecasting). 
Secondly, it seems reasonable to argue that as the company moves up 
an individual cost schedule it will gain more information about the 
reactions of the suppliers of capital, which will cause it to amend 
(i) the shape of the curve in question, (ii) the shapes of other debt 
sources, and (iii) the 'absolute maximum limit' of each debt instru- 
ment, either upwards or downwards. Hence the contour of each line is 
not an absolute statement, only a representation at an instant in time. 
Finally, the shape of the cost schedule will most probably have been 
established as an isolated piece of data. As such, it is unlikely 'to 
reflect the interdependencies which exist between the components of the 
debt mix (although the executive, or the Finance House, which compiled 
the curve may have 'built-in' a modification in an attempt to take ac- 
count of the interactivities). 
These problems apart, consider now the two curves AA and BB: the two 
stages in a strategy of financial mobilityi. On the basis of the inter- 
views, a familiar pattern of events was revealed concerning the reactions 
1. Or, as one executive remarked, it was "a cycle in the process of the 
company's financial evolution often accelerated by temporary adversity". 
ýs. _.., 
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of management to illequidity, unexpected demand for capital assets, 
and general cash inadequacyl. 
The first stage of such a strategy, as shown by the AA curve, contains 
four salient features: 
1. The nature of the problem will probably demand swift and incisive 
action by management. Thus, the use of long-term debt as a major 
means of support is precluded because it will generally require 
a considerable period of time to organise and secure. If the compa- 
ny's understanding of the situation is sufficiently clear to recog- 
nise a longer term deficiency in the capital structure, then nego- 
tiations may commence at this stage to secure a large debenture or 
1. The reader is reminded that the generalisation to follow is a strategy 
of mobility in difficult but not severe conditions. The course taken by 
U. K. management in the early stages of an unexpected adversity show a 
close affinity to that expressed by the participants in. DONALDSON's re- 
search study. 
However, some recent empirical evidence from the USA, see ELAM [41], 
suggests that a different pattern of events occur (to that suggested by 
DONALDSON) as grave financial circumstances overtake a company. Two of 
ELAM's conclusions are relevant here: 
"One unexpected observation was that, over the period studied, the non- 
bankrupt firms had a much higher rate of increase in lease commitment 
than the bankrupt firms. Apparently, as firms approach bankruptcy, their 
lease commitments decrease in relation to their total assets". 141 , p31] "The data indicated that as firms approach bankruptcy almost all its grow- 
ing liabilities are in the form of longterm debt". [41 , p32]. It would seem, therefore, that the BB curve accords with a 'terminal' fi-- 
nancial posture, in that companies do not use, or are prevented from using, 
their short-term debt capacity. This was not intended. ELAM's statistical 
results, and the current field research, would appear to indicate the 
following (although, as a caveat, this impression would require empiri- 
cal validation on a larger scale than the current survey): if 'difficult' 
conditions exist then ease, the company moves from the AA curve to the 
BB curve and possibly back to the 'current' capital mix; however, if ex- 
treme conditions occur the last course of action is precluded and if 
further deterioration takes place the company is forced into insolvency. 
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funded debt at a later period. 
2. At the forefront of a strategy of mobility are short-term debt sour- 
ces --- the reasons for this being that such sources are relatively 
easy to obtain, they are flexible, free from restraint on managerial 
action and, in general, reliable. 
However, they are frequently at the more expensive end of the com- 
pany's debt portfolio. To many observers this may seem a non-opti- 
mal policy: the cheapest sources should have been used first. 
"Theory would suggest that the proper approach to the use of re- 
sources under uncertainty would be to rank these resources in order 
of increasing cost and use them as required, starting with the 
cheapest first. The problem in practice lies in the fact that cost 
does not in itself relate to the needs of mobility, nor does it natu- 
rally coincide with characteristics of resources that do relate to 
mobility". 
DONALDSON [40 , p2441. 
Thus, no surprise is to be occasioned that companies use relatively 
expensive forms of debt, such as leasing, as 
, -, 
a key resource of mobility: 
its. ready accessibility outweights its explicit costs. 
1. To achieve a meaningful policy of financial mobility management must hold 
a portfolio of debt instruments. It must also be prepared to incur the cost 
of leaving part of a cheaper stratum of debt intact (by moving to more 
expensive forms of debt instead of exhausting each source of debt before 
moving to the next). Thus, the price paid for an individual source of debt is, in some measure, dependent upon the cushion of mobility that is demanded. If a company uses leasing at x% when it has at its disposal (as 
reserve capacity) less expensive short-term loan or overdraft facilities, 
then the incremental cost incurred has two components: (i) the rise in interest costs which reflect the increase in the lenders risk as more debt is undertaken, and (ii) the pecunary sacrifice which must be borne if the 
company is to attain its desired balance between those resources in use 
and those in reserve. The latter component (the true cost of financial 
mobility) is frequently neglected in discussions of debt costs. It is al- 
so a further indication of the interdependencies which exist between fi- 
nance costs, and is another argument against 'discriminatory financing'. 
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3. An important aspect of this period of the strategy is to avoid ab- 
sorbing all of the expected capacity in each pocket of debt; on the 
(prudent) argument that the unexpected event may become more severe 
than anticipated. Management will, as a result of this policy, have 
to move up the curve (in a north westerly direction) and begin using 
more expensive strata of debt.. 
.. 
4. When the problem abates, the AA_curve may be relaxed down to the 
current financial mix line, or (as DONALDSON noted, see fn. 2, page 
198) this new financing mix will become permanent and perhaps cause. 
the perceived 'absolute maximum limit' curve to be raised upwards 
and to the right. 
The second stage of the strategy, as depicted in the BB curve, is de- 
signed to achieve two interactive objectives: firstly, it consolidates 
the excess short-term debt facilities into a single long-term debt in- 
strument (an action frequently demanded by the Banks); and, secondly, 
it simultaneously creates-vital short-term facilities which can be re- 
exploited upto and beyond the AA curve if the problem is prolonged --- 
in which case each. of the short-term forms of debt will be pursued to 
the full. 
Thus, in summary, the conversations held with UK management suggest a 
strategy of financial mobility based upon a simple cyclical pattern: 
a reliance on short-term debt, leading to a consolidation of these sour- 
ces which would then be re-employed upto the AA curve. 
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4.3 CONCLUSION 
A great many issues have been covered in this Chapter which are- 
central to the interpretation of financial theory being adopted 
in this Thesis., If the scope of the leasing decision is to be 
fully appreciated and a satisfactory analytical technique 
developed than it is essential that various issues and 
controversies be (at least partially) resolved and translated 
into practical decision heuristics. 
Arguably, the two most important problem areas which have been 
discussed thus far and which impinge principally upon the 
leasing decision are: (I) the correct assessment of corporate 
debt capacity -- so that lease financing can be optimally 
exploited -- and (2) the need to integrate the I. & F. decisions -- 
so that leasing can be correctly evaluated. 
Because the, leasing decision demands a simultaneous anlaysis 
of the two decisions it is essential that financial management 
consider and-make a thorough analysis of the various inter- 
relationships and interdependencies that affect the evaluation 
process. 
The problem, however, is that while the majority of these 
interdependencies are of great practical significance they are 
often subtle, complex and frequently very difficult to model 
with any realism or accuracy. There exists a wide gap between 
the theoretical identification of an 'interdependency the 
development of a procedure to resolve it, and a practical 
algorithm which is a suitably accurate proxy. 
This is particularly true of the hurdle rate to be applied in 
the leasing decision, which as previously argued is synonomous 
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with the hurdle-rate problem in the joint I. & F. decision 
(more on this topic-in the next Chapter). Economic theory quite 
correctly indicates that the marginal efficiency of capital (MEC) 
is the appropriate discount rate to use in a capital rationing 
situation. The unresolved problem, however, is that the numerical 
value of the MEC is only known once the optimal solution is 
attained. This interdependency is well documented in the 
literature but is does not seem to have been associated with, 
or applied to, the leasing decision problem. 
Indeed, the argument is considerably more complex in the case 
of leasing: historically the discount rate problem has been - 
enumerated using a fixed capital budget. However, with the 
introduction of leasing into the pool of funds the capital 
budget effectively begins to increase --- there is a dynamic 
situation in which both the weighted average cost of capital 
and the marginal efficiency of capital change, -at. one and the 
same time. No procedure has been developed to cope with this 
highly complex integrated capital budgeting problem and, as such, 
the correct identification of the hurdle rate under 'dynamic' 
conditions remains unknown. By implication, therefore, the 
discount rate to apply in the case of leasing is also unresolved. 
It has been suggested that the most suitable surrogate is the 
weighted average cost of capital adjusted for any anticipated 
changes brought about by leasing. Regrettably this is neither 
an accurate nor very satisfactory procedure but the nature of 
the interdependency precludes a totally accurate solution. 
The assessment of debt capacity and the optimal quantity of 
debt to be employed by a company are obviously crucial to the 
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efficient use of leasing. Debt financing is now the principal 
source of new capital for U. K. industry and there is every 
reason to believe that this will be so for the foreseeable 
future. Thus, how, when, under what circumstances, and by 
what criteria of judgement debt is raised, becomes one of 
the key problems facing financial managment today. 
Despite observable warnings of illiquidity and cash insolvency 
corporate executives still persist in their reliance upon rule 
of thumb balance sheet ratios, or external advice and indicators, 
as a measure of debt capacity . The field research has identified 
a small but timely and significant trend towards more realistic 
methods of analysis using cash-flow data as a means of 
establishing safe and controllable levels of debt. 
It was argued that companies should measure their unique capacity 
to bear debt using a technique termed the 'debt supportiveness 
of free cash-flows'. Once the quantity of free cash-flow has been 
established the company can engage the 'Linkage' process in an 
effort to promote still further projects and generate still 
further cash-flow by pledging the level of free cash-flow to the 
repayment of Instalment Debt. 
CHAPTER 5 
FURTHER ISSUES OF RELEVANCE TO THE LEASING 
DECISION: DISCRIMINATORY FINANCING; 
MATHEMATICAL MODELS OF THE IZF DECISION; 
AND CORPORATE TAXATION. 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Three major issues will be considered in this Chapter: 
the first is termed 'discriminatory financing', which is concerned with 
the discount rate to be applied'to specific investment or financing 
decisions; the second concerns a discussion of mathematical programming 
models of the integrated I&F decision; and, thirdly, the question of 
corporate taxation will be introduced. 
It will be argued that discriminatory financing is a frequently net 
hazard in the leasing decision which is especially prevalent in those 
procedures which (implicitly'or explicitly) utilised a discount rate 
based upon HALEY & SCHALL's "Value Additivity Principle". A series of 
arguments will be raised against the principle, the most important of 
which is, its failure to acknowledge the fundamental interrelationship 
which exists between the elements of the capital budgeting decision 
and its applicability in the real world. 
Earlier discussion in this Thesis has been concerned with the integrated 
investment and financing decision characteristics of the'leasing 
decision: which is thus seen as a microcosm of the reality of such an 
integration in corporate financial management as a whole. 
The main parameters of any corporate financial planning system are the 
I&F decisions. Current attitudes, both in theory and'(to a lesser ex- 
tent) in practice, are moving towards consideration of the integrated 
decision and a recognition of the interdependencies which exist, with. 
attention being increasingly given to models for this purpose. Thus, in 
the second part of this Chapter, one of the more prominent papers in 
the area of integrated decision models will be discussed. Issues raised 
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will be the structure of the model, its constraints, the data require- 
ment, the model's horizon and objective function, and the manner in which 
integration is, or is not, achieved. 
In this context the optimisation model developed by CHAMBERS is a most 
effective choice to focus upon because: (1) it has been succesfully 
applied in practice by CHAMBERS; (2) historically, it is a development 
upon the work of WEINGARTNER who pioneered the area of financial models; 
(3) the model occupies a rare place in the literature, in that, it com- 
prises not only of the necessary mathematical equations, but also a sub- 
stantial numerical example and analysed results (The investment and fi- 
nancial data can be of enormous assistance when'reproducing the model 
in a personal capacity to obtain clearer understanding of its modus ope- 
randi. Experience gained with this and similar models, shows that while 
they may be mathematically unassailable they are frequently unexpected- 
ly deficient on numerical application: especially in the areas of in- 
feasibility, redundancy and unboundedness); and, finally, the CHAMBER's 
model affords an excellent insight into the interdependencies between 
the I&F decisions. 
The third topic to be discussed is corporate taxation; which is of great 
relevance to the leasing decision. Taxation is a subject of enormous 
scope and complexity which, unfortunately, is often seriously neglect- 
ed in the capital budgeting literature in favour of over-simplistic ge- 
neralisations as to its rate and incidence. The issues raised in this 
section reveal yet further aspects of the complex inter-relationships 
which exist in project appraisal. The argument developed indicates how 
taxation must be fully incorporated into the investment and financial 
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planning sequence if Corporate financial management is to be carried 
out optimally. 
The outcome of this discussion will be a triple integrated model con- 
cerned with the investment, financing and taxation decisions. This mo- 
del represents a new subject'area which, as yet, remains largely unex-' 
plored. 
A tentative framework is established within which to structure discuss- 
ion and analysis of the problem. 
Of necessity what follows in this Chapter must be summary in treatment 
and selective in approach, and -- especially in the area of taxation - 
- be frequently content to define a problem yet only hint at a possi- 
ble solution. One outcome of this will be a number of suggestions for 
further research. 
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5.2: DISCRIMINATORY FINANCING'AND"THEýINVESTMENT'DECISION 
There are two fundamental interrelated issues emanating from the pro- 
blem of 'discriminatory analysis' in the capital budgeting decision: 
1. There is the problem of what hurdle rate to apply to a 
project: should an investment be appraised at a specific 
discount or capitalisation rate which reflects the particular 
characteristics and/or market perceptions of the project (that 
is, the use of a discount rate which is totally individual to 
the asset, its cash-flow profile, or its risk attributes)? And, 
as an important corollary to this issue: 
2. If the company were. to employ a singular discount rate for 
each project, is it possible to ensure that this procedure does 
not (perhaps inadvertently) bestow an unwarranted-advantage or 
disadvantage on any other concurrent or future I&F decision. 
The former problem is a polemical issue in financial theory and will re- 
occur on several occasions when discussing the leasing decision'. The 
second problem is also of major importance to the study of leasing, 
and capital budgeting in general, as the incorrect choice and applica- 
tion of a hurdle rate may lead to the improper acceptance of one pro- 
ject at the expense of (i. e. the rejection of) another. Project selec- 
1. In Chapter 6 of the Thesis it shall be observed that previous writers 
on the leasing decision elect a wide variety of discount rate; many of 
which are argued here to be 'discriminatory'. The ensuing discussion 
of the Value Additivity Principle, which embodies the theoretical jus- tification for using individual project discount rates, provides the 
necessary background for an argument on discriminatory hurdle rates. 
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tion criteria should be free from this bias, and should strive to eli- 
minate, as fully and as reasonably as possible, any erroneous benefit 
or pecunary advantage accruing to the individual project: by ensuring 
that the design of such procedures are based upon the axiom of like- 
with-like equitable comparison of the alternatives. This principle 
applies with equal force to the choice of financing options. . 
I TRADITIONAL THEORY AND DISCRIMINATORY, FINANCING 
Later in this Chapter it will be noted that the particular method of 
financing an asset will determine the type and size of Capital Allowan- 
ces, and other taxation cash-flows, which will enure to an investment 
decision. These taxation amounts will clearly have a significant ef- 
fect on the outcome of the project's appraisal. 
The interaction of taxation flows and the possible acceptance of the 
project, carries with it the significant risk that an investment deci- 
sion may be found to be acceptable purely because of the advantage it 
enjoys in its method of financing. It is a cardinal tenet of 'modern- 
-traditional' financial theory that capital expenditure appraisal-should 
not allow this to occurs. The argument being that projects do not 
exist independently, but as part of the "pool" of projects that are to 
be jointly financed by 
.a 
"pool" of corporate funds. 
The cost which an organisation has to pay for one form of capital is, 
to a significant extent, conditioned by the use which the organisa- 
1. See MERRET & SYKES [ 98 ], ' VAN HORNE C 138 1 or WESTON & BRIGHAM 
£ 144 ]. 
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tion is making, or proposing to make,. of other forms of capital'. 
It is argued here that a company's present financial mix strongly in- 
fluences how its future capital structure can-develop. 
It would follow, therefore, that the preferential financing which might 
be brought into an integrated investment and financing decision in re- 
spect of a particular proposed capital expenditure (say, ,a relatively 
cheap tranche of debt), would only be so preferential because the sup- 
pliers of that particular finance were impressed by the remainder of 
the capital structure of the organisation. To give the proposal under 
review the benefit of that preferential finance would be, in effect, 
to grant a subsidy (or penalty2) to the proposal from all other pro- 
posals. 
This would be termed 'discriminatory financing': the favourable dis- 
crimination taking the form of an advantageous, artificially low, in- 
terest rate3 which will be used to appraise the project. 
The argument supported in this Thesis would therefore assert that no 
1. For example, what is perhaps considered 'cheap' debt is only forthcoming 
at a favourable rate because collateral exists in the form of an equity 
base, and the acknowledged seniority of debt in the event of insolvency. 
Thus, debt may be said to be 'raised on the back' of equity. The inter- 
dependency between capital sources is readily apparent when new debt is 
sought: a higher premium will be demanded on a new tranche of debt if 
the proposed capital mix endangers the risk and security of existing 
creditors and shareholders (who may react by also demanding a premium). 
2. The alternative argument to 'cheap' debt is, of course, 'expensive' equi- 
ty. Consider those projects which are financed with retained earnings: 
it is not normal capital budgeting policy to consider these projects as 
if they were 100% Equity financed; nor are they penalised by a disadvan- 
tageous appraisal rate based soley on the (expensive) cost of equity. 
3. In the case of leasing this may well be the debt-rate of the company (as opposed to the IRR of the lease contract). This distinction is made 
here in advance of the debate in the leasing literature in Chapter 6. 
.. 23ý a 
s uriousi pecunary advantage must accrue to an investment project 
which fortuitously happens to be associated with a cheap source of 
(debt) funds. Expressed another way, this implies that the allocation 
of marginally raised sources of capital to specific projects should be 
treated with the utmost care: so that the funds become indistinguis- 
hable in the 'pool' of corporate finance and, as such, investments are 
funded in a non-asset specific2 manner. It would follow from this (and 
the earlier argument on the correct hurdle rate for integrated I&F 
decisions) that the appraisal rate for all projects must be uniform 
and based upon the weighted average cost of (or marginal'efficiency 
of) capital ..... thereby ensuring that the profitability of a new 
project will satisfy all the financial participants of the company 
and not merely the latest marginal source. 
Exactly how the argument against discriminatory financing can be in- 
corporated into the leasing decision will be left until later Chapters 
on the evaluation of lease contracts. Suffice it to say here, that the 
proposed method involves the 'stripping-out' of the interest element 
inherent within the leasing repayments. 
1. Note the word spurious. Later in the Thesis the concept of RESIDUAL 
CAPITAL BALANCES will be introduced which will be applied to the in- 
dividual integrated I&F decision. Defence of this statement is left 
until later. 
2. A justifiable case can-be made for the use of discriminatory financing 
in conditions of extremely independent projects (i. e. isolated by virtue 
of, say, geographical ö ation -- overseas, for example -- or large, un- 
related, and self-sustaining investments such as mineral extraction). 
However, under normal business conditions such discrimination is argued 
to be incorrect. 
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II THE VALUE'ADDITIVITY PRINCIPLE 
The Value Additivity Principle (henceforth VAP) runs contrary to the 
above 'traditional' approach to capital budgeting, in that the prin- 
ciple states that projects may be considered as"entirely independent 
entities capable of being analysed in isolation. 
The origin of (what has been refered to here as) 'discriminatory fi- 
nanincing' is to be found in the works of MODIGLIANI & MILLER (particu- 
larly their 'correction' article [101 ]). ' They argued that a company's 
cash-flow stream could be successfully divided into its component parts, 
debt and equity elements, each of which could then be discounted/capa- 
tilised at the appraisal rate appropriate to the stream in isolation. 
In a later paper by MOSIN C 102] an asset valuation model, not too 
disimilar from the original MM arguments, was developed which stated 
that the market value of a set of income streams was-equal to the 
aggregate_of_the value of each individual stream.. 
Pursuing this model, SCHALL [119, ] and subsequently HALEY ,& SCHALL 
[ 68 ], developed MOSIN's concept into the more'general Value Addi- 
tively Principle. The VAP states that: 
"The total value of a set of cash-flow streams received 
by investors is unaltered regardless of how that set of 
streams is combined or divided into debt or equity streams 
of one or more firms". 
.... HALEY &. SCHALL [ 68 , p211] 
1. The major difference being a change of emphasis from MM's discounting 
the debt servicing costs and residual equity earnings at their respec- 
tive rates in order to value the company, to an analysis of how perfect 
capital markets would value the income independently and then as part 
of a "set of income streams". Perfect information, arbitrage and com- 
petition ensuring that the streams had identical value under both con- 
tions. 
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The importance of this property of income streams is far reaching: for 
the ability to divide the ultimately aggregated corporate income into 
segments without losing any market value implies that the stream from 
an individual investment project can exist and be analysed as a total- 
ly independent entityl. 
If the VAP holds, then it is feasible to segregate an investment oppor- 
tunity from the group of projects to which it belongs and appraise it 
purely as an income stream on offer to the market --- hence, a single 
project has no influence upon, nor is affected by, any other project or 
group of projects that comprise the firme. 
Hence, using the VAP a project should be appraised as follows: 
"The value of the incremental stream Xn (emanating from the invest- 
ment project in period n) to the investing firm, is equal to the 
value that Xn would have if it were available as an individual 
stream in the market". 
SCHALL C 119 , p201 
1. See HALEY & SCHALL [68 , p268] 2. Project independence is, of course, a convenient assumption in the tra- 
ditional approach to investment appraisal in non-rationing conditions -- 
with the proviso that the results of the aggregate decision may still 
exert an influence upon the yý3s of the various capital instruments 
employed by the company and hence upon the hurdle rate. Thus, a cyclical 
interdependency clearly exists even though it is ignored when projects 
are considered independently. (In capital rationing conditions, indivi- 
dual project appraisal is non-optimal and project sets must be consider- 
ed). By contrast the VAP asserts that the project must be evaluated so- 
lely by the discount rate that the market would apply to the stream in 
isolation. No link exists between the project and the firm for purposes 
of investment appraisal because the investor can divide and freely trade 
the corporate income stream in any combination of segments without loss 
of market value. See SCHALL [119 , p20]. 
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This may be expressed in two ways: if the investment yields Xn ins 
perpetuity then the change in value to the company brought about 
by its acceptance (AVt) is: 
CO 
AVt= E .. X. ;.: SCHALL [119 , p21, 
fn17] } 
t=o t (1 + kn) 
where kn is the appropriate hurdle rate for the project (for that in- 
come stream); alternatively the change in the value of the firm (using 
MM's model) may be expressed as the value of the unlevered stream plus 
the value of the tax rate times the market value of debt associated 
with the stream (the level of debt implicit in the initial cost of the 
investment). Using HALEY & SCHALL's notation, a project is acceptable 
if; 
VZU + t. BZ - IZO 0 [68 , p2841 
1 
where Vzu = Value of the unlevered stream from project z in the market 
t. Bz = After tax value of debt used to support project z. 
Izo = Net investment in project z at time zero 
t= Tax Rate 
Which in a discounting. model becomes: E68 , p285] 
£ (1-t)RZt. -. Izt. +. t. D7zt +E'.. 
ITzt.... 
- Izo >o 
t=1 (1 + kzu)t t=1 (1 + kzb)t 
where Xzt = level, perpetual, cash-flow stream from project-z. 
Izt = further investment in project z at time t. 
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17 
zt = 
Tax depreciation associated with project z. 
Rzt 
= Perpetual interest rate cost of debt B raised as 
part of project z (note: B is never retired). 
kzu = Discount rate applied by the market to the un- 
levered stream. 
. 
kzb = Discount rate applied by the market-to the debt stream. 
The similarity of the VAP project selection procedure to MM's tax cor- 
rection model is now apparent: the VAP analysis implies that a project's 
value will-be maximised if it is-financed entirely with debt (tB rises 
as the proportion of debt rises). Hence, following MM's precedent, 
HALEY & SCHALL are obliged to impose an artifical limit on debt finan- 
cing: 
"Some imperfection is assumed here that favours a limit 
(on the proportion of debt used), this imperfection is 
not binding upon the projects, themselves but on some 
other factor making borrowing beyond some point undesirable" 
HALEY & SCHALL [68 , p285] 
It is argued here that the VAP is less than satisfactory on this'very' 
important issue -- for in this approach, the value ascribed to a pro- 
ject is directly influenced by, and hence dependent! upon, the'level of 
debt capital raised to support the project. By implication, therefore, 
a company's management should strive to optimise this debt level in or- 
der that it may gain maximum advantage from its investment opportuni- 
ties. But unfortunately a sound, rational, solution to the problem of 
what is the appropriate debt-equity mix to employ is far from apparent 
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(and is certainly not intrinsically solved in the VAP). HALEY 
.& 
SCHALL 
are forced into an equivocation, outside their theoretical underpin- 
ning of the VAP argument. 
They suggest that, in practice, management should adopt the following 
procedure: if company A is about to embark upon an investment in a 
process or industry it has no experience of, then it must search for 
a company, B, which is already established in this field. The amount 
of debt then applied to support the asset should reflect: 
"The optimal financing policy of the firms in the 
industry it is planning to enter". 
HALEY & SCHALL [68 , p3373 
iThus,. the writers argue that the company's current financial structure 
under such circumstances is irrelevant' to the decision, because (pre- 
sumably) the demand for the 'type' (i. e. a specific risk/return in- 
come stream) of funds required to support Company A's project will be 
in competition in the market with the 'optimal' capital mix and demand 
schedule for funds from Company B which will also be seeking debt for 
its projects., Hence, Company A must adopt Company'B's capital mix po- 
licy to compete effectively in the market place. 
1. The'cürrent debt-equity relationship of the company's financial struc- 
ture reflects the market perceptions of the income generating characte- 
ristics of the'incumbent investments. HALEY & SCHALL are implicity ar- 
guing that all companies', capital structures are optimal: for Company A 
has an optima structure when viewed from Company B and vice-versa. 
This argument is rejected in favour of DONALDSON's, who states that: 
"This line of thinking merely enlarges the group that is relying on'Some- 
'One'else to make an independent and rational decision which they can sa- 
fely adopt as their own". [39 
., 
p128]. ' See also the following footnote in this section. 
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The statement that Company B is truly "optimally financed" is very 
much taken on trust rather than objective reasoning --- it is HALEY 
& SCHALL's belief [68 p5 & p330J. that capital markets are 
"sufficiently'perfect" for such 'optimality' to occur through market 
forces'. 
If the VAP is to be successfully applied in practice then perfect ca- 
pital markets must exist to support the principle and its implications. 
This gives rise to two important issues implicit within the VAP which 
are at variance with the arguments. being developed in this Thesis. 
1. In the capital budgeting decision using the VAP analysis, projects 
are evaluated individually with the financing decision being con- 
............... .................... 
1. In the previousiChapter reservation was expressed that markets were this 
perfect --- on the contrary, it was concluded that historical precedent (and the security implicit in adopting accepted conventions) is frequent- 
ly, and often unthinkingly, granted the appelation 'optimal'. The em- 
pirical research indicated that, in the minds of many senior executives 
interviewed, the concept of an 'optimal' capital structure was impre- 
cisely formed .... their current financial structure was frequently con- sidered "satisfactory": being an inheritance from previous executives 
who experienced little problem with it; but they felt it difficult to 
defend as being optimal. Bankers and other representatives of the capi- 
tal market were equally unsure -- often ("blindly") applying Balance Sheet ratios to guage optimality despite the agreed consensus when pro- 
bed more deeply that such "accounting evidence" lacked conformity or 
standardisation. 
Empirical research, of a statistical nature, designed to test the effi- 
ciency of the capital market (see FAMA [ 44]1 for a review of the eviden- 
ce) attempts to determine whether security prices "fully reflect" all the 
available information -- the agreed test of efficiency. FAMA concludes that on balance the more complex tests tend to indicate that they do. 
However, two discussions of the paper by SHARPE [123]; and SCHWARTZ [121), 
consider the evidence to be unclear and occasionally contradictory. 
They note the acknowledged problems associated with such research (from 
the specification of a standard measure of the riskless rate or market index, to detailed statistical argument on what are appropriate confi- 
dence limits, the virtues and disadvantages of autoregressive testing 
and filter analyses etc. etc. ) and suggest that -- yet further -- empi- 
rical studies be undertaken to adjudicate the issue. 
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ducted separately from the associated investment decision. 
2. However, in the VAP, the level of debt implicit in any accepted 
project is not determined by reference to other projects which 
comprise the accepted set of investments [ 68', p285]. Thus, the 
demand for funds (the relevant debt-equity mix to be raised) is 
conducted on a project by project basis, with the amounts raised 
being dependent purely upon the characteristics of the project 
itself'. 
The VAP also assumes that an incremental tranche of funds will be 
raised'för'eäch'new'project: the requirement for new debt and equity 
arises because it is assumed that all the previous project's cash- 
flows are dispersed from the company as either debt servicing costs 
or dividends -- in that way the VAP is able to evaluate the return- 
in-perpetuity on the debt instrument and calculate the increase in 
value of the equity on the assumption that shareholders receive all 
the unlevered income'. The problem still remains, however, of establish- 
ing the optimal amount of debt to raise for a new project2. 
The two alternatives proposed by HALEY and SCHALL do not necessarily 
produce the same result [68, p315] and management is free to choose 
............. ... 
1. There is, however, some confusion on the point of which decision should be conducted first: in perfect capital markets C 68J, p286]the decision 
on project debt levels is undertaken before the investment appraisal; in imperfect markets [ 68 , p336] the investment decision is argued to pro- ceed the financing decision; and, finally, when the authors discuss a joint investment-financing decision model C 68', p349] the investment 
appraisal -- that is, the determination of the-value of the project's 
un evere stream -- proceeds the investment'selection and choice of fi- 
nancing structure. 
2. Two alternative discount models are suggested: one requires that the, firm finance a fixed proportion of the project's initial outlay with debt; 
the other maintains that the firm should keep a constant ratio of debt 
to the value of the incremental cash-flow and employ this percentage to fund new projects. See C 68 , p314/3151. HALEY & SCHALL apply the form- er model in their subsequent examples. 
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which criteria it considers most appropriate. 
The assumptions outlined above are prerequisites for the VAP's defense 
of the process of appraising projects independently, for as HALEY & 
SCHALL recognise, project interdependence would render the VAP decision 
procedure inoperative: 
"Since the after-tax cash-flow from a project depends upon 
the proportion that is financed with debt, a dependence of 
this proportion of debt financing on the other projects adopt- 
ed implies a dependence of the project's cash-flow on which 
other projects are adopted. The consequence would be a need 
to evaluate all investment options simultaneously to get a 
joint maximising solution". 
X68 , p286, fnl5] 
Although the above quote does not advocate a simultaneous solution to 
the joint investment and financing decisions'(countenancing 'invest- 
ment-set' decisions only), it does acknowledge that in the event of 
any interdependency existing between the accepted projectsl'then it 
would be erroneous to evaluate investments singly2. This undermines 
what the authors see [68, p305 & p328] as the main advantage of the VAP: 
................................. :. 1'---'-* ....................... 
1. Via, say, a collective influence of the accepted set of investments 
upon the debt raising capacity, of the organisation which, in turn, 
affects the VAP's projects appraisal criteria (which is very sensitive to the effects of more debt) making more projects appear attractive 
which creates more debt capacity etc. etc.. 
2. See AMEY C11 or BROMWICH [24 1. -. 
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viz; it enables the investment decision to be decentralised, thereby 
providing management with a simple tool of analysis for project select- 
ion at divisional levels. The associated financing decision is considered' 
of secondary importance, especially in perfect capital markets where: 
"Financing decisions by the firm are no more than the 
determination of who has rights to what part of the 
future cash-flow of the firm". 
[68 , p2173 
However, when they later discuss imperfect capital markets HALEY & 
SCHALL have to concede, albeit reluctantly, that a mutual relationship 
does exist between investment and finance: 
"If optimal decisions require a simultaneous solution 
of both the investment and financing problems, it is no 
longer possible for management to decentralise investment 
decisions within the firm. In other words, all investment 
and financing decisions must be made "at the top". As a 
practical matter this would be an intolerable situation in 
large firms". 
[68 , p328] 
Their reason for considering the joint decision intolerable is argued 
1. In perfect capital markets the decentralisation of the investment decis- ion would be permissible as it will always be possible to raise extra finance for projects which yield a return greater than the market de- 
sired hurdle rate. However, in imperfect'markets, where capital may be in short supply, decentralised project appraisal will be non-optimal to the total organisation because the base hurdle rate will propose a 
set of projects which exceed the financing constraint: 
the project selection criteria has not isolated the optimal set of in- 
vestments. 
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here to be unfounded: HALEY & SCHALL state that "a theoretically 
correct solution may require enumeration of all alternatives, which 
is impractical", [ 68" , p328, fn. 1] 
because if a company had "35 pro- 
jects" a computer would take "about a year" to evaluate each possible 
budget [ 681 p3591. ' 
This fear is believed to be groundless'. 
It is argued here that the time, cost and effort involved in preparing 
a joint solution to a company's entire capital budgeting problems will 
undoubtedly be extensive, 'if not excessive2. 
0 
. ... . ....... . ................... . 
1. Advanced programming packages for mathematical programming models (for 
example I. C. L. 's, XDLA mixed-integer L. P. software) together with so- 
phisticated procedures, where necessary, for searching over the primal 
or dual spaces of the L. P. to obtain an optimal-feasible solution can 
reduce very large problems to minutes of computer central core time 
(experience gained on'reproducing joint decision models of the CHAMBERS 
type C 30 I verify this). For details of the Operational Research 
techniques involved see WAGNER [140, ] or HILLIER & LIEBERMAN C 74.1. 
2. Natural prejudice and recalcitrance, often based on a misunderstanding 
of the role of modeling, are serious obstacles to the introduction of 
such techniques into companies (as, no doubt, was the case with DCF some 
time ago). On the one hand, financial executives whom I have interviewed 
dismiss models on the belief that project appraisal and treasurership 
are such fundamental areas of management that they should not be dele- 
gated ("to equations"). In fact, the instigation of such procedures 
would probably demand a more rigorous analysis and structuring of the 
decision which, together with a detailed specification of corporate po- 
licy and objectives, should give management an increased confidence in 
the decisions that are taken (after all; "models'are"only"advisory). To 
some firms, however, modeling will represent an expensive toy wich 
demands highly skilled personnel and computer hardware. The effort in- 
volved in preparing an efficient-data support system by modifying the 
financial and management accounts (into cash-flow data --- arguably a 
worthwhile exercise in itself) will place an intolerable burden on al- 
ready severely strained management. (See, for example, the research 
study by ROCKLEY C 116 1 into the capital budgeting procedures in U. K. 
companies -- the pressure on management frequently precludes all but 
the most rudementary appraisal). Nonetheless, it is argued here 
that financial management can be strengthened greatly through the use 
of such comprehensive planning tools. 
For a review of the acceptance of mathematical programming models of 
the joint investment and financing decision in practice see GRINYER 
[65 1 and GRINYER & WOLLER [66 1. 
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However, by pursuing the policy of separating the decisions, for rea- 
sons of administrative convenience and delegation alone, the 
company may be led into potential errors of sufficient magnitude and 
seriousness that the costs involved would warrant a full consideration 
and analysis of the numerous interdependencies -- this will be seen to 
be particularly crucial in the leasing decision. 
The reluctance of HALEY & SCHALL to agree with this argument is pre- 
sumed by the writer to be based on their belief that an optimal finan- 
cial structure probably exists (in the guise of an investor preference 
for a certain debt-equity ratio) but management only has 'hunch' or 
'experience' to rely on when making financing decisions: 
"In our opinion there is no existing procedure or theory 
that provides the optimal solution to the financing decision; 
the determination of the proper mix of financing is still 
primarily a matter for the informed judgement of management". 
C 68 , p249 ] 
5 
Given this belief, financing strategy and policy assumes the funct- 
ion of a 
. 
'given parameter': management cannot elect to better the col- 
lective will of the market through any analytical procedure or oppor- 
tunist actions. 
............... ........ .... .................. .... . 
1. HALEY & SCHALL remark E68 , p2421: "For any given financing policy adopt- ed by the firm, there are likely to be investors who prefer that policy. 
These investors will become its shareholders. Hence, each firm will at- 
tract a "clientele" of shareholders who prefer the policies of the firm 
they hold. A firm that does not maintain any particular policy will be 
relatively unattractive to all. investors since it is "unreliable". 'Con- 
t OU0htly;: firms'should'establish'änd'mdintäin=ä"giVen: pölicy, ' making 
'few canes over time and then only after careful consideration". -- (em-1 
phasis supplied). 
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As such the investment decision is the principal. concern of financial ma- 
nagement: the VAP reflects this philosophy, with a "simple" process 
for estimating the appropriate debt level to attach to a project annex- 
ed to the analysis. If, however, a case can be made for integrating 
the two decisions then the VAP no longer holds -- as HALEY & SCHALL 
frequently acknowledge C 68; , p174,286,329 and 353]. 
Consider now a further important issue in the VAP: 'the chbice'of'dis- 
count'rate. It is reasonable to suggest that the estimation, determi- 
nation or observation of the appropriate discount rate to apply to a 
project's cash-flow is the most difficult'präctical problem associated 
with a VAP investment decision: and one that is never given more than 
cursory discussion by HALEY & SCHALL. The question of where management 
actually obtains (or calculates) the project discount rate, which is 
considered here to be the pivotal point in the applicability of the 
VAP, is left unresolved. On a theoretical level such a problem is reaso- 
nably dealt with under perfect market conditions; but the assumptions 
necessary to support the correct identification of the discount rate 
neglect the existence of interdependencies which occur between the 
I&F 
, 
'decision in imperfect markets. Thus, the VAP assumes: 
1. "Management and investors agree on the expected value of the 
stream provided by any project and that a single discount 
rate is used". C 68; , p272] 
2. "The risk of a firm's securities is unaffected by investment 
in the sense that the applicable preinvestment and postinvest- 
ment discount rate are the same". [68 , p310] 
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3. "Firms maintain a constant ratio of debt to values" C 681, p3101. 
4. "Investment cash-flow streams are level perpetuities" [681, p20]. 
The stance taken in this Thesis, and that taken by HALEY & SCHALL, 
are difficult to reconcile because once imperfections are accepted, 
and interrelationships are recognised to exist between projects, then 
it is no longer valid to appraise projects independently. 
Thus, the valuation of a project's cash-flow stream by a unique dis- 
count rate is-argued here to be incorrect because of the existence of 
significant2 interdependencies between the supply and demand for 
capital. This makes it necessary to appraise projects by a discount 
rate which reflects the dynamic relationship between the investments 
which are accepted and the financial package which supports them. 
As previously noted, however, this does present computational diffi- 
culties3.; 
III 'PRACTICAL PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING THE VAP 
To obtain the discount rate in the VAP analysis (in general several 
1. This assumption presents the VAP analysis with a particularly difficult 
interdependency which is noted by the writers but thereafter ignored: 
viz, "The amount of bonds (debt) issued to finance the investment cannot 
be determined before a determination of the increment in the value of 
the firm resulting from the investment" [ 68, p310]. But, the change in the value of the company caused by the investment depends upon the level of debt used in that investment! 
2. Assumptions 2 and 3 are particularly at variance with this reasoning. It has previously been argued in Chapter 4, that in a dynamic solution 
to the joint I. & F. decision, the discount rate and capital mix are in a state of flux until the optimal solution is obtained. 
3. As AHEY notes "In general a programming approach is indispensable where there are interdependencies" C 11, p721. 
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rates will be required') is argued here to demand a totally unrealis- 
tic and infeasible transfer of information between the company, its 
present and'pötential shareholders. 
Implicit in the VAP investment appraisal procedure is the assumption 
that management will declare (by way of prospectus? ) each potential 
capital investment -- for this would be the only way they could ob- 
tain the appropriate market discount rate for each project. But, 
1. How many people or institutions shall receive this prospectus; 
2. What restrictions shall be placed on commercial security; 
3. When is a capital expenditure proposal of sufficient monetary 
size and development to be worthy of offer to the public; 
4. Would the prospectus include R&D expenditure; non-profit 
making investments covering employee welfare; overseas invest- 
ment; 
5. Does the shareholding public possess sufficient commercial, accoun- 
ting, engineering and marketing skills and experience to be able 
to deduce the worth of a project; 
6. Will such collective decisions be conservative, restrictive and 
possibly. lacking in entrepreneurial flare; 
7. When the project is offered to-the market how much faith can the 
investor place in the cash-flow projections of management, will 
1. HALEY & SCHALL state that it will be necessary to obtain a single dis- 
count rate for each project opportunity C 68";, p274]. 
However, "The advantage to the model lies in the likelihood that oppor- tunities may be classifiable into groups of comparable risk. In this 
case a single discount rate may be used for all opportunities within a 
classification. If the number of rates to be estimated is less than the 
number of opportunities to be evaluated then it is an obvious advantage to the model". 
! [68 , p2731 
I 
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they be guaranteed or audited in some way as a means of validating 
extravagant claims. - 
8. Will investors disregard long term objectives in favour of short 
term benefits. 
9. Should companies issue data piecemeal, project by project, as the VAP. i 
suggests, or., 
10. Should they publish a detailed. specification of investment opportuni- 
ties upto some future date -- on the assumption that the investor 
will be able to exercise a more coherent judgement, promoting and 
selecting a corporate strategy which in toto reflects or produces 
his desired utility. 
11. How many projects can an investor assimilate on one occasion; must 
the company distribute information evenly throughout the year or all 
at once on a given date. 
12. Can the staff of an Investment Trust or Pension Fund which controls 
a well diversified multi-million pound portfolio, covering numerous 
companies, seriously be expected to produce discount rates for count- 
less thousands of projects.. 
13. Will investors be able to differentiate between projects with suffi- 
cient sensitivity; can they adjudicate between mutually exclusive 
projects; can they recognise the worth of central engineering equip- 
ment which may yield an unspectacular profit but is nonetheless an 
essential asset; will they be able to recognise a dubious or misre- 
presentative investment prospectus. 
14. Can the 'consensus' view of the shareholders on what the appropriate ,' 
discount rate is, be accomplished in a realistic time-period. 
15. Will the system mean that projects may be delayed or lose relevance 
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through shareholder inertia or disagreement. 
16. Will the rapid replacement'of vital equipment which say has unex- 
pectedly broken-down be forestalled until a shareholder ballot has 
taken place. 
17. What level of capital expenditure will be left to the discretion of 
management without contacting the shareholders; what, criteria do 
they use when spending this capital. 
18. How many shareholders are considered to form a quorem when decis- 
ions are taken on project discount rates. 
19. Does a company use the mode, mean or median of the distribution of 
discount rates which have been proposed by the shareholders. 
20. Is there aright of appeal against a particular choice of discount 
rate -- besides selling the company's shares. 
.. _ý. 
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IV ' SUMMARY 
In summary, therefore, the VAP is sound within the theoretical confines 
of the perfect capital market where it is feasible to predict how inves- 
tors would evaluate incremental income streams eminating from a single. 
project. However, when imperfect capital markets are considered it is 
cöncluded that the information transfer necessary to approximate to 
perfect market conditions effectively precludes the working of the VAP. 
Thus, projects must be evaluated by a common hurdle rate and not, as 
the VAP suggests, by any form of discriminatory analysis which uses in- 
dividual hurdle rates and neglects the important interdependencies that 
occur in capital budgeting. Hence, in the discussion of previous 
writers on the leasing decision which takes places in Chapter 6, 
the following procedures have now been argued to be incorrect: 
1. Appraising a cash-flow stream by an individual discount-rate 
which is argued to reflect its risk profile or market value to 
the supplier of a single form of finance. ; 
2. Appraising a financing decision by a discount-rate which is 
either the implicit interest rate of the contract or the cor- 
porate borrowing rate. 
3. Including in the debt or lease repayment schedule the inherent 
interest cost of the contract. 
This should be removed from the cash-flow stream because it is 
already subsumed in the corporate cost of capital discount rate. 
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5.3 MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING'MODELS OF THE*I'& F'DECISION 
I INTRODUCTION 
Throughout this Thesis there has been constant reference'to the inter- 
dependencies that exist between the investment and financing decisions, 
and frequent appeals for management to instigate a fully integrated 
planning system within their organisation. The vital necessity to under- 
take comprehensive financing planning has been expressed thus: 
"Few if any important financial decisions can be made solely 
in terms of considerations relating to the moment in time at 
which the choice is made. Invariably current acts have direct 
implications for future acts, and future possible acts or 
events have direct implications for the present. Every invest- 
ment choice modifies the future pattern of funds flow and 
changes the investment choices of the future as well as the 
remaining choices in the present. Every financing decision 
is related to the next financing decision and alters the op- 
tions open the next time around. Every evaluation of the 
options open in the present will be made with an eye to the 
probable events and circumstances of the future. The inter- 
relatedness of events and acts is a fact of business life, 
as it is of life in general, and in its broadest sense fi- 
nancial planning is the effort to identify and evaluate the 
significance of this interrelatedness". 
DONALDSON C 40_ 
_, 
p172] ! 
In this section consideration is given to one of the more prominent 
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models which endeavours to integrate the I&F decisions by means of 
a linear programming mathematical model. The important contribution of 
CHAMBERS (see the introduction to this Chapter for a defence of this 
choice) has been selected to demonstrate the growing field of finan- 
cial modeling. 
To commence this discussion the model will be formally stated, with 
subsequent explanation, and reference to the equations and their eco- 
nomic implications, being made during the text which follows. 
H-1 nt 
MAXIMIZE EE Vtj Xtj 
t=1 j=i 
SUBJECT TO LT / ET g; T=1, .... H-1 :2 
T nt TTT 
F0 +EEFX=D+N;. T=1, .... H-1 :3 t=1 j=1 tj tj oo 
0 Xtj , _1 
for j=1,.... nt :4 
Xtj ,o for j=nt + 1, .... nt :5 
where Xtj = The variable denoting acceptance or rejection of project 
j in period t; Xtj is 0 if the project is rejected and 1 
if the project is fully accepted. Fractional values imply 
marginal acceptance of the project. 
Vtj = The value of the cash-flow stream generated at or after 
the horizon, H, discounted to a single value at the hori- 
zon. 
LT The total value of debt at the end of period T. 
Fo = Cash Flow from "olds'projects. 
Fit = Cash Flow from "new" projects. 
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ET = The total value of equity at the end of period T. 
g= The specified leverage or gearing ratio. 
Dö = The dividend payment as planned at time 0. 
NT = The debt repayments as planned at time 0. 
The 'projects' consist of: 
1 to nt = Investment projects within the company. A total of 
14. projects are specified in each of the 5 years upto 
the horizon. The list of project alternatives is the 
same in each year upto the horizon. 
nt-+ 1= The investment of surplus corporate funds in one- 
year Government Securities bearing a constant yield. 
nt + 2 = The possible acquisition of another company. 
nt + 3 = The issue of Rights in any year upto the"horizon. 
nt + 4 = The issue of a corporate debenture. 
nt + 5 = The investment of surplus corporate funds in the 
common stock of other companies. 
nt =1 to nt + 5. 
Equation 1= The Objective Function; or the net present value 
of the company at the horizon: NPVH. 
Equation 2= The Gearing Constraint; a ratio of total debt to 
the book value of equity :g=0.5. 
Equation 3= The Cash Balance Constraint; the equation may be 
stated: cash flow from old projects + cash flow 
from new projects = dividend + interest paid. 
11 
Equation 4= All investment projects to be accepted at some fract- 
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ional value between 0 and 1. 
Equation 5= All financing 'projects' to be greater than or 
equal to zero. 0 
From this formal statement of the model it is immediately clear that 
it encompasses a great many possible courses of action open to the 
company: from acquisitions (which henceforth shall not concern us) to 
the issue of shareholders rights. Indeed, the results of the model will 
indicate a series of investments to be undertaken in each of the five 
years upto the horizon, together with a complementary list of financ- 
ing strategies to be adopted in the various years. Thus, the potential 
to assist, direct and control corporate financial management through 
such a model is quite apparent. However, in order to fully comprehend 
its advantages and disadvantages, it. is necessary top consider its mathe- 
matical structure and the economic logic upon which it was based. To 
accomplish this satisfactorily it is essential to review the various 
'classic' problems in financial modeling'; the most important of which 
is first discussed in its. historical context. 
II THE HORIZON PROBLEM 
The CHAMBERS programme is a 
. 
development of the two original models pro- 
posed by WEINGARTNER. In his first model [1411, WEINGARTNER was concern- 
ed to demonstrate that linear programming techniques could be applied 
to solve the LORIE & SAVAGE [891 multiperiod capital rationing problem2. 
1. See BERNHARD 117], AMEY C1] and BROMWICH C24]. 
2. See QUIRIN [113, p177-185] for an alternative solution to this problem. 
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It was shown that L. P. techniques could provide a computationally feas- 
ible method capable of solving the vast combinatorial problem of ana- 
lysing every possible group of projects in an effort to find an opti- 
mal solution to a set of projects subject a constraint on capital. 
WEINGARTNER's initial model was, therefore, a maximisation of the NPV 
of the optimal project set subject to a budget restriction on available 
funds. Thus, 
MAXIMIZE E bi xj 
SUBJECT TO Eatjxj I Dt 
0 x1 
where: bj = The NPV of project j: note, the contribution of 
each project has to be specified prior to the model 
being run.. 
atj = The capital requirement of project j in time t. 
Dt = The available level of funds. 
BAUMOL & QUANDT [13] were subsequently to show that the WEINGARTNER 
model contained a fundamental inconsistency in the specification of the 
objective function: 
"If there is capital rationing, and external rates of inte- 
rest are irrelevant, we cannot simultaneously insist on a 
present value formulation-of the objective function and have 
the relevant discount rates determined internally by our 
problem". 
BAUMOL & QUANDT [13 , p3251 
The B&Q problem, which is the modeling equivalent of the HIRSHLEIFER 
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paradox, manifests itself in the inconsistency implicit in the model's 
dual and primal solutions: 
If the objective function is the maximisation of the NPV of 
the set of projects which are the subject of budget constraints, 
then, since the dual values associated with the budget con- 
straints give the marginal efficiency of funds -- or the dis- 
count rate --, it is impossible to specify the value of the 
objective function -- or primal problem -- until the dual is 
solved; but it is impossible to solve the dual until the pri- 
mal objective function is known. 
An impasse is observed, with the apparent conclusion that, in their 
above form, mathematical programming models are incapable of dealing 
with the capital rationing problem. B&Q reformulated the WEINGARTNER 
model by replacing the objective function with one that maximised the 
value of withdrawals from the company. The discount rate was thereby 
exogenously determined as the shareholders expected utility of the funds, 
or dividends, they would receive. However, the applicability of this 
procedure has been frequently criticised; in view of the problems asso- 
ciated with obtaining utility functionsl, so that very few of the cur- 
rent financial models employ this approach. 
In an attempt to circumnavigate the B&Q problem, WEINGARTNER develop- 
ed the "Basic Horizon Model", which represents the forerunner of much 
of the present writing in modeling, including CHAMBERS: 
"The basic horizon model requires selecting a time period 
prior to which outlays and revenues of potential invest- 
ments are stated explicity but. beyond which the actual ... . .. 
1. See WEINGARTNER [1411, BERNARD [17'. ] and ASHTON & ATKINS [6). 
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' flows associated with these investments are collapsed 
4 
into a single quantity, the horizon value". 
WEINGARTNER [141 , p153] 
Thus, the model attempted to maximise the value of the firm at a given 
period some years in the future instead of time zero. The second 
WEINGARTNER model may be specified thus: 
nA 
MAXIMIZE E aj xj 
j=1 
T-1 
'SUBJECT TO - z aft xj Dt 
t=o 
where: 
A CO 
a=E.. a t... j t=T 
ii ) 
t= 
The principal feature of this formulation, which is also to be observ- 
ed in CHAMBERS, is*the'temporal separation'of the'objective'function 
and the constraint: the constraint runs during the period t=o to T=1, 
whereas the objective function covers the post-horizon period only. 
Hence, the duals on the pre-horizon constraints have no influence upon 
the post-horizon discount rates. 
Consider now how the CHAMBERS model engages the horizon problem. It 
will be noted from equation 1, the objective function, that the NPVH 
1. In both the WEINGARTNER and CHAMBERS model the horizon discount rate is 
a pre-determined weighted average cost of capital. Therefore, it assumes 
a given dividend policy, a given and attained financing and capital struct- 
ure policy, and some assumptions about coincidental managerial and share- holder attitudes. 
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represents a perpetual rate of return on the value-of the firm at the 
horizons: the model uncouples the pre- and post-horizon time periods 
., so that prior to the horizon its prime concern is with the managerial 
problems of selecting an optimal investment and financing plan, and 
that at the horizon it maximises the level of reinvestable funds avail- 
able to the shareholder. Is this uncoupling successfully achieved by 
CHAMBERS? 
One significant problem with the model concerns the horizon posture of 
the firm: the link between the pre- and post-horizon circumstances of 
the company is the weighted average cost of capital hurdle rate; which 
is dependent upon the level of leverage being at its maximum value2. 
CHAMBERS applies a discount rate based upon a leverage ratio of 0.5, 
(constraint equation 2: gs0.5), but fails to specify that*at*the 
horizon g will be at its upper bound, g=0.5. There is, therefore, a 
possibility that the gearing constraint could be under-attained. 
It is quite possible to resolve this issue by ammending the year 5 lever- 
age constraint from g<0.5*to g=0.5; but in many respects this is 
inappropriate. Firstly, it pre-judges the financing decision (thereby 
eliminating the raison d'etre of the integrated model); secondly the 
consequences of such an action would not be confined to the final period 
of the model, but would precipitate alterations to the whole of the pre- 
horizon investment and financing plans in an effort to ensure that ca- 
pital equilibrium was reached at the horizon; the third problem concerns 
the artificiality of the solution: the model cannot cope with a capital 
rationing situation at the horizon (the B&Q problem being immediately 
evident) so it has, in effect, to coerce the pre-horizon plans into reaching 
a spurious terminal solution. The interdependency between the evaluation 
1. Equal to the company's weighted average cost of capital. 
2. Numerically, 9.8%, being derived from the cost of debt and equity when g, 
the leverage ratio, is 0.5; see [30, p2711. If this ratio is not achieved then the terminal value of the company, the NPVH, will be incorrectly 
valued, resulting in an'incompatibility between the managerial and share- holder sections of the model. 
I- 
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of NPVH, the appropriate discount rate, and-the internal results of 
the model has been deliberatly evaded, albeit consciously, by CHAMBERS 
[36, p271, fn1]. The mathematical apparatus to deal with these diffi- 
culties has not yet been constructed in the literature. 
As the CHAMBERS model cannot guarantee that the leverage posture of 
0.5 will be attained, two possible situations could have occured to 
prevent it. Firstly, the company could have reached the horizon with 
surplus, or uninvested, equity earnings: 
"If the firm expects to reach the horizon with such a large net 
cash-flow relative to its opportunities for profitable invest- 
ments that it is not able to take full advantage of its debt 
capacity, it must be expected to have less than optimal leve- 
rage and to apply too highla discount rate to post-horizon 
cash-flows". 
CHAMBERS [30;, p290] 
Thus, NPVH is incorrectly valued. Furthermore, because extra funds are 
available at the-horizon in excess of the profitable investments at hand, 
and by implication the necessary capital equilibrium has not been reached, [ 
CHAMBERS has little alternative but. to propose that the pre-horizon di- 
vidend policy be increased to a higher level in order to 'achieve the 
correct balance at the horizon. However, CHAMBERS fails to note the im- 
portantlinterdependency caused by this action: if pre-horizon dividends 
1. As previously noted, the post-horizon discount rate is exogenously determined 
and fixed at the commencement of the analysis. As such, management will use 
this rate regardless of the attained capital structure. The choice of a 
predetermined rate may have been wrong, but it cannot be made more wrong because the model fails to achieve the desired horizon posture. 
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are raised then the cost of equity and consequently the weighted aver- 
age cost of capital will rise, thereby affecting the post-horizon dis- 
count rate, the company valuation and the pre-horizon selection of 
projects. 
The alternative circumstance open to the company at the horizon is to 
attain the desired leverage ratio of 0.5, yet still be subjected to the 
problem of capital rationing,. [30,, p286-90]. This situation under-values 
the worth of NPVH, because the model "abstracts from consideration of 
individual time periods after the-horizon, and represents the investment 
opportunities (available to the shareholder through the company) by a 
range of perpetuities facing the firm at one moment in time" [30 , p2893, 
the level of this yield being equal-to the company's weighted average cost of 
capital. The significance of arriving at the horizon in a state of ca- 
pital rationing, however, is that all the unique. investment possibili- 
ties available internally will not be exploited. CHAMBERS suggests that: 
"By investing further funds at the horizon in the special oppor- 
tunities facing the firm, instead of investing in the market at 
large, stockholders will obtain this surplus. The value of this 
surplus does not depend upon the choice of investments and fi- 
nance up to the horizon; it measures the difference between in- 
vestment in the actual opportunities prevailing after the hori- 
zon and investment at only marginal rates. Stockholders can ob- 
tain title to this surplus by issuing the appropriate amount of 
debt and rights at the horizon". 
CHAMBERS [30 , p298] 
By contributing further funds the shareholders can participate in the 
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higher earning potential of the company: the marginal efficiency of 
capital offered by the project set is higher than the yield on equi- 
valent-risk equity holdings in the market. CHAMBERS proposed "escape 
route" is vital if capital equilibrium is to be attained at the hori- 
zon: for only then can the use of a pre-determined discount rate be 
vindicated; the B&Q paradox concerning the marginal efficiency of 
capital avoided; and NPVH correctly valued. 
It is argued here that the need to introduce ex post financing alterna- 
tives and updated dividend policies seriously weakens the model's so- 
lution. If it cannot produce funding strategies which are appropriate 
at the horizon (the focal point of the model), then contrived manipu- 
lation of the pre-horizon decisions to force the solution towards a 
certain capital mixt introduces an artificiallity into the procedure 
which dilutes much of the author's claim that the model integrates the 
I&F decisions. It is recognised, however, (see BERNHARD's review of 
modeling [17'1), that the introduction of financial alternatives into 
a multiperiod model "has not yet! been effectively handled in a mathe- 
matical programming context". 
Some of this dissatisfaction with the introduction of debt and equity 
into financial models may be observed in CHAMBERS treatment of deben= 
ture and rights issues in the context of horizon valuation. Consider 
the following specification made by CHAMBERS for a debenture: 
15 year duration, £1000 debenture with a E30 floatation cost, a 6% be- 
fore-tax interest rate, 40% Corporation Tax, and all tax flows stagger- 
ed by one year. The following after-tax cash-flow series arises: 
1. It is perhaps more noteworthy that, 'this certain capital mix' is not even 
appropriate --- it is an unnecessary rationing if shareholders are then 
encouragedýto introduce more funds! 
J1 
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YEAR 12 3' 4 ................. 15 16 
17 
CASH-FLOW 970 -60 -36 -36 ................ -36 -1036 
24 
This stream has an IRR of 3.96%; the rate used to establish the weight- 
ed average cost of capital. On the assumption that the debenture is undertaken 
in year 1, and therefore 11 years of cash-flow extend beyond the horizon, then, 
the following technique is employed by CHAMBERS to value the debenture: 
NPVH = -36 - 
36 - 36 ............. -1036 + 24 
(1.0396) (1.0396)2 (1.0396)10 (1.0396)11 
NPVH = -95.3' 
This valution is incorrect. The cash-flow used in evaluating the 
debenture at the horizon contain elements of servicing charges 
which are already incorporated into the weighted average cost of 
capital. Thus, double counting of the interest cost is evident. 
In order to eliminate this problem the debt repayments should consist 
of the capital portion only'. 
The issuance of shareholders rights, and their valuation at the hori- 
zon, is a special feature, of the CHAMBERS model,. To simplify matters 
it is assumed that all the rights will be taken up by the existing body 
of equity holders, and that the issue price per share holds constant 
throughout the period of the model regardless of the prevailing situa- 
tion. The assumptions are undoubtedly simplistic -- alternative share- 
price schedules could be imputed into the model, but it is unlikely 
that a procedure could be devised which actually predicted a share price 
1. For an example of this procedure see Tables 9.3' &-9,4 , Chapter 9. However, it does present a most serious problem because the cash-flow series 
is then insoluble:. a positive interest rate cannot be found for. this series. 
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from the investment and financing strategies chosen by the model. 
CHAMBERS acknowledged that the whole issue of introducing rights into 
the model leaves it vunerable to theoretical dispute and, as such, ma- 
nagement must choose from a set of efficient solutions that which they 
feel will be most beneficial, to the company's shareprice. In an effort 
to evade the whole problem CHAMBERS treats a rights issue as a negative 
investment project: an inflow of funds followed by an outflow of divi- 
dends. 
"Managers should be led to make a new rights issue only if 
there is some increase in the value of the firm to existing 
shareholders after giving subscribers to the new issue a re- 
turn (in this example) of 12ö. A NPVH of the new rights issue 
is therefore defined as that amount at the horizon which, ta- 
ken together with the dividends to which they will be entitl- 
ed over the planning period, gives a return of 12% to new in- 
vestors". 
CHAMBERS [301, p270) 
Thus, given an issue of 100,000 share at £1.60 each, issued in year one 
on the assumption of a 12% return and a pre-determined dividend policy 
of £21,000, £22,000, £23,000, £24,000 & £25,000 in each year upto the horizon, 
we have; (all figure in 1000's): - 
NPVH =- [160 (1.12)5 - 21(1.12)4 - 22(1.12)3 - 24(1.12)2 - 25(1.12)] 
NPVH =- 158.9 
li 
- 269 - 
In order for the rights issue to be worthwhile to the existing share- 
body, the use of the capital so obtained must increase the horizon 
value by more than 158.9. 
The valuation of rights at the horizon is simply a compound return of 
12% on the initial capital input and dividend outflows. The total NPVH 
of the firm is, therefore, the value of the various financial streams, 
plus accepted projects, discounted back to the horizon, 'less"the ter- 
minal value of the incremental equity issue. This can be demonstrated 
diagrammatically below (other aspects of Figure 5.11will be returned 
to later): 
FIGURE 5j- 
INVESTMENTS 
CASH-FLOW CONTRIBUTIONS POST HORIZON PROJECT CASH- 
COMPOUNDED TO HORIZON FLOWS DISCOUNTED TO HORIZON 
DEBT CAPACITY CONTRIBUTION 
VALUED AT HORIZON 
}t=o 
1HORIZON 
= REDUCED COST OR GENERALISED NPVHI 
FINANCING 
COMPOUNDED EARNINGS = 
ON RIGHTS ISSUES POST HORIZON FINANCING CASH- 
FLOWS (GOV. SECS. + INV. IN 
COMMON STOCK - CORPORATE 
DEBT) DISCOUNTED TO THE HORI- 
ZON. 
a 
i - 70 - 
)Two further issues may be raised concerning the horizon. 
Firstly, there seems to be no logical reason (in theory and especially 
in practice') for the superiority of one horizon date over another. 
However, the stability of the solution during the early years of the 
model seems an important factor if, for example, the project analyst 
was experimenting with horizons of say 4,5 and 6 years. Variations in 
the set of projects undertaken, or the financing strategy to be adopt- 
ed, during the common years would hopefully be minimal (although in 
view of the previous comments on the model's desire to achieve capi- 
tal equilibrium at the horizon, it does seem possible that discrepancies 
may occur). Presumably, the further into the future is the critical 
valuation the more acceptable the'model_, will bee. However, this leads 
to the second issue which concerns the validity and accuracy of the 
model's information at and beyond the horizon. Clearly, this data is 
of fundamental importance, being'the catalyst upon which all pre-hori- 
zon decisions hinge. Yet, post-horizon data, being so distant, is oft- 
en fragmentary, often based upon aspiration and optimistic objectives 
and, in general, only an extrapolation of trends rather than antici-, 
pated events (the latter being especially true for the financing opt- 
ions). Not surprisingly, the coincidence of prediction and actuality 
1. Commenting upon the results of a comprehensive survey of financing poli- 
cy in the USA, DONALDSON concludes: "It is not too uncharitable to say 
that the period of many a long range forecast (three, five or ten years) 
is more a function of the length of the ruler used to extrapolate the 
past than it is of any specific limit to corporate vision". [39 , p1771 2. FAWTHROP notes that this may be "distance lending (managerial) enchant- 
ment to the view": a prevarication of the issue of what constitutes a 
company's most appropriate planning period [46'7. 
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in the long-tern is noticably rare. Thus, the model's objective funct- 
ion is seen to be maximising that which management knows least about. 
This inherent deficiency in the prograrne's specification exposes a 
serious weakness in the whole concept of horizon type models : which 
once noted, cannot be expected to reassure a pragmatic management  or 
stimulate it to produce the vast quantities of data input that are needed 
to make the model operational. 
Despite these very real practical problems, certain aspects of the 
integrated investment and financing decision are excellently comprehended 
within the CHAMBERS model. The most notable contributions are in the 
area of "linkage"land in a re-specification of the discount rate to be 
applied in project selection. 
III FINANCIAL LINKAGE AND THE APPRAISAL CRITERIA 
A great deal has previously been, mentioned about the concept of 
financial linkage and the relationship leasing plays within it. In this 
section, consideration is given to the way in which the appraisal 
criterion employed in the CHAMBERS model embodies linkage, and how its 
contribution to the selection of other projects is quantified. 
The model's hurdle rate comprises of three distinct elements: the 
project's FWVH; the cash-flow effects; and the debt capacity effects. 
"At the horizon the firm will select projects by the net 
present value rule, using as a discount rate a weighted 
average cost of capital; but up to the horizon it specifies 
an entire investment strategy year by year". 
CHN1BERS C 30, p269 7 
1. The reader is referred to Chapter 4, section 4.6 for a discussion 
of the "linkage" concept. 
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Within the context of the 'year by year' selection process, it is to 
be noted that [30,, p271, fn11 "the discount rates (the duals) applica= 
ble up to the horizon ........ will appear as outputs, -rather than 
in- 
puts, of the model". Thus, the marginal efficiency of capital in each 
period is established within the model: it is an interperiod rate which 
is not to be confused or compared with an average internal rate of re- 
turn. 
CHAMBERS argues' that the traditional NPV hurdle rate neglects two im- 
portant contributions that a project can make to a company: the first 
is the provision of additional cash-flow which, as previously described 
in the discussion on financial linkage, assists further investment and 
diminishes the need for new financing; and, secondly, the project's 
cash-flow augments the equity of the company thereby establishing debt 
capacity. 
Thus, as shown in Figure 5.1: , the acceptance of a project 
is dependent 
upon two factors: the NPVH, which operates in'the post-horizon period; ' 
and the year-by-year effect of the linkage contribution of each pro- 
ject operating in the pre-horizon period. 
The CHAMBERS model demonstrates how the fundamental NPV criterion over- 
looks the important contribution of linkage in the promotion of contem, 
1. For a mathematically rigorous treatment of this argument see MYERS [105]. 
He develops an "Adjusted Present Value", APV, criterion which comprises 
of the project's incremental NPV plus an ascribed value associated with 
the project's shadow prices on the debt capacity and cash constraints of 
the company. While the CHAMBERS & MYERS concepts are essentially similar, 
the APV criterion is intended to apply to individual projects in isolat- 
ion. However, the relevant duals can'only be obtained through considerat- 
ion of the interactions of the entire project set. Thus, it is difficult 
to envisage how the MYERS approach could establish the individual pro- 
ject data (the shadow prices). The CHAMBERS L. P. model, however, establish- 
es the relevant duals as a matter of course. 
ý1 
l 
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porary'and future projects: with the dual values quantifying this sup- 
port. For example, if the NPVH (or IRR) of a project was superficially 
not very attractive (or, indeed, if two projects had the same NPVH -- 
the linkage duals then being used to identify the more favourable in- 
vestment), it is possible that the project could have a substantial 
linkage dual in one or more periods which was sufficiently beneficial 
to the whole project set that its acceptance was assured. Hence, if 
a project was to provide an advantageous boost to liquidity in a pe- 
riod of tight capital rationingi, the donor project would, in effect, 
be granted the marginal'contribution to the set NPVH brought about by 
its own acceptance plus the benefit to be derived from the newly adopt- 
ed project2. 
The second aspect of linkage which is unconsidered in the basic NPV 
calculation, but which is incorporated into the specification of the 
CHAMBERS model, is the effect of accepting a project upon the debt ca- 
pacity of the company. If an investment yields a net cash-flow contri- 
bution it has, as a result, increased the equity base of the firm. Thus, 
the acceptance of a. project has created an opportunity to raise a spe- 
cific amount of further debt: for example, if 110 of equity were made 
available from the project, and g=0.5,1 then 15 of debt capacity automa= 
tically becomes available. Again; the model credits the donor project 
with the value of the debt capacity dual: or, the increment in the set 
1. See also sub-section IV infra. 
2. The reader is asked to note the similarity of-this argument to that which 
will be proposed in Chapter 9 when the concept of "Residual Capital Balan- 
ces" is quantified. Futhermore, in anticipation of a future discussion, 
note that the value ascribed to the dual is effectively counted twice: 
once as part of the linkage dual for the initial project, and secondly 
as part of the basic NPVH of the newly initiated project. 
.` 
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NPVH caused by raising the extra debt capacity and investing it in pro- 
fitable opportunities. 
In summary therefore, the appraisal criterion at work within the CHAM- 
BERS model takes into account two of the most important interdependen- 
Gies which attach to the acceptance of a project'. In this respect the 
model evinces a powerful analytical technique for investment selection 
which, prima facie, is much superior to the standard NPV criterion. 
This last statement is now discussed. 
IV INTEGRATION OF THE I&F DECISION WITHIN THE MODEL 
From what has already been said it'is clear that the horizon posture 
. of the model is of great significance: it is the focal point of the 
programme and the platform from which all subsequent decisions are ma- 
de. Yet, the horizon position will very probably contain an incompati- 
bility between the quantification of NPVH, and the discount rate, which 
-demands an ex post modification of the dividend policy,, or horizon fund- 
ing strategy, in order that the vital capital equilibrium is secured. 
To avoid the BAUMOL & QUANDT problem (which is, arguably, the most dif- 
ficult, yet essential, task of integrated horizon models) an artificial 
harmonisation of capital supply and demand has to be made., This amend- 
ment to the model's solution manifestly indicates the programme's ina-; 
bility to integrate the two decisions satisfactorily. 
The detached'nature of the investment and financing processes within the 
model is perceivable at the horizon, and moreover is discernable with- 
in the modus operandi of the pre-horizon investment and financing se- 
lection. 
1. But it does fail to consider inter- period cash-flow smoothing which would 
also boost the company's borrowing credibility. 
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"Variations in the estimated results from old projects, 
or from any new projects, affects the firm's optimal fi- 
näncing, plan and market portfolio before they change the 
optimal investment in other internal projects. The oppor- 
tunity both to raise funds and to invest them outside the 
firm appears to make its selection of internal investments 
more robust". 
CHAMBERS [30, p282]. 
CHAMBERS considers that this conclusion is perhaps obvious in view of . 
the model's enlarged scope: which is not just concerned with the WEINGART- 
NER problem of capital allocation subject to budget restraint, but has 
the more comprehensive brief of alleviating capital rationing -- a not 
unduly difficult task in view of the unbounded financial sources at 
the model's disposal'. CHAMBERS CONCLUSION LEADS, PERHAPS SOMEWHAT SUR- 
PRISINGLY, TO THE RELEVATION THAT THE MODEL IS IN FACT A HIGHLY SOPHIS- 
TICATED MECHANISM FOR SELECTING MARGINAL PROJECTS. ' 'Good' investments 
will always be selected (whether through the use of a model or a 
straight-forward NPV analysis)2 and a 'robustness' of the project set 
is ensured. The structure of the model makes the investment decision 
largely'predeterminable, artificially so, because a complementary unre- 
strained financing policy can always be established to support the pro- 
1. In the CHAMBERS model it is always possible to obtain an unlimited quan- 
tity of money at 9.8% by raising £2 of equity to every £1 of debt borrow- 
ed. The CHAMBERS model eschews the investment selection problems associa- 
ted with capital rationing because there is no restriction on the total 
capital available to the company. While there is a limitation on, the 
use of debt this does not imply capital rationing. 
2. That is, a simple NPV appraisal of the project schedules used in the 
CHAMBER's model would select very nearly the same group of investments. 
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ject set. 
Although there is a wide variety of financial alternatives within the 
model they, nonetheless, remain unrepresentative of the market activi- 
ties which govern their use. The linearity property of the model pre- 
cludes realistic adjustment to the cost or yield of one financing in- 
strument in the wake of the acceptance of another'. This element of 
'realism' has-yet to be incorporated into mathematical programming mo- 
dels2. 
The computational 'logic' of the CHAMBERS model is faultless, but it 
frequently leaves the financial posture of the company exposed to appa- 
rently illogical or unreasonable solutions. CHAMBERS recognises that 
some of the proposed strategies appear "unrealistic" and somewhat per- 
plexing by comparison to the conventional financing activities of some 
companies; nonetheless, they are strictly correct. There are two prin- 
cipal examples which deserve note: in year 2, a £106,000 debenture is 
raised, yield 3.98%, while simultaneously £151,000 is invested in the 
equity of other companies, yield 12%; in year 5, a rights issue of 
£564,000 is made, yield 12%, while a concurrent investment of £648,000 
is made in government securities, yield 6%. 
It is not argued here that such actions never occur in practice: monies 
are frequently raised, or amalgamated from internal sources, only to 
be invested or placed on deposit until such time as the relevant in- 
vestment for which they'were'briginälly intended comes into operation. 
1. Although a 'stepped' interest rate function could be devised the interde- 
pendency between, say, the issue of debt and the resulting change in the 
cost of equity; or the price of rights and the concurrent profitability 
or capital structure of the company; cannot realistically be modelled. 2. See BERNHARD (17 ]. 
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II, 
The maxim of corporate treasurership', that money is rarely sought, and 
even more rarely supplied, for unspecified purposes, is seemingly ne- 
glected in the CHAMBERS modele. This omission detracts from the practi- 
cal worth of the financing solution. 
One final point should be raised concerning the robustness property of 
the CHAMBERS model. The normal analytical procedure applied to solve 
a linear programme is to search for the optimal solution over what is 
called the primal space (the 'n-dimensional' picture of the model's 
equations). However, ASHTON & ATKINS [7] have shown that much valuable insight! 
is to be gained by analysing the reciprocal of this problem which is 
found in the dual space (the 'n-dimensional' picture of the model's 
dual equations). If such a technique is used to scan the dual feasible 
region of the model's financing options, ASHTON & ATKINS show that the discount 
rate displays pre-determinable characteristics3. 
Two things follow from their findings: firstly, 'the marginal effi- 
ciency of capital can never exceed the weighted average cost of capital; 
and, secondly, because the dual feasible region can be predicted before 
the model is run, a simple "rule of thumb" technique4 can be applied to 
1. See DONALDSON [39 &'40]. 
2. Or the ultimate source of'the funds is so distant as to be indistinguishable. 
3. This results from a mathematical property of programming models: optimal 
solutions only exist at the intersection of constraints. In the case of 
the discount rate, the intersections take place where financing options 
meet. The interest rate of each financing source establishes the slope 
of each line and, hence, it is possible to locate every intersection and 
what discount rates will eventuate from an optimal solution at that point. 
ASHTON & ATKINS show that the CHAMBERS model contains only two possible points: 
one occuring when the company is in a cash surplus position and equal to 
the after-tax return on government securities; and a second occuring when 
the firm is in a cash-deficit period and equal to the weighted average 
cost of capital. Thus the structure'of the dual feasible region is rigid- 
ly defined. 
4. The technique involves placing bounds on the projects net cash contribut- 
ion plus the net contribution of the project to the debt capacity of the 
company. See ASHTON & ATKINS'[7 ]. 
1 
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the list of available projects prior to the analysis by the model, which 
produces almost the same list of acceptable projects as the model would. 
The extra computational facilities of the model can only out-perform 
the "rule of thumb" on the very marginal projects. Clearly, a cost-be- 
nefit analysis of the model's cost against its superior ability to se- 
lect the least profitable investments would not look favourable for 
modeling. 
V DATA'SPECIFICATION 
Multi-period models of the type proposed by CHAMBERS can only function 
satisfactorily if they are supplied with an immense amount of data. 
Before the programme can be run a list of project opportunities availa- 
ble in each year upto the horizon has to be specified together with a 
period-by-period description'of their associated operational and taxa- 
tion cash-flowsl. Furthermore, all financing options have to be defined 
and their individual costs established, a dividend policy has to be 
elected, and all on-going projects have to be quantified and incorpo- 
rated. 
When management was asked for their opinions and experience of finan- 
cial models as part of the Industrial Survey, many expressed manifest 
reluctance to adopt them. The cost of establishing a corporate model, the 
difficulties of obtaining all the project and financing data2, the dubious 
nature of the more distant data, together with the natural resistance to 
adopt largely unproven ideas, combine together to make management choose 
1. Taxation is highly simplified in the CHAMBERS model, and as such several 
very important interdependencies are overlooked. See sections 5.4 and 5.5 
of this Chapter. 
2. In the numerical example used by CHAMBERS a common investment opportunity 
schedule is employed in each period up to the horizon. 
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less sophisticated approaches to investment and financial planning'. 
Despite these very real problems, and the anticipated poor quality of 
some of the input data, it remains an inescapable pre-requisite of cor- 
porate financial management that long-range plans must be developed. 
The data will be common to any planning tool; and, as such, any criti- 
sism of its relevance or accuracy should be directed at the information 
system which provides it, and not at the model which merely uses it. 
The CHAMBERS model does not claim to produce the infallible optimal so- 
lution from a given set of data, rather it is seen by its author as pro- 
viding management with a number of investment and financing plans from 
which a choice can be made. 
"The purpose of the model is to display a set of alter- 
natives, and the role of optimisation is to ensure that 
the alternatives are efficient ones". 
CHAMBERS [30I, p2693 
VI SUMMARY 
Despite its many faults, it may be stated that the model under decis- 
sion provides: a rational framework in which complex plans and constraints2 
1. Their preference in such-matters generally being directed to single issue 
models, for example the leasing decision, which attempt to solve a problem 
efficiently, economically, and with as much regard for the relevant inter- 
dependencies as possible. 
2. Recent tendencies in the development of financial models have been towards 
greater sophistication in the number and complexity of the constraints; 
developing from WEINGARTNER's [141] simple upper bound constraint on bor- 
rowing into, for example, a bewildering profileration of 800 constraints 
in the model by HAMILTON & MOSES [72 ]. Indeed, in the latter case it is 
tobe presumed that the feasible region is so small that the objective 
function is largely redundant, with the programming model simply being 
employed to obtain a feasible plan. 
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can be subject to rigorous analysis; it provides a medium through which 
various strategies may be tested and the resulting inter-relationships 
observed; it enables management to comprehend the effect of a particu- 
lar policy or action upon other parts of the. company; and, finally, it 
provides an accurate pointer to potential funding difficulting well in 
advance of their occurance. 
Of course, models of the CHAMBERS type are not perfectly developed, as 
much of the previous discussion has indicated. None the less, it is the 
writer's belief that they will become increasingly used in the larger 
organisations to provide an analytical framework within which to con- 
sider the . investment, and financing decisions. 
Hopefully, therefore, subsequent developments in-the field of. financi- 
al modeling will concentrate on the issues and problem areas that have 
been raised in this section of the Thesis. 
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5.4. CORPORATE'TAXATION IN THE U. K. -- 
THE EFFECT OF THE IMPUTATION SYSTEM'ON'CAPITAL EXPENDITURE DECISIONS 
I INTRODUCTION 
An examination is made in this section of the Thesis into the impact of 
the Imputation System of corporate taxation upon the capital expendi- 
ture and financing decisions made by U. K. companies. As fiscal matters 
are notoriously complex, being in recent years the subject of frequent 
alteration to already detailed legislation, the discussion will be. 
concerned with those issues that arise in the context of managerial de- 
cisions, rather than become enmeshed in the details of revenue law and 
liability computations. 
In any commercial organisation tax strategy and planning are fundamen- 
tal aspects of financial management which deserve the most thorough and 
detailed examination. Thus, I agree unreservedly with BUCKLEY when he I 
comments: 
"One of the essentials of investment appraisal is to allow 
for the way in which tax impinges upon a project. The tax 
environment is critically relevant to investment appraisal 
and failure to take account of its full significance repre- 
sents a failure to allow for one of the key factors in cor- 
porate investment policy, since the central objective of 
the aggregate of a company's. investment is the generation 
of adequate net of'täx'cash'flows". 
(emphasis supplied): BUCKLEY [27:, p173] 
t 
t4 ý 
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Is the responsibility of the project analyst to correctly incorporate 
the tax cash-flows emanating from an investment and ensure that they 
fully reflect the realities of the company's current and expected tax 
postures? It would follow from this that the smoothing of tax liabili- 
ties, and their hoped for minimisation, is as important as any comparable' 
corporate objective (such as, maximising sales revenue or minimising 
costs) because the financial repercussions of an oversight, misinter- 
pretation or incorrect calculation in tax matters, is frequently ex- 
pensive not only in itself but also in terms of the continuing conse- 
quences which result from the erroneous decision. 
In the examination which follows of the potential implications of the 
relatively new (April 1973) Imputation Tax system, an inquiry will be 
made into its principal effectsl upon the investment decision, and to 
a lesser extent the financing decision (which of course incorporates 
leasing), and how the integration of these two decisions affects the 
applicable tax rate for project cash-flows. 
Consideration will also be given to the important possibility that the 
new system adds a third dimension to the interdependencies previously 
considered between the investment and financing decisions which compli- 
cates the process of_project selection still'further. A basic framework 
is suggested for the inclusion of tax management within mathematical 
models of the integrated investment and financing decision. 'The purpose 
1. The reader is advised that the discussion is concerned with major taxation 
issues in a 'ceteris paribus' investment --- that is, no account is taken 
of subsidiary cash-flows or tax-flow interactivities arising out of a set 
of circumstances particular to an individual organisation. Such tax compu- 
tations as will appear may therefore be somewhat over simplified. 
The objective is to discuss principles rather than to illustrate computa- 
tions of tax liability. 
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of this discussion is to promote ideas for further research by review- 
ing some of the problem areas that are to be expected in such an ana- 
lysis. The debate is couched in descriptive rather than mathematical 
terms. 
II A BRIEF RESUME OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF U. K. 'CORPORATION TAX 
The. Imputation System of Corporation Tax has in effect two halves. The 
first half is concerned with the imputed tax credit which attaches to 
a qualifying distribution in the hands of a recipient. A qualifying 
distribution can be conveniently summarised as being a distribution 
which will give rise to an immediate or potential claim upon the dis- 
posable-profits of the organisation. From this-it follows immediately 
that a dividend is. a qualifying distribution. A shareholder receiving 
a dividend, therefore, receives with it an imputed tax credit which 
can be used by him or her in the discharge of his or her personal tax 
liability. 
In this Thesis it is the other half of this system of Corporation Tax 
which is of relevance. Companies are assessed to Corporation Tax on 
the basis of their agreed taxable profits. At the time of writing, the 
rate of Corporation Tax is 52% of . 
taxable profits'.. Under the system of 
taxation assessment and collection which exists in the U. K.,, a company 
1. Recent evidence presented by Professor G. H. Lawson to NEDO indicates that: 
in terms of the ratio of tax cash-outflows to concurrent internally gene- 
rated cash-flows, British manuafacturing industry has, in 1974/75, incur- 
red a much higher tax burden'--- in the case of several leading companies 
this has been in excess of 100%. The implications for the rate of taxa- 
tion to be applied to project cash-flows are that the Chancellors decla- 
red annual rate of Corporation Tax is irrelevant. However, for want of 
more specific information, this argument is not pursued here. 
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will be liable to pay the Corporation Tax to which it has been assess- 
ed, between 9 and 21 months after the end of the accounting period to 
which the taxable profits relate. However, if a company makes a quali- 
fying distribution, there arises to be paid an amount (related to the 
size of the qualifying distribution) in advance of the date at which 
the Corporation Tax would ordinarily be paid. This advance amount is 
known as Advanced Corporation Tax (ACT): it falls due to be paid with- 
in the calendar quarter next following the date upon which the quali- 
fying distribution is actually made (not declared, but actually paid 
out). Thus, a company registered in the U. K. prior to 1964, and having 
an accounting year end, at December 31st, and typically-paying a. divi., 
dend some six months after the end of the accounting year, would have 
to pay an advanced instalment (ACT) of the Corporation Tax liability 
due in respect of that accounting year, some nine months after the end 
of the accounting year, and the balance of Corporation Tax (termed Main- 
stream Corporation Tax, MCT) some 12 or 13 months after the end of the 
accounting year. Thus, ACT plus MCT sums to the total liability for 
Corporation Tax leading to the widely accepted argument that -- the' 
higher the rate of-ACT the lower is the rate of MCT; the former is off- 
=set-against (is relieved by a reduction of) the latter. The extent 
,. of that relief is, however-, limited. It is possible for unrelieved ACT. 
to exist and thus for the'effective'rate of Corporation Tax to exceed 
the standard rate. 
The requirement to pay an advanced amount of Corporation Tax must, 
therefore, represent a significant lien upon the cash-flow of an organi- 
sation at a time earlier than that which used to prevail. The situation 
is complicated by the constraints which are placed upon the extent to 
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which ACT can be effectively relieved by reducing the amount of Main- 
stream Corporation Tax which remains to be paid. Using simplified per- 
centage rates for ease of illustration: the amount of ACT which can 
be 
off-set against the total Corporation Tax liability might be restricted 
to 35% of the total taxable profit of an organisation. At the same time, 
the amount of ACT to be paid in respect of a qualifying distribution 
might be 40% of that qualifying distribution (it is stressed that the 
amounts used here are for illustration purposes only). Thus, if a com- 
pany had taxable profits of £100, and had made a qualifying distribu- 
tion of £120, then the ACT falling to be due would be 40% of £120 = £48 
............. yet the amount which could be relieved by set-off against 
the CorporationTax liability of £52 would be 35%. äf the taxable profits 
of £100 equal to £35. There would then be' unrelieved" or excess" ACT 
of £(48-35) = £131'. 
Unrelieved ACT can be carried forward, carried back, or "transferred 
sideways" to other members within a group of companies, if the ACT ari- 
sing in those other periods, or within those other companies, is less 
than that which would be allowable for set-off against Corporation Tax. 
1. No surprise should: be occasioned by the payment of a dividend of £120 out 
of a taxable profit-of £100. Other things being-equal, the dividend is 
likely to be related to accounting profits rather than taxable profits: 
and because of the existence of substantial Capital Allowances, such as 
a 100% First Year Allowance, it is likely that accounting profits based 
upon non-accelerated depreciation rates may well be in excess of taxable 
profits. 
A further complexity to be noted, however, is that the ACT of £48 
would be set against the taxable profits of the year in which the quali- 
fying distribution was paid -- not that to which it relates. Therefore, 
to determine the possibility of unrelieved ACT we ideally require to 
know the taxable profit of the year following that to which the dividend 
or qualifying distribution relates. This must be a matter of concern in 
the construction of taxation decision models, but it is not refered to 
further in this Thesis. ` 
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However, ordinary considerations of prudence dictate against the carry- 
ing forward of unrelieved ACT if future relief is thought to be uncer- 
tain. Thus, the effective rate of Corporate Tax payable by a company 
is a function, not only of the current level of Corporation Tax, but 
also of the extent to which there does or does not exist irrecoverable 
unrelieved ACT. 
This has important consequences for the appraisal of capital expendi- 
ture projects. The need to incorporate taxation cash-flows into such 
appraisal is undisputed. A capital expenditure project will, however, 
contribute towards the profits and cash-flows of an organisation and 
therefore-'(however'indirectly) contribute towards the qualifying distri- 
buti on-policy of the'-organisation . If' 
th'e pol i cy" is such äs to giv 
rise to unrelieved ACT (and if must not be forgotten that the very lar- 
ge Capital Allowances which will enure to the implementation of the 
project will, of itself, compound the problem by reducing the taxable 
profits of the organisation) then to what extent should the unrecover- 
able ACT be included in the-cash-flows of the project? Inclusion could 
be by either writing in an explicit amount*of ACT into project cash-, 
flows, or it, could be by increasing the rate of taxation applied to 
the appraisal from the normal, 52% to the effective rate paid. - 
Alternatively, it could be argued that the qualifying distribution po- 
licy of an organisation is a decision quite separate from that of the 
implementation of the individual capital expenditure proposal, and that 
therefore, on the principle of incrementality, appraisal of project 
should be in terms which relieve the project of any such unrelieved 
............ ... ......... ............................... 
1. See paragraph 6 of SSAP No. 8, August 1974: Issued by the U. K. Accounting 
Standards Steering Committee. 
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ACT. (Indeed, a case can further be made to the effect that as ACT is 
-- whatever the intention -- a withholding tax which the recipient of 
a dividend takes into account in his valuation of the securities of 
the company; then the whole of the ACT portion of Corporation Tax, 
whether relieved or not, should be regarded as being part of the cost of( 
equity and thus included in the hurdle rate used for the evaluation. 
The project would then be appraised at a taxation rate which is indica- 
tive only of the anticipated Mainstream Corporation Tax rate payable 
by the company. At the time of writing this is an unresolved argument. 
Obviously, it will have significant consequences for the selection of 
projects within an investment decision model). 
A`further important taxation issue, when considering project-appraisal. - 
arises out of overseas taxation. ACT is not available for the relief 
of overseas taxation in double taxation relief computations. It follows 
that if an organisation is in receipt of profits and cash-flow from an 
overseas subsidiary, out of which it declares a qualifying distribution 
such as a dividend, then the ACT arising on that dividend is not to be 
regarded as part of the U. K. Corporation Tax-which can be set-off against 
local overseas taxation on those profits for the purposes of double 
taxation relief. On this account, earnings, from overseas projects are 
disadvantaged in terms of effective taxation rates. Again. the question 
must arise: should a project located overseas be appraised at ä rate of 
taxation which includes this liability to unrelieved overseas taxation? 
Or, again, should the dividend policy which has given rise to such un- 
relieved overseas taxation be regarded as a decision which is indepen- 
dent of the individual project: and as such the project appraisal would 
be relieved of this extra burden of taxation. 
1 
A 
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Of necessity these issues are much simplified in this brief discussions. 
There are other and more subtle problems associated with the determina- 
tion of the quantity or rate of taxation to be ascribed to a capital 
expenditure project under the current system of U. K. taxation. Never- 
theless, these two important problem areas will surfice to indicate 
clearly that, as never before, it is necessary to quantify, define and 
time cash-flows arising out of taxation in project evaluation and cor- 
porate financial planning. 
5.5.: PROJECT APPRAISAL AND THE IMPUTATION SYSTEM OF CORPORATE TAXATION 
The previous section, which dealt briefly-with some aspects. of-the 
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operandi "the new tax regulations; provides the 'necessary `rame- 
-wörk'to-analyse the system's far reaching consequences'for'the capital 
budgeting procedures used by U. K. companies. 
Before going on to discuss taxation as a specific subset of a compre-_ 
hensive financial planning model it is extremely important to reconsi- 
der the increasingly complex role of taxation in project appraisal. It 
is possible to identify three broad areas where problems. of a theore- 
tical, and practical nature are thought to occur as a result of'the Im- 
putation System. 
1. WHEN DO'PROJECT TAX*CASH FLOWS ARISE? ' 
The timing and level of taxation cash-flows, once dominated by Capital 
Allowances and the basic tax rate, are under the new system a 
substantially more complex function of ACT, MCT, Unrelieved Overseas 
"- Taxation,. and. Excess ACT. ...... .... ......... ..... . ". .. 
1. The interested reader is referred to CHOWN & NORMAN [34]. 
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It is argued here that a principaliaxiom of capital budgeting is that 
the tax allowances and charges attributable to an asset should be allo- 
cated to the specific project which generated the taxation cash-flows. 
Thus, for example, an analyst would not apportion or in any way dilute 
the effect of a project's Capital Allowance among the other set of pro- 
jects: this is because the incremental tax amounts are generally of 
sufficient magnitude (especially from a discounting point of view) that 
they will form a vital factor in assessing the worth of the project to 
the company. One could also argue that the project has been promoted 
and accepted because the tax cash-flows, which it alone generates, form 
a necessary segment of a more all-embracing taxation strategy; as may 
well be the case with projects that are leased or_situated overseas. 
-However, while this argument represents-an idealto which"project'-äna= 
lysts should aspire, the 'collective influence' of the project set up- 
on the Imputation System will generally make-this goal difficult to 
achieve. It is currently very difficult, if not impossible, to deter- 
mine what monetary amount, -. to incorporate into the project's aggregate 
cash-flow in respect of taxation. This. problem is further compounded 
by a similar inability to specify where in the project's life, and in 
what pattern, the taxation flows are. likely to . occur. 
This is quite a serious predicament. 'It manifests itself in a basic in- 
ability to accurately forecast the company's amalgamated cash-flow pro- 
file into the future. The analyst is again confronted with a particu- 
larly difficult interdependency, or interactivity, which prevents the 
assessment of meaningful estimates of tax rates, or the timing of taxa- 
ti on flows, 'before'the. *overäll'appraisal of'the'pröjett'set'is'Onder- 
taken. 
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Thus: 
Until the final group of investments is selected and underway, the ana- 
lyst cannot properly establish the appropriate tax figures to attribu- 
te to the individual projects. This is because the level of taxation 
that will ultimately result from these projects in a function of the 
'collective influence' of those and previous projects (the composition 
of their aggregate cash-flow, the aggregate of their Capital Allowan- 
ces, the dividend policy, the level of surplus ACT, the extent of un- 
relieved overseas taxation). 
However, the selection of current capital investments, which will go 
on to form the final accepted set, is predicated on the knowledge of 
what their after-tax cash-flows will be. Unfortunately, this cash-flow 
series remains unknown until the optimal solution has been attained 
..... but to determine the optimal solution it is necessary to have 
a precise specification of a project's cash-flow; This interactivity 
has always existed, but never before to such an important extent. The 
crude approximations to taxation reality which have hitherto charac- 
terised project appraisal may no longer suffice. 
2. WHAT RATE OF TAX'SHOULD BE APPLIED TO PROJECT CASH-FLOWS? 
It is conceivable that the appropriate rate of Corporation Tax appli- 
cable to an individual project will vary quite substantially through- 
out its life as the company's fortunes change and previous excesses 
. or surpluses-become relieved. or new. ones. accruel.. It. is. equally possible 
1. For example, see BUCKLEY [27 , p168] who suggests that if surplus ACT exists a project could be exposed to three taxation rates over its lifetime: (i) The minimum mainstream corporation tax rate, (ii) The full tax rate (52%) and, (iii) The difference between the full tax rate and the-rate 
of PICT. The exact timing of the change in applicable rates of taxation does, however, remain a substantial problem. 
i 
- 291 - 
that the rate of taxation is, under the new regulations, indeterminate 
altogether ...... for the taxation analysis of a project must now 
in- 
corporate, and attach new importance to, a whole range of factors which 
previously did not impinge so directly on taxation management: 
1. The distribution policy of the company, the size of the dividend, 
and whether it is qualifying or non-qualifying. 
2. The split of corporate profit between that generated in the U. K. 
and that earned overseas. 
3. The existence of sufficient 'slack' within previous years tax ac- 
counts capable of relieving any excess ACT which is generated. 
4. The delay experienced before surplus ACT may be set-off against 
future years taxation. 
5. The amount of accumulated unrelieved taxation still waiting to 
be set-off against future profits. 
6. The relative tax position and associated Capital Allowances creat- 
ed by other projects within the accepted set of investment ..... 
their 'collective influence'. 
7. The physical location of the asset; whether it is based at home 
or abroad. 
8. The amount of franked income received by the company. - -- 
5.6. A TAXATION'DIMENSION TO'THE INVESTMENT AND FINANCING'DECISION'INTERDE- 
PENDENCY 
The Imputation System demands a further degree of complexity if manage- 
ment is to solve (and hopefully optimise) the interdependency now argu- 
ed to exist between the investment, financing and taxation decisions. 
There are. three important interdependencies which are crucial to this 
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problem: 
1. CAPITAL ALLOWANCES. 
Most investment projects, with the exception of those that are leas- 
ed, attract Capital Allowances which are designed to reduce the cur- 
rent taxation liability. Clearly, therefore, their role in the pro- 
cess of project selection, and their pervasive influence in taxa- 
tion matters, is of prime importance. 
Two groups of problems may be distinguished relating to the quanti- 
fication and allocation of Capital Allowances, although in their 
effects these problems are inter-linked: 
(i) Firstly, as discussed in the previous sections, there is the 
problem of determining the effective rate of taxation to be 
applied in evaluating the worth of the Allowance. If this can- 
not be satisfactorily ascertained then the cash-flow value of 
the Allowances to the company is indeterminate. 
(ii) Secondly, there is the problem of'excess Capital Allowances. 
The aggregated value'of the accelerated Allowances, accruing 
to each one of a number of capital expenditure projects, may 
exceed the taxable profits of the company derived from on-going 
operations'plus the set. of newly accepted projects. The problem, 
therefore, is how to determine the'effective rate of Capital 
Allowances for each individual project. ' And, if the effective 
rate is sufficiently lower than the'nominal rate that marginal 
projects become unacceptable -- thus reducing the excess of 
Allowances and so increasing the effective rate -- then on what 
grounds is the improved effective rate to be re-applied to the 
marginal projects thereby resurrecting the original problem at 
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I 
least in part? . This loop seems capable of continued 
iteration, 
as there can be no guarantee of a convergent sequence. 
Hence, the value of a Capital Allowance -- which makes a significant 
impact on the discounted value of an investment project -- can be 
both difficult to assess and difficult to time. This must be a mat- 
ter of serious concern to financial management in their evaluation 
of the capital budget. 
2. THE DISTRIBUTION POLICY 
The cost of equity is a constituent element of the company's weight- 
ed average cost of capital. If the cost of equity is some function 
of the company's share price, and the share price is some-function 
of the dividend, then it follows that a company's-, distribution policy 
affects its cost of capital. -In ä non capital ratiöningýsituationý " 
the DCF hurdle rate is based upon the cost of capital thereby 
producing an interdependency between the distribution policy and 
the accepted projects. 
As shown previously, the distribution policy can give rise to excess 
ACT (and Unrelieved Overseas Taxation) which, if present; Will affect 
the taxation rate applied to the individual projects. Manipulation 
of the dividend policy in an attempt to compensate for this (by try- 
ing to minimise the tax liability for example) may affect the market's 
perception of the company's economic performance. The ultimate re- 
suit of which will be a change in the company's cost of capital, 
leading to a new project appraisal rate. 
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3. OVERSEAS TAXATION 
If a company is engaged in a significant number of profitable over- 
seas investments while at the same time adopting a distribution po- 
licy which is incompatible with these earnings, then such an action 
may subject the company to the repercussions of Unrelieved Overseas 
Taxation and Surplus ACT; both of which will have to be carried 
forward until such time as they can be absorbed. 
Applying the doctrine of 'collective influence' it would be argued 
that the resulting changes in the applicable tax, 
rate 
should be 
equally endured by the home-based as well as the overseas-based in- 
, vestments. Alternatively, it could be argued that management con- 
'sciously approved an overseas investment policy, the profits from 
which would be subject to the vagaries of taxation agreements and 
conditions in their respective countries. As such it_should be po- 
"licy 
to isolate the effect of the overseas taxation" burden' and re- 
direct any pecuniary disadvantage which arises solely to the foreign 
based investments. 
The problem becomes one of balancing the influence of one group of 
-, projects against another purely on the basis of location, for, example: 
if an unduly large proportion of overseas investments are elected 
to the optimal set of -projects (pro-rata to the original balance of 
home and overseas projects presented for appraisal) then it will 
follow that a proportionally larger overseas tax liability will enure. 
As by the same token less U. K. based projects are being accepted the 
potential clearly exists to incur Unrelieved Overseas Taxation: in 
the form of inadequate double taxation relief -- a situation which 
may be made worse by the dividend policy of the organisation (ACT 
-245= 
on that dividend not being available for double taxation relief). 
This gives rise to a redistribution of the tax liability which may 
alter the project ranking and acceptability of certain investments. 
5.7 AN INCIPIENT FRAMEWORK FOR'THE INCLUSION OF-CORPORATE TAXATION INTO AN 
INTEGRATED INVESTMENT AND'FINANCING'DECISION MODEL- 
INTRODUCTION 
The, proposed system is suggested as a starting point for more advanced 
research on the important topic of incorporating realistic taxation 
policy and events into linear programming models. Because of the scope 
and complexity involved the model is not stated in mathematical equa- 
tions. Instead, the concept is expressed as a flow diagram which hope- 
fully is both homomorphic -- in that it mirrors the problem with suffi- 
cient accuracy --, and representative of the interdependencies that have 
been previously outlined between taxation and capital budgeting. - 
There are two basic objectives connected with the modeling system under 
discussion: 
firstly, to establish the most appropriate estimate of the company's 
taxation liability over, the period covered by. the model. .. 
This will enable the tax cash-flows (TCF) to be allocated 
to each individual project; and,, 
secondly, to determine the resulting after-tax cost of capital that 
wß11 follow, from the selection of the optimal set, of pro- 
jects, the associated corporate tax liability and the (pre- 
sumed) variable tax rate throughout the period covered by 
the model. 
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0 Thus, the problems which are being synthesized into one overall proce- 
dare are: 
2. It is impossible to establish the correct timing or rate of taxation 
until the corporate TCF profile has been. established. The TCF pro- 
file is a function of the optimal set of projects. However, 'the op- 
timal set of projects cannot be determined until the value of every 
individual project's after-tax cash-flow is known. 
2. The basic hurdle rate for the model will be a function of the weight- 
ed average cost of capital. The after-tax cost of the debt element 
is a direct function of the corporate TCF profile. 
3. The cost of equity is a function of the distribution policy; which, 
- as one of its parameters, must take into account the tax consequen- 
ces resulting from the adopted strategy. Those tax consequences in- 
volve, inter alia, the relationship of the ACT arising from the 
qualifying distribution'änd the taxable profits of the organisation. 
Yet, the taxable profit is. largely determined by the level of capi- 
tal investment undertaken and the manner in which it is financed. 
4. Thus, until the optimal set of projects and the optimal set of fi- 
nancing instruments to be employed is known, it is impossible to 
establish the approPiate after-tax cash-flow stream for the compa- 
ny. And until this is known it is not possible to determine what 
the optimum dividend policy should be, and hence what the cost of 
equity is; nor is it possible to determine the tax rate to be used 
in calculating the after-tax cost of debt. Thus, because the appro- 
priate hurdle rate cannot be established it is impossible to deter- 
mine which projects will form the optimal set of investments. 
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1ý 
The proposal about to be outlined, involves the consideration of a 
largely unexplored area of financial management: the-triple integra- 
tion of the investment, financing and taxation decisions. 
It is assumed that at the 'core' of such a scheme is a joint I&F de- 
cision model of the type proposed by CHAMBERS [30; J. To this system is 
added a sub-programme to calculate the taxation liability to fall due 
under the Imputation Tax regulations. The linear programming model 
would, in effect, call upon a taxation package to establish the ap- 
propriate "set" of tax cash-flows which would arise from the optimal 
solution to the two decision model. 
It may be noted that leasing would be an important catalyst in such a 
procedure, as its adoption will affect all three of the decisions and 
would therefore be expected to contribute to, and extensively influen- 
ce, the collective optimal solution. 
I 
, 
II THE TRIPLE INTEGRATION MODEL 
The sequence of events leading to the ultimate solution is shown dia- 
grammatically on the following page; the iterative procedure may be ex- 
plained as follows: 
STAGE 1: The initial data base will comprise of the before-tax project 
cash-flows, the available financing options, and a first ap- 
proximation to a dividend policy. Projects would be specified 
upto the horizon, as indeed would all the data. The taxation 
regulations and assumptions would be based upon one of the 
following policies which would depend upon managements present 
conception of future events: 
1. The best estimate of the company's future taxation liabi- 
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lity extrapolated from the expected performance of current 
on-going projects (e. g. "Surplus ACT is not going to be 
relieved within the period; no Mainstream Corporation Tax 
is to be paid over the period in excess of the minimum 
rate, etc"); or 
2. A base condition reflecting standard rates of taxation 
(that is; full tax rates, taxable profits expected through- 
out the period upto the horizon with no unrelieved over- 
seas taxation or surplus ACT). 
STAGE 2: Run the model to obtain the optimal solution under the ini- 
tial data conditions. This will provide project ranking (and 
rejection) together with a list of financing, options. that 
are expected to be employed up to the horizon. 
STAGE 3: Having established the group of projects tö be undertaken in 
each of the years dealt with by the model, the data so obtain- 
ed would be transferred to the taxation sub-programme in order 
to determine the first approximation to the corporate tax 
schedule. This will provide information of likely tax rates, 
liability schedules etc.; if any major problem areas are re- 
vealed then detailed analysis outside the model will be requir- 
ed (the information being processed by taxation specialists 
and senior management who may have to discuss a variety of 
policy matters, the most serious of which would concern di- 
vidend strategy and overseas investment). 
STAGE 4: The revised data on the corporate T. C. F. will then be refin- 
ed into two additional programmes which are designed to calcu- 
late: 1, the resulting cost of capital, and; 2, the allocation 
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of individual project's respective T. C. F. 
STAGE 5: Having established the new hurdle rate and project after- 
tax cash-flow data, the cycle is repeated; adding, if 
necessary, any new dividend policy which may emanate from 
the specialist advice obtained at stage 3. It may also prove 
necessary to consider project starting dates, delaying or 
advancing the commencement of a project to gain a further 
advantage. 
STAGE 6: The optimal solution is attained when the 'best' combination 
of investment and financing plans is obtained which simultaneously 
maximises the value of the firm and, by implication, smooths 
and minimises the taxation liability. This stage of the 
iterative process relies heavily on the specification of a 
'triple' objective function. This, and other matters of equal 
importance to the model are discussed below. 
0 
I 
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III''COMMENTS AND'CRITISISMS OF THE MODEL 
Of crucial importance to the proposed iterative routine is the alloca- 
tion, of"taxation amounts to the individual projects at STAGE 4. of the 
cycle. Thus, with the exception of'the"less. important standard tax ra- 
te case, management is responsible for-stipulating detailed rules go- 
verning the distribution of taxation charges and allowances for the 
range of circumstances that may eventuate-from the series of, 'optimal' 
solutions (the programme will progress from 'local' optima after each 
cycle to the final 'global' optima,. -or the best obtainable solution). 
For example, management may decide that the taxation sub-programme 
should include the following guidelines, or precepts (these suggestions 
are not argued to be in-. any sense superior to other alternatives cover- 
ing the same problem):, all projects based in foreign divisions of the 
company shall bear an equal burden of. any unrelieved-overseas taxation. % 
and, those projects in progress when surplus ACT arises. will be allo- 
cated the-accumulated, relief. in taxation liability in the year when 
ACT is eventually relievedl, new projects that have appeared in the., 
interim will not be so relieved. 
The formal establishment and adherence to such rules is likely to be 
a very delicate matter calling for impartial judgement as well as taxa- 
tion expertise (because the enactment of such rules will cause projects 
to be given different priorities and ranking, such that divisional 
management - especially those overseas -, may feel prejudiced against 
when they are informed of the taxation. liability they are to bear). Des- 
pite the problems this may cause management, a set of rules will have 
i.. 
............ : 
1; See BUCKLEY [27 1 
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to be constructed and applied irrespective of the use of modeling tech- 
niques. 
An intrinsic feature of the programming huristics must be sufficient 
flexibility: it is important to allow for tactical changes of plan and 
the possibility that the forecasted project cash-flows will fail to be 
achieved, or perhaps even exceeded, thereby seriously affecting the 
concurrent taxation plans and policies. Excessive rigidity in such pro- 
cedures is to be deliberately avoided because, as was shown in Chapter 1, 
tax regulations change with great frequency. Furthermore, as a matter 
of business practice, taxation strategy is often decided upon with 
great expediency at the last possible moment in the tax year when all 
the available data can be assimilated and last minute adjustments made 
to avoid incuring undue liabilities. 
As may be imagined, the possible variety of outcomes from such an all- 
embracing model is going-to be wide, frequently complex, and not neces- 
sarily internally consistent. This section will be concluded with a 
discussion on three points which are thought to represent serious con- 
flicts inherent in any model which tries to integrate the investment, 
financing and taxation decisions: 
1. ''THE'CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE'INFLUENCE 
At each iteration an investment and financing package will be obtained 
which can be used to establish the profile of taxation liabilities and 
rates which will be used in the subsequent cycle. It has previously 
been argued that, in taxation matters, projects can be said to exert a 
'collective influence' -- a "pool" of taxation liability exists in which 
the liability caused by the first accepted project is indistinguishable 
i 
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from the last accepted projects. To that end an average tax rate should 
44 be applied across each project and financing option: - this seems a demo- 
cratic methodology. 
_However, 
it is in conflict with the mathematical 
reasoning used to select projects within the linear programme, viz: 
the dual (the marginal increase in the optimal solution caused by re- 
laxing the constraint by one unit --- the project's worth. may then be 
compared with its rivals to determine which investment yields the high- 
est incremental return). As it is likely that the process will iterate 
around the loop several times there exists,. in effect, a taxation dual 
which provides information on the marginal impact of a particular act- 
ion: that is, the effect of undertaking another project, or increasing 
the percentage of a partially accepted project, upon the tax position 
of the companyl. 
Thus; the model would. be applying'general-taxation criteria to the set of 
projects while at the same time determining their acceptability, or 
value, by their marginal contribution. This incompatibility is recog- 
nised to 'weaken' the solution. However, management's choice is between 
the use of incremental taxation analysis of projects -- their marginal 
worth at the time they are elected to the optimal set, which is argued 
to be discriminatory -- or a decision to adopt the concept of 'collect- 
ive influence' which must imply the use of uniform tax data and rates. 
1. The use of the term 'dual' is not entirely accurate in a mathematical sen- 
se if the taxation calculation is performed as part of a sub-programme of 
the L. P. In the current context it is meant to imply the marginal change in value (i. e. the increase or decrease in tax liability) brought about by a change in the investment set or financing set. 
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2. THE TAX STATUS'OF'REJECTED'PROJECTS 
A matter of further concern, from a methodological as well as a. concept- 
ual viewpoint, is the tax status of rejected projects after each itera-, 
tion has taken place. This problem is believed to be unique to the 
triple integration model because rejected projects will be carried-over 
in each iteration. In the normal type, of model (vide CHAMBERS) taxation 
is specified in advance so that the after-tax cash-flow data for each 
project remains unchanged. However, in the proposed system the accepted 
set of projects are allocated the company's entire expected tax liabi- 
lity: which, by implication, leaves the rejected projects in a state of 
taxation 'limbo'. 
There seem to be two possible courses of action to bring the, rejected 
projects back into the model: 
1. Apply the resulting taxation rates to all projects undertaken irres- 
pective of whether they have been accepted or rejected. While this 
would bestow an apparent amount of taxation on the total group of 
projects which is in excess of that to be paid, it is argued to be 
of no material consequence but merely a fictional devise to enable 
the iterative routine to proceed. All projects will then. commence 
the next cycle with as impartial a tax cash-flow as may be allowed. 
Of course, this procedure may be inappropriate on occasions, espec- 
ially if the solution is unusually volatile: the optimal set of pro- 
jects changing quite dramatically from iteration to iteration as a 
result of 'spurious' taxation amounts being allocated to rejected 
projects. In general, however, it is to be assumed that a relatively 
stable solution will emerge as the model moves towards its optimal 
configuration. As such, the equitable treatment of rejected pro- 
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jects will only affect the aggregate liability modestly on each 
iteration (on the argument that a substantial proportion of the 
company's tax liability will originate from a central group of pro- 
jects which will invariably form the core of the optimal set). 
2. A two tier taxation system is to be adopted: the taxation amounts 
established in the sub-programme are distributed to the accepted set 
of projects; while a standard, full tax-rate, assumption is applied 
to the rejected group of projects. The obvious disadvantage of this 
approach is that it discriminates quite extensively against the re- 
jected projects almost to the extent that they are thereafter so 
heavily encumbered with taxation as to be even more uncompetitive. 
As such, the first optimal set chosen will carry such a substantial 
advantage that other projects will have great difficulty countering 
their initial superiority --- the raison d'etre of the integrated 
model will have been lost. 
3. THE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION 
Thus far, the twin issues of the model's horizon and objective function 
have been avoided. The main reason for this (apart from the constraints 
of space and time in the Thesis). is the acknowledged fact that a fully 
integrated triple model (optimising the investment, financing and taxa- 
tion decisions in one operation) can be expected to possess a very com- 
plex objective function. However, it may be noted here that there are 
three major problem areas which will require further study: 
A. How is the objective function to be expressed? If taxation is to be 
included, is the goal to minimise the tax liability -- what is the 
trade-off between this objective and, say, the maximisation of the 
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horizon value of the company? Are, in fact, two objective functions 
needed: one for the investment and financing model; and one for the 
taxation sub-programme? Will they be in conflict? And can priori- 
ties be assigned between them if they are in conflict? 
B. As was stated earlier in the Thesis, most models work towards (or 
have implicit within them) an horizon posture -- say a debt/equity 
ratio. Thus what taxation posture should be sought? What will this 
be based upon, and how will it affect the model's decisions in the 
pre-horizon periods? Can it be ensured that the investment and fi- 
nancing decision postures are compatible with the taxation posture? 
C. How is the post-horizon taxation data to be expressed? Is it correct 
to endeavour to minimise the taxation liability of the expected T. C. 
F's? Is it possible to match a tax minimisation objective with a 
discounted cash-flow maximisation objective? What-is a valid discount 
rate to discount taxation liabilities? 
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IV SUMMARY 
To sum up the arguments which have been raised concerning taxation"mo- 
dels, it may be noted that: 1, the state of the art is very much in its 
infancy; 2, the interdependencies between"all-three decisions are of 
great practical importance and should not be ignored because they are 
difficult to model; 3,. the first steps in an iterative procedure to 
work towards an optimal solution have been outlined; and 4, a great 
many problems have been specified which will be encountered before a 
workable model is produced. 
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5.8 CONCLUSION 
The problem of 'discriminatory financing' is a most serious one in 
the analysis of. a lease and, as will be made clear in the following 
Chapter, it pervades many of the-suggested procedures for solving 
the leasing decision. It has been repeatedly argued in this Thesis 
that projects must be appraised by a common criterion if an equitable 
comparison is to ensue: this is particularly crucial in the case of 
a specific financing option linked to an investment project. The 
Valve Additivity Principle runs counter to this argument but, as was 
demonstrated in conditions other than a perfect capital market, it 
fails to consider the important interdependencies. which can only be 
satisfactorily considered in a simultaneous I. & F. decision procedure. 
If these interdependencies are acknowledged to exist then the VAP no - 
longer holds and it is incorrect and non-optimal to appraise projects 
by their individual cost of finance discount rate. 
Significant attempts are being made to cope with the interdependencies 
which exist in financial management by way of integrated decision 
models using linear programming techniques. On balance the CHAMBERS 
model, and others of a similar, status, have made some progress -- 
notably in the area of a linkage-cognizant decision criterion -- but 
major issues such as the horizon problem and the BAUMOL and QUANDT 
contradiction have yet to be satisfactorily solved. The widespread use 
of such techniques in practice is someway off., but there is a discern- 
ible increase in their use and as such a great deal more research is 
needed not only on the mathematical structure of the problem but also 
into the more pragmatic issues of data specification, horizon valuation 
and realistic financing options. 
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Of increasing relevance to project appraisal, lease evaluation, and 
mathematical models is the issue of corporate taxation. Project 
analysts can no longer make sweeping assumptions about the rate and 
timing of taxation liabilities. g The Imputation System has further 
complicated an already complex and neglected aspect of financial 
management. Several important 'taxation interdependencies' were 
considered which led to the conclusion that any realistic attempt to 
establish the correct corporate tax cash-flow profile must involve 
a triple integrated model of the investment, financing and taxation 
decision. Such a model is of enormous scope and complexity. It raises 
issues which relate specifically to the leasing decision,., or any 
project appraisal, and evokes-innumerable questions as to methodology. 
A basic framwork was established in an effort to structure the problem 
in a manner which would stimulate further research. 
CHAPTER 6 
THE LEASING DECISION :A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
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. fl 6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this Chapter attention is turned to the various academic 
works in financial theory which relate to the leasing decision. 
It has been estimated by the researcher1 that during the 
period 1960 to the present day, between 150 and 200 articles 
have been written which concentrate primarily upon the 
quantitative analysis of a lease. Needless to say, therefore, 
with such a proliferation of opinions and techniques any 
resume requires considerable editorial judgement as to which 
papers are to be. considered as-the most in'portant contributions 
to the subject. As will becorrercl ear in the discussion tiihich 
follows, the leasing controversy involves a series of debaItes 
and arguments which are conducted on several fronts. Among 
these issues 'are -. 
(i) Is the leasing decision a "lease-or-buy" or "lease-or- 
borrow" comparison? 
(ii) What is the correct hurdle rate to apply to the decision : 
the corporate debt rate, the risk free rate, the marginal 
efficiency of'. capi tal , the weighted average cost-of 
capital, or the borrowing opportunity rate? 
(iii) What account should be taken of the different borrowing 
patterns made available by alternative lease contracts? 
(iv) What method should be used to account for the different 
levels of uncertainty inherent in the various cash-flow 
elements which are present in the analysis? 
1. See TERRY [ 130 
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(v) Should the implicit interest of the lease 
repayments be included or excluded from the 
cash-flow series? 
(vi) Is the leasing decision a financing decision, an 
investment decision, or a simultaneous decision? 
A study of the Literature of lease evaluation will reveal 
pronounced divergences of opinion amongst the various 
writers (arguably one of the most controversial and 
unresolved issues in financial theory); but none so 
striking as the debate on the appropriate discount rate(s) 
to apply to the analysis. - As a precursor to the ensuing 
discussion it is perhaps worthwhile to tabulate the 
remarkable discord in academic opinion over the past 
twenty years on this matter : as is made clear, no 
consensus has emerged -- Indeed, quite-the contrary. 
l 
I. It is salutary-to reflect that this has undoubtedly 
contributed to the confusion which prevails throughout 
U. K. industry on the topic of lease evaluation. See 
the report of the industrial field work in Chapter 7. 
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TABLE 6.1 
A SAMPLE OF HURDLE RATES USED IN THE LEASING DECISION 
INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN DEBT RATE'+ AVERAGE COST OF CAPITAL 
McEACHRON [92 1, 1961 . 
GANT [58 J, 1961 
MERRET & SYKES [98 a, 1963 VANCIL [135 1,1963 
BEECHY C 14 3,1969 FERRARA [ 51 3,1966 
MITCHELL C 99 ], 1970 BOWER, HERRINGER & WILLIAMSON[20J1966 
DOENGES [ 38 , 1971 MAO, [ 93 ], 1969 
ROENFELD & OSTERYOUNG C117] 1974 JOHNSON & LEWELLEN [79 ], 1972 
FINDLAY C 55 2, 1975 SARTORIS & PAUL [118 J, 1973 
EQUITY RATE MULTIPLE RATES ' 
BLOOMFIELD & MA C 19:, 1974 GORDON [ 61 1974 
MYERS [ 106 ], 1974 
WEIGHTED AVERAGE COST OF SCHALL [120] , 1974 
CAPITAL 
KELLER & PETERSEN [81 1,1974 
FAWTHROP & TERRY E 49 J, 1976 
Another significant problem which confronts the writers on lease 
appraisal is whether the correct comparison is a "lease-or-buy" 
or "lease-or-borrow" decision. Majority opinion on this issue 
tends to favour the latter, although there is a notable body of 
opinion to the contrary as will be seen later. 
The proposal that the borrow-vs-borrow decision is correct 
necessarily implies that borrow-vs-equity is invalid as a 
comparison. One defence of this proposition relies upon the 
argument that the financing of projects must be undertaken in the 
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context of a fixed debt ratio which corresponds to the 
optimal capital structure. It would follow therefore, that the 
lease-vs-equity analysis is fallacious because, as the debt- 
equity ratio is pre-set, these two forms of finance can never 
substitute for each other. The only valid comparison is 
between different forms of debt which compete for a share of the 
total debt allocation within the prescribed ratio. If the 
ratio is currently at its upper limit then any introduction of 
incremental debt (say leasing) would imply a trespass of the 
debt-equity boundary. In consequence; the lease analysis should 
be charged a penalty cost for this infringement of the optimal. 
capital structure. 
As will be observed in the ensuing discussion this viewpoint is 
extensively favoured in the literature, but-arguably it'leaves 
several significant questions unanswered. Consider, firstly, the 
circumstances which surround the leasing decision. It could be 
argued that the lease-vs-borrow comparison-depends upon the use 
of leasing as "last resort financing" -- which would clearly 
imply that no equity finance exists to form the other half of the 
comparison. However, an equally valid question is whether any 
" other borrowing capacity exists in these circumstances-, and 
whether in fact a borrow-vs-borrow analysis is possible. 
Resolution of this essentially empirical issue is delayed until 
Chapter 7 when various leasing strategies will be considered. 
Nevertheless, the existence of a pure lease-vs-lease appraisal 
is a possibility ignored by many writers) 
1. Other than those who favour an IRR analysis of a lease contract, 
but invariably this technique is based upon a desire to establish 
the implicit yield of the cont act and not a con i us rejection of the underpinning logic of the 
lease-or-oorroww 
me 
Rods. 
- 314 - 
Another possible defence of a lease-vs-borrow analysis is rooted 
in the axiom of capital budgeting that "like must be compared 
with like. " However, as stated, 'this maxim lacks completeness 
or rigour : for it may be asked, which likeness is relevant? 
Is it simply a specific category of finance? Or is it the economic 
entity of finance as a whole? The issue rests upon whether it is 
more correct to compare debt instruments or financing instruments. 
This is the quintessence of the managerial dichotomy : lease-vs- 
equity. It will be observed in this review of the literature 
that the concentration of extant thought and discussion tends 
towards the comparison of debt alternatives only. These arguments 
will be considered, and where appropriate criticised, in the 
ensuing discussion; although it will not be possible satisfactorily 
to resolve these problems until the results of the Industrial 
Survey have been presented and the lease evaluation procedures 
which emanate from it duly 'proposed and examined in later 
Chapters. ' 
Finally, the reader is asked to note that all the nomenclature in 
this Chapter has been standardised into a uniform group of symbols. 
As such, all the equations and relevant quotes have been modified 
and converted from the originals to provide consistency and, 
hopefully, easier comparison of the various models discussed. 
1. See Chapter 7.2 II, and Chapter 9.4 IV. 
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STANDARDISED NOMENCLATURE -- FOR LEASING LITERATURE REVIEW 
At = Implicit Interest in Equivalent Loan Payment (St) in period t. 
Dt = Depreciation of Asset if owned, in period t. 
d= After-Tax Borrowing Rate (Debt Rate or Borrowing Opportunity 
Rate) 
Ft = Incremental Revenues minus incremental operating Costs 
generated by Asset in period t. 
i= Before-Tax Lease Rate. 
j= Risk Free Interest Rate. 
K= After-Tax Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
ke = Cost of Equity Capital 
Lt = Lease Payments in period t. 
Mo = Present Value of Equivalent Loan at Borrowing Rate (d) 
Pdt = Implicit Principal in Equivalent Loan Payment (St) in period t 
Ii = Life of Lease Contract, in years 
n= Life of Asset, in'years. 
0t = Incremental cash outlays assumed by Lessor but incurred by Lessee 
if Asset is purchased, in period t. 
P= Price of Asset at period t=o 
S. = Equivalent Loan Payment in period t (St = At + Pit) 
T= Corporation Tax Rate 
t= Time Period 
R= Residual Value of Asset, Appropriately Adjusted for Tax, at 
period N 
r= After-Tax Lease Rate 
oc = Certainty Equivalent Coefficient. 
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II. A REVIEW OF THE LEASING LITERATURE : UPV 110DELS 
The work of VANCIL [132,133,134 & 135 ]has, in the writer's 
opinion, been one of the most significant, contributions to the 
quantitative analysis of a lease and some of the problems it 
poses. Although VANCIL. is criticised by contemporary writers 
on leasing, there can be little. doubt that his early research 
laid the foundations upon which much of the-later writings were 
based. 
A great many texts on financial-theory and management give some 
support to VAHCIL'S. vieves and methods of analysis, from which it 
may be concluded that they have found wide acceptance. 
I There is 
also a series of articles by FERRARA [51,52,53 & 543 which gives 
direct support to VANCIL'S argument. Clearly, therefore, this 
review of the literature should commence with a critical 
examination of VANCIL'S lease appraisal model and develop, 
chronologically through the various amendments in lease appraisal 
methodology which have been proposed between 1961 and the time of 
writing this Thesis. 
VANCIL establishes his framework for discussion by reconi'ending 
that the investment and financing decision should be conducted 
separately 
"The first step in the analysis of a financial lease is to 
compare the alternative of purchasing the equipment with 
the alternative of continuing the status quo, another 
'routine' investment decision. If the status quo appears 
1. See, for example, ? AO [93 3, VERRET & SYKES C98 7, VAN HORI1E [138 
and WESTON & BRIGHAM C144 3. 
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to be a better alternative than purchase of the equipment, 
then it is unlikely that, if properly analysed, the 
alternative of acquiring the equipment on a financial lease 
will be more attractive than the status quo. 
Thus the consideration of a financial lease should 
begin only after a company has previously decided that the 
purchase of a piece of equipment is desirable. Having made 
this decision, the company may be faced t'ith several 
alternative methods of financing the acquisition; purchase 
for cash, purchase on an instalment plan or some other 
method involving debt financing, or acquisition via 
financial lease. 
VANCIL [ 135, p93 
VANCIL indicates that a previous analysis must be undertaken 
before a decision is made on how the asset is to be financed. 
This analysis would take the form of an economic appraisal of 
the associated investment decision and, if the result indicated 
a 'go' decision, then the next stage is considered -- namely, in 
VANCIL'S case, 'a "lease or borrow" analysis. 
l 
It has repeatedly been argued in this Thesis that it is erroneous 
to separate the I&F decisions because of the critical 
1. The literature is replete with this procedure. MAO [93, p332 1 is a gooc 
example : "Suppose a firm decides that the purchase of a certain asses, 
is desirable but prefers not to finance the acquisition solely with I 
equity funds. " There is an unfortunate illogicality in this often 
seen statement, in that the circumstances which led financial 
management not to finance with equity is, in its own right, a financi< 
decision -- the analysis of which is never elucidated. Other writers 
whose models are subject to the same criticism are : BEECHY [141, 
BLOOMMFIELD & MA [191; BOWER, HERRINGER & WILLIAMSON [20 7; GANT [58]; 
MAO [93 ]; f ZERRET & SYKES [98 ]; ROENFELD & OSTERYOUNG [117 3: SCHALL 
C120 J; and WESTON & BRIGHAM [144 3. 
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interdependencies that exist between the two : an integrated 
decision is essential in the case of leasing as BOWER rightly 
acknowledges : 
"They take leasing as a decision to be made given 
predetermined financing and investment policies, rather 
than as a decision to be made jointly as part of a'" 
determination of these policies. ..... Anything less 
than a joint analysis of the optimal'mix (of I&F 
decisions) must limit-, the (leasing) decision to an 
approximation of the ideal. " 
BOWER C153, pp25/6 7 
Thus, VANCIL'S analysis is argued to be fundamentally incorrect 
in separating the I&F decisions. The belief that the leasing 
decision is purely a financing one is rooted in VANCIL'S 
conviction that a company has a pre-determinable, stable and 
optimal debt-equity ratio towards which it should strive., 
"Management, acting for its stockholders, determines the 
capital structure through the strategic financing decisions 
which it makes. If"the capital structure is altered 
radically, say from one involving a small amount of'debt 
to one that is highly leveraged, stockholders who desire 
to run only a minimal risk will sell their stock and 
reinvest in a company that has the type of structure they 
prefer. Management can best fulfil its obligations to 
its stockholders by establishing a policy with regard to a 
company's capital structure and adhering to that policy consistently 
over relatively long periods of time. " 
VANCIL [135, p92 ]emphasis supplied 
1. This argument was strongly supported by GANT [ 58 & 59 3. 
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The MODIGLIANI and MILLER nature of this argument is striking. 
Arguably, this is the nucleus of VANCIL'S lease appraisal 
philosophy because it discloses the mainstay of the author's 
reasoning for eventually penalising any debt-instrument which 
disturbs or exceeds the sacrosanct debt-equity boundary. 
VANCIL'S rationale in support of, this conceptual framework is 
based upon a company's "pool of funds" --- which, comprises of . 
all the internal sources of funds plus a definable sum of as yet 
unused debt capacity made available by stretching the company's 
debt-equity ratio to some pre-conceived limit. The extent of 
this incremental debt is likely to be small as a company should 
anyway be operating close to its most efficient ratio (in 
accordance with the quote above). 
The "pool of funds" faces a "pool of projects" --- which consists 
of all the possible investments available to the conpany at the 
time of the analysis. If the "pool of funds" is constrained in 
its growth by the rate of equity funding, as implied by a fixed 
debt-equity ratio, then the financing decision has in-part 
already been made and largely all that is. left to perform is the 
investment decision. I Now then does the analyst evaluate a lease, 
coming as it does with its own financial package, and is it 
conceptually acceptable to allocate that part of the "pool of 
funds" to an individual project? 
1. FERRARA notes : "One doesn't ordinarily consider financing until 
there are worthy investment projects" [51, plll ]. Not-: ever, as 
previously indicated : in the lease analysis proposed by VANCIL 
the investment decision has already been undertaken -- making both 
the I&F decisions predetermined at the commencement of the 
appraisal. This is an underlying confusion in the VAMCIL technique. 
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VANCIL argues that there is no "non-arbitrary" method, of 
associating individual investments with individual sources of 
funds. As debt is generally raised "on the back of equity" 
it cannot be said to relate to any particular project because 
without the equity base, acting as a form of collateral or surety, 
the supplier of debt would not risk his capital. Monies within 
the company cannot be divided into specific segments of finance, 
their sources and costs, aggregate into a single supply at a 
weighted average cost. Therefore, a project which attracts its 
own finance. should not receive preferential analysis or 
consideration by virtue of its (say) "cheapness" of financing 
in relation to other projects. It must be evaluated using a 
standard hurdle rate determined by the weighted average cost of 
capital derived from a pre-set debt equity ratio. 
I 
VANCIL still perceives a problem however. If a lease has been 
undertaken, then the company has '. transgressed its own debt 
limit and (in his view). will thereby incur an extra financing 
cost because thereby extra debt financing is obtained. 
In order to compare existing debt (or incrementally raised debt) 
with a new lease, this EXCESS DEBT FACILITY must be somehow 
"washed out" of the calculation to ensure a "like-with-like" 
comparison. This is done by means of a screening device known 
as the "Borrowing Opportunity Rate" of interest. Debt raised at 
this cost is considered correct within the scope of the company's 
debt facility, debt raised outside this level, in the form of a 
1. This lucid presentation of the argument against "discriminatory 
financing" is one of VANCIL'S primary contributions to 
financial theory. 
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lease, must incur a penalty. The core of VANCIL'S argument 
is that-: 
"In order to get a valid comparison between a financial 
--"lease and direct debt, we must first recognise that a 
certain amount of each lease payment is for ordinary 
interest expenses which the company would have to pay on 
any type of-loan. The amount of this imputed interest 
is measured by the company's "borrowing opportunity rate" 
and these unavoidable interest charges are eliminated from 
the calculation. " 
VANCIL E135, p125 ] 
Implicit in VANCIL'S argument is the unsubstantiated assertion 
that a lease will always bear a higher implicit interest charge 
than a direct debt instrument. This high cost. of leasing is 
alleged to result from the company exceeding its pre-determined 
debt limit. 1 Debt exercised below that limit carries a standard 
interest charge : the borrowing opportunity rate, see VAUCIL 
1135, pplOl-104 J. 
"For our purposes, we shall merely define a corporation's 
borrowing opportunity rate as the minimum rate that a 
company would have to pay today in order to secure a given 
amount of unrestricted funds from the issuance of the most 
attractive type of securities (fron the lenders point of view) 
that the company is in a position to sell. This is a market- 
determined rate and reflects primarily the overall cost of 
money in the economy at a given point in time and the 
lender's appraisal of the credit-viorthyness of the borrower. " 
VANCIL C135, p38 3 
1. See VANCIL C135, p23 1 
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VANCIL suggests that a borrowing rate be established in order to 
evaluate and assess the relative merits of the competing lease 
agreement. It is argued, however, that this proposal represents 
the intrusion of a totally artificial assumption and an artificial 
debt presence into the appraisal. Furthermore, this situation may 
differ significantly from the actual circumstances pertaining at 
the moment of the leasing decision. For example : does the 
borrowing rate ever equal the implicit interest rate charged on 
the lease? Why should a non-existent debt alternative be compared 
with a lease? In a, later Chapter of this Thesis, when the concept 
of a "spill-over" leasing strategy is introduced, it will be noted 
that by definition the borrowing rate must equal the "spill-over" 
leasing rate because in these circumstances this is the only 
effective debt instrument available to the company 
) 
Concern with the "excess debt facility" which leasing may introduce 
into the capital structure prompts VA14CIL to "strip-out" of the 
lease cash-flow the basic interest rate which would be charged on 
an assumed loan at an assumed borrowing rate. By implication 
this leaves a residue in the lease calculation of any excess 
interest which the nore expensive lease may carry : in essence 
this means that the lease will carry a penalty cost viz-a-viz debt. 
1. Within the context of the previous discussion on LINKAGE-LEASING 
and borrowing capacity it would seem to follow that "spill-over" can 
be construed as "stepping-over" optimally exploited borrowing capacity" 
and effectively eating into contingency cash-flow reserves. (It should 
also be noted that there is inherent in any discussion of this nature 
the problem of perceptions : if management believes that borrowing 
capacity is optimally exploited it must be imp icitly believing that 
the borrowing rate equals the spill-over rate). In truth, the 
borrowing rate may well be below the spill-giver rate. The issue now 
becomes philosophical -- should the analysis be conducted on 
perceptions or truth? See the earlier note on subjective judgements 
as to whether leasing at the margin is "planned financing mix" or "spill-over" : Chapter 4.6, IV, page 183. 
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This procedure for lease evaluation is both unclear and not g. r 
always in accord with observed business practices, in that : 
firstly, it unwarrantedly penalises a lease for introducing an 
"excess debt facility" into the company beyond the 
artificially erected inflexible debt limit --this 
contradicts the arguments on the optimal exploitation 
of debt capacity previously discussed in Chapter 4, 
when the judicious use of "excess" debt (particularly 
leasing) was shown to make a significant contribution 
to the growth and profitability of an organisation; 
secondly, it ignores the multiplicity and complexity of debt 
financing operations which exist in practice and which 
could provide any number of interest rate structures 
to be used in establishing the company's borrowing 
opportunity rate; 
thirdly, it assumes that companies have a debt option available 
to them at the time of the leasing decision (which 
they may not always have, see Chapter 7) and that it 
can be tailored to mirror the leasing contract; and, 
fourthly, by "washing out" only a portion of the implicit interest 
inherent in the lease repayment it follows that some 
remnant of interest charges will perforce remain in the 
cash-flow series which, it has repeatedly been argued, 
constitutes a double counting of the same cash-flow. 
1 
1. Thus, VANCIL is in error when he notes: "The reason that our (lease or borrow) calculation is directly comparable ... is that no financing charges are included in either figure. " 1135, p1023. It 
will be shown in Chapter 9 that all the interest within the 
repayment schedule should be removed from the cash-flow series to 
achieve this objective. 
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VANCIL argues that the amount of debt capacity allocated to a 
project in each period should not be permitted to affect the 
apparent profitability of the investment. How then, VANCIL asks, 
is a company to compare debt sources which have different 
repayment profiles? For, -if the repayment profiles differ then 
varying amounts of debt would be outstanding during the life of 
the two debt contracts -- which VANCIL argues would not create a 
like-with-like comparison of the financial alternatives. 
To resolve this problem VANCIL notes that if the investment decision 
implies that a project's initial cost is paid out at the 
commencement of the project, then the price of the leased asset can 
be assumed to utilise an amount of debt capacity, in. year one, 
equivalent to its original cost. 
l The lease must then be compared 
with a similar loan which has a "like-for-like" repayment schedule 
in this way the analysis : 
gives proper recognition to income tax differences but 
not .. the amount of financing provided by a given plan. 
VANCIL [133, p132 3 
1. The exact specification of this 'equivalent loan' has been debated 
vigorously in the literature and will be discussed in the remainder 
of this Chapter., BOWER notes of some of the writers who have 
considered the problem : "Although BOWER, HERRINGER and WILLIAMSON [20 
and VANCIL [135 3 calculate the cost of borrowing sacrificed or the 
value of the Lessor's claim against the company in the same way as 
FINDLAY [55 land others do, they presume that the borrowing that 
would take place if leasing were'rejected would be equal to the 
purchase price of the asset. As a result they calculate their interest 
tax shelter from an equivalent loan equal to the purchase price of the 
asset rather than equal to the present value of the lease payments. 
... difficulties may arise where the purchase price is above the 
present value of lease payments, so additional borrowing, if it 
occurs, could threaten debt limits and affect discount rates. " 
[ 153, pp30/31 ]. 
- 325 - 
"In order to evaluate lease financing it is necessary to 
measure (i) the cost disadvantage of leasing due to its 
higher interest rate and (ii) the cost advantage of leasing 
due to more favourable tax treatment and the avoidance of 
certain costs transferred to the Lessor. " 
VANCIL [135, p34 3 
VAIICIL'S methodology is not made explicit in equation form (which 
could account for some of the unjustified criticism of his method 
by writers who incorrectly specify his algorithm : viz. 
SARTORIS & PAUL C 118, p47 land ROEIFELD & OSTERYOUNG [117, p75 J. 
It is shown below to facilitate further discussion and comparison 
with later models. Thus VANCIL advocates the use of the 
following analysis when evaluating the "lease-or-borrow" decision. 
VANCIL [135, pp96-112 ]. 
N NPV(B) =P-ET. Dt 
t=o 
1PV(L) = E, 
Lt 
_ 
rE (Lt -At) T 
t=o 
(l+d)t 
t=o 
(1+K)t 
The net present value cost of borrowing shows the cost of the 
asset less the tax shield created by the asset's depreciation 
schedule (Capital Allowances). The net present value cost of 
leasing comprises of the lease payments -- discounted at the 
company's debt rate, or borrowing opportunity rate -- and the tax 
deductability of the lease payments less the tax shield of interest 
payments foregone on the equivalent loan. This last term "credits 
the lease with a tax saving only to the extent that it exceeds the 
tax saving on the interest charges that would be payable on a 
- 326 - 
matching loan, " JOHNSON & LEWELLEN C79, p817 1. Or as VANCIL 
notes : "Financing plans which charge an interest rate higher 
than the borrowing opportunity rate are penalised in the analysis 
to the extent of the incremental cost of the higher interest 
charges " [135, plOl I. 
Consider now some of the criticisms leveled at VANCIL'S model. 
Firstly, and without doubt the most cited stricture1, is an 
inconsistency in the discounting of tax shelter. As JOHNSON & 
LEWELLEN note : "Whereas (Bower, Herri nger & Wi 11 i amson [ 20 ])and 
VANCIL discount lease payments at the corporation's debt rate, 
they discount the tax savings on the payments at the firm's cost 
of capital. We would maintain that the tax deductions occasioned 
by such outlays are as certain as the outlays themselves and 
would reject the notion of applying different capitalisation 
rates to the two elements. " C79, p818 1. There is a fallacy in this 
conclusion, although its disclosure is not intended to sanction 
the discounting of lease payments at the cost of debt. It was 
extensively argued in Chapter 5 that the rate and incidence of 
taxation is a function of the total I&F decisions of the 
organisation. As such, an interdependency exists between the 
performance of those decisions and the residual tax shields they 
give rise to : see Chapter 5, section 5.4. Logically, therefore, 
the certainty and predictability of taxation cash-flows are even more 
doubtful and precarious than normal I&F cash-flows -- and not, 
as JOHNSON & LEWELLEN et. al. state, easier to predict, [79, p820] -- 
1. See ROENFELD & OSTERYOUNG C 117, p75 3: JOHNSON & LEWELLEN C79, p818 3: 
BEECHY L14, p377 1: SCHALL C120, pl2ll 3: & SARTORIS & PAULC 118, p481 . 
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clearly, therefore, a case could be made for using a higher 
discount rate than the cost of debt. 
The second issue upon which writers are irreconciled, is a 
fundamental one : that of a "lease-or-borrow" or "lease-or-buy" 
decision? This altercation in the literature will be discussed 
at various periods throughout this Chapter. However, one 
point is worth making which seems to have been overlooked by 
other researchers of VANCIL'S model. It will be noted that 
VANCIL'S algorithm relating to the debt alternative, only deducts 
Dt. T from the cost of the asset, "since depreciation is the only 
deductable expense under ownership. " Clearly this is not the 
case, as interest repayments on debt are legitimate deductions. 
Arguably, VANCIL'S algC)rithm is, although it is never stated, a 
comparison with pure equity financing since no interest 
deductions would then apply to the equation. Thus, the "borrow" 
alternative is suspiciously like purchase via equity. 
Thirdly, ROENFELD & OSTERYOUNG note : "Another problem with 
VANCIL'S lease model is that the lease cost is sensitive to the 
borrowers interest rates. That is, the lease cost will vary 
depending upon available sources of funds and on the firms 
ability to bargain for long-term debt. This sensitivity is 
unrealistic since the cost of leasing is normally fixed by the 
Lessor and there is no interaction between the lease cost and 
alternative interest rates. " (117, p75 ]. When discussing 
interdependencies in Chapter 4.3 it was argued that the cost of 
one financing source can and does influence the cost of other 
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capital issues, however, it is thought that ROENFELD & OSTERYOUNG'S 
basic argument is correct in that empirical evidence suggests that 
the quotation offered by-the Lessor would rarely, if ever, be 
significantly affected'by the cost of capital to the company 
(see reply QL11, Chapter 7)1. Furthermore, it is worth noting 
that advocates of VANCIL'S method of lease appraisal never suggest 
that all financing decisions should be gauged against the yardstick 
of a standardised borrowing opportunity rate. 
Fourthly, and in anticipation of some of the issues to be 
considered later"in this review, MYERS notes that the general 
lease evaluation procedure (viz. VANCIL) embodies several 
assumptions not generally recognised. 
°1. It assumes the MODIGLIANI-MILLER [101 ] view''that the' 
only advantage of debt financing is the tax savings- 
generated by the deductibility of interest from 
taxable income. 2 
1. Since the above was written there has developed within the U. K. the 
practice known as "Variable Interest Rate Leasing. " The Lessee is 
asked to stipulate the rate of interest to be written into the lease, 
bearing in mind sharp fluctuations upwards in medium-term interest 
rates as corrective action is taken against the pressures of 
sterling. Periodically; the Lessor extends a rebate or makes a 
surcharge according to the extent to which the Lessor has over or 
'understated increases in interest rates. Clearly the Lessee does not 
have an unfetted choice of interest rate, but the first impressions 
of the few leasing companies so'far operating this system is that 
Lessees do relate their choice to their perceptions of their existing 
cost , of capital., 
It will not escape the reader that one important result of this 
development is that leasing payments-lose their contractual certainty 
which is advanced by many writers as the grounds for discounting the 
lease payments (or its tax shield content)at a risk-free or risk- 
reduced rate of interest. 
2. See page 272, fn 1, where"MYERS argues in favour of an additional 
"linkage" dual associated with debt capacity being added to the cash. 
flow series : what MYERS terms the "Adjusted Present Value. " 
i 
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2. It assumes dividend policy is irrelevant, again in the 
MODIGLIANI-MILLER sense, and therefore excludes transaction 
costs. It excludes capital rationing a fortiori. 
3. It assumes that the "risk-independence" or "value 
additivity" principle holds. 
" 
MYERS [106, p3 ]. 
The problem of capital rationing and the leasing decision has 
previously been considered in Chapter 4.4 & 4.5, when the 
significant interdependency between the introduction of new funds 
into the I&F decision and the criterion hurdle rate demonstrated 
that the use of a cost of capital hurdle rate was suspect, and 
that a more appropriate criterion was the investment opportunity 
rate. However, see Chapter 9, section 9.6, and FAVITHROP & TERRY 
[ 49, pp91/94 ]for further discussion of this issue. 
In an attempt to overcome the deficiencies of the VANCIL proposal, 
BOWER, HERRINGER & WILLIAMSON [20 ], (hereafter BHW), suggest a 
model which quantified the operating and financial advantages or 
disadvantages present in the lease-loan choice. The operating 
advantage is measured by discounting the company's "basic cash- 
flow" at the weighted average cost of capital, whereas the 
financial advantage inherent in the debt alternatives is measured 
by discounting the lease-loan cash-flows at the "capitalisation rate 
whi-Eh applies to debt. " Like VANCIL, BHW suggest equivalent loan 
payments in order to effect a correct comparison of the alternatives. 
1. See HALEY & SCHALL C68 1, Chapter 5.2 II; and SCHALL E120 3 reviewed 
. 
below. 
3 
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ý" 
.... a lease payment schedule of any configuration can be 
matched by a loan or series of loans with the same 
configuration. Therefore, the loan we take to be alternative 
to, or equivalent to, the lease has payments proportional to 
the lease payments in each period; the proportiön is equal 
to the purchase price of the asset (the loan required) 
divided by the. capitalised value of the lease. " 
BOWER, HERRINGER & WILLIAMSON [20, p260]. 
The same objections can be levied against the equivalent loan 
approach as were set against VANCIL`S use of a borrowing 
opportunity rate (see page 323 ). The equivalent loan assumption 
pre-supposes both the willingness of management to take up a 
funded loan and its availability to management. This may be the 
case in the U. S. A. economy, but the absence of equivalent asset-loan 
facilities is a noticable feature of the contemporary U. K. financing 
scene. This is especially the more so if the lease is "tailored" 
in the manner described earlier in the Thesis. And yet, the absolute 
equivalence of the conceptual loan is the essence of this approach. 
In some ways the equivalent loan. analysis is of the same logical 
precision, but observable unreality, of the 1,11 argument. If one 
accepts such HIM assumptions as an identity of corporate and 
individual risk costs, or the ability to conduct arbitraging 
transactions without brokerage fees etc. then the logic of the MM 
argument is inescapable -- but it does not male it any the more 
acceptable in real life. The same is true of the equivalent loan 
approach to the problem of lease analysis. 
Newly introduced into the basic lease-vs-borrow algorithm of BHW, 
is the inclusion of a salvage value term (Ruf) and a recognition 
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of the various costs incurred by the Lessor when the asset is 
l leased but assumed by the Lessee when purchased (Ot). The BHW 
model may be stated thus: 
PNPV(B) =P-E, 
(At Dt). T 
t=1 
(1+K)t 
NPV(L) =E 
Lt E Lt. T 
-N 
ot(1-z) 
- 
RN 
t=1 t=1 t t=1 tN (i+d) (1+K) (1+K) (1+K) 
Several writers 
2 
comment that the BHW model is identical with the 
VANCIL algorithm (assuming that RN & 0t are zero', -'and allowing for 
a slightly different debt repayment schedule when computing At, the 
implicit interest cash-flow at the debt rate). " 'As such, all the 
previous comments and criticisms'öf VAHCIL apply equally to the 
BHW method. Generally, commentators in the literature do not 
credit BHWI'. with having made'any material contribution towards 
the unravelling of the leasing decision. 
1. As will be noted later, some writers object to the residual 
value of the asset being discounted at the cost of capital, 
prefering instead to use a rate appropriate to the "riskyness" 
of the cash-flow : "One primary element of risk introduced 
into the lease-vs-borrow decision comes from the salvage 
value and this risk should not be ignored. " ROENFELD AND 
OSTERYODUG L117, p76 I. 
2. For example : JOHNSON! & LEWELLEN C79, p818 J: SCHALL [120, p1211 ); 
and WESTON & BRIGHAM [144, p580J . For an illustration of their identity see the SCHALL reference. 
i 
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A most significant paper by JOHNSON & LEWWWELLEN E79 J, (hereafter 
J& L), presented the argument that the correct comparison should 
be the lease-or-buy decision. This was quite contrary to extant 
models where'a debt financing alternative to leasing was usually 
proposed. J& L's theoretical defence of this proposition was 
based upon (what has been termed in this Thesis) the philosophy 
of discriminatory financing. Thus : 
"The literature has established the principle that the 
attractiveness of a capital investment opportunity should 
be appraised without reference to the specific form of 
financing employed in its execution, and without including 
explicit finance charges such as dividend and interest 
payments as part of the cash-flows whose present value 
influence project worth. Rather, all such charges - and 
additional implicit ones associated with the risks borne by the 
enterprise which constitutes the discount rate that is used 
to compute an investment's present value. Inclusion of the 
financing charges again in the evaluation of the expenditure 
opportunity itself would clearly involve double counting. " 
JOHNSON & LEWWELLEN C79, p815 7. 
The various arguments presented throughout this Thesis clearly 
countenance J& L's statement, however, a disagreement will be 
observed in the application of this school of thought when'the 
researcher's model is presented in Chapter 9. J&L expand 
their argument to state that the much favoured borrow alternative 
is conceptually invalid because it is incorrect 
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u ... to associate a specific financing arrangament - e. g. a 
loan - with a specific undertaking even though the two 
happen, in the course of corporate affairs, to occur 
simultaneously ........... It is inappropriate, therefore 
to mix the financing and investment segments of a decision 
in a cash-flow analysis, as it is inappropriate even to 
attempt to attach one to the other. " 
JOHNSON & LE14ELLEN [79, p815/6 1. 
110 
This analysis supports the doctrine that finance is "non asset- 
specific" : that is, within the context of the total investment 
and financing decisions of the company it is erroneous to equate a 
particular tranche of capital with a particular investment. It 
would follow, therefore, that the 'borrow' alternative to leasing 
is discriminatory! The leasing option, however, cannot be anything 
other than asset-specific. In defence of their attitude towards 
the lease- or-buy decision J&L ask : 
".... whether it would be possible for a firm to obtain a 
sum of money, equal to the stated lump-sum purchase price 
of an asset, by entering into an agreement called a "lease" 
with the asset's vendor - and then use the money for some 
other corporate purpose, foregoing the acquisition of the 
asset itself. Quite obviously, this would not be the case. 
One cannot obtain funds with lease arrangements, as one can 
1. ... an exercise in self deception. " J&L [80, p1024 ]. 
6 
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only obtain particular physical assets. Accordingly, 
the appropriate capital budgeting parallel is lease-vs-buy. . 
s. 
JOHNSON & LUELLEN E79, p816, fn. 3 ]. 
J&L next consider the issue of appropriate discount rates to be 
applied in their lease evaluation model and reject the view that a 
single cost of capital should be used for all the cash-flows 
because there is a distinct difference in the market uncertainty 
and predictability of the outright purchase acquisition of an 
asset vis-a-vis a lease contract and its attendent obligations. 
The investment community's attitude towards the former is 
captured in the firm's cost of capital, but the latter are 
noticeably less contingent. Specifically, they involve 
commitments by the enterprise which, in terms of the 
securities market's view of their reliability, necessarily 
fall into the same risk category as do the firm's 
borrowing arrangements. Because they have that similarity, 
they should logically be accorded a capitalisation rate 
which matches the one investors can be observed to demand 
from such arrangements : the effective interest rate on the 
fir's outstanding debt. " 
JOHNSON & LEWELLEN [799 p8181 . 
The JOHNSON & LE14ELLEN model for lease evaluation may now be 
stated, the incremental net present value resulting from 
purchasing the asset is as follows: 
.. 
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A NPV = NPV(P) - NPV(L) 4 
Lt(1-T) 
= 
Eý 
. TDt Ot(1--T) + .. 
RN P+EN 
t=f 
(1 + K) t (l+K)N 
t=1 
(l+d)t 
letting 0t and RN equal zero; then : 
N 
NPV = -P +E 
Lt(1-T) + IN 
E 
TDt 
t=1 t=1 
(l+d)t (1+K)t 
J 
ý6 
It will be noticed immediately that Lt has not been stripped of its 
implicit interest component as the argument presented by J&L 
would have suggested. They defend this action as follows: 
"We are uninterested in whatever division of this lease 
payment into alleged "interest" and "principal" components 
the Lessor may arbitrarily decide to specify. The entire 
payment is a cash outflow for the Lessee and is tax deductible 
by him. For that reason, only the total size of the payment 
is of concern for decision purposes. " 
JOHNSON & LEWELLEN [79, p820, fn. 10 J 
This argument infers that a borrower can never ascertain the 
correct division of the repayment between interest and principal 
and in consequence can not establish the cost of the loan to the 
company. This does not seem to be a very tenable argument 
because the interest component of a loan will automatically and 
inexorably incorporate the lender's various expenses, overheads, 
profit and money costs : for that is the interest price to be 
paid; there is nothing "artificial" about its composition. 
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Thus, while agreeing with J&L that it is improper to include 
the financing. charges in the lease-or-buy decision cash-flows, 
it is concluded that they fail to implement their own proposal 
rigidly.. 
Finally, J&L reject the frequently advocated sequential decision 
procedure -- investment appraisal followed by an analysis of the 
financing alternatives for accepted projects -- noting that it 
can produce incorrect results : 
"Sufficiently attractive lease terms can in fact reverse the 
investment decision ..... Clearly, there will be some 
sufficiently low lease cost at which virtually any asset will 
be desirable. A definitive conclusion to forego an 
investment, therefore, cannot logically be made when leasing 
is a possibility until the second step of calculating what 
we have referred to above as A NPV is executed, and the 
result compared with the original net present value of 
purchase. " 
JOHNSON & LEWELLEN [79, p822]. 
The J&L article provoked extensive comment in the financial 
literature which, with the exception of GORDON [61] was highly 
critical of the proposed model and its theoretical underpinning. 
There is a considerable schism amongst academics on the issue 
of the appropriate discount rate(s) to apply to the various 
t 
1. "Their review of the literature and formulation of the problem was 
undoubtedly facilitated by thinking on the subject because it has 
resulted in a model that I believe is both completely general and 
accurate. " GORDON [61, p245 3. 
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cash-flows : the discord is particularly loud over the 
consequences of discounting the depreciation tax shelter (which 
is effectively lost because the company has leased rather than 
purchased outright) at the company's cost of capital, instead of 
the after-tax interest rate on debt. J&L argue that K is 
the appropriate rate because it accords with conventional capital 
budgeting practice; however, this is refuted by a number of 
writers .2 
"Because of its predictability, the tax shield from depreciation 
should be discounted at the same rate as the after-tax lease 
3 
payments, namely at- d rather than K. " . 
LUSZTIG [91, p1017] 
By contrast other writers insist that leasing-should not be 
considered as a special case but should be treated uniformly 
using the cost of capital as a discount rate for all cash-flows : 
"If, as J&L argue, the lease project is like any other 
capital project, then it ought to be analysed on a 
consistent basis. Specifically, the cash-flows of the 
1. Commentators note that the results of the numerical illustration 
provided by J&L changes from a net advantage to leasing of 1043 
to a much reduced net advantage of 5 if the interest rate on debt 
is used when discounting the depreciation tax shelter. 
2. BIERttAf C18, p1021.1; GORDON [61, p248]; ROENFELDT & OSTERYOUrIG1117, p793; 
SCHALL [ 120, pl2l l J; and MOYER [103, p40 3. 
3. But see note on page 328 ; for circumstances when the contractual 
certainty is by no means assured. 
4. LEV & ORGLER [88, p1022]; SARTORIS & PAULC118, p48];, and BOWERE152, p31J. 
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lease project should be discounted at one rate and that 
rate should be the fire's overall cost of capital encompassing 
the costs of all forms of capital. It would seem to us that 
any treatment other than this would be inconsistent. with 
other capital projects and would tend to treat leasing as 
a special case of the capital project analysis. " 
CLARK, JA1 TOR, II & GALAN [35, p1015/16 1. 
BOUER [151, p29I asserts that it is inequitable to discount the 
tax relief foregone when leasing at the higher rate K,. while 
simultaneously discounting the tax relief on lease repayments at 
the lower rate of d. Such a procedure can only result in a biased 
analysis which favours leasing. BOWER recomends the use of K 
when discounting tax relief [151, p31 , arguing that taxation rates 
and the amount and timing of taxation payments are uncertain and risky, 
indeed they "may be systematic", as such the after-tax interest rate 
is "too low a rate to apply to tax shelter terms. 
Another criticism levelled at the J&L model is widely reported 
througjout the literature: 1 
"Despite their concern about exiciuding "explicit finance 
charges such as dividend and interest payments as part of 
the cash-flows, " L is left to include just such financing t 
costs. When such payments are discounted at d, J, & L retain 
some measure of the double counting which they purport to avoid. " 
LUSZTIG [91, pl017 a 
1. SARTORIS & PAUL (118, p48j; LUSZTIG [91, plOl7j; and LEV & ORGLER 
[88, p1022/3]. 
t" 
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LUSZTIG then argues that if J&L are successfully to exclude the 
financing cash-flows from the lease repayment, the lease alternative 
would always be chosen. This arises as follows : if the salvage 
value and pre-tax cash operating costs are disregarded and taxation 
is 50% then : 
D NPV =NT 
(Dt+L*t) 
P t=1 - 
(1 + d) 
t 
where L*t is the lease repayment net of the imputed interest 
charges, and L NPV is as specified by J&L. 
As r T(Dt + L*t) will equal P when T is 50% -- by definition -- 
t=1 
it follows automatically that A NPV will always be negative and the 
lease always chosen, [ 91, p1018J. 
"Intuitively, if we assume 100ö debt financing as an alternative 
to leasing and hold interest charges to be equal under these 
approaches, it becomes apparent that the present value of 
, 
tax shields occasioned by Dt will, in fact, be significantly 
greater than those arising from L*t (given that earlier lease 
payments are largely comprised of financing costs) .... 
Repayments on the debt financing, thus become the critical 
decision variable and we are very quickly returned to 
approaches suggested in existing literature which do in fact 
separate the decision to "acquire" from the decision about how 
the "acquisition" is to be financed. " 
LUSZTIG [91, p1018 3. 
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Another rejection of the lease-or-buy alternative suggested by 
J&L comes from LEV &. ORGLER : 
"The lease-or-borrow approach seems, however, to make a lot 
of sense since the two alternatives - leasing and borrowing - 
are equivalent from the point of view of financial risk. 
-LEV & ORGLER [88, p10231. 
The need to "neutralise" financial risk in the decision model, 
according to LEV & ORGLER, necessitates a lease-or-borrow approach 
because a lease-or-buy analysis cannot take account of the risk 
differences resulting fron capital structure changes. 
The wealth of corment initiated by the JOHNSO! 1 & LEWELLEN proposal 
is indicative of the worldwide growth of leasing and the 
corresponding need to improve old techniques and provide new ones. 
However, the issues posed at the beginning of this Chapter still 
remain largely unresolved; indeed, academic thinking on the 
leasing decision has, if anything, proliferated and'diversified 
since the J&L debate. 
The next paper to be considered is by GORDON who differs from the 
arguments of J&L in four specific areas :_ 
"l. the correct discount rate for risk free cash-flows; 
2. a difference in term between the lease payments and 
the life of the capital asset; 
3. differences in risk among the components of the buy 
and lease cash-flows; and, 
4. neutralizing the implicit debt financing tied into the 
lease alternative. 
GORDOII [61, p245]. ' 
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'ý" GORDON differs from previous writers in actually'arguing the MM [101 3 
capital budgeting model, using the tax shield approach, which 
recognises the risk between operating cash-flows and depreciation 
tax shields. Thus, the NPV of the buy option is : 
N 
NPVP =-P+z 
(1-T)Ft 
+EN 
Tgt 
t=1 t=1 
(1+K)t (1+j)t 
where 'j' 
' 
is the interest rate on risk free cash-flows. Although 
GORDON wishes to compare leasing with buying there would appear to 
be a semantic volte-face implicit in his model because the buy 
option is really borrow-and-buy. GORDON notes : 
"To neutralise the tax advantage in the lease option due to 
the implicit debt financing we reduce P to (1 - T)L0 and replace 
the balance of P with-a loan. The amount of the loan is P-(1-T)Lo, 
and it will be paid in N periods by means of equal annual 
payments that cover interest and principal at the interest rate 
at which the corporation borrows. " 
GORDON [61, p248] 
UPVP then becomes' : [61, p248] 
NPVP = -(1+T)LQ -E 
(1-T)(St Plt)+Nt 
+N 
(1+T)Ft 
+ 
E1 TDt 
t=1 t t=1 t t=1 t (l+j) (1+K) (1+j) 
The lease alternative also incorporates the risk-free rate for the 
lease repayments and the operating costs assumed by the Lessor but 
0 
1. Note :S= equivalent loan payment and N= implicit principal in 
that payrent. Expanding the second term gives: -St+T(S Nt) which 
istthesloan payment less the tax deductability of the implicit 
ir. 
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payable if the asset is owned (Ot) Thus, the PJPV of the lease 
is :2 GORDON [61, p247J. 
f4PVL = -(1-T)Lo-Z 
(1-T)Lt +iN 
(1-T)Ft 
+ 
ýE (1-T)Ot 
- 
RN 
t=1 t t=1 t t=1 tN (1+j) (1+K) (1+j) (I+K) 
Accordingly, the advantage of buying over leasing is expressed in 
the following equation : GORDON [61, p248 I. 
N flPVP-NPVL =E 
t=1 
(1-T)(Lt St)-TPIt-(1-T)Ot +. 
TDt + Rrl 
0 +j)t (1+K)rý (1 + j)t 
In a subsequent 'coment' HENDERSON suggest that GORDON has made 
a mistake when "neutralising" the implicit debt financing 
alternative. It is argued that the GORDON model implicitly assures 
that greater leverage is-available with debt financing than with the 
lease option. Accordingly, this introduces a bias towards buying. 
The issue hinges on the size of the first debt repayment : 
" at any positive tax rate (T) the first payment GORDON 
proposes under the buy option will be less than the first=, 
lease payment, i. e. WL0>L0(i-T) for any T>O. Necessarily the 
amount of remaining debt will be greater- under the. buy option. 
This approach is at considerable variance with earlier attempts 
1. "0t is discounted at the risk free rate on the assumption, frequently 
correct, that the cash outlays assumed by the Lessor are fixed charges 
subject to little or no uncertainty " [61, p247 ], the lease repayments 
are discounted at the risk free rate because they "are legal 
obligations of the firm" [61, p2471 
2. The salvage value is somewhat more complicated than that indicated 
here, GORD0º1 allows for the possible purchase of the asset at 
period N. As this is not permitted under U. K. revenue law it has 
been omitted in this presentation. 
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to analyse the problem where the avowed purpose was to 
make the degree of leverage equivalent between the two 
alternatives. " 
HENDERSO 1 [73, p149 ] 
HENDERSON recommends that the technique indicated by GORDON could 
be improved if the debt alternative was made more comparable with 
the lease when computing the initial and subsequent payments. The 
proposed alteration to the model would retain the same form of 
cash-flow for the-buy option (excluding the loan) and amend the. 
-lease specification'so. as to define 
" .. the cost of the asset as the cash price, plus the, present 
value of any increase, in payments due to the use of a lease 
rather than a comparably structured loan, but reduced by the 
present value ofany added tax shields available because of 
the-lease. 11 
HENDERSON _73, p148 1 
Thus, the 'corrected' lease cash-flow profile should 1e as. follows; 
with the net advantage shown below : 
14PVL = -P-E, 
(Lt -st-) +E 
T[Lt (St Nt)]+ ýE (1-T)Ft + 
SEI (1-T)Ot 
+ RPM 
t=o t t=o t t=1 t t= lt (1 +K)N (1+j) (1+j) (1+K) (1+j) (1+K) 
NPVP-NPVL =g 
(1-T)(Lt St)-TNt Nl (1-T)Ot ýE TDt + 
RN 
t=o , ý' 
(l+j)t 
t=1 
(l+j)t t=1(l+j)t (1+K)N 
"The immediate (t=o) advantage should accrue to leasing because 
none of a loan down payment is tax deductible as is all of a 
lease, payment. That is, with equivalent borrowing (equal 
- 344 - 
first payments) Lo=So and So=No. So for t=o, 
(1-T)(Lt St)-TNt / (1+j)t = -TNt, and Nt Lo; therefore 
the first term would equal -TLo. Simply put, the 
immediate advantage to leasing is the tax shield provided 
by the first payment. Gordon's formulation overlooks this. 
HENDERSON [73, p1491 
Another"varignt on the theme of correct debt comparators is offered 
by BLOOMFIELD & t4A [19 1, who suggest that the technique proposed 
by BHW gives an "incorrect and, misleading evaluation" which produces 
a ., sub optimal purchase plan. "1. -To-achieve an , 
exact 'congruity. of 
financing options they argue that*the alternative debt plan should 
.: _impose ". identical contractual obligations" -with the lease-schedule. 
"In order to put the borrow and purchase plan on an equivalent 
basis the loan repayments must equal the lease payments in 
period t=l, 2... N. With this uniformity of payment streams 
the two options are on a strictly comparable basis - each 
option utilises the, same, portion of the firm's borrowing 
capacity and restores it at the same rate during the period 
from t=1 to t=N. ". 
BLOOMFIELD & MA [19, p298 
Thus, the company should borrow an amount Mo at period t=o and 
incur a series of obligations 51 , S2 .... SN which are of the 
same size and pattern as\. the lease schedule Ll, L2.... LN. 
1. It will be recalled that BHW [20] constructed a financing option 
which incorporated a loan limited to the amount of the purchase 
price with repayment proportional to the lease payments. 
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"With the firm paying interest at rate 'd' on its borrowings, 
the amount do which the firm can borrow and repay with 
St=Lt for t=1 ... N is given by : 
N 
Mo =E 
ýt 
t=1 
(1+d)t 
BLOOMFIELD & MA [19, p295 ] 
One of the requirements of the BLOOMFIELD & MA model is that the 
company maintain a "target average debt-equity ratio" 
1 The 
problem presented by this assumption is that for debt instruments 
to "utilise the same portion of the firm's borrowing capacity and 
restore it at the same rate" necessitates repayment schedules 
which have the same profile, interest rate, and time period. 
Otherwise the capital recovery and/or capital outstanding in the 
debt and lease contracts will vary and, ipso facto, the 'borrowing 
capacity absorbed and restored will differ. No amount of artificial 
manipulation can ever hope to bring into correspondence two 
fundamentally different repayment schedules. This is the case with 
BLOO14FIELD & MA's solution : the CAPITAL RECOVERY TABLE for each 
of the alternatives is still dissimilar even after the debt comparator 
has been amended. 
Novel to their approach, however, is the use of an equity discount 
rate for all the cash-flows in the analysis : 
1. However, minor variations in the ratio over time. resulting from 
the irregular nature of financing issues does not affect the 
cost of equity. [19, p297 ]. This removes a most critical 
interdependency, 
f 
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"The justification of this approach lies in the stated 
objectives of the firm -'the maximisation of the value 
of the outstanding shares. If firms are to make 
decisions which are consistent with this objective then 
the discount rate employed in the comparison of financing 
alternatives'must be the same rate which the market uses 
in valuing the expected returns to shareholders. " 
BLOO1FIELD & MA [19, p299 
To sustain this objective BLOOMFIELD & MA must make a further 
complementary assumption that the company believes that the 
addition of fixed charges under a lease would be viewed by the 
market in the same light as equivalent fixed charges arising from 
new borrowings, and that acceptance of the lease--or a borrowing 
alternative would not affect the firm's equity capitalisation rate. 
l 
Given these assumptions (and an investment project associated 
with the lease that is acceptable when evaluated at the weighted 
average cost of capital [19, p297 ]) the lease option and purchase 
plan equations may be stated 
BLOOMFIELD & MA [19, p298/9] 
1. GRI! YER notes [64, p232 1, "their assumption that the equity cost 
is insensitive to changes in gearing would be questioned by many 
informed readers. " A leasing paper by KELLER & PETERSEN [81 3 
reviewed shortly, considers this problem in their evaluation 
proposal. 
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Lease cash-flows : 
nNNn, E Ft Lo (1-T) - E, Lt +E TLt +Z (Ot(1-T) - TDt 
t=1 t=1 t=1 t=1 
Purchase-Borrow plan :i 
NN 
E F+ M- P- ES+ET .A t=l t° t=l t t=l t 
as Ft is common, and Lt = St for t=1 to N, the iIPV formulations are : 
NPVL = -L0(1-T) +E 
TLt 
+ 
Ot(1-T) - TDt 
t=1 
(1+ke)t 
t=1 
(1+ke)t 
N 
NPVP1 = 1,10-P +ET. 
At 
t=1 
(1+ke) 
One extraordinary feature of this model is the possible range of 
values that the equivalent loan can take, each of which has a 
different effect upon the evaluation and the initial capital 
1. This equation is to include "the expected proceeds from asset 
disposal" if relevant. 
iýý 1 
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requirement. 
l 'BLOOMFIELD & MA note that one of the following 
relationships must hold for Pao : 
1. Pto<P-L0 2. Mo =P- Lo 
'3. P- Lo <M<P0 -- 4.110 
Assuming that the borrow option is selected, then implicit in these 
relationships is the requirement for a supplementary injection of 
capital in addition to the amount raised by the equivalent loan. 
Expressed simply, if state 1. occurs then. the company requires a 
further capital input of > Lo; if 2. occurs = Lo; if 3. occurs . 
< Lo but greater than zero. BLOOMFIELD & MA explain each of the 
above alternatives as follows; [19, p299 32 
1 
- "If 1 holds the firm would require additional funds on hand in 
period t=o under the loan alternative than under the lease 
option. " Thus, the amount raised from the loan plus the cash 
1. It is interesting to note that SCHALL 1120 ]suggests a somewhat 
similar approach, in that, in his example he uses an asset costing 
£1500 and makes the comparison between a lease contract for that 
amount and a purchase alternative of E1200 debt, andf 300 equity. 
There is no explanation in the text to justify this division other 
than a footnote: "Lease and debt-financing of an asset are similar 
in that both involve a fixed obligation of the firm. However, lease 
payments are necessarily tax deductible whereas there may be a limit 
on the proportion of firm earnings that is permitted tax deductibility; 
also, bond indentures and other loan agreements generally involve more 
restrictive covenants than do lease agreements, e. g. dividends, working 
capital requirements, additional leverage by the firm, etc. These 
differences imply ... that the most 
desirable alternative to lease 
financing may not be 100% debt financing. Whether lease and debt 
obligations are regarded as equivalent, upon leasing an asset the firm 
may reduce its other debt to some degree to maintain a desired degree 
of firm leverage. " SCHALL E120, p1207, fnl0 a 
2. It is worthy of note that this is the first published attempt to 
model the surely unavoidable three way relationship of leasing, own 
funds and borrowing. As such it is a welcome development from the 
excessive pre-occupation with the-pair-only comparison of lease-vs- borrow or lease-vs-buy. BLOOMFIELD & HA however do not signally 
develop this inherent richness in their model. 
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available from L. is less than the cost of the asset and so 
further internal funds are needed to initiate the borrow and 
buy plan. 
- "If 2 applies then funds requirements in period t=o are the 
same under both options. " This is self explanatory in that the 
loan plus L0 equals the cost of the asset. 
- "If 3 holds then the firn raises a loan greater than is 
necessary to cover the asset purchase price, given that the 
funds required for Lo are available. " In this case the loan 
raised is larger than required, Poo+Lo >. P, and the "surplus" 
capital is invested (internally or externally) at the weighted 
average cost of capital. The excess capital will be the portion 
of L. not required to commence the borrow and buy option. 
"' "If 4 holds the firn would have surplus funds equal to or greater 
than L. in the initial period. " In other words, the pre-assigned 
Lo will not be required for. the borrow option but wi 11 be invested 
along with the surplus loan at the cost of capital. 
The BLOONFIELD & MA approach is criticised by GRI IIYER 
, 
for the 
unnecessary use of an equity discount rate and the incorrect 
composition of the lump-sum borrowing alternative. ' GRINYER suggests 
that the true comparison should be between the outright purchase 
price of the asset and the tax-adjusted equivalent loan. 
"(Bloomfield & tia) emphasised the contractual payment aspect, 
, and ignored the taxation generated associated cash-flows, in 
setting up an equivalent stream of cash to be discounted to 
year zero in finding the amount borrowed (Iio). Their approach 
seems, at least to the author, to be in error because the 
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comparison should correctly be made between' alternative sets 
of cash flow implicit in the financing alternatives, and such 
cash-flows are likely to include taxation elements in addition 
to purely contractual ones. 11 
GRINYER [64, p232 ] 
Thus the notional amount which should be raised under the borrowing 
option is equivalent to the after-tax cash-flows associated with 
the lease, and is given by Go: [64, p233 
G= 
Zý (Lt 0t)(1-T)+TDt 
° t=o 
(l+i)t 
If Po, the cost of the asset, is greater than or_equal to the value 
of Go then the lease should be chosen. GRINYER shows that this 
conclusion can be achieved using the BLOOPMFIELD & MA model on the 
assumption that the equivalent loan (Mo*) equals Go from t=1-14. 
"In the above analysis leasing is viewed as an alternative to 
debt which would otherwise have been issued in achieving the 
target ratio. The crutial assumption is that leasing is viewed 
by the market as an alternative to debt with, equivalence being 
established on the basis of the after-tax cash-flows arising 
under each alternative, which assumption may be the most 
realistic at present. If this assumption is accepted there 
remains no differential cash-flows between the lease and debt 
alternatives considered, so that the equity holders' rate has 
no part to play in the-evaluation of financing by borrowing 
or leasing. 11 
GRINYER [64, p234 
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GRINYER is concerned, however, that the borrow or lease alternatives 
may imply different degrees of variability when viewed by the 
market' . 
"with the result that the cost of equity capital changes. 
to reflect the fact (which would indicate an unrecognised 
imputed cost of the leasing flows). " 
GRIPER [64, p233 
Those companies which believe the market will consider, the leasing 
option to be more risky (say), should apply an adjustment to the 
value of 
o 
based upon "the change in the market value of total 
equity in the firm as a result of the changed risk associated 
with lease rather than debt financing" [04, p233, fn3 ]. The 
correction to G0 requires that the analyst establishes the expected 
equity discount rate under each new financing alternative and then 
discount the total dividend flow to the shareholders under each 
assumption, the difference is then added to G02. However : 
"It seems likely that management will consider that it is 
not possible to make the required estimates with sufficient 
accuracy to justify the exercise, for even if the necessary 
adjustment could be estimated with adequate accuracy it might 
be immaterial in amount. " 
GRINYER [64, p233 ] 
1. But will "the market" know of leasing finance? U. K. published 
accounts are not especially forthcoming on this matter. However, 
ED18 may alter this. 
2. 'See GRIPIYER [64, p233, fn3 1 
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BLOOMFIELD & MA also expressed concern about the effects of the 
two financing options on the equity rate 
"It is possible, however, that shareholders do not regard 
lease payient obligations as equivalent to debt repayment 
obligations of equal size and timing. The equity 
capitalisation rate if the lease option was adopted then 
may differ significantly from the rate resulting from the 
alternative financing plan. Such a possibility changes the 
whole complexion of the lease evaluation problem and no 
solution is offered for this special case. " 
BLOOMFIELD & MA [19, p301/2 ] 
The formulation of the leasing problem prescribed by KELLER & 
PETERSEN [81 Jspecifically takes into consideration the 
anticipated influence of the incremental leasing decision upon the 
weighted average cost of capital and the expected return demanded 
by existing equity holders. Central to their analysis is the 
assumption that companies undertake financing decisions with the 
specific intention of naintaining a target debt-equity ratio which 
will minimise the firm's cost of capital. 
1 If the optimal financial 
structure is currently attained then the decision to lease or buy 
"may cause different incremental effects on the firm's financial 
structure depending upon the market's perception of the nature of 
the leasing transaction " [81, p408 ] In their opinion this influence 
has not been adequately considered or correctly quantified in the 
1. KELLER & PETERSEN assume the traditionally-held view of a 'U' shaped 
cost of capital curve, see [81, p406 J 
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extant literature. 
' 
"Under the buy option the financial manager can be thought to 
be expanding the size of the firm through simultaneous 
increases in debt and equity in order to maintain the optimal 
debt-equity mix. When the asset is acquired by entering into 
a lease agreement which the market perceives as a financing 
arrangement, the effect is to drive the firm away from its 
optimal debt-equity relationship and to derive a higher cost of 
capital. "2 
KELLER & PETERSEN [81, p408 , emphasis supplied. 
KELLER & PETERSEN argue that because the lease option -is financed 
totally by debt -- and therefore the optimal debt-equity relationship 
is disturbed - then the lease cash-flows should be discounted at 
the higher ("pro forma") cost of capital pertaining after the 
decision : K*. By contrast the purchase option should be discounted 
at the "after-tax target cost of capital for the firm. " [81, p409 ] 
Two new parameters are also introduced into the model, although 
they are as enigmatic and difficult to quantify as the data 
requirements for the technique previously suggested by GRIFJYER [64 ] 
1. This problem was raised by BHW much earlier in the literature : "If 
leasing changes (corporate) risk, or if reporting differences or 
other factors cause the market to act as if leasing changes this 
risk, then lease and loan alternatives can be evaluated usipg 
different (discount) rates. " BHW [20, p260 
2. As noted previously in section 4.6 and discussed later in section 9.6, 
it is not automatically to be supposed that a higher cost of capital 
will result from the use of leasing, it is possible that the change 
will be insignificant or the cost of capital may even reduce. 
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"D Re = Change in return required by existing residual equity 
to maintain market value of residual equity. 
D Rdt After-tax change in return required to naintain the 
harket value of existing debt-equity. " E 81, p409 
These terms reflect the anticipated change in the risk-return 
profile of the company following the acceptance of'leasing; however, 
no guidance is given by the authors as to how these-figures are 
established. The complete model may be stated thus: 
KELLER & PETERSEN [81, p410 & 412 
N 
NPV(P) = E, 
Ft(l-T) 
+z 
TDt 
+ 
RN 
-P 
t=1 t=1 
(1+K) t (1+K)t (1+K)N 
NN 
NPV(L) =E 
Ft(1-T) 
+E 
Lt(1-T) 
+ 
Et A Rdt +AR 
t=1 t=1 t=1 
(1+K*)t (1+K*) t (1 + K*)t 
It will be perceived that the NPV(L) calculation attempts to 
double count the marginal influences caused by the introduction of 
leasing, by including an explicit tern relating to the capital 
structure and equity holders (0 Rdt +L Re) in addition to a modified 
cost of capital discount rate. It would appear to the writer that 
one or other of the terms is permissible, but not both. Altogether, 
this contribution appears to take the discussion of lease analysis 
very little further in any really useful way. 
SCHALL [1203 disagrees with the use of a cost of capital discount 
rate in the leasing decision and suggests the approach offered by 
1. 
the Value Additivity Principle. 
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"The usual situation justifying the use of the firm's cost 
of capital (all assets with identical return distributions 
and like methods of financing) involves estimating that 
rate at which investors discount firm total returns in 
determining firm value. With assets of differing risk 
and with more than one financing option (e. g. lease or buy), 
the firm must estimate K by observing market rates or 
comparable streams; use of a firm's average is no longer valid. " 
SCHALL [120, pl208 
As was previously discussed in Chapter 5, the VAP uses the discount 
rate which market investors would apply to individual streams of 
cash-flow. Taken to its logical extreme this implies an individually 
determined discount rate for each component of the composite lease- 
or-purchase decision cash-flows; and "such rates are likely to vary 
from project to project" C120, pl208 J. The "expected return 
discounting model" can be expressed as follows, by estimating the 
increase in shareholders wealth '(Sld) as a result of each decision. 
SCHALL [120, pl207 & 1210-3 . 
SLJ(P) = 
rE (Ft Ot) (1-T)+ TDt 
+ 
RN 
+E 
t=1 - t=1 
" (1 + k9)t (1+ k0 )N 
Pý (1-T)Ft Pý (1-T)L S. W(L) =E_Et 
t=, -t t=1 
(1+ kp) (1+ kL)t 
At. T 
(1+ kA) t 
Where KgK A, KF &K L are the discount rates appropriate to each 
cash-flow stream. SCHALL suggests that in estimating K L' for example, 
"the firm might observe the valuation of lessee firms with similar 
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assets as those being evaluated. ... If L , is a relatively low 
risk stream, kL may approximate the borrowing rate kA. " [120, p1209 ] 
Whether the first half of this quote is, a realistic suggestion is a 
matter of opinion, but it must surely be an exceedingly optimistic, 
one in view of the current restricted disclosure of leasing information 
in company accounts. 
This. approach to the analysis of a lease has many critics, of whom the 
researcher is one, because it exemplifies the concept of 
"discriminatory financing" discussed earlier in Chapter 4 of the 
Thesis. ' To reiterate the position taken here : 
"The firm's periodic net cash-flow is composed of a very large 
number of positive and negative flows, each associated with a 
different degree of uncertainty or predictability. It is 
clearly inappropriate to single out one flow .... for special 
treatment. Either a complete breakdown of the net cash-flow 
is performed (AN INSURMOUNTABLE TASK INDEED), or a unique 
discount rate applied to the net cash-flow stream, as is 
conventional in the capital budgeting literature. " 
LEV & ORGLER [88, p1022 ];, eriphasis (capitals) supplied. 
SCHALL also acknowledges that : 
"The above (technique) is not meant to gainsay the practical 
difficulties in ascertaining the k terms .... For the practitioner ... 
the analysis here is meant to suggest that some attempt be made 
1. Notable writers who argue this position are VAN HORNE C138, pplO5-110 ] 
and WESTON & BRIGHAM C144, pp348-3527; within the leasing literature 
LEV & ORGLER E88, p10221 and SARTORIS & PAUL [118, p48 j are 
representative of opinion. See also FAWTHROP & TERRY [49, p83 ]. 
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to adjust for individual asset risk even though a precise 
determination is impossible. '' 
SCHALL [120, p1209 1 
At issue is the problen of practical implementation : the first 
sentence of this quotation might reasonably be described as a 
masterpiece of understatement. Undeniably, the technique proposed 
by SCHALL is intricate and exceedingly difficult to execute. 
Theoretical rigour is not to be abandoned, but the criteria of 
feasibility of analysis and measurability of variables cannot be 
altogether disregarded in the search for an economically efficient 
decision algorithm. Leasing is not merely a pleasant academic 
debate. 
III A REVIEW OF THE LEASING LITERATURE : IRR ! IODELS 
A significant section of the leasing literature addresses itself 
exclusively to the problem of establishing the implicit interest 
rate, or internal rate of return, of a lease agreement. As far as 
can be ascertained most of the models which have been generated 
emanate from writers in the USA, which naturally results in the 
adoption of tax and depreciation policies which do not reflect 
current U. K. practice. As these. have asignificant bearing on 
the outcome of the decision, a special discussion of implicit 
interest rates within the U. K. context will be undertaken in Chapter 8. 
Meanwhile, the extant literature on IRR models will be considered. 
DOENGES vindicates the search fora correct assessment of a lease 
contract's IRR as follows : 
"It may often be desirable to have a rate of return figure 
for a leasing alternative as a means of measuring the cost 
71 
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of leasing as a financing source of funds. Such a figure 
can be useful when compared with interest rates of borrowing 
alternatives, or used as a means of comparison of two or more 
leasing plans. In addition a leasing "rate of return" figure 
must be used when a lease is included in calculating a firm's 
weighted average cost of capital " 
DOENGES [38, p32 ] 
Perhaps the first major IRR lease model 
1 
was developed by BRIGHAM 
but within the context of an effort to establish the rate of return 
on a lease contract to a Lessor. Solving for 'r', the implicit 
after-tax interest rate, the model equates the present value of 
the lease payments after tax relief with the cost of the asset 
less the tax shield foregone by depreciation, and incorporating, if 
appropriate, the salvage value of the equipment at the termination 
of the lease. Thus, 
BRIGHAM [21, p72/3 ] 
0= -P + E, 
Lt 
_ 
EJ (Lt - Dt)T + RN 
t=1 t=1 
(l+r)t (1 + r) 
t (1 + r)t 
This model was to re-energe in the literature., with, the signs 
reversed so that it could be applied to the Lessee, see DOENGES 
[ 38, p35 1, but largely it has been ignored or not quoted. 
As FINDLAY [55, p2323 observed : the first pure lease model appears 
to have been presented as a solution to an example without text 
1. If we disregard the "Profitability Index" method by HcEACHRON 192, p218 ] 
which was more akin to an NPV model although some subsequent writers 
suggest it was an IRR model. 
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comment in QUIRIN: " The formula, shown below, excluded the 
effect of residual values (assuming it to be zero) and somewhat 
strangely but in common with BRIGHAM assumes all cash-flows 
cornence at period 1. 
QUIRIN [113, p119 
N 
0=pE Lt. 
t=1 
(1 + rat 
+EN 
(Lt-Dt)T 
t=1 
+ r)t 
Arguably, the critical debate in the IRR lease literature was 
initiated by BEECHY. Believing, as he did, that the investment 
and financing decisions should be conducted seperately, BEECHY 
argued that-the use of a cost of capital appraisal rate in the - 
leasing algorithms of VANCIL, BHW and FERRARA was in error. As the 
cost of a financing source was an integral part of the weighted 
average cost of capital it followed that "it was improper to turn 
around and use the cost of capital to evaluate the cost of debt" 
[14, p376 ]. To BEECHY the cost of capital should be the result 
of the financing decision and not the cause 
l. His misgivings 
with NPV models were ; 
"Firstly, it is difficult to justify conceptually the diyision 
of the cash-flow effects of a lease. Secondly, the results 
of the analyses, being expressed as present values, are not 
interpretted in the same manner as loans (i. e. effective 
interest rates). And thirdly, the results are dependent 
" upon the cost of capital or cut-off rate used in discounting 
the tax effects. " 
BEECHY C14, p377 ] 
1. See also VAN HORNE [138, p576] who concurs with this argument. 
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To counter these weaknesses the "effective interest method" 
was devised on the conviction that "decision makers are 
accustomed to working with effective interest rates as indicators 
of the cost of debt" C14, p375 J. The validity of this observation 
is borne out in the empirical work supporting this Thesis. 
' The 
implicit interest rate model computed by BEECHY incorporates 
repayments on an "equivalent loan" which mirrors the same pattern as the 
lease instalments. This technique, corresponding. to that suggested by 
BHW [20 1, provides a figure for-the difference in tax deductions under 
a lease compared with an equivalent debt source at an assured 
standard debt cost, see BEECHY C14, p377/8 ]. The before-tax implicit 
interest rate model could then be enumerated as follows = 
BEECHY [14, p378 3 . _, 
N 11 
0=P-E Lt +E 
t=o t t=o (l+i) 
(Lt Dt At)T 
(1 + i) 
t 
MITCHELL [99 ]disputed BEECHY'S method of analysis noting that it 
failed to consider the tax deductability of interest. In order to 
establish a correct after-tax implicit interest rate the following 
amendment was proposed 
MITCHELL [99, p310/11 I 
0=P-zN Lt +E 
(Lt - Dt)T 
t=o - t=o 
(1 + r)t (1 + r)t 
1. See Chapters 7 and 8 below. 
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BEECHY concedes that there is an implicit error in his methodology 
and an adjustment is needed to his original equation to bring 
it into correspondence with MITCHELL : 
"In (Ely original method) the loan interest is permitted to 
offset the implicit interest in the lease, so that the tax 
adjustment actually applies only to the difference between 
the depreciation under borrowing and the "implicit depreciation" 
in the lease. Therefore the gross amount of the interest is 
allowed to flow through to the final cash-flow, yielding a 
before-tax interest calculation. Unfortunately, it works 
exactly right only when the lease payments are"identical to 
the equivalent loan repayments (i. e. L,. = St).,. Otherwise, ' the V 
premium of interest charged by the Lessor is-affected by 
taxes in the calculation and the resulting rate is a hybrid 
partially before-tax and partially after-tax. The correct 
statement of the original equation should be : 
0=P- E Lt +E 
t=o t t=o (1 +i) 
(St Dt At)T 
(1 + ijt 
This will permit the full amount of the lease payments to be 
discounted, since the sum of depreciation will always equal the total 
equivalent loan repayments 
N 
t=o 
BEECHY [15, p770 
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z -_ 
ýý.. . 
BEECHY then proceeds to illustrate the equivalence of the two 
models using numerical examples [15, p771/72] which demonstrate 
that their respective before and after-tax procedures will always 
produce the sane yield. However, in a later paper by DOENGES [38J, 
he suggests that current tax practice in the U. S. A. would normally 
indicate that the after-tax yield will typically be higher'than 
the (tax adjusted) before-tax yield; and in consequence the former 
mode of analysis is to be prefered by management. 
"While it is possible for the after-tax cost of. leasing to 
equal the before-tax cost multiplied, by one minus the tax 
rate, -the' occurrence of-. such an event is unlikely. -Differences 
between imputed lease principal` repayments and depreciation 
charges and differences between residual and book salvage 
values, 'resulting in variations of the tax shield effect, ` 
require the use of (the equation below) in calculating the 
cost of leasing. " 
-DOEPNGES '[38, p36=3 
Thus, the after-tax IRR of leasing versus purchasing can be 
determined as follows :.: _ 
DOENGES E38, p351 
0=P- Eý Lt +N 
(Lt Dt)T 
t=1 t=1 
(1 + r)t (1 + r)t 
RN 
t (1 + r) 
It will be recalled that this equation is the same as that 
presented by BRIGHAM [21 ]but with the signs reversed. Although 
DOENGES does not contribute to the IRR methodology he nevertheless 
offers aclearer insight into the implications of the algorithm and 
its sensitivity to changes in the data imputs to the model. 
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"First, it is likely that because of the lost depreciation tax 
shield, a lease that is otherwise comparable to a debt 
arrangement will often bear a higher cost. The result will be 
a higher weighted average cost of capital. Second, the tax 
rate in effect will clearly affect the relative desirability 
(in terms of IRR cost) of. leasing and borrowing alternatives. 
Because of the tax effect, the cost of debt tends to increase 
with a decrease in the tax rate, since i(l-T) increases as T 
decreases. In the case of leasing, however, the effect of a 
decrease in the tax rate is at least partially offset by the 
fact that, although the term-L(1-T) will. increase, the term DT 
will decrease as taxes decrease. As a result leasing should 
become relatively more desirable when, compared to borrowing as 
tax rates are lowered; and vice-versa as tax rates increase. 
Finally, 
... the 
less accelerated the depreciation method 
the ... lower is the after-tax cost of leasing, and thus a 
lower weighted average cost of capital-. (wi. l1 result), with 
the reverse holding true for a change to a more accelerated 
method of depreciation. " 
DOEUGES [38, p37/8 
Progress in the literature of IRR models is perceptibly slow in 
comparison with the contemporary evolution of IPV algorithms. A 
late article by FINDLAY duplicates the sensitivity analysis 
presented above, confirming its conclusions, and proposing a simple 
extension to DOEfGES' procedure by allowing for prepayments of the 
lease instalments, operating savings (0t) and salvage value. Thus 
1. MITCHELL [99, p314 ] made the same point earlier, noting that 
"accelerated depreciation makes leasing relatively more expensive. " 
v 
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FINDLAY [55, p233] 
o= (P-Lo) -tl 
Lt-(Lt-1-Dt-0t)T-Ot 
+ 
(Lt1_1-Dry-OM)T-ON-RN 
(1 +r)t, (1 + r)rý 
The only feature to distinguish this equation from its precedents - 
save the alteration to the initial cash-flow - is the final term 
which "would consist only of the tax shield, operating savings and 
the salvage value of the asset lost through leasing. [55, p233 
Coming"inbetween the two previous contributions is a model by 
ROENFELDT &. OSTERYOUtIG C1171whi ch introduces a new. aspect into IRR 
decision procedures vide "certainty equivalents": R_& 0 argue. ' 
that the techniques of VRIJCIL' & GHW-produce two `different' costs 
for a lease because they utilise different borrowing opportunity 
rates for the debt conparitor : yet nothing has materially 
changed in the lease itself. As such they contend that the cost of 
a lease should be structured and determined independently of, the 
borrowing rate [117, p76 ]. They feel that the nodel proposed by- 
BEECHY is an improvement on NPV-type analyses, nonetheless they 
note of BEECHY'S nethod : 
"The lease cost is still sensitive to interest rate changes,. 
the interest costs and associated tax shields are discounted 
at the two different rates, and the cash-flows are unadjusted 
for risk which renders the calculation of the effective 
percentage cost difficult to interpret. " 
ROENFELDT & OSTERYOUNG (117, p77] 
R&0 recommend a nodel which has the following features 
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"First, the expected operating costs that would be incurred 
with a purchase but which are included in the lease payment 
trust be subtracted from the lease ... i 
Second, the tax shield from depreciation nust be added to 
the after-tax lease payment ... 'the depreciation tax shield 
is'a penalty or opportunity cost because the asset is not 
purchased. 
Third, the salvage value, is adjusted for risk by multiplying 
it by a certainty-equivalent coefficient or risk-adjustment 
factor o( t. It 
ROENFELDT & OSTERYOUiiG [117, p78/9 3 
Thus ; -their model establishes=-"r" - _the after-tax, adjusted, cost; of 
leasing and compares it with the after=tax borrowing rate : 
ROENFELDT & OSTERYOUNG [117, p79] 
L 0) (1-T) +D TR 0= p (t att ta tý PI 
,. 
R&0 consider the advantages of this method to be : 
"First it focuses exclusively on the financing decision without 
intermingling it with the investment: decision. Second, only 
those costs which are relevant to the method of financing are 
considered, and all the costs are evaluated on an after-tax 
basis. Third, the cost of leasing is insensitive to changes 
in the interest rate on borrowing. Finally, all the costs 
are adjusted for risk which permits a meaningful calculation 
of one percentage cost for each financing alternative. " 
ROENFELDT & DSTERYOUNG [117, p79 ] 
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The problem of risk adjusted cash-flow was discussed when the 
leasing paper by SCHALL [120 ]was reviewed earlier. However, it 
is worthwhile to make one additional , point concerning the 
implementation of R& 0's proposal. In a numerical example they 
"assume a certainty - equivalent coefficient of-1.0 for maintenance 
and insurance costs each year and 0.9592 for the salvage, value in 
year 6. " [117, p793 
The writers give no indication of the method of estimation, origin 
or rationale behind-the, coefficient for salvage value -- which, at 
an accuracy of four decimal places, must surely-be considered 
absurd in the confines of practical application. 
Thus far no cornent has been made about the possible repercussions 
of a lease cash-flow series with multiple rates of return : what iw 
TEICHROEW, ROBICHEK and tIONTALBANO [128] have termed a "mixed 
project. " There has been abrief exchange in the literature between' 
MITCHELL E 99, p3091 and BEECHY [15, p772/3] on the problem of multiple 
returns, but it was adjudicated tobe "substantially irrelevant-to 
the problem of lease evaluation " C15, p7733 
This view- is not shared ' by , 
the writer. Arguably this topic is of 
sufficient importance to warrant a ful. 1 discussion of, the 
consequences and implications of a mixed financing project and a 
review of the possible difficulties which may be encountered when 
evaluating the implicit yield of such a contract. As such, the 
matter will be pursued further during Chapter 8 when a relevant 
example will be devised using U. K. data. 
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6.4 CONCLUSION 
Throughout this review of the leasing literature it has been 
possible to trace the development of various algorithms and 
models which endeavour to solve the leasing decision. However, 
one conclusion is clear at-the completion of this exercise : no 
convergence of opinion or solution procedure has emerged. 
Various problems are present in the leasing decision which do 
not correspond with the 'norm-al' pattern established in financial 
theory of neatly isolating the investment and financing decisions. 
Four distinct controversies may be noted in summary,,: 
1. There are those writers vwho. argue-that the I_& F decisions 
should be conducted independently- and inconsequence . the 
analysis of a lease rests solely on an appraisal of the 
financing decision. 
2. Those writers who assume that an optimal debt-equity ratio 
exists and that any trespass of this ratio should attract a 
penalty cost ; this is the price the company must pay'for 
using a lease. 
3. Those writers who, in striving for an equitable "like-with- 
like" appraisal, construct often ingenious, but none the less 
exceedingly complex repayment schedules for the debt 
equivalent ... irrespective of whether they exist or can 
be negotiated. 
4. Those writers who reason that the leasing decision should be 
conducted with more than one discount rate in order to 
capture the different degrees of "riskyness" present in 
the parameters of the leasing cash-flows. 
I 
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All of these approaches are at variance with the arguments, 
presented in this Thesis and show a serious disregard for the 
critical interdependencies which abound in financial 
management. Outside the theoretical framework of "perfect 
markets" all of these arguments are redundant and subject, to 
the criticism of "discriminatory analysis. " 
1 New approaches 
must be sought which have at their core a desire to solve. the 
integrated I&F decision which characterises a lease 
appraisal. 
One area of serious neglect in the. extant literature is the' - 
almost total disregard of the circumstances which surround-the 
'". w4 ^, decision to lease. Significant questions,. are.: what is, the... 
relationship of the leasing decision to thQ. remainder of the 
capital budget; what financing options are realistically open 
to the company; what rationale dictated-the decision to lease 
the particular project in question and not another one which 
had been allocated outright-purchase finance; is the' taxation 
strategy compatible with the leasing decision; what is the 
effect of the leasing decision upon the profitability of the 
(previously accepted) set of projects -- has the decision 
significantly altered the marginal efficiency of capital or' 
the weighted average cost of capital, rendering previous NPV 
calculations incorrect and project ranking in error; and, 
finally, if leasing contracts have equivalent implicit costs 
does the shape of the repayment profile effect the decision 
criterion? 
1. See section 9.3,1, below 
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These issues have not been explored satisfactorily in the 
literature, if at all, which produces an underlying weakness 
in the appraisal methodologies. Arguably, this stems inter alia, 
from a serious deficiency of empirical evidence and understanding 
of leasing decisions in the practical-environment. Consequently, 
the proposed models fail to encompass the richness of the leasing 
decision. As such the following Chapterswill explore the 
questions raised and attempt to clarify them in relation to the 
total I&F decision set. 
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CHAPTER 7 
TIE USE OF LEASING FINAUCE IN U. K. 
CORPORATE FINANCING STRATEGIES --- 
APB II1DUSTRIAL SURVEY 
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7.1 INTRODUCTION 
As was demonstrated in Chapter 6, normative discussion of 
lease evaluation abounds in the literature of finance, but there 
is a serious dearth of information on how U. K. corporate 
financial management actually perceives and uses this method 
of financing. ' 
The results and observations that follow are drawn fron extensive 
industrial field research into the corporate use of debt and 
lease financing. 2 The study, carried out over the period 
January - July 1974, was divided into two parts. 
I. A survey involving senior executives of 54 major corporations 
located in the U. K. who agreed to conplete_a questionnaire on 
their corporate financing policies and postures, and, in the 
majority of cases, to discuss their answers during subsequent 
intervie; vs. 
2. A survey involving the controlling management of 10 
individual lease financing organisations based in the U. K. 
I. Although not directly relevant to the U. K. capital market, 
there have been two other studies of a reasonably similar 
nature in the U. S. A. (the first is now out of date -- although it is still frequently quoted in discussions on leasing -- and the 
second is of a somewhat specialised nature). The results contribute 
little towards our understanding of U. K. attitudes towards lease 
financing. See VANCIL & ANTHONY C 132 ] and btcGUGAU & CAVES C 95.1 
2. ACKNOWLEDGMENT. The researcher would like to thank the NORflAPl- 
TMIJ UFFUifb; -c/o THE DANK OF ENGLAND, for the necessary financial 
support to undertake this research field study. 
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The questionnaire and related interviews were later 
followed by more extensive discussions with representatives 
of leading U. K. finance houses and industrial banks at two 
seminars arranged at tlarwick University in late 1974 
industrial representatives were also present at these neetings. 
The seminars performed an important function in the research 
progra, e, for they allowed the various ideas and arguments 
which follow to be tested and modified to reflect the conditions 
and situations under which leasing is used in practice. Support 
for this mixture of the pragmatic and normative approaches is 
advocated by DONALDSON 
The normative researcher should look to descriptive 
research for assistance in identifying and classifying 
the problem and assessing the relevance of his results. 
The descriptive researcher should look to the results of 
normative research for help in identification of the 
relevant issues for exploration and for ideas as to ho, 
the present state of the art nays be improved through 
logic and analysis C 40, p12 ý... If the ultimate 
purpose of theory is to influence practice for the better, 
there nust be both a descriptive and a normative model, which 
are capable of being linked together. " 
DONALDSON C 40, p34 3 
i. Of particular relevance in these discussions was a thorough 
debate of the lease evaluation techniques to be described 
in Chapter 9. 
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The nethodoloov adopted for the ! 'Lessee' survey was as 
follows: 
1. A letter was written to the head of the finance function 
in each of the chosen companies explaining the nature of the 
research and asking then to write back to the University if 
they were interested in participating. In all 120 companies 
were contacted (selection of these companies was totally at 
random). The response rate of 45% was relatively high. In 
part this may have been because each company replying would 
receive a copy of the ultimate report, but also it was 
thought to be indicative of the concern with. which 
management viewed the topics discussed in the survey. 
2. When the questionnaire replies were received the 
participants were asked if they would be willing to expand 
their answers in a personal interview. 
3. All interviews, with relatively few exceptions, were 
tape-recorded with the consent of the respondent and later 
transcribed. Each meeting lasting in ggneral for between 
one and two hours; although in some cases it was 
'considerably longer. The researcher had personal 
conversations (during the Lessee and Lessor surveys) with 7 
Treasurers, 18 Finance Directors, 5 Financial Controllers, 
6 Chief Accountants and 4 executives in other capacities. 
4. All quotes are unaltered fron the original, but for 
obvious reasons of confidentiality, the names or companies 
of the respondents are not divulged. (Confidentiality was 
particularly requested by the companies replying to the 
Lessor survey : the financial executives concerned %,: ere 
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particularly anxious that the resulting data should be 
well concealed if it was to be disclosed as part of the 
research. This wish has been complied with). 
The 'Lessor' survey was conducted somewhat differently in that 
the questionnaire was railed directly to the Leasing Manager 
of twenty major leasing organisations. Ten Lessors replied and 
all were interviewed. Because of the relatively low size of the. 
sample an opportunity was taken to invite representatives of the 
leasing industry to two research seminars on the study. Both 
discussions were well -attended and further detailed information 
was obtained. 
The primary purpose of the Lessor interviews and discussions was 
to provide the researcher with information on hoa the leasing 
industry actually operated, from which it was hoped that the 
results would provide the opportunity to compare the attitudes 
and perceptions of both parties to the leasing contract. 
In the following sections of this Chapter the-more comprehensive, 
Lessee survey will be discussed first. This will lead to the 
identification of several leasing strategies which will go on to 
form the basis of the quantitative appraisal of lease financing 
which will be introduced in Chapter 9. The Lessor survey will be 
considered in the last half of this Chapter when various questions 
will be reviewed which mirror similar enquiries made in the 
Lessee survey. - The important differences in attitude will be 
discussed. 
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7.2 THE RESULTS OF THE LESSEE QUESTIONNAIRE 
Using Capital Employed at the date of the last Balance Sheet 
prior to the questionnaire as an indicator, the distribution 
of respondents by size was as follows : 
CAPITAL EMPLOYED £11 1; Uti3ER OF COtiPANIES 
Under 20 15 
21 - 50 11 
51 -100 10 
101 -500 12 
5C0 plus 6 ti 
The widespread use of leasing is clearly demonstrated by the 
sample of companies: 
Qli. "Does your conpany use, or has it used, leasing? 
In the last Now Actively 
2 or 3 years consi Jeri nc: I 
FOR PLANT AND MACHINERY 13 32 7 
FOR GOODS VEHICLES 15 15 7 
FOR COMPANY CARS 13 12 10 
FOR ANY OTHER EQUIPMENT 17 17 10 
NOT AT ALL 9 6 13 
The reader is reminded that some respondents mould make more 
1. Part of this questionnaire, concerned with the Lessee's opinions 
and policies on Corporate Debt Capacity, have been discussed 
previously in the Thesis, see section 4.7 supra. 
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than one reply in their answers, %rhereas others would' decline 
to answer a particular section. Hence, the aggregated answers 
will not always exactly equal the sample size of the companies. 
The i ntervi e; -ls attecmted to establish" to what extent financial 
nanager., ent in these companies : 
1. Used leasing as part of a fornal financing strategy, 
compared with its use as enercency financing. 
2. Evaluated alternative leasing agreements, first against 
each other and secondly against alternative methods of 
financing. 
3. Included leasing,. as "off balance sheet"-financing, in 
their evaluation of the debt capacity of their organisation 
(associated with- this is the- understanding Which conpanies 
have of the perceptions of their external financial advisers 
in this matter ---- a subject discussed at-length in the 
analysis of this section of the results in Chapter 4), and 
4. Delegated, if in fact leasing was used in their organisation, 
the authority for its use amongst the different. levels of 
the rianagerýent structure. 
I It1VESTflENT APPRAISAL AND LEASE FINANCING 
Considerable argurent has been advanced in this Thesis in favour 
of integrating the investment and financing decisions of a 
company. This is especially relevant in the field of leasing 
where a joint decision procedure is deeried to be essential. 
However, the techniques Used, and the degree of sophistication 
adopted in capital budgeting routines, varied widely in the 
. 
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sample, frort payback through accounting rate of return, to 
discounted cash-flow 
Q12 "Which of the following techniques are used by your 
company to evaluate capital proposals? " 
REPLIES 
PAYBACK 15 
AVERAGE PROFIT TO AVERAGE. CAPITAL 10 
DISCOUNTED CASH-FLOW 17 
DCF + PAYBACK OR AVERAGE RETURU 21 
FINANCIAL COMPUTER MODELS 7 
Opportunity was also taken to investigate the forecasting routines 
used in corporate financial policy in order to obtain background 
information about how financing decisions are derived. 
Q13 tIn preparing financial forecasts for capital budgeting 
purposes, over what period do they cover? " 
REPLIES 
ONE YEAR 13 
ONE TO THREE YEARS 7 
THREE TO FIVE YEARS 23 
LONGER 5 
Q14 "Do you base your financial projections upon? " 
CASH FLOW FORECASTS ONLY 0 
EARNINGS AND INCOME ONLY 0 
BOTH OF THE ABOVE 35 
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It is worthwhile recalling one important observation that 
was made when anälysing the results concerned with Corporate 
Debt Capacity in Chapter 4: viz, the survey captured a period 
of change in Industrial attitudes towards debt strategy. 
Further refinement of Questions Q13 and Q14 during the interviews 
revealed that for many of the smaller conpanies (<250 M. Capital 
Employed) cash-flow forecasting was a relatively recent 
introduction and, because of the inadequacies of their data, 
it was generally confined to forecasts of up to one year. 
An enquiry was made as to how companies would acconmodate leasing 
agreements into their budgeting process. 
For many of the conpanies interviewed, leasing; per se, was not 
considered as an investment decision at all : 
"The question to lease or not would come after the 
investment appraisal. Our first decision, to invest, 
is based upon outright purchase, we may theh look at 
the lease arrangement for finance. 
Having corvnitted ourselves to undertake the 
project, whether we lease or purchase becomes part 
of the financial appraisal, not part of the 
investment appraisal. " 
This is a clear separation of the investment and financing 
decisions; 'a methodology adopted by over 60`00 of the sample. 
Of the rest, subsequent discussion revealed that any integrated 
decision process was carried out at a very superficial level or 
by routines which were frankly highly suspect as to their validity. 
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Q15 "When capital expenditures are presented for appraisal 
is it the company, policy to calculate the investment 
('spending') decision quite separately from the 
related financing decision? " 
YES t; 0 
22 13 
. 
This is a disappointing result for two reasons : firstly, fron 
the viewpoint of current developments in financial theory, it 
would appear that, as yet, very few industrial companies 
actively use any forn of integrative techniques to solve the 
I&F decisions1; and, secondly, as the subsequent conversations 
were to confirm, even the leasing decision is not singled-out as 
a special case requiring some form of joint-decision analysis. 
There also prevailed considerable confusion in the minds of nany 
of the respondents as to the 'correct' method to be adopted in 
the leasing decision, and the exact cash-flows to be used in the 
analysis. 
1. There are several other 'capital budgeting in practice' surveys 
in the literature : in the U. K., ROCKLEY C 116 ; in the 
U. S. A., HAD [ 94 7; MANNER C 82 3; PETTY, SCOTT & BIRD C 112 3 
and FREt1GEN C 57 7. There is little evidence in any of these 
studies that integrated decisions models are being used; the 
only exception being "simulation" computer packages which use 
investment and financing data together, but not in a fully 
integrated decision procedure, vide CHAMBERS [ 30 3. 
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Question Q16, gives some indication of the alternative 
combinations of cash-flow that are used. in'lease appraisal 
procedures. The researcher, upon detailed enquiry, found that 
navy alternative methods of lease evaluation exist in industry -- 
with almost every executive interviewed proffering a different 
opinion as to how a lease should be analysed. 
Q16 "When considering lease repayments for project 
evaluation purposes are they treated as:. " 
YES 
. MO 
FIP; AfICING CHARGES (similar to 
interest and banking charges). 9 13 
OR. OPERATING COSTS -22 2 
OR. PART CAPITAL & PART INTEREST 47 
As will become apparent in questions, Q17 & Q19, many of the 
respondents did in fact generally undertake a comparative study 
of the cost of leasing versus the cost of an alternative debt source 
as their principal accept-reject criterion for lease financing. 
Judging from replies, Q7 & Q8 (see Pane 218 Chapter 4: the "question 
relates to the quantity of debt capacity on call to the conpany) it 
1. The chief purpose of this question gras to see how many 
companies chose the third alternative (part capital ü part 
interest) : this is the potential problem of 'discriminatory 
financing' which requires that the interest costs be 'washed-out' 
for a correct appraisal. Clearly this is infrequently done in 
practice. 
- 331 - 
was clear that the sample of companies had quite a depth of 
unused financial support available to them as a direct 
substitute for Instalment Debt. 
Thus, alternative leasing plans would be evaluated against 
each other, and against a datum interest rate based upon the 
present incremental cost of the cheapest source of funds 
available to the company, which in general would mean their 
overdraft facility Question, Q17, is relevant here.: 
017 "When evaluating "a . 
lease proposal do- you make. the 
decision upon ?" 
(a) Whether the interest rate implicit in the lease repaynent 
is higher or lower than a specific interest rate 
(current bank rate for example) 
YES NO 
21 4 
(b) An aggregate of : lease repayments, operating costs and 
revenues generated by the project, clearing a DCF 
hurdle rate : 
YES t; 0 
17 5" 
Companies were, naturally, concerned to deternine the before- 
tax and after-tax yield of the lease contract or the alternative 
debt source. Hotwrever, the after-tax rate of interest was 
frequently expressed by the simple convention i(i-t); where 'i' 
is the cost of the funds employed and 't' is the prevailing tax 
rate. It will be at-Cued in Chapter 8 that this procedure can 
contain several errors --- the most notable of tihidh are the 
problem of including or excluding the Capital Allowances, and 
the question of which debt sources and which cash-flow streams 
should be brought into comparison when deteniining the rival 
interest rates. 
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The, 'to lease or not to lease' decision process most often 
mentioned during the interviews is typified by the following 
quote : 
"Since the nercer we have been well below the gearing 
we set ourselves. tic have got 40 or 50 million pounds 
worth of borrowing capacity we could go for without 
netting over the top of our gearing. Therefore, the 
alternative has been, borrow more, or lease, -just' that..,, .' 
Thus we don't compare the leasi nC rate of return 
with our internal rate of return. but against our outside:,, 
borrowing rate. We compare it with the cost from the 
banks on fixed debt. It is a straight ccnlarison of 
interest rates against lending rates. This criteria 
is very tough for leasing and has caused us to come 
out of it. 
One of the consequences of incorporating lease financing into 
the capital budgeting system is that instead of paying for an 
asset outright, the company only needs to produce sufficient 
funds to cover the first instalment. It could be argued, 
therefore, that the amount of capital saved because there has 
been a decision to lease rather than to purchase, should, in some 
manner, be incorporated, or at the very least considered, in the 
analysis of the initial lease contract. 
1. This has been terned the RESIDUAL CAPITAL BALANCE which, in 
year ö=Yöf ä-'lease cc t"rsct; is the dif-erence Tetween the 
i ni ti ä1 ca pi täl- cost öf fhe as set änc"tYa Tirstll ease`-ý 
instalr; ent. lies iciýortnnt`cöncept ifl1ýfern tlý`e Tiäsis of 
the Teäse evaluation technique to be proposed in Chapter 9. 
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To test this viewpoint the respondents were asked whether or 
not they performed such an appraisal, be it in qualitative or 
quantitative terns, and if so, were the relevant gains or 
losses attributed to the lease alternative. 
Several of the financial executives interviewed did consider 
this a pertinent factor in their decision, albeit in an imprecise 
and qualitative manner. As such there was no evidence of any 
di rect' änd' ünarbi gudu's introduction of' thi s return into"the' - °. : 
lease cash-flo. "t analysis. As one finance director remarked 
'" I iöül d cö de`r the' al ternäti veöportüni ty -created ''' 
by the, Residual Capital i3alances; it- is probably 
right to consider it as an incremental revenue brought 
about by the-decision-to lease. 
Our decision to lease in the first place was based 
on the fact that it would release funds for further use. 
Althouch it is not made explicit in the quote, this respondent 
practiced the lease strategy shortly to be described-as 
"PLANNED FINANCING MIX". Under these circunstances'it'is here- 
argued ' that the'-RESIDUAL CAPITAL BALANCES concept is 
applicable and any resulting pecuniary advantage should be 
attributable to the leasing alternative. 
Not everyone agreed however, they argued that the Residual 
Balances concept would depend upon their financial position 
at the tine : 
1. Defence of this argument is delayed until Chapter 9. 
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"Its not attributable to the leasing deal. We have 
only been pushed into leasing because of the non- 
availability of other funds. Therefore, the 
remaining sum has not been available to spend elsewhere. 
Here the leasing strategy terned "SPILL-OVER FINANCING" is 
observed where the available funds to the company have become 
exhausted. In this situation no Residual Capital Balances can 
exist and therefore no additional advantage can accrue to leasing. 
The following section will consider the concepts of "PLANNED 
FINANCING MIX" and "SPILL-OVER FINANCING" in more detail, 
although the associated quantitative assessment of each 
strategy is deferred until Chapter 9. 
II THE STRATEGIC USE OF LEASING 
The research-study has identified three major leasing policies- 
adopted by companies in their overall financing strategies. 
Question, Q18, is indicative of the grouping of each strategy 
amongst the survey sample. 
ONE: Leasing is to form an integral. part of the corporate 
financial structure. As a result of this policy any 
capital expenditure presented for review could become a 
candidate for lease financing. This may be called the 
" 
"PLANNED FINANCING MIX" strategy. 
Tt; O: The company may decide to utilise leasing when other 
corporate funds available internally or externally, 
are othe n, ise close to exhaustion. This utilisation 
results frort a gradual progression through other forms 
of finance in previous periods, with the company first 
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using those sources considered (on whatever 
grounds) to be cheapest, or sonetimes the most 
readily accessible. Having reached the stage -- 
generally in between two capital budgeting exercises -- 
where, apparently, the only remaining financing capacity 
is lease financing, management takes the view that it 
rust be used to fund some VITAL capital expenditure1 
This may be referred to as "SPILL-OVER FINANCING" 
because the 'pool' of capital expenditures accepted 
in the previous budgeting exercise plus the internediate 
project about to be leased, will spill-over the 
reservoir or 'pool' of funds available. 
Although the "SPILL-OVER strategy may be viewed simply 
as 'ä `last resort' method of financing, the concept is 
more subtle than that. Rather it denotes the use of 
leasing on a'teiporary and discontinuous basis to 
obtain a much needed asset in the face of what appears 
1. The financial circumstances surrounding the concept of "SPILL- 
OVER" have been observed by other writers, notably DONALDSON: 
although leasing has not always been used as a method of 
alleviating the problem : see-C40, p30 & p7.5. ]. As part of a 
more general case study DONALDSON comments on one company : 
"With all existing external (financial) sources apparently at 
their limit of availability, with internal sources apparently 
incapable of handling alone the rising flow for current 
operations, and with new capital expenditure needed to 
consolidate gains made so far, the company appeared to be facing 
a difficult future in the battle for balancing funds flow. " 
[40, p152] 
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to be an acute capital shortage. As previously 
noted on page 225 of Chapter 4, there is an 
empirical study from the U. S. A., see ELAN ' [413 , 
which suggests that leasing commitments decline 
as companies approach bankruptcy. As ELAM 
comments from his sample of bankrupt and 
nonbankrupt fires : "(My) prior assumption --- 
(which the research showed to be wrong) -- was that, 
while there was a general upward trend of leasing 
by all the firms, the weaker firms would be forced 
to turn to leasing to a much greater degree 
because of their weak financial position. That 
assunption followed from the theory that since a 
Lessor had a more direct legal claim to an asset 
than a lender, he would be more willing to lease to 
a weak firm that was unable to borrow money to buy 
the asset. " ELAM C 41, p32 3. The ELAM data 
in fact indicated that as firms approach bankruptcy 
their use of leasing was unchanged or slightly 
reduced. This, together with a vigorous denial by 
all the Lessors interviewed that they were not 'the 
last refuge of an improvident management', but in 
fact employed as rigorous a standard of credi b": orthyness 
as other financial institutions, would seen to dismiss the 
'last resort' theory of lease strategy. 
It may be thought that the use of leasing in "SPILL- 
OVER" conditions, although an isolated event, will 
nevertheless go on to form part of the (planned) 
- 387 - 
financing nix in future years, and clearly this 
is so. However, the essence of the "SPILL-OVER" 
concept relates to the intention at the moment of 
the financing decision and not its imediately 
subsequent administration. 
One final point of clarification should be made 
concerning the previous discussion in Chapter 4 of 
the optimal exploitation and absorbtion of free 
cash-flow. The quantity of leasing used is 'planned' 
to correspond with the residual amounts and profile 
of the period free cash-flow which remains after the 
other principal elements of the debt portfolio have 
been taken into consideration. However, because 
"SPILL-OVER" leasing will take place between 
budgeting periods -- and therefore after the optimal 
investment and financing sets for that particular 
year have been selected -- it could have a 
detrimental effect upon the debt-supportive capacity 
of free cash-flow. This may mean, for example, that 
the company temporarily exceeds a debt-supportive 
constraint. ' However, as both the'"SPILL-OVER" and 
"PLANED FINANCING MIX" algorithms which follow in 
Chapter 9 are devised for the non-nodeling, single 
financing decision situation, the quantitative (IIVP) 
repercussions which result fron each approach to 
leasing upon the debt-supportive capacity and 
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linkage concepts can seither be evaluated nor 
included in the decision procedure. 
THREE: A by no means negligible aspect of financial 
management is the using of leasing as a TAXATION 
strategy., All the conpanies interviewed who 
practised such a policy had as a comon characteristic 
the fact that they were operating in a minimal or no 
tax liability situation. Such a condition generally 
resulted from a carry forward of substantial 
Capital Allowances from major capital expenditures 
in previous years. Any large capital expenditure now 
(such as a major addition to plant and equipment, or in 
certain cases an oil tanker, aeroplane or florth Sea 
Oil facilities) would therefore derive little if any 
benefit from the attached Capital Allowances. 
There may indeed be a deferred benefit as the Capital 
Allowances become effective in future years, having 
been carried forward; although it was not always'clear 
to the researcher that users of leasing as a taxation 
strategy had seriously attenpted to quantify this; 
I. The reader is asked to note that in general, and for the purposes of 
subsequent analytical techniques to be outlined in Chapter 9, the use 
of leasing as a "taxation" strategy nay be assured (on the basis of 
enpirical observation) to be a sub-set of the-"planned financing nix" 
strategy. The evaluation procedure will, therefore, be equivalent 
for both strategies; but in the "taxation" case the appraisal will be 
conducted using a zero tax rate (assuning that to be applicable). It 
is also possible of course, that leasing will be undertaken by a non 
tax paying company in "spill-over" circumstances, in which case the 
"spill-over" algorithritrill also be enumerated using a zero tax rate. 
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however, if a series of major capital expenditures 
is anticipated during the coning periods, then there was 
a well-nigh indeterminate defernent. 
If the asset is leased, - however, the leasing company 
will retain the equity of the asset and, as such, 
they will receive the Allowances, thereby becoming a 
'tax sponge' for the Lessee. In effect'we observe 
the sale of Capital Allowances to the high profit 
sectors of the city : namely the Banks and Finance 
Houses. In return the size of the lease repayments 
are correspondingly reduced fron what they would have 
been., This unique feature of leasing has undoubtedly 
been one of the prime instruments in the growth of the 
industry. But once more, the researcher was unsure 
that those employing this strategy had adequately 
.. 
traded-off the reduced value of the tax shield 
resulting fron the reduced leasing payments, against 
the avoidance of a reduced value of Capital Allowances. 
It will subsequently be argued that the capital budgeting techniques 
and lease evaluation prodedures should be appropriately codified so 
"". as to reflect the true economic consequences of adopting a-given 
_. 
leasing policy. 
Replies to Question, Q13, implies that the "PLANNED FINANCING HIP 
use of leasing is sonewhat greater than the "SPILL-OVER" use of 
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Qlö. "If your conpany used, uses, or will use leasing, do any or 
all of the following factors apply? 
The need was/is/will be urgent, 
no other funds being available 
i. e. leasing is "EMERGENCY 
FINANCING". 
Leasing is part of a 
"PLANNED FINANCING MMIX" 
Leasing is "SPILL-OVER" 
financing: i. e. Covers 
deficiencies or short-falls 
in planning. 
Leasing is "OFF BALANCE SHEET" 
finance and so: 
(a) Does not affect 
borrowing capacity. 
(b) Improves the apparent 
return on capital 
enployed. 
Because your company has very 
large capital allowances any. 
new equipment would be unable 
to benefit fully from the 
1000 first year relief and 
so leasing was used as an 
alternative. 
VERY 
RELEVANT RELEVANT IRRELEVANT 
7 4 28 
17 12 12 
7 6 25 
8 15 1s 
4 14 19 
8 5 25 
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leasing, even when the latter use is stretched to include 
t "EMERGENCY FINANCING. " However, care must be taken in 
interpreting what is meant by the utilisation of leasing as 
part of a planned capital structure.. Strictly speaking, 
this means that a predetermined share of the total capital to 
be used during a capital budgeting exercise is comprised of 
lease financing. In section 4.5, supra, it was argued that,, 
the predetermined share of leasing is not established by 
reference to any Balance Sheet ratio. Rather, _it, 
is a function 
of the debt-servicing adequacy of free cash-flow after 
financial linkage has been optimised. It follows from this 
that the quantity of Instalment Debt to be employed in the 
capital budget is only known after the iterative routine has 
been completed. In fact, it was suspected that in many cases 
the "planning" was not this. precise. It consisted more of a 
willingness to entertain the usage of leasing finance even 
though internally generated and in ediately accessible external 
funds were not yet totally exhausted. Sometimes this was because 
the assets involved were known to be particularly acceptable to 
leasing companies so that the best terms might be anticipated; 
and sometimes because some major capital expenditure(s) which 
would require large amounts of internally generated finance 
was (were) in review, creating a wish to conserve such finance 
1. By definition, "EMERGENCY FINANCING" is a special form of 
"SPILL-OVER FINANCING". The common characteristic is that 
all other regular or familiar financial sources have been 
exhausted. 
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by the use of alternative sources of capital in suitable cases. 
1 
The former case has about it something of a note of'expediency, 
whereas the latter is more indicative of a planning approach. 
Invariably the signal, to lease originated at corporate 
headquarters as they were the only group with access to the 
company's overall financial, situation, both at-the time of 
consideration and for the future. Hence, there was a marked 
reluctance on the part of, many financial executives to incorporate 
leasing within the innate devolution of any financing policy. The 
authority vested at divisional level would only extend to the 
choice of assets to be leased, with head-office adopting the 
role of internal banker.. 
"11hen we look at our forward projections over the next 
2 or 3 years we may see we are hitting our overdraft 
limit. This tends to take us into a position of 
capital shortage so we cut the proposals from the 
divisions to ensure that we will not be embarrassed. 
So because of this cut back the divisions have had to 
resort to looking at leasing. "2 
Thus, the use of leasing was sometimes regarded as an activity 
initiated when the company has got to the limits of its 'normal' 
borrowing capacity and, due to a variety of reasons, just had 
to raise further finance. As one finance director replied : 
1. An example of the financial linkage and project re-scheduling 
procedures discussed in Chapter 4. 
2. A clear example of "SPILL-OVER" financing, as is-the next 
quote to follow in the text. 
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"If we were in a situation where we were getting up 
to our borrowing limits then we night get into 
leasing again. This is the only reason we went 
into leasing at all. Cash constraints and 
borrowing constraints were tight. We see leasing 
very much as fringe finance. We had projects that 
could not be funded by-the cash sie had available 
so we considered leasing. 
On average about three leasing companies were asked to quote 
for any particular contract with the quoted rates being 
very much subject. to, the processes of negotiation and bargaining 
between the two parties. This enables a very flexible lease 
repaynent schedule to be arranged which can make significant 
contributions to the profitability of the venture and may ease 
cash-flow in the early years of an asset's life; furthermore, 
as was noted in Chapter 4, the facility for 'tailor-made' 
leasing schedules also assists in'the process of financial 
linkage. 
"We have persuaded some lease conpanies to quote us 
variable interest. rate agreements : and equally to 
allow us to pay during the course of the lease at 
varying, amounts. As such the meetings became a 
discussion and detailed analysis of what was most 
suitable to the both of us. " 
As finance houses are competitive in the terms on which they 
offer lease financing, such flexibility of arrangement is an 
added boost to cash-flow planning and the optimal exploitation 
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of the organisation's debt-supportive capacity of free cash-flow. 
Furthernore, because the Capital Allowance associated with the 
asset accrues to the Lessor it becomes extrenely significant, 
ih terns of cost, to establish the current tax position of the Lessor. 
"When we got into leasing for the first tine on a big 
scale, £2.75 millions, the range of interest rates 
quoted varied enormously. This made us appreciate that 
the rate quoted by the leasing companies will depend, upon 
when THEY can use the first year allowance and this may 
not always be in one year. Therefore you have to check 
which leasing company can pick up the immediate benefit. 
In the_last: deal time completed it was a sharing of the 
profits in almost precisely fifty-fifty. 
During the course of the Lessor interviews, several leasing 
managers indicated that their tax position was such that all 
their present leasing contracts were being priced on the 
assumption that only 50`, of the first year allowance could be 
absorbed in the following year. Quite clearly, therefore, the 
above respondent's advice is a very important issue to consider 
when undertaking lease financing. 
Not all the financial executives considered leasing to be a 
sound proposition. They-reasoned (often, on their own 
admission without experience or evidence) that if the Lessor, as 
"a third party, gras introduced between the seller and buyer of an 
asset, then it raust always be cheaper to purchase! ' An 
alternative argument, generally put forward by the larger 
1. This attitude seems to have prevailed ever since the introduction of leasing into the U. S. A. -- the VM CIL and ANTHONY[ 12 survey noted this objection to leasing in 1962; see also VA1CIL r III x, 11) 111 - 
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a 
international conpanies in the sample, was of the kind : we 
can always obtain funds at a cheaper price than a leasing company, 
so why lease? '' 
As question, Q19, indicates, many companies continue to rely on 
imprecise perceptions and intuitive guesses, rather than economic 
analysis, when raking the leasing decision. It is not too 
unreasonable to suggest that the tern 'detailed comparative cost 
study' did in fact flatter sone of the executives who professed 
to be employing it. Many respondents expressed doubts and concern 
about the procedures they were adopting; and nany openly admitted 
that they had difficulty in calculating implicit nominal interest 
rates in, say, a monthly repayment lease schedule lasting five years. 
Q19. "Do you consider leasing to be an expensive forri of 
finance in relation to other sources? " 
(i) INTUITIVELY 
(ii) BY DETAILED COMPARATIVE 
COST STUDIES 
YES NO 
25 6 
33 12 
It is worth noting fron the answers to question, Q19, that 
although a clear alternative choice was posed the total number of 
replies was 76, which exceeded the sample size. This evidence 
would suggest that the respondents used both guesswork and (some 
sort of) back-up analysis to evaluate the cost of a lease. 
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And, 'finally, the companies were asked the following question; 
(previous comments concerning this table, and the inconsistency 
of the results with others on debt policy have been made on 
page 215 of Chapter-4). 
Q20. "If you consider leasing to be expensive have you any 
explanation, intuitive or reasoned, for the continued 
growth of leasing? " 
A Blank space was provided. 
TYPICAL REPLIES: 
1. "It leaves conventional credit lines clear. " 
2. "Advantageous for small, growing companies with limited 
capital. " 
3. "No other source of finance available. " -y 
4. "Shortage of borrowing power. " 
5. "Spreads cash-flow. " 
6. "Inflation. " 
7. "Desire to have-a better balance sheet. " 
8. "For reasons of tax management especially the 
1000' Capital Allowances. " 
9. "If funds available in short supply then business turns 
to-leasing as an easy way of borrowing. " 
10. "Spreads capital spending without impinging on other 
facilities. " 
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7.3 THE RESULTS OF THE LESSOR QUESTIONNAIRE 
To the best of the writer's knowledge there has not previously 
been an empirical study (in the U. K. or U. S. A. ) of how the 
leasing industry functions from the aspect of-the leasing 
executive. It-is assumed that this reflects ' the' reluctance of 
many leasing companies to reveal information which may expose 
-certain aspects of their commercial strategy to other members 
of the industry. Thus, a most significant constraint on the 
collection-of a suitable sample of Lessor data is the-extremely 
competitive market in which they operate, and-the consequent - 
heavy demands made on their time and skills. In such 
, circumstances it is not to be expected that research contact 
can be made with nany-organisations, and thanks are indeed due 
to those leasing companies who co-operated in the research. 
Although the sample size of Lessors is only ten, it does 
"'t nonetheless represent-approximately 25% of the total industry 
and as shown in question QL3, they comprise many of the larger 
Lessors in the U. K. capital market. 
Questions, QL1 and QL2, were asked in order to obtain vital 
background information on the portfolio of clients each 
leasing organisation attracted. For example, some Lessors, 
notably No. 4 and flo. 6, had their leasing business dominated by 
one or possibly two very large lease contracts; company No. 2 
concentrated its activities only on "small growing businesses"; 
1. There being about 40 leasing companies in the Equipment Leasing 
Association to which nearly all U. K. Lessors belong. 
2. Note: the reference question nur. ibers for the Lessor survey are 
denoted by QL ; as opposed to Q for the Lessee survey. 
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QL 1. "Using the capital employed categories shown below could you indicate the 
approximate distribution of your customers? " 
CAPITAL 
PERCENTAGE OF CLIENTS IN EACH 
CAPITAL EMPLOYED CATEGORY 
EMPLOYED 
BY LESSEE 
1 
COMPANY IDENTIFICATION NUMBER 
234567 8* 9* 10 
£ loom +I 80% 20% 10% 50% 5% 
£ 50m to £ loom 10% 50% 30% 0.01% 20%° 5% 
£ 20m to £ 50m 10% 20% 2% 40%° 20% 5% 
£ 5m to £ 20m 20% 10% 10%1 4.99% 
110% 1 
10% 
Om to £ 5m 80% 98% 10% 
195% 1 
75% 
'not available 
OL 2. "Could you please indicate how the total value of the assets you lease to 
customers is distributed? " 
PERCENTAGE OF LESSOR'S CAPITAL 
CAPITAL DISTRIBUTED FROM LESSOR TO LESSEE 
EMPLOYED 
BY LESSEE COMPANY IDENTIFICATION NUMBER. 
1 234567 8* 9" 10 
£ loom + 60% 30% 
1 
10%1 60% 35% 
£ 50m to £ loom 30% 30% 30%1 45% 22% 15% 
£ 20m to £ 50m 10% 30% 50% 20% 12% 15% 
£ 5m to £ -20m 20% 
10% 20%1 
1 
6% 20% 
1 
£ Om to £ 5m 80% 50% 20% 
0 1551 1 15% 
*not available 
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OL 3. "What is the approximate valve of the assets leased out by your organisation in 1973, 
within the U. K.? " 
COMPANY 
IDENTIFICATION 
NUMBER 
TOTAL CAPITAL 
VALVE OF LEASED 
ASSETS 
COMMENTS BY LESSORS 
1. £ loom "With commitment to £ 200m by 
31 dec. 1973" 
2. £ 16m "At cost" 
3. £ 25m 
4. £ 16m "Those leased in total, not taken or in 
year" 
5. £ 13.7m ---- 
6. £ 86.6m cost 
.C 35. Om = written down value' 
7. £ 14.5m "Written down value' 
8. £ 25. Om 
9. £ 39. Om "Value of assets bought during year upto 
30.10.73. Not w. d. v. " 
10. 
,£ 
25.4m Cost 
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whereas, companies No. 1 and flo. 7 did the majority of their 
business with large -- "often blue-chip or household name" -- 
companies; arid, finally, companies No. 3 and No. 10 adopted 
the deliberate policy of a diversified portfolio of Lessees. 
Question, QL3, is merely a factual account of the leasing business 
undertaken by each of the Lessors in the year prior to the survey. 
Its purpose was' to provide information upon which discussion of 
the later, ýnore important, questions could be based. It also 
enabled the researcher to gain an initial insight into the 
t 'bounds' on each conpany's leasing operation..,: - -- 
One very important factor must be stressed at-this stage because 
it is believed to have an important bearing on ; one of the 
subsequent responses : many of the Lessors stated that the denand 
for leasing -- during the period imediately prior, and during, 
the survey -- was "phenomenal", "absolutely astronomic", "quite 
beyond our capacity to fund it. " 
Questions, 'QL4 to QLS, were included in the survey in-an effort 
to obtain a more detailed understanding; of the-'. modus operandi' 
of actual business practice, the questions would provide answers 
not nornally found in the literature. 
1. Was the bound established by reference to the quantity of 
funds available to the Lessor,. the demand for capital by 
the Lessee, or the Lessor's -- or its parent's -- tak position? 
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QL4. 
(i) "Is it company practice only to lease assets that maybe defined loosely as 'middle of 
the road' (i. e. plant and equipment that is easily marketable because if is not too 
specialised or specific only to a number of industries)? " 
(ii) "Or, are you prepared to lease any type of asset? " 
COMPANY 
IDENTIFICATION 
NUMBER 
REPLY TO 
PART (i) 
REPLY TO 
PART (ii) 
1. YES, to strong lessees YES, to certain lessees almost anything 
2. NO YES, only so long as it attracts capital 
allowances 
3. YES 
4. YES, obviously there are items which are 
unacceptable 
5. NO YES 
6. YES 
7. NO YES 
8. NO YES, providing that the lessee is financially 
sound and the capital valve above £ 1000 
9. NO YES, to customers of suitable calibre and 
always providing that the asset is suitable 
for leasing 
10. NO- YES 
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Thus,. as question, QL4, clearly indicates, it is the usual 
custom to lease any type of plant and equipment in which the 
Lessee may be interested. There would appear to be only minor 
provisions or restrictions as to the choice of asset -- which 
generally means that it must attract Capital Allowance, be 
reasonably easy to identify, and be leased to a 'reputable and 
credi t:: orthy' Lessee 
Reply, QL5, confirms the widely held view that the majority of 
Lessors are willing to enter into 'tailor-made' lease contracts 
with their-clients (this-accords with the experiences obtained 
from the financial executives in ; the. Lessee survey) . It. is 
quite noticable that both the 'Lessee and Lessor see this facet 
of leasing-as an important "selling-point" for lease financing. 
A number of Lessors commented that they would occasionally 
receive clients who had tried to negotiate other forms of debt 
but had been unable to obtain the repayment schedule pattern 
they desired, and as a result were searching for a Lessor who 
would be willing to write a contract to a given pattern 
One aspect of actual leasing practice that is not well 
2 
documented, even within the Industry itself , concerns the 
'Secondary Period' of a lease arrangement. -Question, QL6, 
provides some detail, indicating that most of the Lessors 
provide a form of clause or stipulation that the Lessee may 
continue the contract for an indefinate period at a nominal -- 
"peppercorn" -- rental. The size of this payment is generally 
1. One Lessor noted :"e could not be interested in leasing 
equipment to certain companies (Computer Bureaus, Travel 
Companies, etc. ) because we feel that these industries are 
not sufficiently stable at this time. " 
2. See pages 25/26, Chapter 1. 
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QL5. "In the negotiations with a customer do you allow 'tailor-made' rates of payment 
and/or interest rates to be made? " 
COMPANY 
IDENTIFICATION REPLY 
NUMBER 
1. PROBABLY 
2. YES -- for interest I read rentals 
3. YES -- rates of payment, not interest 
4. YES - within reason 
5. YES 
6. NO 
7. YES 
8. NO 
9. YES - rates of payment, not interest 
10. YES 
QL 6. (i) "Do you charge a'peppercorn'. rent during the secondary period of the lease contract? " 
YES NO 
COMPANY No.: - 2,3,4,5,6,7,8 1,9 
(ii) "Or is the charge for this period based upon a fixed percentage of the size of the 
repayments in the primary period? " 
YES NO 
COMPANY No.: 
1,4,9,10 2,7 
(iii) "Or is it a fixed charge? " 
YES NO 
COMPANY No.: - 1,2,6,7 4,9 
-404= 
set so that it will cover the various administrative expenses 
that are expected during the period. Alternatively, the Lessor 
sets the 'secondary period' rental at a fixed percentage nominal 
annual sum (generally not exceeding 5% of the primary period 
annual rental). 
The second option open to the Lessee at the conclusion of the 
primary period is to to minate the contract and, as mutually 
agreed, allow the equipment to be sold. As can be seen in the 
response to question, QL7, the issue as to who actually disposes 
of the equipment is divided. Some leasing organisations which 
specialise in specific assets (notably, ships, aeroplanes, 
computers and transport fleets) sometimes have--a very,,. ... ,. 
comprehensive knowledge of the second-hand market for their 
assets and prefer to conduct the negotiations thenselves. Other 
Lessors, who regard themselves merely as the provider of 
instalment finance, prefer that the Lessee disposes of the 
asset : in which case the funds obtained will be divided 
according to the original contract (generally on a 50/50 basis, 
but this depends upon the expected salvage value -- if it is 
very small the Lessee will keep most of it, if it is sizable 
anount then some proportional split is normal). 
Thus, as a generalisation, the Lessee will typically receive a 
generous amount of the salvage value, if not all of it. 
2 
1. There are only a small number of 'specialised' Lessors. 
However, such is their understanding of the various products, 
that for example they would advise against leasing computer X, 
or aeroplane Y, if they thought the equipment did not achieve 
certain standards. They would not issue leases for such products. 
2. One Lessor noted that they only retain "l/10th of 1% of the 
sales proceeds. 
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0 
OL7. (i) "Do you normally dispose cf the asset? " 
YES NO 
COMPANY No.: 
1,3,4,5,9 2,6,7,8,10 
LESSOR COMMENT 
COMPANY No. 3: Sold by lessee as lessors agent. 
6: Lessee disposes of asset and retains a o/o of the sales proceeds. 
7: Lessee disposes of asset and retains a o/o of the sales proceeds. 
8: Lessee receives a portion of the sales proceeds. 
(ii) "Or, do you typically allow the lessor to dispose of the asset and keep this nominal 
figure? " 
YES NO 
COMPANY No.: 
7,8,10 1,2,4,9 
LESSOR COMMENT 
COMPANY No. 10: Lessee disposes of asset for a fee. 
QL 8. "Do you permit modifications to be made to the assets once they are 'in situ' with the 
client? 
YES NO 
NORMALLY, subject to request and inspection 1,2,3,4,5,8,9,10 
OCCASIONALLY, subject to request and inspection 6,7 
NEVER --- 
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I 
4 
In consequence, much of the concern expressed in the 
financial literature involving the 'expected opportupity loss. 
to be incurred by the Lessee because he does not obtain the 
salvage value of the asset, is largely irrelevant in the U. K. 
market : although some exceptions may be expected, especially 
with large value assets on relatively short-tern leases, in 
which case a suitable secondary period clause can usually be 
negotiated which does not disadvantage the Lessee. 
Question, QL8, is once more a request for purely factual data 
_. 
regarding the modification to assets once they are with the 
Lessee. It was assumed that this would be an important factor 
to some industrial concerns who may wish to alter the asset 
during its life. For the majority of Lessors their only concern. 
in such matters was expressed thus : 
"As long as they don't affect the value of the equipment, 
downwards, or make it unrecognisable, then the Lessee 
can do what he wishes providing that he informs us of 
any major (and not trivial) modifications. 
Of significant interest and importance to this research study 
was the credit assessment of the Lessee made by the Lessor. 
Some of the leasing companies relied on their parent Bank for 
the appraisal of creditworthyness, primarily because the 
potential Lessee held his normal trading account with the Bank 
and they already had a credit rating established. Thus, in a 
few cases, it would be normal operating procedure to exercise 
the same standards as would apply if the client was petitioning 
the parent for a medium tern loan. However, the majority of 
Lessors interviewed were extremely concerned that they had 
ý Y, 
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0 a 
substantial autonomy over their credit policy, although, 
clearly, there were rules and guidelines issued by the parent 
to direct and limit any extreme action. 
The answers to question, QL9, reveal a predominant concern 
for the traditional measures of debt capacity, namely the 
Balance Sheet debt/equity ratio. Debt levels (which, as may 
be anticipated, included any previous lease commitments). were 
supposed to accord with the "normally expected industrial 
average". Of almost equal importance to the Lessor, as an 
vindicator of credit standing, were profits and profit trends. 
It was common during the interviews to be told that the Lessor 
took "an overall-view" : by which they implied that their credit 
department would "review all the evidence. " 
To gain a clearer insight into the replies given to question, QL9, 
it is considered worthwhile to summarise one of the major topic 
areas to emerge from discussions with bankers of all sorts. It 
was observed that industrial lending is a function of five 
factors : 
1. An assessment of the company -- size, technology, products 
and markets. Is it a business which seems to have a 
reasonable chance of survival if there is an economic 
downturn? 
2. An assessment of the quality of the management as individuals 
basically are they competent and trustworthy people? 
3. Collateral and security. 
4. A view of the future econorly as a whole. 
5. Instructions and constraints from Head Office. 
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NOTES ON REPLY QL 9. 
COMPANY 
IDENTIFICAT(ON. 
NUMBER 
LESSOR COMMENT 
1 "it is not possible to rank indicators. The assessment of a 
lessee for large capital equipment is specific to each lease 
and must be a total evaluation". 
2 "Indicators (i) to (iv) are clearly important factors, jointly 
and severally. I decline to give a rating in general terms. 
Outside these factors one has to consider: the industry; the 
state of the economy; the asset itself and perhaps most 
importantly of all the management and trading record as 
an indication of the quality of the record: " 
3 "Rank :1 Good past profit record for at least 5 years. 
2 Good future prospects. 
3 Stable industry : for instance we would not 
lease to travel companies and computer 
bureaux at present". 
4 "This alone depends on the size of the contract. 
Accounts only reviewed over £ 5.000, varies greatly from 
business to business". 
7 "Depends on size of transaction". 
9 "Many others too numerous to specify". 
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Balance Sheet ratios, track record and forecasts are indicators 
of these factors which combine to form a scenario of the 
company -- it is an 'in toto' opinion. Thus, a detailed ranking 
of these indicators cannot be very specific or clear cut; an 
observation which is borne out by the replies to QL9. This is 
because: 
A. Bankers and leasing executives do not think and operate in 
this way, for exanple one respondent noted : "It would be 
impossible to rank the indicators you have listed (in QL9) 
because each situation, each asset and each company is 
evaluated individually. 
B. The researcher suspects (but finds it diffjcult to prove 
conclusively) that, at the time of the survey, there was an 
atmosphere of change in the methods and criteria used in 
lending negotiations which had arisen out of the pressure 
of the prevailing economic conditions. The various leasing 
organisations were finding that their traditional credit 
rating policies were exposing then to an unacceptable level 
of bad debts and lease contracts in default. As such, the 
frequency with which "future cash-flow projections" appeared 
in the replies (as a second, or back-up, choice of debt 
capacity indicator) is significant : for it denotes the 
changing attitudes which predominated during the field 
research. The Lessors were, in fact, searching for a more 
accurate index of debt capacity. It was noted in Chapter 4 
that today it is quite common for Banks and Finance Houses 
to request a cash-flow statement from their clients; in late 
1974 however, this was by no means standard banking procedure. 
- 411 - 
It was hoped that question, QL10, would reveal that 
sufficient corporate cash-flow was an essential requirement 
for a successful lease application. The researcher was trying 
to establish what forward-looking indicators were used by the 
Lessor and, in particular, whether they employed any fore of 
'debt-supportiveness of cash-flow' constraint when they 
analysed the client's capacity to repay the instalr; nts. In 
fact, the replies produced a variety of answers with, 
profitability being the main concern. of the Lessor. 
In question, QL11, the respondents were asked to specify 
which factors affected, the rate of interest charged to their 
client. The nost prominent alternatives from the list provided 
were : (1) taxation and their capacity to absorb the 100% first 
year allowance; (2) current interest rate costs; (3) the 
financial status of the client; (4) future interest rates, and; 
(5) the amount of capital under consideration. 
The significance of the Lessor's fiscal position was noted on 
several occasions: 
"A company dealing in financial leases raust absorb the 
Capital Allowances at the first opportunity. It must 
also have regard to money costs. If it cannot do the 
first and ignores the second it will either lose roney 
or become uncompetitive. " 
"When you speak of the amount of funds at our disposal 
you are really referring, in the first instance, to 
the level of budgeted profits by the Group as a whole. 
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QL 10. "Using the categories to the previous question (QL 9). Which indicator/s are you most 
concerned with over the period of the contract should a client transgress a figure you 
consider important? " 
COMPANY 
IDENTIFICATION 
NUMBER 
LESSOR COMMENT 
1 "Again each factor could be important depending upon 
circumstances". 
2 "The industry; management charges and gearing. But as 
lessors one can have little influence (save the ultimate 
sanction) once the lease is written". 
3 "Any default in rental payments'. 
4 "Profit to Capital Employed". 
5 "Profits". 
6 "Profitability; DIE ratio i. e. over-commitment". 
7 "Balance Sheet and future cash-flow". 
8 "Fall in Profit levels"., 
9 "Concerned with all these factors but question is academic 
because a lease is a fixed contract and providing there is no 
breach, we have no right of withdrawal". 
10 "Future cash-flow projections". 
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Fron this we nake an estimate of our potential tax 
liability for the period. Given these two figures 
we are then in a position to assess how nuch leasing 
business we should undertake to shelter those profits. 
The second quote is believed to be indicative of the typical 
procedure followed by a Lessor when deternining the quantity 
of business to be engaged in during a given year. It is quite 
normal for the Lessor to cease leasing after X nonths into the 
taxation year because he has exhausted the Parent's tax 
liability. Two other Lessor's noted on this inportant issue 
"le participate in two types of business here 
financial leasing and industrial hire purchase (the 
latter, of course, has the Capital Allo.; ance going 
to the hirer and not us). In general our N. P. rates 
are higher than our leasing rates. However, when we 
have consumed our taxable profits we then charge 
exactly the same rate for both sources of finance 
because we cannot benefit from the Allowance, and 
hence cannot offer tax-sheltered rates. 
"I would be very surprised if you found any Lessors 
in the market at the moment, there are just not the 
profits to spare. The forth Sea Oil companies are 
currently mopping-up an incredible amount of funds; 
they soon suck-up all that's available. We are 
now in the situation where companies are almost 
placing advance bookings for future year's tax 
shelter. As such, many Lessors are badly over-extended 
- 415 - 
and are having to offer contracts which are priced on 
the assumption that they will only be able to absorb 
50% of the First Year Allowance in the following year. '' 
The entire process of estimating the quantity of available 
funds is quite precarious because of its dependence upon the 
achievement of a predetermined level of profitability by the 
parent company. If an excess of profits is signalled towards 
the end of the fiscal year then it is always possible for the 
Lessor to solicit new business in an effort to absorb the 
over-budgeted tax liability. The nore serious problem, however, 
is a possible shortfall in anticipated profits and a consequent 
reduction in tax liability. Because the pricing structure in 
the industry is fiercely competitive and the profit margin on 
each contract is not very large, all the excess leasing 
business will probably be rendered unprofitable because the 
receipt of the substantial cash-inflow, in the form of the 
Allowance, has been postponed to a later period. 
1 It can be 
expected that the pressure on the leasing subsidiary to elininate 
all, or nearly all, of the Group's tax liability has led many 
Lessors to exceed this figure and thereby produce some 
unprofitable leases. It is difficult to obtain a candid view on 
this topic as many Lessors regard it as a most delicate matter 
which must be restricted to the higher echelons of their 
organisation. 
1. The lease repayments will have been priced at a certain level on 
the assumption that the Allowance will be received at a specific 
date -- the earliest possible opportunity. If this cash inflow is 
delayed then clearly the discounted value will be reduced and the 
total NPV of the contract diminished. There will also be an effect 
upon the quantity of leasing that can be undertaken in future years 
if significant Capital Allowances are being carried forward. As a result subsequent periods will have a proportion of their tax ýipbijity already absorbed and as such the Lessor will have to under .nn 
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The preference shown in the rankings for the "financial status 
of your client" was said to mirror two things : the demand 
for leasing, and the consequent ability of the Lessor to pick 
and choose "only the very best", "most creditworthy" Lessees. 
There is a contradiction here however with the comments 
previously made to question, QL9, viz : the level of bad debts 
amongst the population of Lessees was running at unacceptable 
levels. It would appear, therefore that either : (1) the Lessor 
felt compelled to claim that all their clients were 'first class' 
'1shen in reality this was not the case; or (2) there could have 
been a far higher failure rate amongst 'old' clients that those 
currently being accepted. under the more stringent assessment. 
Of particular interest in this research study was the 
composition of financial instruments used by the Lessor to 
fund leasing activities. It had been thought that the Lessor 
would employ a balanced portfolio of equity, long-term debt and 
short-tern debt. However, this proved not to be the case. 
It was noted in Chapter 1 that (according to a survey 
conducted by the E. L. A) 72% of the lease contracts issued in 
the U. K. last for between 3 and 5 years. The problem faced by 
nany Lessors, however, was that during the period surrounding 
the date of the field research, they were experiencing great 
difficulties in raising funds to match this duration of contract. 
1. Often referred to as the Lessor's "r, ioney-book. " 
2. They were having to break with no rrmal fund raising practice and 
raise funds piecemeal : the Lessor going to the capital market 
for the required quantity of funds ti": hen each lease was agreed 
upon. All Lessors hoped that this situation would soon cease 
and they could revert once again to a more balanced capital mix. 
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As one Lessor noted : 
"The difficulty today is that there is not a ma-ket 
for say 32 year money which is the ideal fund to 
support a5 year hire-purchase or lease contract. " 
The'existarce of this gap in the market, at that time, has 
had a profound effect upon the leasing industry because it 
has forced it to rely (temporarily) almost totally on short- 
ter.. ý finance 2 Confirmation of this statement is to be 
found in the replies to question, QL12. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, many of the executives intervi6wed were extremely 
concerned that they were "borrowing short to lend long" in a 
very volatile capital market. Most of the Lessors in the 
sample (and the researcher was told that the sane was true of 
other leasing organisations which were not questioned) were 
committed to a capital structure which comprised of E0-90 
short-tern, debt. 
The dangers inherent in such an exposed position were apparent 
to the senior executives in the leasing industry. Many pointed 
to the haphazard (sic) growth of leasing as the root cause-of 
their current capital mix problems : if the pattern of demand 
had been more accurately predicted then perhaps they could have 
established a broader-based funding strategy which included a 
larger proportion of long-term capital and greater equity 
participation. As it is, their failure to anticipate the denand 
1. The long-tern market for funds was equally unaccommodating 
"The longer you make a 'loan' today the higher the coupon 
rate" -- private correspondence with the leasing manager of 
a U. K. Finance House, dated 31/12/74. 
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for leasing and the rapid changes in the capital market 
has left them totally unprepared : many of the Lessors were 
locked into a rising interest rate market with fixed 
repayment 1 ease contracts which, as "a11 acknowl edged, was a 
recipe for extensive financial losses. 
Concern over this 'structural' problem within the industry has 
brought to a head the demand for a new method of accounting 
for leases. in the books of the Lessor. _1 
Various arguments 
against the proposed Investment Period system have been made 
previously and will not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that 
the replies to question, QL12, seem to provide strong motivation 
for the industry to promote such a technique : although it has 
been questioned iýrhether this method of_ reporting Profi t-wou1 d_ . ', 
remain gernane if the Lessor's desired funding policy of a 
'balanced capital mix' was to be achieved. 
In an effort to obtain a comparison'between the views. of the 
Lessees and Lessors as to why leasing was orIwas:. 'not 
. 
used, the 
questionnaire provided the opportunity for the Lessor to choose 
fron a list of alternatives and indicate which-factors in their, - 
opinion encouraged the Lessee to use leasing_and. ywhich factors 
were influential*in dissuading the 'Lessee'from. leasing. The 
responses are shown in questions, QL13 and". QL14. 
1. Viz, the Investment Period method, see Chapter 2. This, firstly, 
assumes that the outstanding capital amount in each lease will 
be paid-off as quickly as possible (thereby attempting to match 
the repayment of funds originally raised for the contract), and, 
secondly, attempts to "front-end-load" the profits fron the 
lease into the early years of the agreement. 
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Two issues are dominant in the minds of the Lessors as to 
why companies lease : (1) TAXATION -- leasing is used as a 
principal aid in tax management particularly then no taxable 
profits exist; and (2) leasing is used AS A MEANS OF ALLEVIATING 
CAPITAL RATIONING. Of the other factors listed, "off balance 
sheet financing" scored relatively poorly, 'with many of the 
Lessors commenting that they thought it was a very 
unsatisfactory reason for leasing as any credit analyst would 
observe its presence and. as such the 'off balance sheet' 
argument was totally neutralized. 
Four of the Lessors were of the opinion that leasing was at . 
tires used as a corn of 'last resort' financinn, although on 
further questi artii n3 it gras apparent, that r any 'Lessors were 
confusing 'last resort' with 'ererc ency' financinc, where the 
Lessee ranted to obtain the asset quickly but all its lines of 
credit %": ere currently at their limit, as such the Lessee could 
negotiate an increase in these limits (which ray-take d" 
considerable time) or begin discussions with a Lessor in an 
effort to complete the transaction swiftly. 
The response concerning the "general high cost. of money in the 
econon; '" was 1 over than expected. It will be recalled fron 
Chapter 1, pp47-49, where several alternative hypothoses were 
raised as to why the use of leasing was growing in the U. K., 
that it was suggested that perhaps the Lessee may be forced into 
leasing in a 'tight' Honey period because there were very feu 
financial alternatives open. It would appear, however, that 
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many members of the leasing industry do not envisage themselves 
t" 
fulfilling this role in the Honey market.: Whereas, the Lessee 
(particularly the smaller companies who have less financial 
manoeuvrability) ! feels obliged to traverse across a list of 
debt instruments towards the more expensive tranches of 
finance -- which for the type of lessee under consideration'2 
meant reaching their overdraft ceiling, exhausting short-tern 
bank support and as a result being compelled to use leasing if 
they wanted to fund further fixed assets. This discrepancy 
between Lessee and Lessor viewpoints may inply : 11) that-the 
Lessor is reluctant to admit that leasing is used by some of 
their sr; a11er ci entS -as ä final financing Stion; "ör -(2) the 
Lessee -can süccess_fülly disguise.. his'.. motives , ', for-: leas lrrg 'at'- " `ý'- 
least in part, by not disclosing the limited alternative 
financial sources at his disposal. 
1. This is perhaps'an oversight by the Lessor in that no connection' 
was made bet"reen previous statements that the demand for leasing 
was very high and the cause of that demand. Many Lessors assumed 
that it was the pressure on company profits (which had reduced the 
Lessee's capacity to absorb the Capital Allowances) which had. led to 
the increased demand. It is argued here that rising interest rates 
also have the effect of naking companies turn to other more 
expensive forms of finance, of which leasing may be one. 
2. As was made clear in question, QL1, the typical size of Lessee 
varied enormously throughout the sample of leasing organisations -- 
thus it was almost inconceivable to think of a Z100M+ capital 
employed colony Bing 'forced' into leasing (although this was in 
fact the case with two of the respondents), whereas the more exposed 
financial position of the smaller companies interviewed often left 
then obliged to seek leasing or other instalment debt financing. 
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The following points nay be nade, concerning the replies to 
question, QL14 ; 
1. The najority of Lessors are (understandably) resolutely 
convinced that once a client has experienced the benefits 
of leasing he ti"ii11 henceforth include it as an integral 
part of his financial structure. But; if, a company has 
not previously tried leasing (or even entered into 
discussions about the possibility of doing so), then the 
Lessor feels that the Lessee will have a preconception 
about leasing and the Lessor which-encompasses excessive 
salesrranship, misleading claims, sharp ("Ar., erican". ) 
practices', 'and ahost of unsubstantiated psychological- 
blocks against, tne use of-- leasing which sirºplya-eýnot'true. _.: 
Given an opportunity to clarify their- professional standards _ 
and attitudes, all. the Lessors 'believed* that the leasing 
industry would grow substantially to. take. in those companies 
whose current reluctance to employ leasing could be shown 1 
to be based upon mistaken beliefs and hearsay evidence. 
2. Companies which have large reserves of cash will have 
little or no notivatfon to lease; preferring instead to 
use their own funds. 
3. If a company has sufficient capacity to absorb the 
Capital Allowances which are being generated then (a) it 
will wish to reduce its tax liability by cliaiing all the 
Allowances itself and not by selling there to the Lessor, and 
(b) the tax sheltered leasing rates being offered will, as 
a result, not be competitively priced for a company with 
taxable profits. 
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4. Several Lessors commented that their client often needed 
assistance to calculate the true rate of interest on a 
contract, from which they conclude that criticism of leasing 
rates was often based on presumption rather than fact. As 
one Lessor noted : "Leasing is expensive but not necessarily 
more expensive than other forms of finance. 
Finally, an opportunity alas taken to enquire on what basis the 
sample of Lessors would suggest lease financing to a client rather 
than other forms of Instalment Debt. It was hoped that this would 
reveal how the Lessors viewed leasing's relative strengths and 
weaknesses in comparison ! ritEý Iar products' on the money market.,,, 
See question, QL15. 
lia1f- the, respondents c^dre ö ceFned ,o stress theýtäxätzan 
advantages enjoyed by leasing as being one of the prime benefits 
to the Lessee. The ability to offer what were in effect privileged 
interest rates to those 'companies who could not absorb their own 
Capital Allowances was clearly seen as a major attraction. From 
the remainder of the sample (particularly companies No. 3,7 & 9) 
rather terse and disappointing replies were provided 
1: in the 
subsequent interviews. 'it-rias-to-transpire that these companies did 
not consider other forms of Instalment Debt to be in competition 
with leasing and as such had answered the question in a rather 
negative way. 
1. Perhaps this is only to be expected in the last question of a 
research study given to busy financial executives. -- 
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One last point may be made regarding this question and financial 
linkage. The concept was not familiar to any of those interviewed, 
but upon a brief explanation of the potential role of leasing in 
working capital management and the ability of free cash-flows 
to be pledged for further instalment debt, there was a positive 
response that many of their clients engaged in leasing because : 
(i) it provided a means of instalment payment and thereby 
spread the initial cost over several years; 
(ii) it helped stabilise cash-flow demand; 
(iii) it meant that working capital levels could be 
maintained rather than reduced for outright purchase 
capital expenditure; and 
(iv) it provided-the opportunity to cocimence production T J- 
now rather than having to wait until funds could be 
raised internally. 
Thus, combining this rather fragmentary evidence, it is possible 
to suggest that the concept of linkage which has previously been 
outlined does in fact represent a formal rationalisation. of 
observable industrial practice; although it would appear that 
..: 
linkage is-infrequently optimally' exploited by the Lessee. 
7.4 CONCLUSION 
It has previously been noted in Chapters 3 and 4 that the use 
of debt financing by U. K. companies has grown with remarkable 
speed in recent years. A significant aspect of this development 
in the capital market has been an ever increasing trend towards 
the use of Instalment Debt by industry. 
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Leasing does face psychological barriers to its ready and 
efficient utilisation however. The feeling that it is somehow 
an 'infra dig' source of funds still apparently persists in 
some quarters. It is argued both by the researcher and riany 
Lessors that such barriers are often based upon irrationality 
and a lack of sound analysis. In the period since. the Lessee 
survey was undertaken this resistance to leasing has notably 
eased, mainly due to an increasing familiarity with-it and the 
continuing requirement by companies for externally generated.. . 
finance. - 
It is perhäps'understandäble that leasing has only reached 
claturi ty as a, source of corporate funds in recent years 
this failure may be ascribed to, the poor quality'of. advertising . 
literature for leasing in the past and the superficiä-1 treatment 
of lease financing in the academic and professional journals- 
where (with.. a few notable exceptions) it has continued to be 
depicted as a straight financing decision when in fact it is a 
far more complex probleri requiring an integrated investment 
and financing decision. 
There often appears to be an implicit, assumption in"Much of. the 
writing on lease appraisal, that the leasing decision takes place 
in an unidentified and rather vague corporate world : one which 
is assumed to exist in isolation from the normal capital budgeting 
process and one which does not reflect corporate reality or explain 
the causes behind the use of leasing. As has been shown, different 
leasing policies exist in practice (vide : "Planned Financing Mix", 
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ý... ýý - 
a simple' financing decision comparing the cost of 
leasing with the cost of overdraft. 
4. Delegation of the leasing decision generally conformed 
to the following pattern : (i) the submission of 
divisional capital budgets which exceeded the available 
capital; (ii) the signal fron head-office for the 
divisions to lease a given quantity of assets;, and 
(iii) the selection of which assets to lease by the division. 
unsati stactory- in practice .: orten tarn ng the for i or 
1. There was a strong , and growing use of leasing by the 
sample of companies. 
2. The capital budgeting procedures of the. rajority of- 
-, respondents indicated a clear. spparation, of the investment 
and financing decisions. 
3: The evaluation of a lease was frequently inadequate and 
"Spill-Over" and, "Taxation") which are a product of the 
financial circumstances facing the company. It is important 
that the implications of this new empirical evidence should be 
enbodied in appropriate analytical techniques developed to 
quantify the effects of undertaking a given strategy. That the 
analysis of a lease is situation dependent adds a completely 
new dimension to the problem. Of major importance to, this 
classification of leasing strategies in the introduction of the 
cdncept of Residual. Capital Balances. It has been argued that 
this is 
'an 
implicit and necessary factor which should be 
incorporated into the decision. -process : further consideration= 
of this topic is undertaken in Chapter 9. 
Thus, in suri: *ary` th-e; Lessee-. field research=su-gested!. '-- m, 1` 
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5. The "off balance sheet" argument in favour of leasing 
("it leaves conventional credit lines clear") was 
occassionally suggested by the Lessee as an inportant factor; 
Iwhile 
this may have a marginal influence on gaining extra 
credit in the short-run, it will certainly be taken into 
account by Banks and Finance Houses if the quantity of 
leasing increases and, as such, no real advantage can exist. 
6. Three leasing strategies were observed : "Planned Financing 
Mix"., used as a general part of the company's capital 
structure to spread cash-flow and ease capital rationing;, 
"Spill-Over" financing when leasing is used in-between capital 
budgets when other funding sources are apparently exhausted; 
. -and "Taxation", -when leasing is used in. a no, tax-liability. 
_. situation. 
7. The newly introduced concept of Residual Capital Balances was 
occassionally considered by some of the Lessees albeit indistinctly. 
N evidence was forthcoming to' suggest that any of * the- sari le of 
companies had examined the influence of Residual Capital 
Balances on alternative lease contracts, nor had there been 
" any attempt made to quantify their ir. ipact on the leasing decision. 
It will be recalled that one of the main objectives of the Lessor 
survey and field research was to gain an inside knowledge of the 
modus operandi of the leasing industry, which hitherto has not 
been made publicly available. However, a major problem (which it 
is felt will always be present in any analysis of the U. K. leasing 
industry) is the difficulty of obtaining a homogeneous population 
of Lessors from which the researcher can draw comprehensive 
conclusions. 
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This. arises because of the diversity of leasing organisations 
some Lessors specialise in multi-million pound contracts with 
very large companies; others act as financial intermediaries 
between the Lessee and a consortium of companies acting as 
joint Lessor; while others concentrate upon relatively small 
clients who lease assets valued in a range fron, say, £1000 
to 150,000. ' As such, the researcher crust take care when 
sunning-up and synthesising the data' because-the, objectives and 
attitudes of the sample of Lessors äre liävle'to differ quite 'r 
. -significantly. - tiith this caveat, therefore, certain overall 
conclusions 'can be -dratiin 
There was an exceptional'denand for-leasing during the. - :..: ; 
period of the survey. This-Is -assumed to have-". two principal 
causes (i) company profits"here -under pressure"whicF:. -' - 
reduced' the. available tax shield, thereby naking. i. t difficult 
to take full advantage of any Capital Allowances, -'as a result 
companies turned to leasing for taxation benefits; (ii) tl ' 
companies were faced with very high money costs, heavy 
drains on working capital and nany of their debt sources. 
fully exploited -- and so in order to support further fixed 
investment they turned to leasing. 
2. The Lessee can expect the following : 'tailor-made' lease 
contracts, advantageous secondary period terns, and a 
significant proportion of the ultinate salvage value of 
the asset on tem. ination of the primary period. 
3. At the tine of the survey a client's debt capacity was 
generally established by reference to debt-equity ratios and 
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profit trends. However, many of the Lessors were changing 
to cash-flow forecasts and indicators as a more accurate 
method of assessing debt bearing capacity; today cash-flow 
forecasts are almost standard credit assessment procedure. 
4. The nonetary level of leasing business undertaken by the 
Lessor (that is, the total anount of assets leased in each 
year) is constrained by the Group's taxable profits. Most 
leasing cor. »anies were established to shelter their parent's 
tax liability. . 
5. Many Lessors consider that leasing's principal attraction 
to the Lessee is the taxation advantages it enjoys. Other 
points in favour of leasing briefly are, 'ease of payment' an. d 
the. relief of capital -rationing. , .. 
-.., 
-_ 
6. The rate öf interest charged by the Lessor depends'Upon the'. 
-prevailing interest rates and the group's current, 
tax 
position. If'taxable profits still exist to be relieved then 
theýLessor can offer "tax-sheltered"-rates; if "the tax 
liability has been exhausted then the Lessor will either cease 
leasing or charge 'ordinary' -- non tax-sheltered -- rates. 
7. At the time of the survey the Lessor's capital structure 
was in general very heavily biased towards short-tern debt. 
This is potentially most dangerous as it leaves the company 
exposed to fluctuations in money costs. Attempts were being 
made to correct the balance back towards more long-tern debt 
and equity. However, during the survey this objective was 
being frustrated because many Lessors reported that they were 
having difficulties obtaining long tern funds. 
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CHAPTER 8 
FPISTALME1 T DEBT FINANCING TABLES. -TO-- 
DETERMI11E TIE NOMINAL IEITEREST RATE OF A 
LEASE CONTRACT: ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES. 
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8.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous Chapter concern was given to a field research 
study of the use and appraisal of lease financing by U. K. 
based companies. It was demonstrated that many financial 
executives evaluated lease agreements solely on the basis of 
establishing the "implicit" interest rate of the lease contract. 
Evidence was-also forthcoming to suggest that'this rate would 
be compared with the cost of the cheapest source of finance 
available to the cerpany; which on further. questionning usually 
implied the cost of an overdraft facility or less frequently a 
terror loan. 
I; hi 1e it. will. be. argued in-Chapter 9 that the -evaluation of a "ZI 
" .. 
. )4r i 
'"1" 
equir`s a leaseoý : zne cäntractýnan a' 
cor.; iari-son ofý_cohnetiri intgt-es irätes, it is. clear--'that a set 
of before and after-tax interest rate tables would be a 
valuable aid to the practitioner. Such tables could be used'in a 
"ready-reckoner" fashion to establish the interest cost implicit 
in a monthly or other periodic repayment schedules for a leasing - 
contract. 
The result of a comparison of that cost'with some other debt 
instrur.. ent will depend upon how the two sets of cash-flott: data 
are specified. Closer consideration of such specifications 
reveals potential areas of controversy'. An important issue to 
decide is whether, when establishing the internal yield of a 
contract, the opportunity. cost of the Capital Allowances foregone 
(because the company has leased rather than bought outright) 
should or should not be included in the appraisal. 
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In order to answer this problem it will be necessary to 
reconsider the list of alternative cash-flow specifications which 
could be applied to an Instalment Debt contract. This leads to 
a more precise understanding of the cash-flows which should be 
compared with each other in a current 'lease or borrow' implicit 
interest rate anlaysis. It is argued that these are generally 
specified incorrectly in practice. The remainder of the Chapter 
is concerned to discuss the analysis of a 'nixed financing 
project' which ray occur when appraising a lease cash-flow schedule. 
2.2 OBJECTIVES AND ASStJ PTIOfS 
From the empirical study it was clear that busine; smen 'wished to 
ascertain the before and after. -tax ;, yields on a lease- agreement. 
17, 
for two reasons :. 
"- -_r _er-fir -_ , 
r., 
". _ : 
l: , e'v`:. ,: "_ . .;.; r. "'.; ri. V- E"" 
faci f tüte 
. a. 
corpari sore _be een: tý1e;; ccs "of, t va. ýr. _ .- 
4tit ý 
more. leasing contracts, possibly Ewithh'<different''repayi: ient .. I 
schedules and time periods; and, 
2. To establish the yield of 'a lease- contract -. i n order to -=; 
compare it-with the cost of "bank overdraft iänce -" 
Thus with this objective, a set of Tables have been constructed 
(shown in Appendix No. 1 at the end of the Thesis) which grill 
enable the Lessee to: 'deter mine the interest rate-yi: eld''simply ' 
and efficiently. The Tables cover lease schedules lasting up 
to 12 years in duration, and are designed for lease agreements 
with constant periodic repayments. Thus, subject td the argument 
which is about to follow, the Tables may be used to find : 
0 
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I. - The 'before-tax' nonifnal interest rate on the contract. 
2. The 'after-tax' noninal interest rate. on the contract. 
' 
Two groups of Tables have been constructed for the after- 
tax rate in order to take account of the different way in 
which businessmen specify the cash-flow profile of the 
debt instrument that is to be conpared with leasing. 
3. With a snail additional calculation the nominal yield 
thus derived can be converted into the equivalent 
n, , ). licit'- interest rate of the, lease contract.., -,. 
Uurerous__articles in the literature ýof-leaseäppraisa1 
sugrest -that. the, correct analytical procedure, i s... to 
calculate the'_ IRR (. the-inolicit' interest rate)-. of the . 
`ý 
lease on a before: or`after- tax basis-. - Most authori'ties"'yý,.. -- 
su, gest an after-ta; basis; typical writers who rake 
these 
, proposals are 
BEECHY C 14 £t l53; CHAST_EE1t C 31 £ý 32.3 
FIPiDLAY 
-[ 
55 1 ;" WYi1Af [ 14' & 149 3; DOEfiGES E33 ]; 
-QUIRINI [. 1133 and' MITCHELL 99 .7.... - 
However, these analyses'do not take into consideration 
the significant influence-Of the U. K. 's. Capital V Allowance system on the decision comparison. This Chapter 
redresses that omission. It is stressed, however, that 
the correct analysiseof, a lease requires a more. detailed 
evaluatiön (shown in Cha'pter9) than: sinply establishing- . the IRR of the contract. 
-', 
ý3: '- 
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I. PRIMARY PERIOD ASSUMPTION 
.A 
typical financial lease consists of a primary period which is 
tt years long -- during which the Lessor recovers the initial 
cost of-the asset less any associated Capital Allowances, plus 
his profit -- and a secondary period which will commence on the 
termination of the primary period. It is generally accepted 
that an interest rate analysis will only be concerned with the 
repayment schedule in the primary period because 
1. The rentals paid in the secondary, period are monetarily 
- -insignificant, commonly taking the form of a nominal 
rental . 
2. The contract may be terminated during the secondary 
period at conparatively short notice by the Lessee, 
making the length of this period indeterminate; and, 
3, the rentals occur at a sufficiently distant period as to 
be immaterial in discounted cash-flow analysis. 
II. ' TAXATION ASSUMPTION 
The following two conventions have been adhered to in the 
preparation of the after-tax tables: 
1. The rate of Corporation Tax is taken at 50% 
2. In common with other analysts working in the field of 
project appraisal, it has been assumed that a one-year 
tax delay occurs after the end of the accounting year, 
I in the receipt or payment of taxation. amounts relating 
to that year. 
The latter convention requires closer scrutiny in the 
case of leasing contracts because they can be expected to 
involve payments in advance : that is, the initial payment 
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is at t=o. It has been assumed that to corresponds to 
the first day of a new accounting year for the Lessee. Given 
a one-year delay convention, the lease payments will earn 
tax relief at the end of the following year (t=2) : that is, 
one year elapses before the payments are entered into the 
accounts and a further year goes by before they receive tax 
relief. I (The equivalent two year delay period also applies 
to the receipt of Capital Allowances). To illustrate this 
point using monthly repayment : 
t= ,o. 12 F3 
LEAS I P! G 
SCHEDULE Lo L, ...... L 
= 12L TAX RELIEF 
RECEIVED t=2 
DISCOUNTED TO ZERO 
8.3 THE BEFORE TAX YIELD. 
The following expression is considered to hold for Instalment 
Debt contracts: 
2 
fJ 
p=E 
Lt 
t=o 
(1 +i )ra ,t 
_ 
1. Fron the empirical research it was clear that this two year 
deferrment is frequently overlooked by many U. K. an1Tysts. 
2. See RENWICK [115, pp95/96 ]. 
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NOMEFICLATURE : 
Let p= Initial Cost of Asset 
Lt= (Constant) value of each period lease repaynent 
i= Nominal period interest rate on the contract 
f1 = Length of contract in years 
n= Number of period lease repayments per annum. 
It will be noted that this expression makes use of the function 
i/n to give the period compounding rate where there are m periods 
per annum. For example, if quarterly periods are considered then 
for an annual interest rate of 12`S the quarterly period rate 
would appear to be 0.12/4 = 0.03`.. In fact, the Tables which 
subsequently derive fron this basic formulation nake use of the' 
Banking and other Finance House convention that the 3% rate 
thus derived will be used as a quarterly compounding rate. 
This gives-an annual 'interest rate sor. e0hat -i n exddss 0 -12% 
specifically it is (1 + 0.03)4 = 12.55% To repeat, this is the. 
connon practice in respect of Bank. Overdraft and other. forns 
of debt finance arranged through Finance Houses. It is possibly 
salutary, therefore, to reflect that the phrase, "Overdraft 
at 3% above Bank Borrowing Rate (9%) =. 12%", really only reflects 
a true borrowing rate if this interest is computed on that 
facility at annual rests. If interest is computed at 1% monthly 
rests then the resulting true interest cost is 12.68%. To 
achieve a true compound rate of 12, E p. a. on monthly rests, the 
monthly interest rate to be charged is approximately 0.93%. 
However, in these Tables the ordinary Bank/Finance (louse 
convention has been followed. 
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Thus, in using the Tables, it is important to realise that 
the interest rate which is revealed is slightly lower than the 
true rate of interest which is implicit in the contract under 
review. It is, however, still necessary to know this nominal 
interest rate in order to compute what the period compounding 
interest rate implicit in the contract really is. A little 
additional calculation will then reveal the true implicit 
interest rate : for example, using Table 3 of the Appendix 
("Half Yearly Repynents with zero percent tax") it may be 
asked what is the nominal interest rate implicit in a leasing 
contract which requires 4 semi-annual payments of £500 to 
finance a capital asset costing £1000. As will be explained 
in the text which follows, the method of using the Tables is 
to express the payments as the divisor of the capital sum and 
to seek the resulting quotient in the applicable Table, here 
the relevant Table is P; o. 3. Thus, £1800 : £500 = 3.6, on 
Tabl e. JIo. 3. the factor of 3.6 is to be found at the co-ordinates 
"No. of rentals =4" on the horizontal axis and "Interest Rate 
= l50.0' on the vertical axis. 
Hence, the nominal interest rate of the contract is 15%. If 
the Lessee were to ask the Lessor what was the interest rate on 
the contract the Lessor would in the majority of cases reply 15%. 
In point of fact it is slightly more than 15% because the rentals 
reflect the fact that interest is calculated semi-annually on 
15/2 = 7j`ß per six months. Expressed as an annual rate this is 
2 
equal to (1 + 0.075) = 15.56%, the real rate of interest. 
- 441 - 
The Tables have been expressed in this way so as to correspond 
most closely with existing U. K. 'Banking and Finance House 
practice. Conversion of the nominal rate used in practice to the 
real rate, involves the simple additional calculation 
illustrated in the previous paragraph. 
Returning to the equation, it will be noted that when solving 
for i the capital benefit received is being equated with the 
leasing premiums paid, with the repayment schedule being prior 
to the receipt of tax relief by the Lessee. However, the L 
series of cash-flows is comonly, not strictly a before-tax figure: 
in fact, the size of the periodic rentals have been distorted 
through the lessor "leaking back" his receipt of the asset's 
Capital Allowance to the Lessee by tray of a reduced premium 
Thus, strictly speaking, 'L is a tax affected series. 
The 'true' before-tax yield on the lease contract in a more 
rigorous analysis could only be obtained by comparing P, the 
before-tax capital iriput, with the unadjusted value of the 
lease premiums L' -- that is, before the Capital Allowances 
have been transferred. 
A would-be borrower may approach a Bank in either of two 
guises : firstly, as a supplicant. for overdraft facilities to 
A sinilar observation has been made by 110YER [1031 in the 
U. S. S. concerning the Investment Tax Credit (ITC) which 
attaches to the purchase of an asset (currently this is 
valued at 7`%, of the capital value to be set-off against 
the tax liability after one year). The ITC may go to the 
Lessee or Lessor, but. if the latter receives it MOYER 
correctly argues that there should be a corresponding 
reduction in the lease repaynents. 
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1 
purchase some asset , and secondly, as one who wishes to 
utilise the leasing facilities offered by (some other part of) 
the Bank. The Bank, in its two parts, will then offer financing 
terms. For the leasing contract these may well reflect some 
passing on of the Capital Allowances secured by the Dank on 
the asset. For the straf gihtfon: ard overdraft they will not, 
as the Bank will not receive such Allowances. 
The 'passing-on' of the taxation advantage can alternatively be 
thought of as the opportunity cost of the Capital Alloaance 
foregone by tilge Lessee. Thus 
(L't - Lt) f< CA t t=o 
This expression shoals the reduction in the lease schedule 
which reflects the Capital Allowances; with /ß being the 
appropriate discounting (capitalisinr) function. The equation 
is not an equality because the Lessor ti; ill probably retain a 
proportion of the Allowance. After all, it is his taxation 
liability that is being enployed to the benefit of both 
parties. 
Thus, although a set of before-tax tables have been conpiled 
it raust be recalled by the Lessee that the cash-Tldw series 
1. Directly or indirectly, Banks still protest that it is 
not their function to provide capital for long tern fixed 
assets, but as to how realistic this is today is very 
rauch open to question. If by borrowing working capital 
the client frees his own funds for fixed asset procurement 
is there realistically any difference? 
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enployed is a hybrid consisting of part pre-tax and part 
post-tax figures. It follows, therefore, that a comparison 
between the cost of leasing and borrowing on a before-tax 
basis can lead to an erroneous conclusion because the lease 
figure has been distorted by the passing-on of the Capital 
Allowance. 
3.4 THE AFTER, TAX YIELD -- BORROWING AND LEASING 
Frort the enoirical study it was observed that by the 'cost of 
bank finance', businessrien would singly express the after-tax 
rate of interest as i(1-t); where i is the cost of funds 
employed and t is the prevailing tax rate. However, a more 
rirorous examination of the cash-flows associated with bank 
finance indicate this is by no means sufficient. 
The neglected element missing from this analysis is the actual 
use of the bank finance -- that is, the investment of those 
funds into fixed assets. It is assured that the bank finance is 
used directly, or by freeing corporate funds from working 
capital, in the outright purchase of an income-earning asset. 
This process can be conveniently termed the "borrow and invest 
by buying'' decision. Thus, the complete cash-flow series can 
be specified as follows: 
TABLE 8.1 
BORROW AND INNEST BY BUYING 
t= 0123...... P1 tý+l 
P 
ti ti ...... ti ti 
(p) 
(A) 
CA 
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The above cash-flows, at yearly intervals, are simply the 
receipt of P and its immediate investment (A) in an asset, 
followed by a series of i's (the interest repayments), and 
the tax-relief on i, ti. At the end of the sequence a 
negative (P) is shown to represent the repayment of the 
borrowed principal. It will be noted that the combined 
effect of the capital receipt and investment, (P-A), is zero. 
The aggregate series would then look as follows: 
t=o 123N N+1 
6 () ("CA + i(t-1)) T(t-1) .... ((P)+71-(t-1)) Ei 
Given that a solution rate exists for this series, what lease 
cash flow series is it to be compared with? Possible 
alternative cash-flow series are given in-the following table 
8.2 which starts with the basic receipt of the capital value 
of the asset and the lease premiums required to finance it. 
Initially, these are premiums unadjusted for Capital Allowances 
received by the Lessor. These assumptions are successivaly 
relaxed. 
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TABLE 8.2 
LEASE FINANCING : ALTERNATIVE CASH-FL04! SPECIFICATIONS 
LESSEE: SORROI! AND INVEST BY LEASING 
1. P NON-QUALIFYING ASSET, PREfIUNS THERE- 
(L') (L') (L') ,., 
FORE UNADJUSTED FOR CAPITAL ALLOUANCES 
AND UNRELIEVED FOR TAX. 
2. P NOU-QUALIFYING ASSET, PREMIUMS THERE- 
(L') (L') (L') 
... 
FORE UNADJUSTED FOR CAPITAL ALLOWANCES 
BUT TAX RELIEVED 
tL' tL' tL' ... 
3. P QUALIFYING ASSET, PREMIUMS THEREFORE 
(L) (L) (L) .,, 
ADJUSTED FOR CAPITAL ALLOWAiCES BUT 
NOT TAX RELIEVED, AND WITH SPECIFIED 
(CA) OPORTUNITY COST OF CAPITAL ALLOI", ANCE 
FOREGONE. 
3' P 
(L) (L) (L) ... 
AS (3), EXCLUDING CAPITAL ALLOUANCE 
OPPORTUNITY COST. 
4. P 
(L) (L) (L) ... ' (CA) 
tL tL tL ... 
5. P 
(L) (L) (L) ... 
: tL tL tL ... 
QUALIFYING ASSET, PREtlIUNS ADJUSTED 
AID TAX RELIEVED, ' OPPORTUi1ITY COST 
SPECIFIED. 
AS (4), EXCLUDING CAPITAL ALLOWANCE 
OPPORTUNITY COST. 
If, as in Table 8.1, the Capital Allowance is specified as a positive 
benefit to the "borrow and invest by buying" decision, it would patently 
be wrong also to bring it in as a negative outflow (opportunity cost) 
in the "borrow and invest by leasing" decision; for that would be 
double counting of the sane cash-flow. This iten cannot be shown as a 
positive realised benefit to the one decision and an opportunity cost 
of a benefit foregone on the other half of the same decision. This 
would seem to indicate that a correct "lease versus borrow" implicit 
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yield conparison ought to be between the yield on the "borrow 
and invest by buying" -decision as derived fron the data of 
Table 8.1 and alternative 5 in Table 8.2. 
This is only part of the analysis however. It has been argued 
in this Thesis that the leasing decision is essentially a 
combined investnent and financing decision. The "borrow. and 
invest by buying" decision cash-flows of Table 8.1, and indeed 
the. "borrow and invest by leasing" decision as so far specified 
in Table 8.2 have failed to recognise the integrated decision 
by not including the operating cash-flows associated with the 
asset. 
t= I01234 
OPERATING 
CASH-FLO: "; S f f,, ß .... 
TAXATION 
THEREOII - (tf`) (tf`) (tf3) .... 
To ensure strict comparability of the two decisions the above 
cash-flows should be added to both series. However, as the 
operating cash-flows are in this case identical for the 
alternatives, computational economy is secured by excluding then. 
Arguably, there should be included in the operating cash-flows, 
so far as concerns the "borrow and invest by buying" decision, the 
variable (A) of Table 8.1. 
(A) represents the comitnent of the borrowed funds to the asset 
and therefore is clearly part of the operating cash-flows 'i that 
is to say part of the investment decision cash-floi rather than the 
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financing decision cash-flows. The question has to be asked : 
is there any equivalent cash-flew in the leasing decision such 
that the same economy of computation can be achieved by 
ignoring this amount in both of the decisions? 
At first sight this would not seen to be the case, there clearly 
is an amount (A) in the "borrow and invest by buying" decision. 
After all, the overdraft facility is made available to the 
client who then cornits it to the purchase of an asset. In the 
leasing decision, however, the funds are supplied by the Lessor 
direct to the supplier of the fixed asset. The Lessee is not 
involved in the actual investment of the sum involved in the 
capital asset. 
Further thoue'ht indicates that this non-identity is spurious. 
In the "borrow and invest by buying" decision admittedly it is 
the client who rakes out the cheque or other remittance for 
onward transmission to the asset supplier; %thereas, in the 
leasing decision it is the-Lessor who makes out the remittance. 
Yet, in the first case the client is arguably acting in the rol e 
of agent, especially in so far as the borrowing will have been 
made on the explicit condition-that the funds thus". r6ised are 
cor: lni tted: 'to the asset and to no other. So far as concerns the 
leasing decision, the direct transmission of the funding 
remittance from the Lessor to the capital supplier is no more 
than the physical implementation of a legal requirement that the 
equity in the asset shall be shown to remain clearly with the 
Lessor. Other than reasons of convenience, or possibly of trust, 
there appears to be no reason why the Lessor should not dispatch 
the necessary remittance to the Lessee who would then hand it over 
to the supplier of the asset. 
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The real involvement of the Lessee is clearly indicated by the 
requirement to be found in rest leasing contracts that the 
Lessee! shall at some tine specify to the Lessor, firstly, that 
the asset has been received in rood order and, secondly, that it 
is indeed the asset that is the subject of the leasing contract. 
Until this certification has been received by the Lessor frort 
the Lessee,. the Lessor will not cake payment to the asset supplier. 
Clearly, in the leasing contract there is in reality the sar.: e 
receipt of the capital borrowed by the Lessee and its immediate 
investnent by him in the asset as is more explicitly recognised 
in the "borrow and invest by buying" decision cash-flow analysis. 
On these grounds, therefore, it is clear that there is the sane 
identity of (A) in either decision and that, in'the interests of 
computational economy, this item can be excluded from both sides 
of the comparison. 
With these considerations in mind. the cash-flow analysis relating 
to the "borrow and invest by buying" decision. can be amended as 
bel ow: 
TABLE 8.3 
AMEIIDED EORRO:! AND INVEST BY BUYING DECISIOM 
t=0 12 
P 
ti ti ... ti ti 
(P) 
Cl' 
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The removal of the outlay (A) in Table 8.3, together with the 
elinination fron both sides of the conparison of the asset's 
operating cash-flaws is, as previously noted, in the interest 
of computational ease. 
The realisation that the inclusion of the Capital Allowance 
as a specific benefit to the "borrow and invest by buying" 
decision and also as an opportunity cost to the "borrow and 
invest by leasing" decision would be double counting, means 
that the correct comparison between the two decisions is that 
arising fron a solution of the cash-flovws specified in 
Table 8.3 and alternative 5 of Table 8.2 respectively. 
The Capital Allowance can be brought in as a benefit to the 
buying decision or as a cost to the leasing decision. The 
following section goes on to specify a matrix which indicates 
the relevant cash-flow parameters to compare. 
8.5 EPPIRICAL OBSERVATION AND REt; O171E(dDATIONS 
In practice the field research suggested that. businessnen rarely, 
if ever, '!. pursue the course of analysis suggested above, prefering. 
in its place-to use a form of algorithm i(l-t) when'-evaluating the - 
"Borrow and invest by buying" decision. It is uncorimon-for 
practitioners to incorporate into their analysis the capital' 
movement -- particularly, they would frequently neglect the 
influence of the capital repayment at the end of the period. 
Furthermore, the field study indicated that businessmen rarely, 
if at all, include the Capital Allowance obtainable from the money 
they had borrowed and invested. 
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Thus, in an effort to accor: mmodate the cocoon practice of 
excluding the Capital Allowance from the borrowing decision 
(despite it being a realisable benefit thereof) an alternative 
set of Tables have been constructed which include the 
opportunity cost foregone in the leasing analysis : box 3 in 
Table 8.4 overleaf. 
One important point rust be stressed concerning Table 8.4 and 
observed industrial practice. It has been argued in this 
Chapter that the correct analytical corparison is between either 
box 1 and 2, or box 3 and 4. In practice, however, it has been 
perceived that businessmen often compare box 1 with box 4 
thereby erroneously failing to take into consideration the effect 
of the resulting Capital Allowance on the decision cash-flows. 
Hence, the final recommendations may be survted up as follows 
(see Table 8.5) : 
When comparing the "borrow and invest by buying" decision 
with the "borrow and invest by leasing" decision, it is 
necessary to establish whether it is the policy of the 
Lessee to include or exclude the Capital Allowance 
from the "borrow and invest by buving" decision. 
Having settled this, the rules as set out in Table 8.5 
should be applied. 
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TABLE G. Ar 
CASH-FLCU ALTERNATIVES : DECISION MATRI 
SORROW 11 LEASE 
1 
F 
(i) 
ti ti .. ti ti 
(P) 
P 
(L) (L) (L) 
tL tL tL 
(CA) 
3 
P 
(i) 
. 
(i) ... (i) 
ti ti .. ti t 
CA 
TABLE 8.5 
DECISION CRITERIA 
DCRRCU AND INVEST 
ý; Y BUYING , 
BORRO>! AND INVEST vs BY LEASING 
INSTALLMENT DEBT 
TABLES TO BE USED 
FOR LEASING DECISION 
EXCLUDE CAPITAL INCLUDE CAPITAL 
ALLOUANCE ALL01: AN'CES TABLES 9- 12 
(BOX 1, TABLE 6.4) (BOX 2, TACLE 8.4) 
INCLUDE CAPITAL EXCLUDE CAPITAL 
ALLC ANCE ALLOWANCES TABLES 5-S 
(COX 3, TABLE 8.4) (BOX 4, TA3LE 8.4) 
P 
(L) (L) (L) ... 
tL tL tL 
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8.6 USING THE It1STALi1ENT DEBT TABLES 
I. THE BEFORE TAX YIELD : TABLES 1 TO 4 
Using the initial expression for Instalment Debt contracts 
the following elementary transformation nay be made to 
obtain the P; PV FACTOR which is applicable to a lease contract 
Lo, L1, L2 ... L1 =a constant repayment per discounting 
period. 
- 
Thus: 
rl NPV FACTOR P=E 
.t t=o 
1 
I1 +i 11. t 
TT 
This surration is the Uniform Series Present Worth-factor of 
a cash-flow sequence with periodic repayments. However, it is 
not. the easiest of nunbers to calculate using ordinary yearly 
t 
period tables so the expression may be rearranged to assist 
. computation as 
follows: 
NPV FACTOR P (1 +i, H. 11-1 
tt}i+1 
1ß1\1 + 
jlýti. td-1 
1. This expression has been modified fror: that shown in RENUICK 
[115, pp95/96 )so as to take account of the initial t=o lease 
payment. For individual calculations the expressions in 
brackets are generally available from standard sets of discount 
tables. It should also be noted, in advance of subsequent 
'after-tax' equations where the specification of the cash-flow 
series is significant, that the expression to the right hand 
side of the equality is positive -- in cash-flow terms L is a 
negative nunber (arid will appear as such in later after-tax 
equations). Here, however, it does not affect the value of 
the UPV FACTOR and is shown in this fashion simply to give 
positive numbers in the Tables. 
I 
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It will be observed from this equation that relatively small 
numbers will be raised to quite high powers -- for example, 
a 12 yeär, monthly repayment contract beari n, a 5°' yield 
(i = 0.05,11 = 12, tJ = 12) would be 1.00416 to the power of 
144. Clearly; great care must be taken in calculating this 
number. 
Thus, the before-tax rate can be established in tie 
following, extrenely convenient manner : 
1. For=each lease-contract co puce (F L) to 'abtain'. thc 
PI? V FACTOR : this will be used in all the Tables--. 
2. Seek, the appropriate before-tax tables (Tables 1 to 4) 
corresponding to the nurbar of ^aynents to je made"per 
annun 11 = 12,4,2 or 1 ... monthly, 
buarterly, 
half-yearly or yearly. ' 
3. Look along. the row corresponding to the length of the- 
contract N =A to. 12 years " (a1 ternatively- PIil; = nunber 
of_rentals-in the schedule). Find'the nearest-number to 
the (P - L), NPV FACTOR. This will be situated in the 
appropriate inpiicit interest rate column. 
1. It is frequently found that calculators and other accounting 
machines will round figures up or down, to a small but 
- significant extent, when low nurbers are raised to 
large 
; rowers. This can alter the effective interest rate on a long 
life contract. A more appropriate alternative in such cases 
is to computerise the formula or to use six figure logarithms. 
An inspection of the Tables will reveal the necessity for 
great accuracy -- full interest rate points being separated 
by slim margins in the P! PV FACTOR. 
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EXAMPLE 1 -- 
Consider a5 year contract for an asset costing £100,000 with 
monthly repayments of £2300. First establish the UPV FACTOR 
1100,000 = 2300 = 43.48. Turn to Table 1 (see Appendix No. 1), 
the before-tax monthly repayment schedule, and look along the 
5 year, GO repayments, rove until there is found the nearest 
number to 43.48. This is in the 14% interest rate column. 
II. THE AFTER-TAX YIELD; EXCLUDING CAPITAL ALLOUANCES : TABLES 5 TO ß 
Let: 
CT = Corporation Tax Rate 
USPIWWFi/t = Uniform Series Present Worth Factor, i% for t years 
SPPWFi/t = Single Payment Present Worth Factor, i% for t years 
Thus, the tax relief = I1. L. CT. (USPLUFi/t+l - SPPWFi/1) 
The bracketed. expression merely represents the discounted 
series fron t=2 to N+1. This enables the tax relief to be 
determined from existing tables should the computation be 
undertaken by hand or outside the range of the interest rate 
tables shown in the Appendix. Hence, the following expression 
may be derived : 
r1tý-1 NPV FACTOR P rl+i -1N 
+1 +M. CT E1_1 
fli l+i 1tvirt-1 
t=1 (1+i )t+l (l+i ) 
1 
The right hand side of the equation being the figure shown in the 
series of Tables 5 to 8. To establish the yield simply determine 
the NPV FACTOR and follow the procedure as indicated above. 
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EXAMPLE 2 
Consider an 3 year contract for an asset costing £50,000 
with quarterly repayments (fi=4) of 53690. Firstly 
determine the NPV FACTOR : 50,000 :. 3690 = 13.54. Turn to 
Table 6, the after-tax, Capital Allowance excluded, 
quarterly repayment schedule and look along the 3 year line 
6a 7; S 80 9i) 
7 years 
8 years ..:..: - 
13.60!. 13: 296' _ .. -.. ..:. 
9 years 
By interpolation the nominal interest rate ;s 7b6; ß. 
III THE ArTEP. TAX YIELD, IflCLUDIfIG CAPITAL 'ALLQt! Aý{CES : TASLES TO 12 -: 
The appropriate equation is thus 
.1_ 
P=-E +11. CT 
iE Lt Lt P. CT. CA. 1 t=o ý_1 - ------ - (l+i)1t ý- ý1+; ý t+l (l+i) ý1+; 
This This may. be alternatively expressed as: 
P1+ CT. CA 
= , 
Lt PREVIOUS i4PV FACTOR AFTER TAX 
(1+i} 
NPV FACTOf% P. PREVIOUS PlPV FACTOR AFTER TAXý- 
1+ CT. CA. SPPllF i/2 
where CA = Capital Allowance Rate (= 100%) 
EXAMPLE 3 
Consider a3 year contract for an asset costing £1000 with 
half-year repayments (02, i9N=G) of £215. 
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THE NPV FACTOR : 1000 215 = 4.65 which fron Table 11 
gives us an After-Tax yield of 20°, x. 
It is recorriended that when two lease contracts are being 
compared in a situation that precludes the use of a 
'borrowing' alternative, then Tables 9 to 12 should be used 
because they contain the full opportunity cost cash-flow 
series. Note also that for Tables 4,8 and 12, the yearly 
repayment schedules, lease contracts are shown which run for 
the, nunber of years indicated in the left-hand column : vi.: ... 
a3 'period' contract will have 4 rdpaynents (the first being 
at t=o and the last at t=3) with the Lessee retaining the 
-asset for a primary period which lasts up, to the corrience,., ent 
of period t=4. To avoid the slight confusion this can cause, 
the user should, in this exanple, read along the 4 'year' line 
when trying to match the fIPV FACTOR with the implicit interest 
rate. 
3.7 THE MIXED FIt, AfiCItlG PROJECT - 
A potential hazard so far excluded . 
fror our discussion and 
analysis of financing projects is the existence of a non-sirple'- 
cash-flour series : where the sign of the aggregated periodic 
cash-flow sequence changes frön positive to negative core than 
once (which is typically the case in an after-tax series). In 
such circurstances it is necessary to deternine whether the 
project is 'nixed', and consequently whether the analystýis 
faced with problems of mul till e solution rates, (more than 
one yield for the same cash-flow series), or the invalidity 
of the apparent solution rate. 
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If it can be shown that the project is indeed 'mixed' then 
the apparent yield (the sequence's IRR) is-not applicable and 
t 
must be replaced by what i1A0 calls the RIC, 'r', the return 
on invested capital; which is a complex-function of r and k, the 
company's weighted average cost of capital. 
While the RIC technique is widely recognised as the correct 
analytical approach for solving 'mixed' investment projects, 
it has not-been modified, in the literature to interpret 'nixed' 
financing-projects 2- {in our case we have a 'mixed'--integrated 
investment and financing project): The - difficulty- presented in 
a 'riixed' investment project is, that it will fluctuate from 
being an absorber of corporate funds to being a provider of` 
corporate funds. 
, 
; hen it is in the forcier state it rust "earn" 
its return on capital, the.. RIC, iahen it is in the latter. 'surplus' 
state it is granted an earning power on the funds'it provides', 
equal 
-, 
to the- cost of capital of--the company, k: In 'certain-- 
situations the RIC. yield 
. 
can, differ subs. täntially-fron the" parent 
yield so that, great care must be taken when establishing the- 
internal -interest rate. .. 
1. The reader is referred to H AO C 93, p197 et. seq .a where an algorithmic technique, based on the RIC, is shown to analyse a nixed investment 
project. For a more detailed proof see TEICHROEW, ROBICHEý 
fONTALBAIIO C 128 1. 
2. This problen has been raised by S! IAR C146 ]in the very specialised 
context of nultiple rates of return in a leveraged lease (where 
several type of finance, e. g. debt, mortgage financing and equity 
funds, may be used simultaneously to fund the lease, see C146, pl2823) 
WIAR notes the possibility of a 'nixed' project, but his analysis is 
conducted within the confines of USA leverage lease practice änd 
tax laws : these conditions clearly do not apply in the U. K. and 
consequently WIAR's analysis if not pursued further here. However, 
what follows is a generalised analysis of the 'mixed' financing 
project problem as observed in a U. K. context. 
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.. 
8.8 THE. YIELD ON BORROWED CAPITAL - YOC 
As non-simple financing projects are frequently observed, is 
it possible merely to reverse the RIC analysis when considering 
a 'mixed' series on the grounds that the debt instrument moves 
from being a prd vider of funds to being an absorbed of funds? 
To analyse either variety of 'mixed' project it is necessary 
to establish the "project balances" of a cash-flow series : 
which are simply defined as the accumulated compound value 
of the cash-flow sequence. In the case of a financing project 
which is 'mixed' it will be necessary to compound the positive 
project balances, St, forward at the YBC, i'; which is the 
financial equivalent of the RIC in an investment project. 
However, when the project balances are negative the project 
requires an injection of funds (a reallocation of capital from 
other sources within the company) which will be assumed to 
cot 'b'; the compounding rate on negative balances. 
Thus, using the following after-tax lease contract --- which 
includes the asset's Capital Allowances -- as an example of 
the YBC technique, we have : 
TABLE 8.6 
LEASE CONTRACT CASH-FLOW SERIES 
t= 0 12 3 456 
P 1000 
L (279) (279) (279) (279) (279) 
tL 140 140 140 140 140 
CA (500) 
TOTAL 721 (279) (640) (139) (139) 140 140 
Zý'. 
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'" The apparent yield on this series is 20 % (see Table 12 in 
the Appendix). However, as the series in 'non-simple' it is 
necessary to determine whether it is also a 'mixed' project 
(it could be a pure series, see Table 9.7, in which case it 
is safe to use the internal yield. This is accomplished by 
compounding the TOTAL cash-flow line forward at'the minimum 
t% 
rate which will make all project balances positive . In 
this exacipl e the mi ni nurn rate is 29%; at this level the 
project balances are : 
t= 0123456 
PROJECT BALANCES St 1721 651 200 119 14 158 203 
To test if the project is mixed an examination must be made 
of the sign of the terminal project balance, S,,, and apply 
the following criteria. 
TABLE 8.7 
MIXED PROJECT CRITERIA 
NON SIMPLE FINANCING PROJECT 
PURE : St >, 0; Sr"1 0 
MIXED : St >0 Sri >0 
Thus, this financing project is mixed and the Yield on 
Borrowed Capital appraisal technique nust be adopted. 
1. The reader unfamiliar with the technique and proof of 
this concept is referred to R1AO [93, p203 1. The method 
to be described above is the reverse of the RIC analysis 
where the project balances should be negative -- this 
occurs because of the large negative outlay of the asset 
at t=o. In the YGC analysis the Lessee receives a 
positive inflow of (P-L) at t=o, therefore the project 
balances are positive. 
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By trial and error it is necessary to establish the YBC, i', 
which in conbi nati on with aý ci ven rate for 'b' will reduce 
the terminal project balance to zero. If a rate for 'b' of 
140 is assumed, i', the correct yield, can be established as 
follows: 
TABLE 8.8 
YIELD On BORROWED CAPITAL : MIXED SERIES 
S =-721 S >c . o t 
S. 721(1 + 0.13) - 279 = 572 Sý o 
S2 = 572(1 + O, 1(C) - 640 = 35 Sty o 
S3 = 35(1 + 0.1 ) - 139 = -9° 
I St <o 
S4 = -93(1 + 0.14) - 139 = -250 Si <0 
S5 = -250(1+ 0.14) + 140 = -123 Sy <o. 
S6 = -123(1+ 0.14) + 140 = 0 St= 0 
1` = 0.13 
1 = 0.10 
i !' = 0.18 
°) = 0.14 
5=0.14 
b=0.14 
YBC found 
-: :.: i; 
--. r. ý 
Hence, given a 'b' o, 0.14. it has been demonstrated that 
the 'true' yield on borrcwed capital ,is 
10% -- some. "rhat 
lower than the 'apparent' yield of 20`,. Fortunately this 
yield is unique, but this nah: not hold for other types of 
financial i-nstrunent. (The structure of a lease schedule's 
after-tax cash-flow may well preclude the possibility of 
Multiple yield contracts. Other forms of borrowing, such as 
conditional sales agreements and other financial contracts 
with complex fluctuations in their cash-flow profile, may 
give rise to multiple yield solutions wich are very 
difficult to interpret meaningfully). 
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flow is the correct rate for 'b' established? In the case of a 
financing project whose project balances are positive (the 
lease is 'lending' to the company) it has been stated that the 
project balances should be compounded forward at the YBC. 
However, when the project balances are negative (the lease is 
effectively 'borrowing', or requiring support, from 'the company) 
then the compounding rate is not the YBC but the prevailing 
Investment Opportunity- Rate of the organisation. - 
In a position or equilibrium--- the corporate lending rate 
equals the corporate borrowing rate -- this would be -the 
organisation`s "cost -of'-capital . ut- theF existence 
and 'uti-l fsaticn 
of leasing as part of a Planned Financing Mix- i rnpl i es that tree 
firn is using this source of funds to alTeviate ä tight capital 
rationing situation. Thus, it is conceivable chat-a 'slack' , 
rationing situation still pertains (the ccripany is-experiencing a.. 
modest capital rationing problem) Under. these-ci rcurrstancesý the 
Investment Opportunity Rate becomes the. IRR of the marginäl'ly 
rejected project. 
The analytical procedure is then irriediately confronted with a 
succession of highly complex- interdependencies between the 
I. & F. decisions. Such interactivities make it exceedingly 
difficult to establish the company's narginal efficiency of 
capital -- which is the parameter to employ as the appropriate 
'b' value. These problens have been discussed elsewhere in the 
Thesis (notably Chapters 4 and 5) and, in the context of the 
1. For a definition see section 7.2, Chapter 7; or FAWTHRCP & 
TERRY [48 and 49 3 
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current debate, it rust be conceded that for practical purposes 
it is to be assured that the Investnent Opportunity Rate is 
sufficiently close to the cost of capital that the latter nay 
be safely used as a surrogate. 
However, by very virtue of the fact that leasing is being used 
by the company it follows that the cost. of capital will change, 
leading to an almost intractable problem unless advanced iterative 
techniques are resorted to (such as mathematical programming). 
In an effort to obtain a workable solution, other then by 
computer, it could be assumed that when the firn is leasing and 
the project is mixed, then the compounding rate on negative 
project, balances should beset ät. the_'pre -financing', cost, of 
capital. This would imply that the algorithni-c solution as shown 
in Table 8.8 would_, be,. lagging one period behind. the 'actual change 
in capital, structure. 
It must be accepted, however, that the whole topic area of nixed . 
financing projects is. a fairly. esoteric one (especially in practice) 
and a branch of financial managenent that will continue to, elude 
a totally accurate solution. As such, it must be assumed, however 
reluctantly, that for practical purposes the solution rate to any 
"borrow and investment" sequence is acceptable and is in fact 
valid. Althounh, as a final caveat, if a company is enbarking on 
a very large leasing contract which exhibits a non-sinple 
cash-flo'.: series, it would be prudent for the analyst to apply 
the Yield on Borrowed Capital technique in order to establish if 
the project is nixed and if so, how sensitive the apparent 
yield is. 
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8.9 CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this Chapter has been fourfold: 
1. To provide the financial executive with a set of Tables 
that nay be used to evaluate the Nominal interest rate 
of a lease contract. liith a small additional calculation 
the 1; oninal rate can be converted into the Implicit rate. 
It was clear fron the Industrial Survey that many 
businessman found this an irksome task given that no simple 
and efficient Tables exist in practice. 
2. The field research also indicated that the 'lease vs. borrow' 
implicit interest rate comparison was very often incorrectly 
-specified.. This Chapter- has attempted'; to provide: a'" rational 
franework for such an analysis. 
3. Arguably, the most serious omission in 'practice was the 
influence of the asset's Capital Allowance on the decision 
outcome. Thus, an attempt was made to enumerate and explicitly 
evaluate the potential impact of the Capital Allowances on 
both sides of the 'lease or borrow' comparison: The correct 
comparitors being displayed in Tables 8.4 and 8.5. The 
Appendix contains Uoninal interest rate tables for both sets 
of alternatives depending upon whether the Lessee includes or. 
excludes the Capital Allowance fron the 'borrow, decision Sr 
cash-flow. 
4. A significant problem which can occur in this form of analysis 
is, the unsuspected (at least in practice) presence of a 'nixed' 
financing project. An analytical procedure was developed to 
calculate the correct, adjusted, Yield on Borrowed Capital for 
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a mixed project. The navy interdependencies that exist 
between the I. F. decision and the marginal efficiency 
of capital make it difficult for a totally accurate 
solution to be derived fron this procedure. In consequence 
it was arcued that the derived Tables and the yields they 
indicate, are a sufficiently accurate proxy for the true 
YLC yield. However, if the lease project is of sufficient 
magnitude and a non-simple cash-flow series is revealed, 
then a YGC analysis should be conducted. 
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'} ' .. 
CHAPTER 9 
THE EVALUATION OF AN INTEGRATED INVESTMENT AND LEASE 
FINANCING DECISION 
.. 
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9.1 INTRODUCTION 
The classic 'lease or borrow' decision is, ºwith one or two 
exceptions, concerned purely with the financial alternatives 
available to the company : it does not acknowledge the 
fundamental and concurrent inter-relationship with the 
associated investment' decision. This Chapter intends to redress 
this omission in the literature by discussing a new method of 
appraisal : namely, the analysis of an integrated leased-linked- 
investment decision. The major departure from received thinking 
in this area concerns the incorporation into the evaluation of 
the concept of RESIDUAL CAPITAL BALANCES. 
The relevance of residual capital balances (RCB's) to the 
leasing analysis will be explained and enumerated in the 
following discussion. It will be argued that RCB's are a major 
decision variable which management must consider when making 
the choice between leasing and competing forms of debt. - 
In Chapter 7 of the Thesis two principaT, leasing strategies 
were formulated on the basis of extensive empirical 
observation of U. K. leasing policy. These were termed 
"Planned Financing Mix" and "Spill-Over" financing. It is 
subsequently argued that'the capital budgeting techniques and 
procedures used by a company should be appropriately modified 
so as to reflect the true economic consequences of adopting 
a given policy. It follows from this that the analysis of a 
lease is situation dependent. 
The "Planned Financing Mix" concept is most important to 
our discussion because it gives reality to the concept of 
- 467 - 
residual capital balances. It is contended that many lease 
evaluation procedures are erroneous because they overlook two 
vitally important issues : the integrative nature of the 
decision (that is, the bringing together of the investment 
and financing decisions); and the creation, under circumstances 
to be defined, of residual capital balances. 
9.2 THE EVALUATION OF EQUIPMENT LEASING CONTRACTS 
As noted in Chapters 6 and 8, the evaluation of a debt 
instrument such as a-leasing contract frequently takes the form' - 
of a discounted cash-flow appraisal, usually by determining the 
implicit or internal interest rate inherent within the 
repayment instalments. A comparison of the internal interest 
rates, or DCF yields, of two competing debt plans usually will 
give rise to a decision based upon the lower of the two interest 
rates. 
Suppose then, that an asset with a capital cost of £1000_can be 
financed by the follovrino alternative 1eäse contracts. ` Each* 
contract requires four period payments, payable at the 
commencement of each period. Forthe sake-of simplicity' 
and compressed tabulation, it will be. assumed that each 
period is of 12 nonths duration. 
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TABLE 9.1 
COMPETING LEASE CONTRACTS 
COIITRACT PERIOD 0-I PERIOD 1-2 PERIOD 2-3 PERIOD 3-4 
LEASE A 
LEASE B 
(E322) 
(£400) 
(£322) 
(E350) 
(£322) 
(£300) 
(£322) 
(£170) 
F. B. The amounts are shown in brackets to indicate that they 
are negative quantities or cash outflows. 
It can be deduced that an interest rate of 20% will discount 
both leasing contract'. s cash-flow series into equivalence with'. 
the 411000 capital cost of the asset -- that is, the internal 
interest cost of each of these contracts is 20%. It would - 
therefore appear that on the above calculation' the financial 
manager should be indifferent between these two neans of'.. 
financing the acquisition of the. asset. 
This analysis correctly brings into account the size and timing 
of the repayment schedules. It fails to consider, however, the 
effect of the RESIDUAL CAPITAL BALANCES specific to each scheme, 
defined as 
'The residual amount of capital outstanding after the 
successive, cumulative repayments have been made'. 
To observe hoer residual balances influence the appraisal of a 
lease, it is important to question the role of leasing in the 
capital budgeting mechanism. Leasing can influence the 
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number of projects to be undertaken if the finance budget is 
fixed, although patently it cannot effect the amount of funds 
available for allocation. Leasing enables a 
, 
redistribution of 
the "pool" of funds to take place. 
For example, if the asset in the above example were to be 
financed with internally generated funds it would cost £1,000 
in a lunp sun cash outflow. If it were to be leased under 
contract A, the first year cash outflow would only be 1322 (the 
initial instalnent payable at the beginning of the first period). 
. If the amount of. finance . available to the fi rrl was limited to 
£1,000, then to procure the asset by outright purchase would 
totally exhaust the capital budget. By leasing the asset, the 
company is able to acquire the asset plus additional assets, whose 
outright-purchase cost-is 1678, or whose initial leasing 
instalments amount to 1678. 
These additional assets would. not be available except through 
the use of leasing-as a means of-'financing-'the first-asset. 
This sum of E678 can. be, termed the. "residual capital balance in 
year 0=I". The use=of leasing tdfinance the=first investment 
project has created a second investment project opportunity; 
The assumption made here, and defended later, is that this 
investment is in the working capital of the organisation. 
This argument, if accepted provides still further support for 
the concept of integrating the I. & F. decision. The residual 
capital balances are being incorporated into the analysis of 
the leasing decision and ipso facto, therefore, there is an 
integration of the financing decision and the secondary 
investment decision. 
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It is argued, therefore, that it is correct to credit the 
original lease financing decision and investment project with 
the return from the residual balances project. After all, 
they are a product of the same financing decision -- to lease 
rather than to acquire outright. 
Earlier in the Thesis two circumstances were distinguished 
under which leasing night be used. An examination of these 
will hopefully clarify the issue of residual capital balances. 
(The reader may care. to review the definitions given in 
section 7.2 II, Chapter 7). . 
A. If the leasing decision corresponds to-a "Spill-Over" 
financing decision then, II THESE CIP. CUfSTAF CES IT WOULD 
BE LOGICALLY CONSISTENT TO SAY THAT THE RESIDUAL CAPITAL 
BALANCES AP, GUPIENT IS tlOT VALID. BY THE DEFINITION! OF 
"SPILL-OVER" FILIA! CE THERE ARE 110 EXISTING FUNDS 11HICH 
CAN Its PART BE FREED TO FIý; AtICE OTHER. IIIVESTttEtITS 
6. However, if it is decided that leasing shall be used as { 
part of the company's PLANNED FINANCING 14IX strategy 
thereby contributing to the stipulated relexation of 
1. The definition'of ''spill-over" financing can be"identified more 
specifically as relating to the 'minimum amount of finance 
sought by the organisation to effect the investment project'. From 
the industrial research it appears fhat this is a reasonable 
assumption. Thus, the "spill-over" financing may be a lump-sum 
amount obtained from another debt sources but specifically used to 
purchase the asset in question, or it may be lease financing. 
ýnii chi evri's i _(_an-&_the fihTd study suggests it to be the latter) 
it is clearly meant to be the minimum amount of borrowing -- there 
is no question of a spill-over lump sun borrowing being used to 
finance a series of lease contracts. This '. could, in effect, 
constitute a second capital budgeting exercise. 
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capital shortage conditions such that there are funds 
which will be released by the use of leasing rather than 
outright purchase -- then the residual capital balances 
argument will apply. Under these conditions the evaluation 
of a lease contract must in some way include the opportunity 
for additional earnings '., hich are generated by the residual 
capital balances. 
The balance of this Chapter will be concerned with developing 
an exposition of such a technique. 
9.3 AN INTEGRATED ANALYSIS 
It is argued that the evaluation'of a leasing contract properly 
requires that the investment and financing decisions be brought 
together in an integrated appraisal; and that the evaluation 
procedure should include the following coriponents: 
I. The investment project's operating cash-flows. 
2. The cash-floti", s generated by the, financing instrument under - 
consideration -- e. g. the-. series of leasing, instalments. 
=---- 3. The taxation Zash -, #'I. awr. -appropriate_ to . the. type of financing 
under consideration. 
4. The exclusion or Iwashing-oüt" -of the-interest component 
inherent in the financing instrument cash-flow series. 
5. The determination of the residual capital balances, and 
the attribution of the potential earnincs of those balances 
to the integrated decision. 
This possibly rather complex-looking package is in fact much 
easier to irrolene'nt than it at first appears. Before 
proceeding with the argument it is appropriate to comment 
briefly on items 4 and S. 
/ 
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I. DISCRIMINATORY FINANCING 
When discussing interdependencies in capital budgeting during 
Chapter 4, it was noted that the particular method of 
financing, used in respect of a given investment decision, 
will determine the type and size of Capital Allowances and 
other taxation cash-flows which will enure to that investment 
decision, so vitally effecting the outcome of its appraisal. 
This interactivity carries with it, apparently, the 
significant risk that an investment decision may be found to 
be acceptable purely because of an advantage which it enjoys 
in its financing. It is a cardinal tenet of financial theory 
that capital expenditure appraisal should not allow this. 
' 
For, in the end, the cost which an organisation has to pay for 
one fore of capital is, to a significant extent, conditioned 
by the use to which the organisation is naking or proposing to 
make of other forms of capital. 
It would follow, therefore, that the preferential financing 
which night be brought into an integrated investment and 
financing decisicn: in respect of a. particular proposed.. 
capital expenditure, would. only be preferential because the 
suppliers of that particular finance were impressed by the 
remainder of the capital structure of the organisation. To 
give the proposal under review the benefit of that 
preferential finance would be, in effect, to grant a subsidy 
1. See for example MAO c93 3 SOLOION 1150 3 VAN HORNE t 138 
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to that proposal fron all other proposals. This is termed 
"discrininatory financing". The favourable discrimination 
. takes the fore of a favourable interest rate. '` 
To riinimise this discrinination in an integrated 
investment and financing decision, it is argued 
that the interest cost component of a leasing 
contract (or similar debt instrument) must be 
excluded from the financing cash-flows. 
After all, that favourable interest cost is part of the 
company's weighted average cost of capital, the DCF criterion 
rate, which will already be subsumed in the discount rate to 
be applied to the decision. 
It may subsequently be noted that in any lease schedule 
the size of the capital element of a particular payment is a 
direct function of the interest charged : which in turn has 
a, corresponding impact upon the residual capital balances. 
In the appraisal technique shortly to be-outlined the. - 
capital content of each instalment is involved, so it could 
be argued that this proposal is also guilty of discriminatory 
financing! It is more precise to note that residual capital 
balances are a positive function of the amount of borrowing 
implicit in the lease over its life. In respect of a given 
asset value, different leasing repayment schedules over a 
common life will generally imply different amounts of 
borrowed capital at different points in time in the connon 
life. The method proposed recognises the different earning 
power generated by those different capitals, the existence 
1. A typical lease appraisal example of this being that suggested by SCHALLL120 
, fib 
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of which is not related to the overall financing pattern of 
the organisation and so may be correctly ascribed to the 
individual decision. 
II. THE INVESTMENT OF RESIDUAL CAPITAL BALANCES Ifl WORKING CAPITAL 
Various assumptions may be made concerning the location of the 
residual capital balances and their earnings. As a methodological 
convention the RCB's are assumed to be, invested for one year in 
the working capital of the organisation, where they will be 
periodically reduced to finance the next repayment in the 
instalment series. The actual, location of this investment", may 
be in either: 
(i) the working capital component of new projects; or, 
(ii) it may be an investment in the working capital 
support of on-going operations. 
Either location would free otherwise-committed capital from 
investment in unspecified capital formation and enable it to 
earn at the general or average rate thereon. The one-period 
investment into working capital can only be credited with 
the average return on assets enjoyed by the firn (later 
designated by the symbol W) for there is no way of knowing 
the precise location or, usage of this working capital and as 
a result only an average rate can be used. 
Although it could be argued by management that they had 
specifically leased asset X (rather than acquiring it outright) 
so that they could purchase Y -- with the return Y produces 
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being the embodynent of the return ascribed to the RCB's -- 
this is a discriminatory process. To avoid this bias, using 
the "pool" vs. "pool" argument, it is contended that the 
secondary investment opportunity, made available through 
leasing, be located in the 'neutral' area of working capital. 
The earnings from residual capital balances invested in 
working capital will of course also remain in'working capital. 
Thus achain of earnings will develop in. a compound manner 
up to the end of the period covered by the integrated 
decision analysis when, in common with the convention adopted 
by most analysts working in the field of project appraisal, ' 
they are assumed to be disinvested from the combined project. 
In the examples which follow the choice of a, pre-tax average' 
earnings rate for 'b', rather than an after-tax rate, offers 
purely computational advantages : facilitating the correct 
timing-of the subsequent tax-. cash-flowss for discounting 
purposes ._... 
:.. ,., ' ý' 
Considerable-debate is present in the literature on the 
method-of establishing the true' cost -of'working'capital. 
2 
However, it is. argued here'that. the return experienced by ä-. ' 
company-on its working capital component is an 'average' 
opportunity cost' of the expected return from all the ., 
accepted projects (which by inference makes -W higher. 
1. See AMEY & EGGINTOPJ [ 2, p147 ] 
2. See the book of reading by SflITH 0151] ; or LAWSON [ 64 
- 476 - 
than the weighted average cost of capital). As noted 
previously, the location of RCB's may be in on-going or 
new projects. Thus management may either : (i) establish 
the average anticipated return from all project sets to be, 
undertaken between now and the horizon; or (ii) analyse 
the historic return on working capital for say the past two 
or three years. Hopefully, these figures will not be too 
dissimilar; but if there is a notable divergence than a 
preference nay well be given to the-forecasted returns 
available to the company. 
III. THE POTENTIAL ERROR OF DOUBLE COUNTING 
It might be argued that the specific introduction of earnings 
on the residual capital balances will lead to a form of double 
counting of income. 
It has been proposed that the appraisal of an integrated 
leasing decision should bring into account a portion. of the 
future earnings which are expected to accrue from the series 
of investments currently about to be undertaken; and by 
extension, a portion of the future earnings from-all 
projects subsequently accepted throughout the planning period. 
Therefore, when the individual projects which 'provided' 
those earnings are/eiere appraised, arguably it would be wrong 
to impute to those projects any yield which was at a rate 
equal to, or lower than, the given value of 'b' -- on the 
grounds that this portion of the yield has been absorbed 
within the lease appraisal (the 'donor' investment could only 
justifiably claim the excess yield it generated above the 
rate 'b'). 
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The proposed method of evaluation deliberate ly; atteripts to 
quantify the specific opportunity benefits derived (as a 
result of expanding to set of projects to be undertaken) 
through leasing. 
Thus, the quintessential characteristic of the integrated 
RCB analysis lies in the explicit enumeration of the facility 
offered by each leasing contract to provide a totally unique 
secondary pecuniary-advantage to the company. As such, each 
lease- project will be attributed a distinctive pattern of 
RCB earnings effectively re-distributed from the set of 
new. 3y created secondary investments. 
This concept is not without its parallel, however, for in a 
discounting procedure one of the basic tenets of investnent' 
decision mathematics, namely the "reinvestment assumption" is 
equally subject to such a reproach. 
1 
Thus, when the suggested RCB procedure is considered in 
-conjunction with the other accepted projects in the'-finally,, 
accepted set of investments, it would be. observed that the 
surmation of earnings will exceed the-`correct` total by the 
1. For an explanation of the reinvestment assumption and its 
ramifications, see FAWTHROP (45, p191/194 : particularly 
the requirement that the "depreciation fraction" of cash- 
flow be re-invested in future projects at the equivalent 
yield if that yield is to be attained. Clearly, therefore, 
an intrinsic aspect of the discounting process relies upon 
the 'double counting' of project cash-flows. 
b 
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quantity of earnings attributed to the residual capital 
balances. This is an implicit feature of such an opportunity 
cost model : but it is argued that it in no way invalidates the 
ultimate ordinal decision it produces. 
The lease or buy algorithm established in this Thesis is 
based upon a desire to derivea practical (non-programming) 
technique which is cognizant of the effects of a decision to 
lease upon the-current-capital budget, together with the 
repercussions such-a decision produces on subsequent 
budgeting periods. 
It could be argued that an investment and financing decision 
model of the linear prograrsning type could cope adequately 
with such an aim. However, any such model will utilise a 
valuation technique which is intended to reflect the various 
premises built into the progranne's structure. The question 
still remains -- what is the appropriate valuation technique 
for an equipment lease? 
1. Further, consider the examination of alternative decision 
procedures based upon linear prograiiming, see CHANGERS [30 3 
The acceptance of a project will in part be dependent upon 
the dual value which that investment possesses. However 
those duals represent the marginal impact of that project 
upon a constraint and ultimately upon the objective function. 
The origin of the dual value lies within another project's 
contribution to the set11PV. It follows, therefore, that 
there is an implicit and inevitable double (or even multiple) 
counting inherent in such an appraisal. The same is true of 
the lease evaluation procedure developed here. It is 
essentially a sub-optimal decision criteria because, as 
previously discussed, there is an innate fallacy in appraising 
the individual project even though it is based upon an 
integrated I. & F. decision. (The nature of the ordinal 
solution will be considered again in section 9.6). 
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It will be recalled from Chapter 5 that the type of model 
proposed by CHAMBERS [30 Jwould, on a prima facie basis, be 
ideally suited to the task. But, unfortunately, upon an 
examination of the valuation techniques adopted by this 
particular model it becomes clear that little progress can 
be achieved by using the programme as it is currently 
structured. As previously noted, the objective function 
consists of two elements (namely,: the value of-the-post-horizon 
cash-flows of all projects accepted prior to the horizon; and the 
maximisation of the value of the corporate financial structure 
at the horizon). It follows that the contribution-'of leasing 
to the worth of the company will similarly have two components 
firstly, -the lease project's post-horizon. operating-cash-flows 
discounted back to the horizon at the weighted average cost of 
capital (which is pre-set and therefore excludes any leasing 
which is newly introduced); and secondly, the fä11 lease 
repayment schedule still outstanding after the WHO discounted 
back to the horizon at the implicit interest cost-of the lease 
arrangement. (arguab-ly'a case of _discriminatory financing). 
Both discount rates are somewhat dubious. ' 
Clearly, as previously argued, such a nethod, of evaluating a 
lease is inadequate. The current state of development of 
mathematical programing techniques fails to express the more 
global effects of accepting a lease, which can result in a 
failure to recognise the true potential of leasing within the 
overall corporate financing strategy. Further developments and 
refinements will have to be made before leasing can be 
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satisfactorily introduced into such models; and even then they will 
be faced with a recurrent problem of valuing the worth of a lease 
at the horizon. 
9.4 THE APPRAISAL OF AN INTEGRATED LEASED-INVESTMENT PROJECT 
Nomenclature: 
Let At = Capital Allowances, attributable if the asset 
is purchased. 
b= Before-tax average investment opportunity rate 
on the working capital of the accepted set of projects. 
Ct = Incremental operating costs incurred by the project. ' 
IIt = Implicit. Interest in lease repayments. 
K= Weighted average cost of capital. 
Lt = Lease repayments, per annum. 
N= Life of lease contract; n .= 
"Life of asset 
P= Cost of Asset if purchased 
Rt = Incremental sales revenue generated by the project. 
T= Corporation Tax rate. 
t= Tice interval in years 
I. "PLANNED FINANCING MIX" 
The algorithm nay. be specified as the sumation of the 
following elements A to E. It is shown in this particular 
(simplified) form so that the reader nay observe the precise 
pattern of cash-flows and tax conventions adopted. It is 
recognised that the algorithm could be specified in a more 
mathematically succinct nanner but it is believed that the 
form adopted provides a more satisfactory explanation. 
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PRESENT VALUE (LEASE) = 
t=1 
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Where the function 'S ' is given by the recurrence 
relationships 
St+1 = S'(1 + b) - b. T. St-1 
subject to_ the -ini 
*ial-.. conditions'-: S "=. 1 and S= b" for 
t = 1,2,.. fJ 
1. The expansion of the-recurrence relationship proceeds as follows: 
S°=1: S1=b: for t=1, SL=b(1+b)-b. Tl (this gives column year 2 in 
Table 9.6 following); for t=2, S3=[b(l+b)-bT](l+b) --bT(b) 
(this gives column year 3 in Table 9.6), etc. up to t=P1. 
It should be noted that the recurrence relationship holds true 
for n>-N. This merely reflects the general practice in 
financial leasing where it is host unlikely that a lease 
repayment schedule will extend beyond the life of the asset . 
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The following notes amplify the precise meaning of each section 
of the algorithm: 
Equation A: The investment, or operating, cash-flow series, 
discounted and taxed one year in arrears (the 
one year tax delay convention is common to all 
equations). 
Equation B: The repayment of capital implicit within each lease 
charge; it will be noted that the interest element 
subsumed within the repayment schedule has been 
removed. As previously argued, this 'contamination' 
of the cash-flow stream must be eliminated because the 
cost of capital hurdle rate inherently takes this into 
consideration. To include this amount of interest a 
second time would clearly be double counting of the 
same cash-floi and tantamount to discriminatory 
financing. This expression is then discounted and 
receives tax relief. 
Equation C: The residual capital balance investment and 
disinvestment;, in the working capital of the 
organisation, discounted at the appropriate year. 
Equation D: This expression calculates the earnings on the 
residual balances and suns the resulting values at 
the horizon (t =n; see in particular the notes to 
Table 9.6 following). This earnings figure is then 
discounted. 
Equation E: As a result of the one year tax delay convention 
the earnings on the residual balances generated in 
the year prior to the horizon will require taxing 
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in year n+I. This expression calculates the 
required tax figure and then discounts it. 
II 'OPIE YEAR' OR 'HORIZON COi; POUNDI! G' OF THE EARNI11G 0", THE R. C. B's 
The concept of residual capital balances credits the leasing 
option with the opportunity gain which it makes available to the 
company. However, the exact manner in which these earnings 
accrue can be modified depending upon circumstances and 
managerial direction. For example, close study of the "planned 
financing mix" algorithm and example, will reveal that a specific 
assumption has been made about how the earnings on the residual 
capital balances actually accrue. As is made clear in Table 9.6 
the earnings schedule has accumulated on a compound basis up to 
the termination of the integrated project at the horizon. 
This assumption is made on the belief that management will allow 
the residual balances to remain within the company's pool of 
working capital. Alternatively, -this initial. assumption could be 
modified if an'alternative policy were to be applied which 
. permitted the_earcfng to be disinvested from the project at the 
end of the year to which they relate, (see Table 9.10 following). 
This strategy, and the cash-flow it produces, could be argued to 
be a source of dividend payments or more probably a pre-assigned 
source of funds for further promotion of leasing contracts. 
Resolution of which option to adopt (either the 'horizon' or 
'one-year' compounding earnings method) will depend upon either 
managements insistence on a particular policy; or an evaluation of 
the NPV of the integrated project under both assumptions. Primarily 
the latter course is a precautionary measure : experience indicates 
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that the appropriate strategy is not always deducible prior 
to the application of the two algorithns. The reason as to 
why it is not so obvious lies in the varying impact made by 
different lease repaynent schedules on the size and rate of 
decrease of the positive residual capital balances which, in 
turn, will directly influence the size and number of negative 
balances occuring at the end of the lease contract. This, 
together with the commensurate variation in the capital elements 
in each lease alternative, proves too complex a series of 
nunerical interactions to be dealt with by anything other than 
a full calculation. Thus, the identity of the key variables 
involved in the evaluation (if any are dominant) and the 
selection of the appropriate strategy, introduce yet another 
dimension into the leasing problem. 
III "PLAT HIED FINANCING MIX" --- ONE YEAR DISINVESTMENT MODEL 
If the 'one-year' earnings assumption model is used then the 
residual balance equation as shown above is slightly modified 
expression C, D, and E are eliminated and replaced by F. 
Pl t_1. 
F PL' (1 + b) M 
t=l s=o s (1 + "t 
+ 
(1 + K) 
+ +2 (1 + K)ý 
This assumption sinplifies considerably the earnings on the 
residual capital balances. The numerical expansion of this 
equation is to be found in Table 9.10 infra. 
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IV WHAT SHOULD THE LEASE ALTERtlATIVE BE COMPARED WITH? 
In Chapter 3 argument was advanced concerning the comparison 
bet': een the implicit interest rate in a leasing contract and 
a "borrow and invest by buying" alternative. It was clear from 
the field-work that companies frequently considered their 
overdraft facility to be a "natural comparator" with any 
leasing arrangement. 
However, there was sufficient deviation fron this 'consensus' for 
the observer to conclude that management was, in fact, quite 
prepared to compare leasing with whatever alternative was 
available or most readily accessible. Various courses of 
action were described throughout the interviev. ls to suggest a 
catholicity of lease versus (? ) options 
I. Divisional management would perhaps conclude that in their 
circumstances it was a strai ghtfon"iard choice between 
-outright, purchase of the asset, using-the he'ad-Office* 
capital allocation, or leasing : 'no borro: ring alternative 
existed and they were not enpbwered to-seek 'external funds -' 
other than'a pre-arranged local - overdraft. requirement. 
2. For the centrally located finance director it may have 
been a question of leasing versus whatever form of debt 
could be raised at that time. The choice being constrained 
somewhat by the size of the contract and the current 
outstanding position with the group of potential funding 
sources. 
. 
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4 
3. For ether companies leasing was employed as a matter of 
course, even necessity, in view of their taxation position; 
in which case it was then a matter of establishing which 
was the most favourable leasing plan. 
4. In periods of financial urgency, such as the "spill-over" 
leasing strategy previously defined, there was no immediately 
available alternative at all. Here too it was a question 
of choosing the best lease contract. 
The important conclusion to be drawn from this industrial 
experience is that external analysts cannot make a dogmatic 
statement about what the correct alternative is : lease vs own funds; 
lease vs overdräft; lease vs term loan; or lease vs lease 
because it can be any of these, depending upon the circumstances 
that face the company at the moment the decision is taken. 
Management is constrained by the investment and financing decisions 
it has made, it is making and it intends to make. The non- 
uniformity of decision variables reflects business-life and the 
researcher, and the analytical tools he proposes, must 
accommodate this fact. 
For the purposes of illustration in this Thesis, it will be 
assumed that the decision rests on a 'lease or buy with own funds' 
comparison. However, a 'lease versus lease' comparison can be 
achieved by applying the alternative lease contracts to the leasing 
section of the 'lease vs buy' decision. It must also be noted 
that should the comparison be between leasing and a term loan which 
was payable in instalments, comprising of capital plus interest as 
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per a lease, then it is clear that the residual capital 
balance argument will apply to both alternatives. There is 
nothing unique to lease financing which gives it a pre-emotive 
right to the op portunity gains available from the earnings on 
the RCB's. It is the prevailing circumstances that decide 
whether RCB's exist to be ascribed to a project. 
There is, however, one important reason why the 'lease or buy' 
decision has been selected as a numerical example and this rests 
on the necessity to conduct the analysis within a strictly 
comparable framework. One principal difference between leasing 
and buying an asset is that the latter action carries with it a 
Capital Allowance (which under current U. K. legislation amounts 
to a 100% first year allowance). As with the residual capital. 
balances argument, the receipt of the Capital Allowance does in 
fact provide the opportunity for a secondary investment. To 
ensure comparability, the evaluation of the 'buy' decision raust 
also explicitly include the. opportunity-benefit made available-. - 
through the secondary~ investnent of the Capital Allowance. 
Thus, the relevant. al gori thri= for- the 'buy' tin th own- funds - 
comparison, including the re-investment of the Allowance upto- 
the horizon can be expressed as follows: 
NPV(PURCHASE)= -p+E (Rt-Ct) ___ 
11+ATS 
t=0 0+ K)t (1 + K)t+l 
t n-2 
Where 'St' is the recurrence relationship previously described 
but with alternative initial conditions, So=O and SI=I for t= 
I, 2... 11. (For a numerical illustration see Table 9.12). 
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9.5 A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE OF THE RESIDUAL CAPITAL BALANCES CONCEPT 
I. THE LEASE VS. BUY DECISION! UNDER "PLANNED FIUAINCINC MIX" CONDITIONS 
The problem confronting nanagen; ent is whether to lease, purchase 
or reject a particular investment opportunity. As previously argued, 
this is contrary to much of the received opinion which in general 
specifies that a sequential analysis be performed : first the 
investment decision, if favourable then and only then conduct the 
-'lease or buy', or 'lease or borrow' decision. - Argument has been 
advanced in this Thesis for an integrated decision. - 
In practice, the treasury function'of an organisation will present 
management with a variety of potential lease contracts, each 
offering an individual cash-flow repayment profile and most 
probably competing interest rates. As such; it is incumbent upon 
the analyst to rominate the most advantageous instalment debt 
plan. The algorithms shown rovidea powerful technioue for 
screening competing lease contracts. 
If the corporate financial circumstances dictate it, the host 
beneficial lease option should then be ccnpared with the N? V 
of the project when financ=ed with internal funds (or, if appropriate, 
with borrowed funds used specifically to finance the asset in 
question). In. the following example internal funds are employed in 
the outright purchase-acquisition of the asset. This provides an 
oppcrtunity to illustrate the 'earning on the Capital Allowances' 
technique previously described. 
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Consider the following problem: 
An asset nay be purchased outright for £10,000, or be 
made the subject of a lease contract with 5 yearly 
instalments of £2593 starting at t=o. At the end of 
the 5 year primary period the salvage value of the 
asset is assumed to be zero and (for the sake of 
simplicity) it will be assumed that the operating 
costs of the asset are exactly the same, irrespective 
of %ihether the ässet. is purchased or leased. The 
company adopts a "planned financing nix" strategy. 
Hence, examining the leasing contract it can be established 
i 
that the effective before-tax interest rate is 15%w As a 
first step in the analysis it is necessary to determine the 
division between capital and interest portions of each lease 
repayment. 
TABLE 9.2 
LEASE REPAYMENT SCHEDULE 
TIME t: 0 _I L. 3.4 -5 
-VALUE OF- :. - 
ASSET - 10,000 
LEASE 
REPAYMENTS (2593) (2593) (2593) (2593) (2593) 
Fron this specification of the lease contract is is possible to 
establish its Capital Recovery Table 
1. This can be determined by Table No. 4 in the Appendix; 
PIPV FACTOR = 10000: 2593 = 3.856, which is to be found 
at the co-ordinates '5 years', '15% interest rate'. 
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TABLE 9.3 
CAPITAL RECOVERY TABLE --- CALCULATION OF IMPLICIT INTEREST 
TIflE t CAPITAL 
GUTSTAUDItNG 
AT START 
INTEREST 
co 
15% 
CAPITAL 
+ 
INTEREST 
LEASE 
REPAYMENTS 
CAPITAL 
OUTSTANDING 
AT END 
0 
. 
10,000 - 10,000 2593 7407 
I 7407 1111 8518 2593 5925 
2 5925 889 6414 2593 4221 
3 4221 633 4854 2593 2201 
4 2261 339 2600 2593 - 
With the interest costs implicit in each repayment clearly 
established they can now be 'washed-out' of the lease schedule; 
as per expression B in the planned financing mix algorithm; to 
leave the capital payments per period., 
TABLE 9.4 
CAPITAL ELEIIErIT GF LEASE It1STALfEUTS, 
TIME t 0 I 2 3 4 5 
Lt (2593) (2593) (2593) (2593) (2593) - 
11t 0 1111 339 633 339 - 
Lt - Ilt (2593) (1482) (1704) (1960) (2254) - 
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The residual capital balances, as previously defined, are the 
capital amounts outstanding after each lease repayment has 
been remade. Hence, as the total sun of the lease repayments 
will always exceed the cost of the asset if there is a positive 
interest rate, so the residual capital balances will automatically 
change fror. positive to negative as the accumulating repayments 
exceed the cost of the asset. The value of the residual capital 
balances in each of the-years of the lease is calculated as 
follows: 
TABLE 9.5 
COMPUTATION OF RESIDUAL CAPITAL BALANCES 
TIME t 0 1 2 3 4 .. 5 
LEASE 
REPAYMENTS (2593) (2593) (2593) (2593) (2593) - 
REPAYMENTS (2593) -. (5186) (7779) (. 10372), (12965).. 
RESIDUAL - -' - CAPITAL V 
BALANCES 7407 --4814 
_ 
2221. '-(372). (2965)V 
[P 
In Table 9.6, the 'horizon compounding' assumption relating to 
the earnings on the residual capital balances is fully 
enumerated. The data shows the gross earnings and the taxation 
thereon as it accrues through the reinvestment process. At 
the end of each year the earnings and taxation fron the RCG's 
are aggregated and the net figure promptly reinvested back 
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into working capital. This rather laborious exposition is 
adopted to clearly demonstrate the assumptions implicit in the 
model, which may be listed as 
ASSUMPTIONS TABLE 9.6 AND TABLE 9.12_ 
1. 
---------------The 
average earning rate 'b' applicable to the residual 
balances (and in Table 9.12 to the Capital Allowance) 
is 
. 
30% before-tax --- 15%.. after-tax, which is marginally 
higher than the after-tax cost of capital of 1.2°,,. It must 
be stressed that these figures are purely for illustrative 
purposes. 
2. The earnings compound forward at 'b', theanticipated 
return, on the company's working capital. ý.., 
3. Residual Capital Balances '(and the Capitol Ailo4an. e of 
Table 9.12) are invested. in working capital for, one, year 
periods. 
4. No. taxation relates to_v/orking capital. mbvements; it does, 
however, -relate to the earnings thereon. 
5. Corporation Tax is set at. 50% and a one-year tax delay 
convention applies. 
Thus; fron Table 9.6 it is observed that : 
(i) The first year RCG of 17407 is invested at the 
beginning of year 0 (a negative cash-flow) and 
recovered at the commencement of year I (a positive 
-cash-flow). It is not reinvested again because the 
next lease repayment is effectively paid from it and 
so it diminishes in value by Ll, becoming the second 
residual capital balance (see Table 9.5). 
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(ii) During year 0-1, the RCB of £7407 has earned at a rate 'b' 
to yield £2221 at the end of year 0, the commencement of 
year 1. This is at once reinvested into the pool of 
working capital, but it is also subject to Corporation Tax 
at rate 'T' (50%, giving £1110 tax) which is deemed to be 
paid at the end of the following year (year 2) in accordance 
with the one-year tax delay procedure.. - 
{iii) The reinvestment of the £2221 earnings during year 2, at 
the rate 'b', will yield a further £666 at-the end of that year. 
Thus, at the end of year 2, there is available for reinvestment 
(12221 + £666 - £1110) = £1777. 
(iv) This process again provides a net result of zero cash-flow 
in all years except at the horizon where the accumulated net 
earnings are finally divested from the integrated-project. 
There will also be produced a final tax charge in the year 
after the horizon arising out of th?: one year delay . 
convention. 
(v) Similar earnings pulses emanate from the-RCB's generated in. -. 
each year. V V. 
(vi) In the later periods of the project the RCB's will become 
negative, thereby acting as a further drain on working 
capital by demanding ne., injections of funds to support the 
remaining lease repayments. When this occurs an opportunity 
cost should be imputed to the RCB's because they are losing 
earning potential for the company. For exanple, taking the 
year 4 figure of positive £2965 it will be charged at an 
interest rate of 'b`., producing an effective loss of earnings 
of (£839). 
TABLE 9.6 
COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS OI RESIDUAL CAPITAL BALANCES 
TIC It 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
(7407) 7407 
2221 
(2221) 2221 
(1110) 
666 
F T77T ýi (1777) 1777 0 (333) 
533 R 
T977 I (1977) 1977 
(266) Z 
593 
- - 0 r3 6 1 r, 
(2304) 2304 U 
(297) 
691 (345) 
(4814) -4814 1444 
(1444) 1444 
(722) 
433 
fiß'S` 
(1155) 115 
(216).. :.. 
346 
(1235) 1285 
(173) (192). 
305 
I iýp% 
H 
(2'22 -)-" ýý222T 
666 0 
(656) 666 R 
(333) 
200 
- - 
I 
3 
(533) 
... 
533 
Z 
.. ' (100) 0 
160 N (80) 
372 (372) 
(111) 
111 (111) 
55 
w(33ý__ 
2 
16 
Z b 
444 
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Combining (vertically, year, by year) the data from Table 9.6 
the following aggregate series is achieved : 
TABLE 9.7 
AGGREGATED DATE: THE MOVEMENTS OF, AND AFTER TAX EARNINGS OPI, 
RESIDUAL CAPITAL BALANCES 
TIME t 0I 1 -2 3 41 5 6 
AGGREGATE 
IFIVESTMEMT, At4D ,_- DISINVES M. E NT OF 
RESIDUAL CAPITAL (7407) 2593 2593 2593 259-3- 845 (157) 
BALANCES AND 
THEIR RESPECTIVE- 
EAPJIItIGS PULSES 
UP TO THE HORIZON, 
AFTER TAX. 
The operating. cash-flows relating to the lease (the investment., 
decision cash-flows. excluding _ 
the- Capi tal Al l owwwance) are shown. 
in the following Table and are taxed. Also shown are the 
implicit capital element in each lease repayment which will 
receive tax relief. It can be seen at t=o, in the operating 
cash-flo-vi series, that no account is taken of the cost of the 
asset (for this is subsuried in the capital repayments of the 
lease schedule). 
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TABLE 9.8 
TAXATION ON EARNING AND CAPITAL AT 50% 
TIME t 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
OPERATING CASH- 
FLOtW: S 0 3000 4000 5000 3000 2000 
CORPORATION TAX 
AT 50% - -. (1500) (2000) (2500) (1500) (1000) 
'i 
0 3000 2500 3000. - 5000 5000, (1000) 
CAPITAL RE- 
PAYMENTS IMPLICIT (2593) (1482) (1704) (1960) (2254) 
III LEASE 
INSTALMENTS 
TAX RELIEF 
AT. 50% - - 1297 741 352 980 1127 
(2592) (1482) (417)' 1(1219) (1402) 980 1127 
Thus, having now conpleted the computation of the various 
elements of the "planned financing nix -- horizon compounding" 
algorithm, the subsections can be amalgamated to form, the 
-complete data for the integrated'leased-investment project 
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TABLE 9.9 
IUTREGRATED PROJECT DATA 
HORIZON! COMPOUNDING EARNINGS ASSUMPTION 
TIME t 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
OPERATING CASH-.: 
FLOWS, NET OF TAX 
-- .0 
3000 2500. 3000 1 . 500 500 (1000) 
CAPITAL REPAY- 
tIEPITS IMPLICIT (2593) (1482) (407)q (1219) (1402) 980 1127 IN LEASE . INSTALNEUTS { 
AFTER TAX RELIEF 
INVESTMENT 'At1D 
DISINVESTMENT OF 
RESIDUAL BALANCES (7407) 2593 2593 2593. 2593 
~ 
845 (157) AND THEIR--RESPEC- 
TIVE EARNINGS 
PULSES AFTER TAX 
AFTER-TAX 
AGGREGATED DATA (10,000) 4111 4686 '4374 1691 2325 (30)* 
II THE ONE-YEAR EARNINGS ASSUMPTION -- A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
Before making by analysis of this cash-flow stream or, the 
purchase alternative;. the one-year disinvestient assumption model 
will be considered. Using exactly the same data as the previous 
example-and applying the modification (equation F) to the 
"planned financing nix" algorithm, the following Table can be 
constructed 
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TABLE 9.10 
COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS ON RESIDUAL CAPITAL BALANCES 
ONE YEAR EARNINGS AND DISINVESTMENT FROM MODEL 
TIt-! E t: 01 2 3 4 5 T6 
(7407) 7407 
2221 (1110) 
(4314) 4814 
1444 (722) 
(2221) 2221 
666 (333) 
-_372 (372) (111) 55 
2965 (2965) 
(839) 44 
AGGREGATE 
CAST-FL0: (7407) 4814 2927 2534 . 
2149 (3799) 44 
And, hence, because Table 918 still-applies the i=ollowinC cash-flow 
streams can be combined for the integrated decision 
TABLE 9.11 
INTEGRATED PROJECT DATA --- ONE YEAR EARNINGS ASSUNPTIO 
TIRE' t: 
1 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
4 
OPERATING CASH - FLOUS AFTER 
TAX 0 3000 2500 3000 500 500 (1000) 
CAPITAL REPAY- «. , _. HEfUTS i 1PLICIT 
IN LEASE INST- (2593) (1482) (407) (1219) (1402) 980 1127 
ALf TENTS AFTER 
TAX RELIEF 
INVESTIMENT AND 
DISINVESTl 4ENT 
OF RESIDUAL 
CAPITAL CAL- 1 (7407) 4814 2927 2534 2149 (3799) 444 
ANCES PUM { 
THEIR RESPEC- 
TIVE ONE-YEAR 
EARNINGS 
PULSE AFTER 
TAX 
AGGREGATED 
DATA AFTER 10,000) 6332 5020 4315 1247 (2319) 571 
TAX 
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The analysis of this cash-flow series is also tenporarily 
delayed until the next section 9.6. 
III THE PURCHASE OPTION 
In Table 9.12 the 'horizon compounding' assumption relating to 
the earning of the asset's Capital Allowance is evaluated. This 
data presents the gross earnings:; and the consequent taxation 
-thereon as -it accrues: through the reinvestment process. 
As may be noted .. ºrom the 
'Table, at the end of each year the 
earnings Iron the Capital Allowance are aggregated and the net 
figure promptly reinvested. Thus, it nay be observed that : 
(i) As the Capital A11o'1ance becomes availäbl*e it is 
promptly invested within the company's working capital 
at the beginning of-year 2. It is subsequently 
disinvestedor recovered at the commencement of year 3 
(a positive cash-flow of £5000). 
(ii) During year 2, the £5000 Capital Al-lowance has earned at 
a rate (30M before-taX) to yield £1500 at the end of 
year 2, ý-the-beginning-of--year 3. - -The. -total amount of 
". _. 'ý- £650C is at once reinvested for a further year. 
(iii) The. investnent -of '6500 ai11 generate. earnings -of .11950, 
tax liability of £750 will. also occur in this period 
which represents a 50°. Tax rate on the previous year's 
earnings of £1500. The aggregate of ¬7700 is then 
reinvested. 
1. The value of the CA is £5000, derived as follows: £10,000 x 
1C02 first year allowance x 50" Corporation Tax rate. As 
noted in Chapter C, the two year delay experienced in receiving 
the CA arises because it will take one year for the asset to be 
displayed in the accounts and a further year before receipt 
occurs as a result of the one-year tax delay convention. 
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(iv), This process continues giving a net result of zero 
cash-flow in all years except the horizon w'nen the 
accumulated, net earnings are finally disinvested. , 
There 
will also be a final post-horizon tax charge arising as a 
result of the one-year tax delay convention. 
Thus, the 'buy' option cash-flows may be stated as : 
TABLE-9.12 
OPERATING CASU FLOWS t! HEil PURCHASED fl CLUDIflG THE 
EARNING ON THE ASSET'S CAPITAL ALLOWANCE 
TIME t: 0 1 2 3 4' 5 6 
OPERATING 
CASH-FLOWS (10,000) 3000 4000 5000 3000 2000 
CORPORATION 
TAX AT 50°; (1500) (2000) (2500) (1500) (1000) 
AFTER-TAX 
OPERATING (10,000) 3000 2500 3000 500 500 - (1000) 
CASH-FLOWS 
CAPITAL' 5000 
ALLOWANCE- (5000) 5000 
Y PLUS ITS 1500 
ASSOCIATED '. 05` 0 0 
EARNINGS (6500) 6500 r. SCHEDULE 1950 
AFTER TAX (750) I 
"-77CU z (7700) 7700 
2310 0 
X975 i. i (1105) 
TOTAL 
'PU°CHASE' 
AFTER TAX (10,000) 3000 2500 3000 500 9535 
(2105) 
CAS1i-FLO!: 
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Thus, making the assumption that the after-tax cost of capital 
to the company, 'K' is 12%, then: 
NPV(PURCHASE) @ 12% = 1464 
9.6 ANALYSIS OF THE AGGREGATED DATA 
A dominant question at issue in the evaluation of an integrated 
finance-investment project is the determination of the appropriate 
hurdle rate to apply to the joint cash-flow series. 
The 'purchase, using own funds, option' comparison was discounted 
at the company's weighted average cost of capital prior to the " 
introduction of leasing into the financial mix. 
Clearly applying this discount rate to the lease alternatives would 
produce a suspect calculation. It was argued in Chapter 4 that this 
is not a very satisfactory approach because the use of Instalment 
Debt in the capital budgeting process will affect: 
(i) the value of the weighted average; (ii) if the project that is 
leased is accepted it will change the marginal efficiency of the 
investment set; and (iii) it is always unpredictable at the outset 
of the analysis whether the limits of the company's cash-flow 
debt-supportive capacity will be reached and in consequence prevent 
the full 'softening' of the capital rationing constraint (should 
this occur the marginal efficiency of capital will be greater than 
the changing weighted average cost of capital). 
The anticipated changes in the weighted average cost of capital 
present great computational and theoretical problems of much 
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I" 
complexity : how much will it change by and in what direction, 
higher or lower? 
If it is assumed that the hurdle rate rises then the analyst 
is faced with the serious problem of enumerating the effects of 
such a change upon not only the joint project but also upon all 
accepted and rejected projects which form the competing investment 
set. By raising the discount rate those projects currently in the 
`accepted-group' will have their individual N. P. V! s diminished 
(in comparison with the value they would have held had the 
discount rate not been altered). Furthermore, if the new rate 
changes sufficiently, it could precipitate a re-selection of the project 
set by rejecting certain projects which were previously acceptable.. 
A totally fluid situation then pertains which, if computer help is not 
available, will leave the analyst with a most extensive-iterative 
problem of selecting and re-selecting the optimun complementary 
package of investment and financing schemes. It is feasible that 
circumstances could arise such that, in total, the loss of NPV. to'the 
project set brought about by the re-alignment of'the discount rate 
could cancel out any potential gains to be made through leasing. It 
ray follow, therefore, that the inability to make this important 
1. The major theoretical issue concerns the 1119 [ 100 & 101 1- vs 
traditional school debate on the shape of the cost of capital 
curve as the company's debt/equity proportion changes. Although 
argument is still to be seen in the literature on this topic, 
the ensuing text favours the suggested 'saucer-shaped' curve 
proposed by SOLONONS [ 150 1 
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calculation results in the true 'net' NPV of the integrated 
project being somewhat exagerated. 
Alternatively, it could be assumed that the hurdle rate decreases 
(possibly as a result of the positive effects of financial leverage) 
in which case the sane problem of quantification arises; except in 
this case the results will be beneficial to the company because 
the use of leasing will have contributed towards increasing the 
NPV of the remainder of the-accepted project set. 
It may be pessimistically concluded, therefore, that ANY lease 
analysis which uses the weighted average cost of capital as a 
hurdle rate cannot produce a totally satisfactory and unchallengeable 
decision rule : the interdependencies and computational complexities 
involved are too critical to be ignored yet often too intricate to 
be modelled. Thus, in this attempt to develop a lease algorithm 
within the rigours of accepted capital budgeting theory and 
techniques, the appraisal acceptance criterion which has to be 
applied' is only- partially; satisfactory because of ä besic`inability 
to specify the correct discount rate., And,. hence, atruly accurate 
-financial statement such- as leasing is 
purchase- cannot be 
-produced. 
It is Host. important to state, however, -that while 
the evaluation- 
procedures developed here are exposed to the criticism mentioned in 
Unfortunately, the evaluation of, this potential loss is almost 
impossible to quantify without advanced mathematical programing 
methods. Realistic computations of this kind cannot be fully 
represented in an individual, multi-period, lease analysis 
conducted manually. 
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the preceeding paragraph, they are nevertheless a most 
effective technique for providing managerent with a more 
meaningful albeit ORDINAL, solution to the choice of 
alternative lease contracts and to the lease or buy, or lease 
or borrow decision. 
Mindful of the foregoing, the evaluation of the two "planned 
financing mix" cash-flow streams can now be compared with the 
result of NIPV (PURCHASE) which was 1464. Thus; from Tables 9.9 
and 9.11 it is found that : 
"HORIZON COINPODUDING" EARNING ASSUMPTION : IIPV LEASE @ 12°'. = 2900 
"ONE-YEAR" EARNINGS ASSUMPTION : [; PV LEASE 0 12% = 2495 
Both options exceed the purchase alternative and so in these 
circumstances leasing should be undertaken and management should 
allow the earnings from the residual capital balances to remain 
in working capital until the termination of the joint project at 
the horizon. 
9; 7 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS ON THE "PLANNED FI IAPICING MIX" ALGORITH'SS 
To obtain an overall impression of the interaction of the various 
parameters in the decision models it is possible. to test each 
al. gori'thrr at various value' of ' i, ' and ' b' , respectively, the. 
implicit interest rate of the associated lease contract and the 
earnings rate on the residual capital balances. 
Adopting the standard investment project used in this Chapter and 
keeping the discount rate constant at 121 after-tax, it is 
possible to establish the following sensitivity date : shown 
in Tables 9.13 and 9.14, and graphed in Figure 9.1. 
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TABLE 9.13 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS ON THE 'HORIZON! ' COMPOUNDING ALGORITHM, 
NET PRESENT VALUE OF THE INTEGRATED PROJECT AT 12% 
=. - -IMPLICIT: INTEREST RATE-OF LEASE 'i'. . 
5 CF 
RESIDUAL 5° 619 
BALANCES 10Z 952 
REIÜVESTPhEUT °4,, E 15 1359 
RATE 20% 1853 
. b. 25% 2448 
30% 3157 
3 5`} 3998 
10% 15N 20°, 2 5" 30" 
809 936 1164 1337 1497 
1089 -- 1217 1346 1470 -. 
1504 
1439 1512 1586 1655 1719 
1869 1881 1894 1904 1911 
2398 2340 2283 2226 2172 
3024 2900 2765 2635 2512 
3779---- 
. 
3567 " -3355 3144 - 2945 = 
-. - ---:: 
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TABLE 9.14 
SEflSITIVITY. ANALYSIS ON THE 'ONE-YEAR' COMPOUNDING ALGORITHM, 
NET PRESENT VALUE OF THE INTEGRATED PROJECT AT 12% 
IMPLICIT IflTEREST RATE OF LEASE 'i' 
5% 10% 15% 20`1 25% 30`: 
5%% 740 920 1091 1259 1423 1575 
RESIDUAL 
10 -1130 1254 1370. 1435 
{ 
-1597 1700 BAL AUGES 
,j 150,0 1530 1583 1650 1 1712 1771 1324 
REINVESTMENT 
20 1910 1922 1920 1939 1945 1949 
RATE 
25°% 2300 2256 2211 2166 2119 2073 
300% 2690 2590 2495 2392 2293 2193 
35% 3080 2924 2771 2619 2466 2323 . 
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The following inferences may be drawn from the graphical 
representation of the sensitivity data illustrated in 
Figure 9.1. If T equals the Corporation Tax rate, it will be 
noted from the exemplar project that : 
1. For a given value of 'b' such that, bbl-T >K, the after- 
tax earnings rate on working capital is higher than the 
after-tax Bleighted average cost of capital, then the lower 
the -cost of *the lease the higher the IM of the' integrated 
project. 
2. For a given value of 'b' such that, b 1-T <K, the after- 
tax earnings rate on working capital is lower than the 
weighted average cost of capital, then the higher the cost 
of the lease the higher the tlPV of the integrated project. 
3. Notionally there is an indifference level at, b 1-T K, 
that is b= 24%, K= 12°, T= 505x. However, due to the 
effect of tax lags etc., the NPV is not exactly horizontal 
at these parameters.. Under, these circumstances the cost of* 
the lease would appear to be immaterial (although economic 
logic would suggest that the cheapest lease be selected, 
the algorithn. does not automatically indicate this). 
The stable value of the integrated project's 1UPV reflects 
the neutralizing effect on the RCß earnings caused by 
conpounding *and discounting at an equivalent rate. 
It should be stressed, however, that the above deductions refer 
to constant repayment lease schedules for a given investment 
project. The real value of the algorithms presented above is 
their capacity to select between competing and fluctuating 
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lease repayment patterns -- which is a far more difficult and 
subtle comparison. 
One further point may be raised concerning the-data under 
discussion. It is, possible that the configuration of the 
repayment profile nay be such that the i1PV curves cross within 
the band of feasible interest rates. It may be added in 
parentheses. that the researcher has not. experienced this- 
'phenomenon' during experimentation with the algorithm-using - 
typical implicit interest rate. ledse contracts, but 
intersections are quite feasible at what are perhaps unrealistic 
rates. Nevertheless, the following hypothetical, situation . 
could arise 
FIGURE 9.2 
PLANNED FINAUCING P1IX INTERSECTION 
IIpy! 
high 
i 
I'LL' 7 
INTEREST RATE i 
The cross-over point1 at i` would have the following 
consequence on the choice of competing lease contracts :. 
1 This is sinilar in effect to a "fisherian intersection" 
("Rate of Return Over Cost"); see FISHER 1 56, Ch. 7 
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if i<i' it is better for the conpany to have a higher value of b; 
if i>i' it is better to have a lower value of b. The major 
conclusion to be drawn fron the possibility of-an intersection 
is that the implicit interest rate of a lease is not necessarily 
the crutial parameter in the leasing decision, and in fact it 
may be misleading. 
9.8 "SPILL-OVER" 
The Industrial Survey revealed that the leasing strategy 
termed "spill-over" occurs under two inportant and concurrent 
conditions: 
1. The conpany resorts to leasing because its other, financial 
resources are heavily co°, mi tted. elsewhere in the 
organisation to such an extent that their normal sources 
of debt are alnost exhausted, or are believed to be 
exhausted; and, 
2. Typically this would occur in-between No capital 
budgeting exercises in a' totally random manner with the 
asset in question being considered, _for 
urgent strategic 
or production reasons, to be of sufficient importance to 
receive 'top priority for capital. -- in whatever form is 
-rost readily available or negotiable. 
Management may possibly have small pockets of debt available 
and it nay be actively considering an attempt to secure a major 
tranche of capital, in the near future to remedy the current 
1. Say,. the remaining overdraft facility which it intends to 
preserve as a strategic reserve of financial mobility; 
see section 4.7 II, Chapter 4. 
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situation, BUT AT THE PIOME1JT OF DECISION there was no immediate 
alternative methods of financing. 
l It follows, therefore, that the 
relevant selection criterion becomes one of determining the most 
suitable leasing contract : that is, a "Lease A versus Lease B" decision. 
The second stipulation concerning "spill-over" leasing is most 
significant in distinguishing it from "planned financing mix" and its 
associated RCB's. The issue revolves around the analysis of a lease 
within a simultaneous investment and financing decision set -- the full 
capital budgeting appraisal for a given year -- and the isolated, 
totally detached leasing decision. As previously argued,. with "planned 
financing mix"" the use of leasing. effectively releases- funds for 
investment elsewhere in the organisation. However, with "spill-over" 
leasing there are - nofunds available to be released. The decision and its:,. 
consequences stand alone. and so-no residual., capjtal. balances can accrue, 
to the joint project. 
In order to solve the "spill-over" problem. it. is necessary to adopt a 
technique which, -by virtue of the circumstances, is forced to look at 
the leasing decision in isolation-fron the normal capital budget, but 
none the less maintain the integrated fern of analysis with the 
investment decision. 
The 
. 
"spi 11 -over". algorithm can be extracted. from the. ". planned 
financing nix" procedure: by simply removing-the equations 
relating to., the RCS's (namely eliminate exoressiors"C, D and E). =. M 
The relevant decision parameters are then quite. simply -the ._ý. 
1. It will be noted fron Chapter 4, when the debt-supportive capacity 
of cash-flows and LI NMAGE -LEAS I NG were discussed, that companies 
are expected to maintain a contingency cash-flow reserve for 
emergencies. The funds necessary to initiate a lease contract in 
"spill-over" conditions are drawn from this pool (which clearly, 
is finite). 
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operating revenues and costs plus the capital repayment 
series implicit in the lease contract. It may be noted in 
the light of the previous discussion of double counting in the 
"planned financing mix" algorithm, that the "spill over" 
equations do not perforce contain any opportunity benefits or 
costs and as such cannot be said to double count any cash-flow. 
An illustration of this technique can be. obtained simply by 
selecting. the appropriate data from the "planned financing mix" 
example previously illustrated (Table. 9.8 contains the 
relevant after-tax cash-flow series). 
A sensitivity analysis-can be performed on the exemplar 
investment project using different implicit interest rates for 
associated constant repayment lease contracts... Thus, : 
TABLE 9.15 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OU THE "SPILL-OVER". ALGORITHM USING THE 
EXEMPLAR INIVESTMEUT OPP_tRTUF1ITY 
IMPLICIT INTEREST RATE OF LEASE 'i'' 
15' 20" 25ý 30 
tiPV OF- 
ItUTEGRATED, 
PROJECT. AT%12% '. _2041- 2040.2026 ': 
2019 2005 1992 
The resulting UPV is remarkably stable throughout the ranee of - 
interest rates shown, primarily because the implicit interest 
cost has been removed from the lease repayment schedule. The 
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only difference between competing contracts is the time 
profile of the capital instalnents which, although summing to 
equivalent anounts wi 11 be biased towards' the front or. end of 
the contract according to the interest rate charged. 
Thus, within the "spill-over" circur. istances shown above it is 
quite clear that nanagec, ent should choose the cheapest lease 
available; a conclusion which accords with intuitive 
judgement. However, given the opportunity to' negotiate 
'tailor-nade' contracts the resulting pattern of capital 
repayments is the critical factor in deciding which. is the 
rast attractive lease. It"should. also be noted as before that 
this analysis requires a known discount rate Qich leaves 
unresolved the interdependency between the injection of new 
lease finance . and the weighted average cost of capital. The 
repercussions of the decision to lease will influence-the 
hurdle rate to be applied to all projects but, unfortunately, 
these effects are difficult to quantify in an isolated decision 
procedure. 
9.9- CONCLUSION 
Capital budgeting is now-increasingly recäCnised as a'study of 
the sinultaneous investment, financing (and indeed taxation) 
decisions. However, it is also widely acknowledged that there 
exists many theoretical, practical and computational difficulties 
which prevent the development of a totally satisfactory, 
all-encompassing, corporate decision model. Arguably this is an 
unattainable Utopia, thwarted by the many interdependencies 
and interrelationships which are ever present in financial 
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management. Although these problems nay be recognised and 
adequately documented, they are not as yet capable of precise 
quantification. 
These are most serious obstacles which impede the development 
of algorithms to solve the leasing decision : for if the 
theoretical and operational evolution of an overall solution to 
the integrated I. & F.. decision is incorinlete, then the task 
of refining and framenti ng -such a methodology dawn to an 
individual lease appraisal technique is both conceptually creak 
and prone to'räise tore issues'tfiän i. t`sb1Vek. ' riot surprisingly 
therefore, the leas in; -decision has attracted much -scholarly 
debate in recent years, for it lies at the very nucleus of 
academic progress towards an integration of the I. & F. decision. 
It is quite apparent, ho:: ever, that this trend has not produced 
a consensus of opinion as to how a lease should be evaluated; 
indeed quite the contrary, it has led to confusion and 
misunderstanding on the part of those executives who are 
empowered to make the leasing decision: In tire'judgement of- 
the writer, based upon the experience jai ned -düri ng' the 
Industrial Survey-, fa: r toö' nanj!. discussions_ an leasing have 
pursued solutions which are too theoretical': with the 
commensurate problem that they are incapable of being 
successfully applied within the industrial and commercial confines 
in which they are expected to be used. Co matter hoi', desirable 
and theoretically essential some parameters may be, it is erroneous 
to assume that when a finance director makes a leasing decision 
he will have instant access to linkage dual values, market 
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determined risk-return discount rates for specific projects, 
or a knowledge of precise variations in the weighted average 
cost of capital or marginal efficiency of capital as they 
change in response to the use of leasing. 
In consequence, the philosophy behind the proposed RCB technique 
is to produce an independent lease appraisal method which is 
robust enough for everyday application -- which by implication 
means that it will be computationally and economically efficient, 
but'wwith many of the refinements of mathematical programing 
having been, relinquished. As such, the RCB technique is clearly 
exposed to 'the criticism that it is not the "exact" solution. 
This is not repudiated. Hopefully, however, the series of 
arguments presented throughout the Thesis will have satisfied 
the reader that a rigorously correct solution which is capable 
of being used in practice, cannot currently be achieved. 
Needless to say, when and if many of the interdependencies 
which interact with the leasing decision are fully clarified and 
neasüred, then the decision criterion itself will progressively 
become more accurate': 
The application of the "planned financing nix"'and "spill-over" 
algorithms are intended to provide a rauch clearer guide to the 
consequences of adopting a particular leasing strategy. The 
concept of residual capital balances enables management for the 
first time to carefully assess and quantify the implications of 
each fluctuating lease contract upon the total profitability 
of the project set. The research has established that the 
evaluation of a lease is situation dependent and that each 
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repayment schedule has a significantly different impact upon 
the present-and future capital budgets. However, in the 
pursuit of this objective it has been necessary to devise an 
opportunity cost solution to express the financial 
consequences of adopting a planned leasing strategy. By 
implication, therefore, it becomes essential to establish the .. 
correct basis for equitable comparison with other competing 
sources of funds. The most dependable comparison will be 
between alternative leasing contracts because they are absolutely 
--equivalent financing instruments (their individual contribution 
being measured by the profile of the capital content of the 
lease repayments and the earnings potential of their RCG's). 
However, the problems of correct comparison are more acute 
when leasing is being compared with the outright purchase 
acquisition of the asset using internally generated funds. In 
this case it is essential that the analyst considers the 
secondary investment opportunity created by the asset's 
Capital Allowance, as an explicit calculation, if an impartial 
selection of financing instrurlents is to be made. 
Clearly, this procedure is somewhat artificial, but so too is 
the comparison being made. The doctrine of capital budgeting 
that 'like must be compared with like', would preclude the 
"lease vs. buy" analysis On the grounds of incompatibility. 
Yet companies perform such appraisals daily -- and even if they 
carry it out incorrectly, it none the less represents the type 
of information which is constantly requested. 
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Finally, it will be noted that the RCG technique does not 
incorporate an equation to assess the effect of the lease 
upon the exploitation of free cash-flow. To do so"would 
require a complex 'dual-like' augmentation to the algorithm. 
Unfortunately, however, the literature has not yet produced a 
practical adjustrient to the standard UPV criterion which could 
be added to the individual I. Ü F. decision. When this is 
accomplished it will provide a host valuable indicator of 
the additional hidden benefits of leasing. 
In conclusion the following topics may prove fruitful areas 
of research which will Hake a noteworthy contribution to the 
understanding of the leasing decision and the role of leasing 
within corporate financing strategy and debt nanagenent: 
(i) resolution of the nany interdependencies which impinge 
upon the analysis of a lease, particularly the discount 
rate paradox; 
(ii) a developnent of current investment and financing 
decision models so that the individual integrated 
decision may benefit -- notably, a resolution of the 
horizon problem and the pre-deternined discount rate;. 
an incorporation of realistic taxation policies; other 
problems include data specification, evaluation procedures, 
the model's constraints and authentic financing policies; 
(iii) a closer investigation of the linkage-leasing proposal 
with the possible formulation of a basic working model 
capable of being computerised; 
(iv) further exploration of the empirical study initiated 
in this research progranre to examine the ever evolving 
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attitudes towards leasing strategy and appraisal; 
(v) a search for a possible simplification of the planned 
financing nix algorithm -- and perhaps the construction 
of planned financing mix standard Tables for constant 
lease contracts covering normal bands of interest 
rates and time periods; 
(vi) and finally, further research into-the problem' of 
incorporating dual values into single decision criteria, 
especially the effects of linkage upon the leasing 
decision. 
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APPEF4DIX r, o. I 
N07I11NAL INTEREST RATE TABLES 
COMPRISING OF LEASE CONTRACTS WITH MONTHLY, QUARTERLY, HALF 
YEARLY AND ANNUAL UNIFORM REPAYMENT SCHEDULES. 
ZERO PERCENT TAX 
TABLE NO. I MONTHLY REPAYMENTS 
TABLE NO. 2 QUARTERLY REPAYMENTS 
TABLE NO. 3 HALF YEARLY REPAYMENTS 
TABLE NO. 4 ANNUAL REPAYMENTS 
50% CORPORATE TAX RATE 
TABLE 1-10.5 MONTHLY REPAYMENTS 
TABLE 110.6 QUARTERLY REPAYMENTS 
TABLE NO. 7 HALF YEARLY REPAYMENTS 
TABLE 110.8 ANNUAL REPAYt1ENTS 
50% CORPORATE TAX RATE INCLUDING CAPITAL ALLOWANCES 
TABLE NO. 9 MONTHLY REPAYMENTS 
TABLE NO. 10 QUARTERLY REPAYMENTS 
TABLE N0.11 HALF YEARLY REPAYMENTS 
TABLE H0.12 ANNUAL REPAYMENTS 
. le 
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